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Constructing a new measure of poverty for the UK 
 
Abstract 
This thesis will present a theoretical case for a new indicator of poverty, and construct a 
specific version of this indicator for the UK. It will calculate the actual poverty line, analyse 
its components, and discuss its implications.   
The thesis will begin by demonstrating that the outcomes of poverty studies are highly 
sensitive to the choice the indicator. It will document the history of poverty measurement 
in the UK, concentrating on the interaction of theory and measurement in different periods. 
Since current poverty indicators are not strongly connected to the underlying living 
standards, this thesis will also provide a new account of how living standards of the least 
well-off have evolved over the past decades, concentrating especially on recent research 
findings on measurement issues in this field. This documentation prepares the ground for 
the actual poverty indicator to be constructed in later chapters.    
The thesis will proceed to a discussion of the macroeconomic policy implications following 
from different poverty definitions, integrating the poverty literature into the wider 
economic literature. This step will identify the existence of problematic trade-offs in 
poverty policies, providing a case for scrutinising poverty indicators more carefully for their 
robustness and plausibility. It will move on to perform a ‘robustness test’ on existing 
measures, and highlight their shortcomings. The critique of existing measures will then be 
turned into a blueprint for the construction of an alternative measure.  
This measure will then be constructed with data from a variety of sources. Its results will be 
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Economic and social policies are frequently judged by their effect, actual or perceived, on 
the situation of the least well-off individuals in society. The impact on ‘the poor’ is one of 
the litmus tests of welfare reforms, labour market reforms, tax reforms, and indeed 
economic and social models as a whole. Meyer and Sullivan (2006, p. 1) go so far as to say: 
“The change in poverty is relied upon as an indicator of success or failure of our economic 
system and government policies.” 
 
A critical feature of poverty analyses is that their outcomes are strongly affected by the 
underlying definition of poverty itself. Applying two or more poverty definitions to the 
same dataset usually produces two or more very different poverty profiles. The definition 
does not only affect the poverty rate. More importantly, different measures differ in the 
population subgroups they identify as high-risk groups, in the time trend they display, and 
in the socioeconomic variables they are correlated with (more on which in subchapter 1.3). 
The same welfare reform, tax reform or labour market reform that is associated with a fall 
in poverty as measured by one indicator can be associated with a rise in poverty as 
measured by a different indicator. They therefore produce very different ‘narratives’ of 
how poverty has evolved over different periods, and why. Ultimately, they can lead to very 
different policy implications.  
But what does ‘poverty’ mean in the first place, in the context of contemporary developed 
countries? Traditionally, poverty has been understood as a lack of resources necessary to 
fulfil essential physical needs, such as nutrition, shelter and clothing. The research of 
Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree in the late 19th and early 20th century, which 
represents early attempts to systematically measure poverty in Britain, was based on this 
understanding (e.g. Rowntree, 1922). In research covering the world’s least developed 
countries (LDCs), poverty is still understood as related to physical functioning. The $1-a-day 
standard (nowadays mostly replaced by a standard of 1.25 International Dollars), 
traditionally the most common measurement of poverty in LDCs, was originally proposed 
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on the grounds that it broadly corresponded to a minimum quantity of core physical 
necessities (see Ravallion et al, 1991).1 
But such a concept of poverty is only applicable up to a certain level of economic 
development. Internationally, poverty as measured against the $1.25-a-day standard falls 
steeply with rising GDP per capita, even if there is substantial variation in poverty rates at a 
given level of GDP. Beyond levels of roughly $15,000 (in International Dollars), subsistence 
poverty rarely occurs at all (based on data from the World Bank, 2011).  
This is true for cross-country comparisons at a single point in time, but also for within-
country time series. In recent decades, a number of countries have eradicated, or come 
close to the eradication, of subsistence poverty. Chile and Malaysia achieved this in the 
mid-1990s; Mexico, Thailand and Costa Rica achieved it in the early to mid-2000s, and Brazil 
is currently on the verge of achieving it (based on data from the World Bank, 2011). It is 
striking that in each of these cases, the near-eradication of subsistence poverty occurred 
when the respective country had reached a level of GDP per capita which was broadly 
equivalent to the British level of the early 1950s (author’s calculation; based on data from 
Maddison, 2008, and World Bank, 2011). This was precisely the period in which subsistence 
poverty measurement was abandoned in the UK, on the grounds that the last Rowntree 
study had found subsistence poverty to be on the verge of disappearance (more on which 
in Chapter 2). Poverty rates are not simply a function of GDP, but the mentioned level 
seems to mark a critical threshold. When countries reach a level of development 
comparable to the British level of the early 1950s, the eradication of poverty in the most 
basic sense comes within sight.   
However, poverty indicators commonly applied to developed countries do not attempt to 
measure subsistence poverty. They differ both from the ones commonly applied to LDCs, 
and from the Rowntree-style indicators that were applied to developed countries in the 
past – not merely in the sense of being more encompassing, or concerned with a less 
severe form of poverty. They attempt, as will be shown below, to approximate a different 
underlying concept: one related to social participation, or the ability to comply with the 
social customs prevailing at a particular time and place. In this framework, an individual 
who experiences no difficulties in obtaining the means necessary for physical functioning, 
but who is unable to engage in many customary social activities, would still be classified as 
poor.  
                                                          
1The authors also found that the $1-a-say standard approximated many domestic poverty indices used in LDCs. 
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The underlying concept of poverty involved is therefore a much more abstract one. 
Rowntree’s indicator could rely, for a good part, on highly tangible measures. The food 
component of his indicator was meant to reflect a consensus among nutrition scientists on 
what constituted a minimum nutrient intake for a healthy diet (Rowntree, 1922, p. 88-106). 
The original $1-a-day poverty line had a similar underpinning. There is no obvious 
equivalent for the much more abstract concept of ‘social participation’. As Kenworthy et al 
(2009, p. 2) note: “Once societies move past subsistence levels, there is no non-arbitrary 
"minimal" standard of living.” 
 
An entirely non-arbitrary standard there may not be, but this thesis will argue that existing 
poverty measures are not just arbitrary, but fundamentally flawed in several ways, and that 
these flaws undermine their capacity to produce sensible policy recommendations for 
tackling poverty. This thesis will argue that it is both desirable and feasible to establish a 
poverty measure which is a lot less arbitrary, a lot more informative, and a lot more 
plausible than any of the existing ones. This thesis will develop a novel critique of existing 
poverty measures, which it will then turn into a requirements catalogue for a new type of 
poverty measure. It will establish a measure which fulfils these requirements, first on an 
abstract and general level, and then with actual UK data. This will produce a measure which 
is able to detect drivers of poverty that current measures are oblivious to, a measure with 
which more cost-effective anti-poverty policy strategies can be identified. If more widely 
adopted, a poverty measure of this type could reorient poverty research and the wider 
poverty debate.  
 
1.2 What this thesis will add 
  
The remainder of this chapter will demonstrate how the level, trend and risk group 
identification in a poverty study depends critically on the choice of the poverty indicator. 
This has been shown many times before for comparisons of particular indicators applied to 
particular years and particularly countries, but this chapter will show that it is a universal 
property of poverty measurement. The choice of the indicator is decisive for the outcomes, 
but this is rarely explicitly recognised in the poverty debate, where the poverty rate 
produced by a specific measure is often simply reported as ‘the proportion of people living 




Chapter 2 will go on to explain how the understanding of poverty in the developed world 
has changed over time, why this change has occurred, and what the consequences were, 
focussing mainly on the situation in the UK. This chapter will argue that in the UK, the 
change in the measurement of poverty has influenced perceptions of the topic, giving rise 
to a specific ‘poverty narrative’ which could not have arisen without a prior change in 
poverty measurement. While the statistical indicator behind the term ‘poverty’ had 
changed, the connotations that the term evoked had not, or only to a much lesser degree. 
This leads to frequent misunderstandings.  
 
One of the salient features of contemporary poverty measures is that they have become 
largely detached from the underlying living standards of people at the lower end of the 
income distribution. Poverty rates as such do not contain information on what it is these 
people can or cannot afford. Chapter 3 will therefore document how living standards of the 
least well-off have evolved in recent decades, according to a wide variety of indicators. It 
will not produce much original data, but it will produce an account which will be novel as a 
‘package’, because it will not just bring disparate indicators together, but also show how 
they can complement each other and why they sometimes seem to contradict each other. 
In this sense, Chapter 3 is a more comprehensive account of British low-earners’ living 
standards than what can currently be found in the literature. Chapter 3 will offer a 
discussion of living standards as such, not benchmarked against any poverty line, but it will 
nevertheless prepare the ground for the development of a new poverty measure later on. 
Among other things, Chapter 3 will show how multidimensional living standards really are. 
They do not simply ‘rise’ or ‘fall’; rather, improvements in some respects can coincide with 
stagnation or deterioration in other respects. No single poverty indicator could possibly 
capture all of this information single-handedly, but by then, it will have become clear that 
contemporary measures do not even come close. Thus, even though Chapter 3 will not 
discuss poverty per se, it will provide the underlying information on the living standards of 
the least well-off which a more discerning poverty measure should be able to capture. It 
thereby defines a benchmark against which poverty indicators will later be judged.  
 
But before that, Chapter 4 will discuss the macroeconomic policy implications that follow 
from different poverty measures, beginning with a review of the econometric literature 
which seeks to identify the determinants of poverty rates. The question of this chapter is 
not whether different poverty measures can identify different driving factors – that much is 
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obvious; it simply follows from the way these measures are mathematically constructed. 
But the relevant question is whether the policy implications following from different 
poverty measures are merely different, or whether they can be actively in conflict with one 
another. There are studies on the determinants of relative poverty rates which argue that 
this is not the case, and that the determinants of relative poverty largely coincide with the 
determinants of poverty more generally. Chapter 4 will challenge this argument. It will do 
so by integrating the literature on the determinants of relative poverty into the wider 
literature on the determinants of economic performance. The poverty literature and the 
economic literature often appear to be ‘talking past each other’, and Chapter 4 will act as 
an ‘interpreter’ between them. It will thereby begin to bridge the gap between the two, 
which will put a new complexion on both, but especially on the literature on relative 
poverty. It will emerge that the outcomes of these studies are not as easily generalisable as 
their authors imply. These outcomes are typically derived from small country samples, and 
are prone to extrapolating too much from regional particularities. They produce findings 
which are at odds with large sections of the wider economic literature, and Chapter 4 will 
show that this is not a coincidence. On the whole, Chapter 4 will come to conclusions that 
are quite different from the ones that the poverty studies draw. Chapter 4 has important 
implications for the remainder of the thesis. If anti-poverty policies did not involve any 
trade-offs, the accuracy and plausibility of a poverty indicator would not need to be 
especially high. Even a flawed poverty measure could then produce sensible 
recommendations. But once the existence of trade-offs and potential conflicts of objectives 
is acknowledged, the bar has to be raised. Poverty measures then have to satisfy higher 
quality standards, because errors are no longer ‘costless’.  
 
Chapter 5 will assess the quality of current poverty measures, with a particular emphasis on 
relative measures as they are most widely used in poverty research. Critique of relative 
measures is far from new, but as Chapter 5 will show, previous critiques have often missed 
the point, because they have failed to engage with the theory behind relative measures. 
Chapter 5 will develop a critique of relative measures from a completely different angle, 
which is novel in two ways. Firstly, it will draw a strict distinction between the theory and 
the measurement of relative poverty by referring back to the history of ideas already 
documented in Chapter 2. The poverty literature often conveys the impression that once 
poverty had become redefined to mean a form of social exclusion rather than physical 
deprivation, the adoption of relative measures was only a technical detail. Chapter 5 will 
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challenge this interpretation. It will show that relative poverty measures as we know them 
today were just one among many possible specifications of a much more general theory. 
There was no automatism which had to lead to the adoption of relative measures; rather, 
the same broad concept of poverty could have been approximated in many other ways. 
Chapter 5 will go further and also argue that relative measures are a flawed approximation 
of this wider idea. In other words, the novelty here is that this is a critique ‘from within’: 
Relative indicators will be judged by their own standards, whereas conventional critiques 
have generally judged them by the standards of some entirely different theory of poverty. 
The second novelty of Chapter 5 is that it will integrate two hitherto separate strands of 
literature: the literature on relative poverty and the literature on the determinants of self-
reported ‘subjective well-being’. The latter explicitly investigates the importance of relative 
income and absolute income, so it could potentially inform the poverty literature – as long 
as a number of caveats are kept in mind. Chapter 5 will show that these two strands of 
literature are not natural complements, so integrating them is not a straightforward 
process.  
 
Chapter 6 goes on to extend the critique of relative measures to the conventional 
alternatives. It will show that these alternatives either fail on similar grounds, or in other 
ways. Chapter 6 will develop criteria for the assessment of a poverty indicator’s quality, 
thus crystallising the insights from Chapters 2, 3 and 5 into a requirements catalogue. 
Conventional poverty measures do not meet these requirements, neither on their own nor 
in combination. Chapter 6 will proceed to discuss two relatively recent developments from 
poverty research, both of which fulfil some of the criteria in the catalogue while failing on 
others. It will then show that the strong elements of both approaches can be blended into a 
novel measure of poverty: a priced basket of consensually defined necessities. Surveys that 
seek to establish a consensus on what constitutes necessities in the UK today already exist; 
and priced baskets also exist, derived through qualitative research methods (i.e. focus-
group discussions). But these two approaches have never been brought together. There is 
currently no priced basket reflecting a broad consensus, established in large-scale surveys, 
on what constitutes necessities. This thesis will construct such a measure.    
 
Chapter 6 provides the template for the new measure. Chapter 7 will use this template to 
build an actual poverty line with real-world figures from scratch. It will draw on confidential 
data accessed through the Secure Data Service (SDS) and the Virtual Microdata Laboratory 
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(VML). It will also draw on publicly accessible data from the Government Statistical Service 
(GSS), the Office for National Statistics (ONS), Local Housing Allowance Direct (LHA), the 
British Insurance Premium Index (BIPI), the public transport providers of twelve large and 
medium-sized cities, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, and Statistics Canada. It will 
construct eight different sub-poverty lines, and discuss the most important ones among 
them separately.  
 
Chapter 8 will present the total poverty line, which is the sum of the sub-poverty lines 
constructed in Chapter 7. It will discuss the results, including the possible policy 
implications, and put them into context.  
 
Having developed and discussed a new poverty measure, Chapter 9 will discuss the next 
steps that should be taken from there, especially in poverty research but also in policy 
making. It will show how this new measure could be improved further if the research 
funding was available, and how it could then be integrated into poverty research. The thesis 
will end with a conclusion.  
 
Needless to say, the discipline of poverty research is infinitely broader than what this thesis 
can cover. A number of important issues will be excluded from the thesis, or only 
mentioned in passing. Topics which this thesis will not address, despite their obvious 
relevance, include: 
 the divisive issue of ‘structure vs. agency’: Is poverty primarily a function of the 
economic system, or do behavioural explanations play a role? 
 social mobility issues, both intra-generational and inter-generational. 
 the question of whether poverty alleviation is only an end in itself, or whether 
poverty is also causally related to social problems such as crime. 
 the role of education and (vocational) training in poverty alleviation.   
 
In short, the thesis will be relatively broad, but nowhere near exhaustive.  
 
Before anything else, the next subchapter will explain the workings of the commonly used 
contemporary poverty measures. There will be an emphasis on separating inherent aspects, 
which are part of an indicator’s definition, from aspects that represent common usage but 
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which could, in principle, be altered. Different classification systems will show how these 
measures differ and what they have in common.   
 
1.3 Contemporary poverty measures defined 
 
Before reviewing the empirical literature using different poverty measures, it is first 
necessary to define these measures themselves. This sub-chapter explains the most 
common approaches to poverty measurement, which are relative poverty (RP), subjective 
poverty (SP), absolute poverty (AP) and material deprivation (MD). Within each of these 
approaches, there can be substantial differences depending on the precise specification of 
the indicator. The definitions are partially based on the World Bank’s manual on poverty 
research (Coudouel et al, 2002), but mostly on how they are actually used in the literature 
itself. This will become clearer in subchapter 1.3, where examples for each of the concepts 
will be presented.   
Relative poverty (RP) 
Indicators of relative poverty (RP) are based on the income distribution within a pre-
defined geographic area, which is almost always the nation state. Living standards are 
approximated by disposable cash income, or, much less frequently, by expenditure, but this 
is not a defining feature. Other approximations are imaginable.2 ‘Income’, in this context, 
does not denote nominal but ‘equivalised’ household income. Equivalisation is the process 
of making household incomes comparable across different household types. Household 
incomes are converted to a common basis by attaching different weights to each household 
member. The aim is to account for economies of scale in household consumption, resulting 
from the shared use of resources such as housing space and household appliances. It also 
accounts for differences in consumption levels between adults and minors, and sometimes 
between minors of different ages. There are several equivalence scales, which differ in their 
assumptions about the extent of economies of scale in household consumption, and how 
they relate to the age of the household members. Equivalence scales also differ in their 
degree of differentiation. The OECD equivalence scale, which assigns the same weight to 
each child, can be seen as representing the simpler end of the spectrum. The McClements 
                                                          
2There are various attempts to estimate the fungible value of public benefits in kind, or imputed 
values of owner-occupied housing, and add these values to income. These approaches and their 
difficulties will be further explored later. See Wolff (2009) for an overview. 
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equivalence scale, which has been used in official income and poverty statistics in the UK 
until very recently, would then represent the more complex end of the spectrum. It splits 
children into seven different age groups, and attaches a different weight to each (ONS, 
2008, p. 32). Under the McClements scale, a two-adult household earning £X is assumed to 
attain the same living standard as a single household earning 0.61 * £X, as a household of 
two adults and one adolescent earning 1.36 * £X, or as a household of two adults and one 
young child earning 1.21 * £X. The two-adult household is the reference category, so that in 
a hypothetical society consisting only of two-adult households, nominal and equivalised 
incomes would be identical. The appropriateness of equivalence scales is a matter of 
debate. Saunders (2009, pp. 8-9) has criticised equivalence weights as arbitrary. Blackburn 
(1998, pp. 461-462), in contrast, complements a poverty study by a sensitivity analysis using 
various equivalence scales, and finds that it has no substantial impact on the results for 
most countries.  
Incomes are usually averaged over a period of one year, although this is not a defining 
feature either; it is merely explained by the fact that most income statistics are also 
gathered on an annual basis. Yet the time period is alterable. What defines RP indices, as 
mentioned, is that they set the poverty line as a fixed fraction of central tendency, which is 
meant to be an approximation of ‘typical’ living standards at a particular time and place. In 
earlier RP studies, the usual measure of this was the arithmetic mean (Atkinson, 1998, p. 2), 
though later the median become the more common one. Income distributions are not 
symmetric but positively skewed, since there is an obvious lower bound3 but no upper 
bound. The mean will therefore always exceed the median, which means that it will always 
exceed the incomes of more than half of the population. If the difference between the 
mean and the median is large, the mean will exceed the incomes of the vast majority of the 
population, which makes it unsuitable to approximate typical living standards. Since the 
mean includes all incomes, even the most atypical ones, it can be sensitive to a small 
number of very high values. A small number of individuals with very high incomes can 
therefore have a strong impact on the mean, even though they are unlikely to have a strong 
impact on perceptions of what constitutes a ‘typical’ living standard. The median avoids this 
problem. Since it is the income of the household at the mid-point of the distribution, it can, 
by definition, never exceed the incomes of more than half of the population.     
                                                          
3 One could, in theory, imagine poverty statistics taking account of ‘negative incomes’, such as losses of the self-
employed. But income statistics are not gathered in this format. Negative incomes are set to zero, making zero 




Since it is unaffected by outliers, the median is a more suitable representation of typical 
living standards (Saunders and Smeeding, 2002, pp. 1-4). This does not mean that the 
median is an entirely unproblematic measure. Easton (2002, pp. 6-7) points out that a 
reduction in the tax burden of top-earners, coupled with an increase in the tax burden of 
median income earners, can produce falling poverty rates if the poverty line is pegged to 
median incomes. The higher tax burden leads to a reduction in median disposable incomes, 
which, in turn, leads to a reduction in the poverty line. If incomes just below the poverty 
line are unchanged, or decrease by less than the poverty line, the poverty rate would fall. 
This would not have happened if the poverty line had been pegged to the mean instead of 
the median. Unlike the median, the means records the reduction in the tax burden of high-
income earners, and the ensuing increase in their disposable incomes. Therefore, if the tax 
reform is revenue-neutral, mean incomes will remain unchanged, and so would a poverty 
line pegged to the mean.  
However, while the latter scenario is merely a statistical possibility, the standard objection 
to the use of the arithmetic mean applies universally. Mean incomes are above median 
incomes in every single OECD country (see OECD, 2008, p. 30).4 Since median incomes are 
always below mean incomes, the replacement of the mean with the median has been 
accompanied by the choice of a higher threshold: 50% of the mean has been replaced by 
60% of the median as the most common poverty line in RP statistics.  
The poverty rate, or the headcount measure, can be complemented by a measure of the 
depth of poverty, usually the ‘poverty gap’ index which measures how far below the 
poverty line the average incomes of the poor are. The poverty gap, originally devised by Sen 
(1976), is the percentage point distance between the average income among the poverty 
population and the poverty line. The purpose of the poverty gap measure is to make 
poverty statistics less reliant on the poverty threshold chosen. Poverty rates only detect 
movements across the poverty threshold, but no movements below or above it. So the 
poverty rate can record drastic falls if large numbers of households moved from just below 
to just above the poverty line, even if their incomes had barely changed. By the same 
token, if large numbers of households moved from far below the poverty line to just below, 
but no household actually crossed it, the poverty rate would remain unchanged. In both 
                                                          
4 The median-to-mean ratio can itself be used as a rough measure of income inequality, since a large deviation 




cases, the additional information provided by the poverty gap can rectify the picture: The 
latter situation would result in a decrease in the poverty gap; the former situation would 
result in an increase, as the remaining poverty population would now be further away from 
the poverty line. A less common alternative consists of looking at a range of poverty 
thresholds instead of a single one, for example by adding an upper bound and a lower 
bound. The evolution of poverty against the conventional threshold of 60% of the median 
could then be complemented by e.g. the rates resulting from additional thresholds at 50% 
and 70%. The poverty gap and the poverty rate can be integrated into a composite 
measure, which can be augmented by a measure of inequality among the poor (Sen, 1976). 
Absolute poverty 
Indicators of absolute poverty (AP) are characterised by poverty lines that represent a fixed 
level of purchasing power, or command over material resources. The poverty line is not 
connected to average living standards, so the poverty status of a given individual does not 
depend on the incomes of other individuals. Under an AP measure, individuals whose 
incomes are equal to the poverty line always enjoy the same material living standard, even 
if it is a cross-country study covering very different societies, or a time series study covering 
a long period.  
There are different ways of deriving AP lines. An AP line can refer to a living standard which 
is interpreted, by some criterion, as an ‘objective’ minimum standard. In this case, there 
would be some underlying theory of poverty, i.e. an explicit reason why a living standard 
below this threshold should be labelled ‘poverty’ and a living standard above should not. 
The already mentioned Budget Standard Approach pioneered by Seebohm Rowntree falls 
into this category. Here, the poverty line has a clear interpretation: It is equal to the cost of 
a pre-selected consumption basket. Thus, in this framework, ‘being poor’ means being 
unable to afford the basket. A similar logic applies to the World Bank’s $1-a-day standard. 
However, the BSA is not by definition an absolute measure. If the content of a BSA basket 
was, in some way, linked to a representative consumption basket for middle-income 
earners, it would effectively produce a measure of RP. No such ‘relative BSA’ measure 
currently exists, but considering the theoretical possibility is a way of separating accidental 
from defining features.  
In research referring to contemporary developed countries, the use of AP lines is less 
frequent, but when they are used, they seldom have an interpretation of their own. In time 
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series analyses, they are typically derived from the RP line of one particular year, which is 
held fixed in real terms and applied to subsequent years (see DWP & ONS, 2009, pp. 41-53; 
OECD, 2008, pp. 129-130). Technically speaking, this simply means decoupling the poverty 
line from median incomes and coupling it to the Consumer Price Index instead. A RP line is 
thus converted into an absolute one, because from now on, it no longer responds to 
changes in the living standards of others but always represents the same constant living 
standard. Similarly, in cross-sectional analyses, the poverty line can be ‘borrowed’ from one 
country and applied to others. In such cases, the poverty line is adjusted for differences in 
purchasing power, but not for differences in average incomes (e.g. Smeeding, 2006; Notten 
& Neubourg, 2007).  
In both cases, whether it is borrowed from a particular year or from a particular country, 
the resulting AP rate has no interpretation of its own. There is no reason why a poverty line 
equal to 60% of the median income of a different country, or a year in the past, should have 
any particular meaning here and now. In both cases, the purpose is simply to derive a 
common standard representing a constant level of purchasing power, independent of the 
year or the country. Such ‘frozen’ or ‘borrowed’ poverty lines will subsequently be called 
‘quasi-absolute’.  
AP is often used as a synonym for ‘extreme poverty’ (Brady, 2003, pp. 8-10; European 
Commission, 2004; Pickett and Wilkinson, 2007, p. 6; New Policy Institute & Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation (n.d.)). This may be a reflection of the fact that the use of AP lines is 
much more frequent in research covering developing countries, or developed countries in 
the past, rather than contemporary developed countries. But it is not part of the definition 
of AP. Interpreting AP as ‘extreme poverty’, and RP as ‘moderate poverty’, confounds to 
distinct categories. The absolute/relative distinction contains no information about the 
‘generosity’ of the poverty line, or the severity of the poverty concept examined. An AP line 
can easily be higher than an RP line. In time series studies, this occurs whenever real 
median income falls after the year in which the RP line is converted into an AP line. In cross-
country studies, this occurs whenever the poverty line of a wealthier country is applied to a 
less wealthy one. The ‘borrowed’ AP line can then be higher than the domestic RP line, 
leading to AP rates exceeding RP rates. Several authors have used the PPP-adjusted AP line 
of the United States to compare AP rates across OECD countries (Scruggs & Allan, 2006; 
Smeeding, 2006; Notten & Neubourg, 2007). For countries with mean/median incomes 
substantially below the US level, the resulting AP rates exceed RP rates, because the PPP-
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adjusted US poverty line exceeds 60% of the domestic median (or 50% of the domestic 
mean).  
An even starker example is Eurostat’s (2008, p.44) €10-a-day poverty line. It is a 
minimalistic standard for Western Europe, which is why it produces poverty rates close to 
zero there, but it is much higher than domestic RP lines in most of Eastern Europe. It 
therefore produces poverty rates of close to 30% for Poland, and close to 40% for Lithuania 
and Latvia. The real difference between AP and RP, in this regard, is not that AP is less 
generous but that it is less bounded. AP measures cover the full range; they can produce 
poverty rates between 0% and 100%, while RP measures are much more bounded both 
upwards and downwards. RP rates below 10% or above 30% (against a threshold of 60% of 
median income) are theoretically possible, but do not currently exist anywhere (OECD, 
2008; OECD, 2011),5 as they would require an extreme shape of the income distribution. 
An AP line that is derived from a basket of necessities need not be minimalistic either, it can 
even be very encompassing – this simply depends on how encompassing the basket is. 
Examples for encompassing baskets are hard to find, as they are very rare in practice, but 
they do exist: The Canadian ‘Market-Based Measure’, compiled by Statistics Canada, is a 
poverty index based on the cost of pre-defined basket of consumer goods. It is ‘absolute’ in 
the sense that its poverty line corresponds to a constant material living standard, which is 
not affected by average incomes in Canada. But it produces a higher poverty rate than its 
relative counterpart, because the constant living standard it represents is itself a very high 
one (Human Resources and Social Development Canada, 2008).  
Like RP, AP measures also approximate living standards by income, or less frequently, 
expenditure. Incomes are equivalised to adjust for differences in household size and 
composition, in the same way as with RP figures. Poverty gap or composite measure can be 
derived in the same way as for RP.   
Subjective poverty 
Subjective poverty (SP) indices derive poverty lines from large-scale surveys. Their rationale 
is to overcome the arbitrariness of both absolute and relative poverty lines. There are two 
                                                          
5Having said that, one study by Eurostat (2008) finds a poverty rate minimally below 10% for Sweden and the 
Czech Republic. The difference with the OECD figures is explained by the equivalence scale.  
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quite distinct approaches which, in the empirical literature, both come under the header of 
SP. They will be treated separately here, and examples of both will be provided later.  
The first concept is one which could also be called ‘self-assessed poverty’, because they are 
the result of surveys in which every respondent selects their own poverty status. 
Respondents are classified as poor when they consider themselves poor. In this version of 
SP, there is no poverty line and no equivalisation, because no measure of household 
income or spending is included. There is no poverty gap either, but some differentiation 
among the poor remains possible. Households can be asked to classify themselves as e.g. 
‘moderately poor’ or ‘very poor’.  
The second variant of SP could be labelled a ‘majoritarian’ or ‘democratic’ poverty line. As 
before, respondents are asked whether or not they consider themselves poor, but in this 
version, they are not classified according to their self-assessment. Instead, income and self-
assessed poverty status are plotted against one another, to check whether there is a point 
of inflection in the income distribution below which most respondents consider themselves 
poor, and above which most consider themselves not poor. This inflection point is then 
used as a poverty line, and respondents are classified accordingly by their income. An 
alternative within this category consists of asking respondents what they consider to be the 
minimum income necessary to maintain a minimum decent standard of living in their 
country of residence. The responses are then averaged into a so-called ‘consensual poverty 
line’. This can be done separately for different household types, in which case no 
equivalisation is required (it results in an implicit equivalence scale, but it is not a fixed 
one). Poverty gaps can be derived in the same way as for RP and AP. The majoritarian 
approach classifies all respondents by the common standard they have collectively agreed 
upon, whereas under self-assessment, each respondent sets their own standards. In a 
hypothetical society in which all individuals had identical views on what constitutes 
poverty, both approaches would yield identical results.    
Material deprivation (MD) 
The term ‘material deprivation’ (MD) refers to a class of indicators which attempt to 
measure involuntary lack of goods and services. Respondents are presented with a pre-
defined list of items, and asked whether they lack any of these. In some versions, those 
who lack items are also asked whether they lacked it because they could not afford it, or 
because they did not want it. There is some similarity with the already mentioned Budget 
28 
 
Standard Approach, but the crucial difference is that MD measures rely on respondents’ 
self-assessment rather than an observable measure of living standards like income.  
MD poverty studies use a poverty line, too, but it is not a monetary one. Respondents are 
classified as poor when they lack more than a pre-defined number of items, e.g. more than 
two. One variant of MD attaches different weights to each item, based on how many 
households lack this item overall. The assumption behind this is that lacking an item which 
most households possess is a more severe form of deprivation than lacking an item which 
many other households cannot afford either. This method results in a ‘deprivation score’, 
which is the weighted number of missing items, with the poverty line also defined as a 
minimum deprivation score rather than a monetary value. The average deprivation score 
among the poor can be seen as the equivalent of the poverty gap measure.    
Occasionally, one finds indicators that measure lack of consumer items in a particular 
category (e.g. New Policy Institute/Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2009), which one could 
view as partial MD measures.  
Table 1.1 contains the most common categories of poverty concepts, and distinguishes 
them by how they approximate living standards, how the set the threshold which separates 
the poor from the non-poor, and how they can account for differences in the severity of 
poverty.  
Table 1.1: Four common poverty measures, compared according to three key criteria 
 Proxy measure of 
living standards 
Poverty line Proxy measure of 
the depth of poverty 
Relative poverty Income or 
expenditure 
Fixed fraction of 
central tendency 
Poverty Gap 
Absolute poverty Income or 
expenditure 





Majoritarian Income or 
expenditure 
Majority decision Poverty Gap 
Self-assessed Self-assessed not applicable Self-assessed 
Material deprivation Reported 
consumption 
Fixed number of 
missing  
consumption items or 
deprivation score 
Average deprivation  
score among the 
poor 
 
There are alternative ways to categorise poverty measures. Boarini and d’Ercole (2006, pp. 
11-12) distinguish between ‘input-based’ and ‘outcome-based’ measures. The former 
concentrate on indirect, observable measures of living standards, such as income or 
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expenditure. The latter attempt to measure living standards in a more direct way. 
Differences can occur when there are substantial differences in the ‘transmission rate’ of 
inputs (like income) into outcomes (living standards). Two households with identical 
incomes may differ in other, unobserved variables that still make them end up with very 
different living standards. Special needs would be a possible reason. Differences in non-
market access to goods and services (e.g. childcare provided through the extended family) 
would be another one. An altogether different explanation refers to the labour market 
instead of the product market. Even if the transmission rate of income into living standards 
was the same for all households, a case can be made for indirect measures when labour 
markets are less formalised, which makes income data difficult to record. Yet as long as the 
provision of most goods and services is mediated through markets, and most labour 
activities take place in the formal labour market, input-based measures are generally 
preferred, because of their greater precision.  
The categorisation of Boarini and d’Ercole can be extended to the poverty measures 
mentioned above. RP, AP and majoritarian SP would then be classified as input-based 
measures. They rely on indirect measures of living standards, such as income or 
expenditure. MD and self-assessed SP are outcome-based measures, as they rely on 
respondents’ own assessment of their living standards. No information is required on how a 
household manages to obtain all the items on the MD list, or on why a respondent does not 
consider themself poor. Only a final outcome is recorded. Table 1.2 provides a brief 
summary. 
Table 1.2: Input-based vs. outcome-based poverty measures 
Input-based measures Outcome-based measures 
Relative poverty Material deprivation 
Absolute poverty Self-assessed subjective poverty 
Majoritarian subjective poverty  
 
Neither category of indicators is definitely superior to the other. The strength of input-
based measures is that they use observable, verifiable and relatively precise data. Their 
weakness is that they are partial measures which are prone to miss many subtleties. For 
outcome-based measures, it is the other way round: A variety of unobservable 
determinants of living standards can be accounted for, but the results are neither precise 
nor verifiable.  
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Finally, it is the distinction between absolute and relative poverty measures which has 
probably been the most controversial subject in poverty research (see for example Sen, 
1983; Townsend, 1985; Sarlo, 2008, pp. 1-5, Clark et al, 2006). In this debate, AP and RP are 
often plotted against each other as polar opposites, but it is more expedient to think of this 
distinction as a continuum. Depending on their specification, RP measures can become 
more similar to AP measures and vice versa. Once this is taken account of, SP and MD 
measures can also be categorised within this framework: They remain concepts in their 
own right, but depending on their specifications, they can develop strong relative or strong 
absolute properties. Table 1.3 summarises these considerations.  
Both RP and AP measures can be ‘more relative’ or ‘more absolute’ depending on the 
frequency with which they are updated. AP lines are fixed in the short term, but they too 
are updated eventually. An example is the UK government’s AP target for child poverty. It 
was originally defined against a poverty line equal to 60% of the real median income in 
1998, now replaced by real median income in 2010. So while a RP line changes in line with 
median incomes in every single year, this poverty line has changed in line with median 
incomes after twelve years, which is a difference of degree rather than principle. 
Geography can also blur the distinction between RP and AP, a good example being 
Eurostat’s (2008) pan-European poverty line. Eurostat shows (albeit only for one single 
year) what relative poverty rates would look like if the poverty line was pegged to the pan-
European median income, instead of national medians. From a European perspective, this 
is clearly a RP line, because it always grows at exactly the same rate as the European 
median income. However, from the perspective of a small member country which has no 
discernible influence on the European average, this RP measure becomes effectively an 
absolute one. It is absolute; not in the sense that it is fixed, but in the sense that it does not 
respond to changes in domestic median income, or indeed any domestic variable.  
SP and MD can be classified according to the same logic. SP becomes in effect relative in 
nature if public perceptions of what constitutes poverty are closely related to average 
incomes, and move in line with them. If these perceptions are rather independent of 
average incomes, SP becomes a more absolute measure. With MD, it depends on how the 
list of items is assembled and updated. If it is updated very frequently and in line with 
average consumption habits, it becomes more relative in nature. If it is only changed very 
infrequently and/or if changes do not bear a close relationship with average consumption 
habits, it becomes more absolute.  
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Table 1.3: How different poverty measures can tend towards (→) being ‘more relative’ or 
‘more absolute’ 
 Relative poverty Absolute poverty 
Relative 
poverty 
n/a RP → AP if updated only infrequently; 
RP → AP if national poverty is measured 
against an international median, on which 
the country in question has little impact  
Absolute 
poverty 
AP → RP if upgraded very frequently n/a 
Subjective 
poverty 
SP → RP if public perceptions of what 
constitutes a ‘necessary minimum’ is 
closely related to average incomes 
SP → AP if public perceptions of what 
constitutes a ‘necessary minimum’ is either 




MD → RP if underlying consumption 
basket closely follows average 
consumption patterns  
MD → RP if underlying consumption basket 
does not follows average consumption 
patterns 
 
Some of the above measures can also be blended, an example being the combined MD/RP 
measure which forms the basis of the third official child poverty target in the UK. It counts 
those who are simultaneously in two kinds of ‘poverties’: Households must have a 
deprivation score of at least 25, and their income must fall below 70% of the median. 
Ravallion and Chen (2009) have constructed a RP measure with an absolute floor below 
which the poverty line cannot fall. Since the poverty line becomes decoupled from the 
median below this threshold, the measure is effectively a combination of RP and AP.  
   
Having defined and classified the most important contemporary poverty measures, it is 
now possible to move on to an overview of the empirical literature using two or more of 
these measures. The key result of this literature review can already be forestalled: The 
choice of a poverty measure is not simply a technical detail; it is the decisive choice which 
shapes a study’s outcome.  
 
1.4 How different poverty measures produce different results 
 
Using British data from 1999, Bradshaw and Finch (2003) apply three different poverty 
measures: RP, MD and self-assessed SP. This method produces three different poverty 
populations, and the extent to which they overlap can be used as a measure of the extent 
to which the three indicators are interchangeable for one another. Given that the three 
indicators measure different things, it would be surprising if the overlap of the poverty 
32 
 
populations was very strong. For example, an individual whose income had recently 
dropped to a very low level would instantaneously be classified as poor by the RP, but 
probably not yet by the MD measure. However, the most notable outcome of this study is 
not that the overlap limited, but that there is virtually no overlap at all, beyond what a 
random draw would produce.6 The authors note:  
 
“These results indicate a considerable lack of overlap between measures that have been, 
and still are, used to represent poverty. If the measures were completely uncorrelated one 
would expect to obtain a distribution that is quite close to the one obtained” (ibid p. 516). 
Crucially, each indicator identifies different risk groups. The RP measure suggests that 
pensioners and single households are disproportionally affected by poverty, while couples 
with children are less poverty-prone. The MD index, in contrast, identifies pensioners as a 
low-risk group, while couples with many children now appear disproportionally vulnerable. 
A few findings are consistent across all three indicators; in particular, all three identify 
economic inactivity as a risk factor. But even here, large differences in magnitude exist 
(ibid. p. 520). The three indicators thus lead to differing, and potentially conflicting policy 
recommendations, for example with regard to how to allocate social policy budgets.   
Brewer et al (2008, pp. 70-79), using British data from 2006-07, measure poverty among 
families with children in two different ways – RP and MD – and compare the results. The 
poverty count is roughly similar across both indicators, but only about half of those in 
relative income poverty are also materially deprived, and vice versa. RP and MD are not 
completely uncorrelated, but  
“the relationship is far from perfect, with considerable volatility in the pattern of Material 
deprivation scores across income. Moreover, there is a wide variation in Material 
deprivation scores for given incomes.” 
The authors compose a structural model to estimate which factors increase the risk of RP 
and MD, controlled for other factors. For a few of these factors, both RP and MD yield 
similar coefficients, in particular, both identify lack of employment as a significant risk 
factor. But the coefficients of other potential risk factors differ across indicators. Geography 
                                                          
6 Their poverty populations for all three measures are in the order of 20% of the total population, large enough 
to make some overlap almost inevitable. Even if these three populations were selected by random drawings, 
some individuals would be selected more than once.  
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stands out as a sharp separator of RP and MD: The two indicators do not identify the same 
‘poverty pockets’. This divergence is not especially problematic as long as the reason is 
rather obvious. Households living in London, for example, are less likely to be in RP than 
households with similar characteristics living elsewhere, while more likely to find 
themselves in MD poverty; but this is almost certainly a reflection of regional price 
differences. However, there are other differences in risk factors which have no obvious 
explanation, such as the role of household type or ethnicity.  
Cribb et al (2012) perform a similar comparison, using a different specification of MD, and 
more recent data which capture the impact of the current recession. On their account, the 
overlap between the two poverty populations is even smaller. 44% of the materially 
deprived children live in households with incomes above 70% of the median.7 
Van den Bosch et al (1993) compare poverty rates in seven European regions and small 
countries, applying RP and SP measures to data from the mid-to-late 1980s. This time, the 
SP measure is a majoritarian one based on survey responses. By definition, this 
specification produces a larger overlap of the groups than the previous studies, because 
one poverty population is now always a subset of the other. If the SP (RP) threshold is 
above the RP (SP) threshold, then all the relatively (subjectively) poor are automatically in 
subjective (relative) poverty. But in this study, it is the size of each region’s poverty 
population that differs dramatically depending on which poverty measure is used. The two 
measures provide different impressions about where Europe’s poverty pockets are. SP in 
Belgium, for example, is more than twice as high as in the Netherlands, even though RP 
rates are similar. Curiously, even though one poverty population is always a subset of the 
other in each region, there are still differences in the risk factors identified. This can occur 
when one population subgroup is overrepresented among those who are in between the 
two poverty lines, and therefore poor according to one indicator but not according to the 
other. Within each region, there are groups which have a high poverty risk by any indicator, 
especially the economically inactive. But in many regions, whether pensioners, lone 
parents, single adults or large families are classified as high-risk or low-risk groups depends 
on the choice of indicator (ibid, pp. 248-253).  
In a similar analysis, Marks (2007) applies three different poverty indicators to Australian 
data from 2001 and 2002. Apart from RP and self-assessed SP, he uses a measure of 
                                                          
7These children do not appear in the statistics for the combined MD/RP measure, since households with 
incomes above 70% of the median are removed. 
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‘financial stress’, which could be regarded as a partial MD indicator. Respondents are asked 
how frequently they incur arrears on important bills or have to borrow money to meet 
necessary expenses. The RP and the financial stress indicator display similar poverty rates, 
but again, the relatively poor and the financially stressed are distinct groups, with only 
about a third of the relatively poor also reporting to experience financial stress. The overlap 
between SP and financial stress is relatively large, but only 30-40% of those who view 
themselves as poor also record incomes below the RP line. At the same time, some of those 
households who classify their own living standards as ‘prosperous’ find themselves in RP.  
Unsurprisingly, the indicators differ in the risk factors they identify. Controlled for other 
factors, higher education levels are significantly associated with a lower risk of RP, but not 
with a lower risk of SP or financial stress. Controlled for other factors, the risk of financial 
stress significantly decreases with age, which is not true for the risk of SP and RP.  
Einasto (2002) performs a comparison of three different poverty measures – RP, self-
assessed SP, and MD – for a single country over time. He applies the three measures to 
data from Estonia between 1994 and 1999. Only 45% of those in RP are also in MD poverty, 
while 39% of the materially deprived are also relatively poor. SP shows no strong overlap 
with either measure, and all three show different time trends.  
Using data from 23 European countries as of 2003, Matcovic et al (2007) compare RP and 
self-assessed SP rates. The most apparent, albeit predictable difference is observed when 
separating the old (EU-15) from the new member states (NMS), and calculating 
(unweighted) average rates from the national RP and SP rates. Both regions display the 
same average rate of RP, but an enormous gap in SP rates. SP exceeds RP in every single 
one of the NMS, while the opposite is true in each of the EU-15 states except Greece. 
Matcovic et al also look at an index of MD, and find a moderate correlation (r = 0.52) 
between MD scores and RP rates.  
Boarini and d’Ercole (2006) review previous studies on the overlap of RP and MD measures, 
and conclude that the mismatch between the poverty populations identified by the two 
indicators is a consistent finding across the literature. The exact figures differ, but generally, 
fewer than half (and often substantially fewer) of those classified as ‘poor’ by the RP 
indicator are also classified as poor by the MD indicator and vice versa. The authors’ 
aggregate a study of their own to the literature, which confirms these findings. They find 
that the overlap increases when the RP poverty threshold is raised, e.g. to 70% of the 
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median. But then again, raising one poverty line also increases the size of one of the 
poverty populations, which would increase the overlap even if the groups were assembled 
by chance.  
The main findings of Boarini and d’Ercole are confirmed by a more recent cross-country 
study by the OECD (2008, pp. 190-193), which applies an indicator of MD and one of RP to 
its member states. This study also finds: 
“The overlap is in general only partial, i.e. only a small proportion of people reporting 
Material deprivation are also income poor, and vice versa.” 
As a cross-country average, only a fifth of those who count as materially deprived are also 
in RP, and there is no country where the overlap is larger than one third. This study also 
performs an indirect risk group analysis by plotting RP rates and MD rates against age. Two 
very different lifecycle profiles emerge. The RP risk shows a roughly U-shaped pattern: It is 
high among recent entrants to the labour force, falls steadily over people’s working life, and 
rises again as they approach the retirement age and beyond. The MD risk, in contrast, is 
highest in the early stages of working life and falls in an almost linear fashion from then on 
in most countries covered, though the steepness of the fall differs (ibid. p. 189).This echoes 
an already mentioned finding from earlier studies, which perform a more direct risk-group 
analysis: Pensioners are a high-risk group according to RP, and a low-risk group according to 
MD measures.  
MD results depend on the contents of the underlying consumption basket and on the 
implicit poverty line, but the above findings do not seem to be sensitive to changes in these 
variables. The MD measure used by Eurostat (2009) differs from the OECD specification 
which most studies use, but reproduces the same basic results. Experimenting with various 
implicit poverty lines for MD, and comparing MD rates to RP and SP rates across the EU 
member states, Eurostat concludes: 
 
“All these figures confirm that deprivation and poverty are not concentrated on the same 
subpopulations and that the relationship between income poverty and deprivation is weaker 
than could be expected” (ibid pp. 9-12). 
 




A different Eurostat (2009a) study which compares RP and MD across the EU-27 also finds: 
 
“In general, the correlation between the standard At-risk-of-poverty rate and the Material 
deprivation rate is quite low (0.42 at country level), given essentially that in most countries 
different subsets of the population are affected by each of them” (ibid p. 10).  
 
Using data for British families with children from the early 2000s, Brewer et al (2009) plot a 
wide variety of MD and quasi-MD measures against the distribution of income. This allows 
a much greater sensitivity analysis as to whether the above findings are an artefact of a 
particular cut-off point for either RP or MD poverty, or a particular specification of MD. The 
authors show that the correlation between MD and income is weak in general, not just 
below the RP line. Average MD scores fall with income, but only in a slow and erratic way. 
Albeit at a lower frequency, households with high MD scores can still be found even in the 
high income brackets. It is only the most restrictive specifications of MD which are largely 
confined to the lower half of the income distribution, and even these go well beyond a cut-
off point of 60% of the median, meaning that the overlap between the RP-population and 
the MD-population is still limited.  
 
Measures of income-based AP are rarely contrasted to MD or SP measures. An exception is 
the study by Eberstadt (2008), which compares AP and (partial) MD using US data for the 
past four decades. The main outcome is that while AP has shown no systematic trend since 
the early 1970s, the more direct measures show sustained improvements in living 
standards at the lower end of the distribution. The results need to be interpreted with 
some caution. The author discusses potential explanations, and most of them seem to be 
specific to US data rather than to the relationship between AP and MD in general. Still, 
what is safe to say is that the study provides no reason for interpreting AP and MP as close 
substitutes. 
 
Thus far, every study has shown a very limited overlap between RP, MD and/or SP. This lack 
of association between poverty indicators also extends to a comparison of RP and AP, albeit 
in a different way. Unlike with SP and MD, RP and AP cannot identify entirely different 
subpopulations, because both are income-based measures, which differ only in where and 
how they set the poverty threshold. Thus, if the RP (AP) line is above the AP (RP) line, the 
AP (RP) population is always a subset of the RP (AP) population. They could only identify 
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different risk factors if one population group was strongly over- or underrepresented in the 
income range between the two thresholds. Studies which apply RP and AP measures to a 
single country and look for differences in the risk group analyses are therefore rare.  
Studies which use both RP and AP measures are almost always cross-country comparisons, 
or within-country comparisons over time, with AP and RP rates being plotted against one 
another. So unlike in the studies reviewed up until here, the focus of RP-AP studies is on 
poverty levels and time trends, not on the identification of risk groups, risk factors or 
geographic poverty pockets. Their focus is not on the micro level but the macro level, which 
will be the topic of Chapter 4. For this chapter, suffice it to show that what is true for the 
micro level is also true for the macro level: Different poverty measures produce different 
results.  
Blackburn (1998, p. 460) applies RP and AP measures to eleven Western European and 
North American countries, using data from the early 1980s and the mid-1980s. Their AP line 
is the official US poverty line of the year 1985, which is transferred to other countries and 
years while keeping purchasing power constant. Plotting the poverty rates against one 
another, a negative correlation of r = –0.36 results. This is because at that time, many 
European countries displayed AP rates that exceeded their RP rates, while the US deviated 
far into the other direction. The author notes that “poverty comparisons can be very 
sensitive to whether a relative or absolute standard is used” (ibid. p. 450).  
A similar comparison has been performed by Scruggs and Allan (2006), using data from 16 
OECD-countries in the mid-to-late 1980s and the mid-to-late 1990s. Their AP threshold is 
set at 40% of the US median in 1986. A strong negative correlation between AP and RP 
rates results. Times trends differ even more, as the two countries which have recorded the 
greatest increase in RP (Ireland and the Netherlands) are also the ones which recorded the 
largest decrease in AP.  
Notten and de Neubourg (2007) compare RP and AP rates for 16 Western European and 
North American countries in both 1996 and 2000. Their AP line is the PPP-adjusted US 
poverty line, as in Blackburn’s study. Contrary to the latter, both measures are correlated in 
the snapshot perspective. Yet time trends differ strongly. Ireland and Spain have recorded 
the sample’s sharpest reductions in AP, but none in RP.   
A similar result is obtained by Smeeding (2006), who compares RP and AP in 11 Western 
European and North American countries, using, again, the PPP-converted US poverty line 
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for AP. In the snapshot perspective limited to the year 2000, AP and RP rates are correlated, 
but the time trends from the mid-1980s to the year 2000 clearly differ. Again, the countries 
that have achieved the largest percentage point reduction in AP are also the ones which 
recorded the largest percentage point increase in RP. 
Albeit indirectly, Kenworthy et al (2008) study the same relationship, using data from 17 
OECD countries in 2000. The authors do not apply poverty lines, but look at relative and 
absolute living standards of people at the lower end of the income distribution, which are 
very close substitutes for RP and AP respectively. Relative living standards are 
approximated by the ratio of incomes at the 10th percentile to incomes at the 50th 
percentile of the distribution. Absolute living standards are approximated by incomes at the 
10th income percentile in each country, measured in PPP-adjusted US Dollar. The authors 
obtain a correlation of r = 0.62 for this cross-country sample. But as shown above, 
correlations at a single point in time may hide huge variation in time trends, which are not 
considered in this study. 
The OECD (2008) provides a rather unusual version of a cross-country AP comparison, 
where each country’s relative poverty line is frozen around the year 1995, and then applied 
to income data of 2005. Each country thus retains a poverty line of its own, and progress 
within each country is measured against domestic real median incomes of a decade earlier. 
The results obtained for the change in AP, under this definition, also have little in common 
with the data for the change in RP during the same period. Finland and Australia, for 
example, record noticeable increases in RP, while AP falls by about one half. 
The paragraphs above are a review of existing studies which compare RP and AP rates. The 
remainder of this subchapter will make a minor addition to this literature by providing a 
time-series comparison of RP and AP rates in the UK. It is derived from a dataset from the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (2008), which permits a rough reconstruction of the income 
distribution in different years from 1961 to 2008. The advantage of this dataset is that it 
enables some experimentation with different specifications of both RP and AP, thus 
allowing a broader sensitivity analysis. Apart from data for the population as a whole, the 
IFS dataset also contains data for various population subgroups separately: children, 
pensioners, working-age parents and working-age non-parents. This allows checking 
whether the correlation between RP and AP is robust across various specifications, time 
periods and subgroups. The IFS dataset forms the basis of the institute’s publication series 
‘Poverty and inequality in the UK’, which also contains discussions of RP and AP. But unlike 
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the correlation matrix compiled below, the IFS series only looks at the evolution of these 
rates during short and recent periods, and it does not directly plot RP and AP against each 
other. A downside of the dataset is that it does not allow much experimentation with AP 
rates. The only AP-rates which can be extracted from it are quasi-AP rates against the real 
median incomes of the years 1996 and 1998. It would be preferable if the quasi-AP line 
could be obtained as against the median of any given year.   
When taking the period 1961-2008 as a whole, the correlation between RP and AP is always 
negative – in all subgroups, with all combinations of thresholds and measures of central 
tendency. This is, of course, not surprising in a growing economy, where AP always falls in 
the long run while RP can go in any direction. But the dataset can also be divided into 
shorter periods, e.g. decades, which produces a very different set of outcomes. The 
correlation between AP and RP rates can now be strongly positive, strongly negative, non-
existent, or anything in between. 
The tables below illustrate this by contrasting the correlations obtained for two different 
decades, the 1980s and the 2000s, using the median-based measures and taking a AP line 
based on the real median of 1998. For the 1980s, RP and AP are consistently and strongly 
negatively correlated.   
Table 1.4: Cross-correlation matrix of relative vs. quasi-absolute poverty rates in the UK 
1980-1989 
 RP 
(70% of  
median) 
RP 
(60% of  
median) 
RP 
(50% of  
median) 
RP 
(40% of  
median) 
AP (70% of 1998-median) -0.97 -0.96 -0.93 -0.90 
AP (60% of 1998-median) -0.96 -0.95 -0.92 -0.88 
AP (50% of 1998-median) -0.93 -0.86 -0.82 -0.80 
AP (40% of 1998-median) -0.67 -0.49 -0.41 -0.44 
-author’s calculation, data from IFS (2008) 
 
For the 2000s, in contrast, the association between RP and AP is generally positive. This 
association is much less consistent across different threshold combinations, but taken 
together, the two tables still serve to show that the association between AP and RP can go 
either way. The impression about which periods are associated with progress in poverty 
reduction, and which are associated with stagnation or a worsening, often depends on 
which of the two poverty measures is chosen.  
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Table 1.5: Cross-correlation matrix of relative vs. quasi-absolute poverty rates in the UK 
2000-2008 
 RP 
(70% of  
median) 
RP 
(60% of  
median) 
RP 
(50% of  
median) 
RP 
(40% of  
median) 
AP (70% of 1998-median) +0.87 +0.55 +0.10 -0.48 
AP (60% of 1998-median) +0.84 +0.59 +0.23 -0.33 
AP (50% of 1998-median) +0.64 +0.64 +0.49 +0.07 
AP (40% of 1998-median) +0.13 +0.50 +0.72 +0.62 
-author’s calculation, data from IFS (2008) 
 
These time series do not yet cover the present recession, which has only had a substantial 
impact on real incomes since 2010. But preliminary data suggest that the same pattern, or 
rather, the lack of a consistent pattern, will probably hold throughout the recession and 
beyond. The study by Brewer et al (2011) is in part an assessment the changes in RP and AP 
since 2008, and in part a forecast of the likely changes over the coming years. The quasi-
absolute threshold is set at 60% of real median incomes in 2010. Between 2009 and 2012, 
the AP measure shows a sharp increase in poverty across all population groups studied. RP, 
in contrast, initially decreased slightly, and then returned to its 2009-level. From 2013 
onwards, RP is forecast to continue increasing, while AP is forecast to slowly fall again.  
 
1.5 Conclusion  
Given that poverty is a highly abstract concept, it is obvious that different indicators are not 
simply substitutes for one another. But the short summary of this chapter is that the results 
of a poverty study are not just influenced, but virtually determined by the choice of the 
poverty measure. 
Nevertheless, policymakers, charities and anti-poverty campaign groups often seem to 
assume that different poverty indices were close substitutes. The choice of a poverty 
indicator is therefore mistakenly treated as if it were merely a technical detail, rather than 
the decisive question. As a result, the figures resulting from the application of common 
poverty concepts are seldom interpreted with the appropriate caution. For example, the 
poverty count resulting from the use of RP measures are frequently reported as ‘the 
number of people below the poverty line’ or simply ‘the number of people living in poverty’ 
(see, for example, Gregg et al/ Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1999; CPAG, 2000; Save the 
Children, 2000; Barnado’s, 2001). The caveat that such figures result from the application of 
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one very specific concept of poverty, based on very specific assumptions, is seldom 
provided (even though there are a few exceptions – see UNICEF, 2012). Section 2.4 of the 
next chapter will show that this leads to a variety of widespread misunderstandings in the 
poverty debate.  
 
This chapter has explained how different poverty indicators are constructed and applied, 
without much regard for the ideas that these indicators represent. But different indicators 
do not just differ in their technical properties. They embody different ideas of what poverty 
actually is. The next chapter will address this issue. It will explore how the common 
understanding of poverty has itself changed over time in the developed world, and 
















2. The understanding of poverty over time 
 
2.1 The origins of poverty measurement 
 
Poverty research has long been based on an understanding of poverty as impeded physical 
functioning. Poverty was interpreted as a lack of resources necessary to fulfil essential 
physical needs such as nutrition, shelter and clothing. In Britain, systematic attempts to 
measure poverty go back to the research of Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree in the 
late 19th century (Pantazis et al, 2006, pp. 91-92; Hills, 2004, p. 39; Townsend, 1954). Data 
documenting the living standards of the poorest had been gathered long before (Gordon, 
2006, pp. 37-39), but it was the work of Booth which became associated with the first use 
of explicit, monetary poverty lines. This advent of monetary thresholds separating the poor 
from the non-poor marks the advent of modern poverty measurement, which differed from 
the concept of ‘pauperism’ that was known until then: A ‘pauper’ was not defined in terms 
of income, but in terms of reliance on poor relief.  
The poverty line enabled Booth to compose his renowned poverty maps of London, which 
categorised boroughs by their prevalence of poverty (Charles Booth Online Archive, n.d.; 
Glennerster, 2004, pp. 18-21; Fearon, n.d.). Booth, however, never explained where this 
threshold – which he called ‘the line of poverty’ – came from. This has only been ‘second-
guessed’ later: Gillie (1996) finds evidence suggesting that Booth had derived it from the 
calculations of the London School Board, which had devised a formula for working out 
which families should be exempt from school fees. 
Seebohm Rowntree’s work is different insofar as he explained in great detail how he 
developed his poverty line – indeed, that is the major part of his first study ‘Poverty, a study 
of town life’ (see Rowntree, 1902; Rowntree, 1922). This study, which measured poverty in 
York in 1899, can therefore also be seen as the first systematic development of a poverty 
indicator. Rowntree defined poverty in the following way:      
“By this is meant that their [the family’s] total earnings are insufficient to supply adequate 
food, clothing and shelter for the maintenance of merely physical health” (Rowntree, 1922, 
p. 54). 
In this study, establishing what counts as ‘adequate’ is seen as a matter of scientific 
enquiry, not personal judgment. The role of the poverty researcher, in this framework, is to 
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consult the relevant scientific literature, and identify a common denominator on what that 
necessary minimum is. Once this denominator has been established, it has to be converted 
into a set of actual goods and services. The researcher then has to establish how much it 
would cost to purchase these goods and services at a low cost, given local prices. The result 
is a costed consumption basket containing a specific quantity and quality of food, housing, 
clothing, and several household-related items. As far as possible, every subcomponent of 
this basket is meant to reflect a scientific consensus in the respective discipline about what 
constitutes minimum requirements for physical health. The total cost of acquiring all 
elements in the basket is the poverty line. 
It is worth looking in greater detail at how Rowntree compiled the three most important 
sub-baskets, namely the ones for food, housing and clothing, because it clarifies the 
understanding of poverty behind this method.  
 
The chapter on food represents the purest expression of Rowntree’s approach. It begins 
with a literature review summarising the state of knowledge in the field of nutrition 
science, from which Rowntree extracts a list of the essential nutrients that make up a 
minimum healthy diet (Rowntree, 1902, pp. 88-98). The list is then transformed into a food 
basket gathering all these nutrients at a low cost: “Our next step is to select a standard diet 
which shall contain the nutrients that are necessary for the maintenance of physical 
efficiency. [...] It now only remains to ascertain the cost of the diet which has been selected 
(ibid., p. 98-103). The result is the basket’s food component. Not every component of the 
basket is derived in this way, but this is Rowntree’s ‘gold standard’, and where he deviates 
from it, he describes it as a second-best solution.  
 
The chapter on housing makes this clear. It also begins with a review of the relevant 
sections of the literature on hygiene, in order to establish a minimum amount of living 
space required in order to avoid adverse health effects (Rowntree, 1902, pp. 171-180). 
Rowntree explains that ideally, the way to proceed from here would be to collect the 
corresponding local rents for this minimum quantity of housing space, and use it as the 
basket’s rent component. He did not put this into practice, because he did not consider 
York’s rental market to be sufficiently developed: There were simply not enough flats on 
offer which fulfilled Rowntree’s requirements; so instead, he recorded the rents that the 
survey participants actually paid (Rowntree, 1902, p. 106). Since the investigation was 
confined to poor areas, he assumed that these already represented the necessary 
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minimum. But this is a compromise owed to local idiosyncrasies. Rowntree still explains 
what his first-best solution would have been, even though he could not implement it.  
 
The clothing category also represents a compromise of this sort. Since the literature did not 
allow the identification of clothing basket, Rowntree established one interviews with survey 
participants. But again, this is a second-best alternative. The core idea is still that “clothing 
should be adequate to keep the man in health” (Rowntree, 1902, p. 107-108. The need for 
household goods was established in a similar way.  
 
On the whole, Rowntree’s 1899 measure was an extremely ascetic, pure subsistence 
standard: 
 
“A family living upon the scale allowed for in this estimate must never spend a penny on 
railway fare or omnibus … They must never purchase a halfpenny newspaper or spend a 
penny to buy a ticket for a popular concert. They must write no letters to absent children … 
They cannot save, nor can they join a sick club or Trade Union … The children must have no 
pocket money for dolls, marbles, or sweets. The father must smoke no tobacco, and must 
drink no beer. The mother must never buy any pretty clothes for herself or for her children … 
Should a child fall ill, it must be attended by the parish doctor; should it die, it must be 
buried by the parish” (Rowntree, 1922, p. 134). 
 
People were classified as poor – more precisely, to be in ‘primary poverty’ – when they 
were unable to afford this basket of minimum necessaries. The central finding of the 1899 
study was that as many as one in ten households lived in conditions of primary poverty, 
with incomes below this poverty line, ascetic though it was. Rowntree’s findings made a 
major impression on policymakers and the wider public. It is documented that Winston 
Churchill, then an MP, commented at the time:  
“I have been reading a book which has fairly made my hair stand on end, written by a Mr 
Rowntree who deals with poverty in the town of York” (quoted in Bradshaw, 2000, p. xliii).  
Churchill interpreted the findings as an indictment of the British government’s spending 
priorities:  
"It is quite evident from the figures which he adduces that the American labourer is a 
stronger, larger, healthier, better fed, and consequently more efficient animal than a large 
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proportion of our population, and this is surely a fact which our unbridled Imperialists, who 
have no thought but to pile up armaments, taxation and territory, should not lose sight 
of.  For my own part, I see little glory in an Empire which can rule the waves and is unable to 
flush its sewers"(quoted by Rowntree Society, 2012).  
Lloyd George also reportedly endorsed the book during public speeches, and it probably 
contributed to the social reform programme adopted from 1906 on (Bradshaw, 2000, p. 
xliv).  
But Rowntree’s contribution went beyond its immediate impact. It inspired a whole new 
branch of social research. In the first half of the 20th century, and especially in the interwar 
period, a variety of similar, regional poverty studies were carried out. Rowntree’s 
methodology of deriving the poverty line from a basket of necessities, the ‘Budget Standard 
Approach’ (BSA), was widely replicated (Horton & Gregory, 2009, pp. 1-6; Linsley & Linsley, 
1993; Pichaud & Webb, 2004, pp. 33-47). The understanding of poverty underlying the BSA 
can therefore be considered the dominant understanding of poverty at that time. 
The common thread which runs through all BSA studies is that poverty is a physical 
condition and an ‘objective’ phenomenon.8 In this understanding, defining what does and 
what does not constitute a necessity is not merely in the eye of the beholder; it is, on the 
contrary, largely physically and biologically determined. BSA researchers always concede 
that there is a degree of personal judgement and discretion involved, but this is typically 
presented as an accidental, unintended feature of their studies. Personal judgement comes 
in when the researcher has to choose a second-best solution due to issues of data 
availability, gaps in the scientific literature etc. Thus, BSA researchers do not claim that 
                                                          
8 Whether or not this minimalistic, subsistence-related concept really represents Rowntree’s own understanding 
of poverty is a matter of controversy. Veit-Wilson (1986) argues that even though most authors have 
interpreted Rowntree in this way, it is a misreading of his position. According to Veit-Wilson, Rowntree’s 
understanding of poverty was, on the whole, much broader, with the subsistence poverty concept underlying 
his famous poverty basket representing just one layer of it. Therefore, Veit-Wilson argues that the later 
reinterpretation of poverty as inhibited social participation rather than physical deprivation should not be seen 
as a paradigm shift away from Rowntree, because it was not at all at odds with Rowntree’s broader 
understanding of poverty.  
This debate is, however, tangential to the purposes of this chapter. Rowntree’s above-described necessities 
basket was based on an understanding of poverty as physical deprivation, not inhibited social participation – 
regardless of whether this fully describes the way Rowntree understood the concept or not. It may well have 
been just one facet of his thinking, but it is this facet which formed the basis of his most widely publicised 
empirical results, and more importantly, which shaped poverty research in the first half of the 20th century. His 
poverty theory may well have had many other elements, but these are not the elements which are reflected in 
his 1899 measurement, nor which other poverty researchers following Rowntree’s methodology adopted.  
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their studies were entirely objective, but they see entirely objective poverty studies as 
feasible in theory.   
It follows that in this understanding, the definition of poverty is also a universal one; it is 
not seen as specific to time and place. This may seem counterintuitive because many BSA 
poverty surveys contain a wealth of highly site-specific local information – indeed vastly 
more so than contemporary relative poverty studies. Rowntree’s 1899 survey, apart from 
providing a general overview of the local economy and demographics of York, goes into a 
level of detail which has no equivalent in modern poverty research. He describes York’s 
sewer system, provides ground plans of typical houses in the investigated areas, shows 
what building materials they are made of, and explains the conditions of meat and dairy 
production (because this affects hygiene standards), among many other details. While not 
all BSA researchers have matched Rowntree’s meticulousness, BSA studies contain, by their 
nature of being local surveys, much more site-specific information than contemporary 
poverty studies.  
Still, most of this site-specific information enters the analysis with a specific function, 
namely to show how it affects the requirements for physical efficiency. Therefore, features 
like climatic conditions, architectural features or working conditions are sometimes 
described in great detail, because they influence the composition of the BSA. In areas 
where more people are engaged in physical labour, a BSA requires a higher nutrient intake, 
and in areas with colder temperatures, more heating fuels are required to maintain a given 
room temperature. But what these studies pay scant attention to is customary tastes and 
social conventions. BSA-poverty is not rooted in a social context. It is impeded physical 
functioning, so it differs across time and place only insofar as the conditions for physical 
functioning differ. 
While the achievements of BSA poverty studies are undisputed, important questions 
remained unanswered in this framework. A puzzling feature of Rowntree’s work was the 
high degree of what he labelled ‘secondary poverty’, a phenomenon which also affected 
other BSA poverty studies, even if they did not necessarily use this term. The figures which 
attracted most attention were those for primary poverty, which described the condition of 
those whose income was below the BSA poverty line. However, Rowntree and his research 
team also found conditions of visible deprivation among households who would not have 
been classified as poor by the BSA method alone. There was something that their measure 
appeared to miss. As Rowntree explained: 
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“The investigator, in the course of his house-to-house visitation, noted down the households 
where there were evidences of poverty, i.e. obvious want and squalor. Direct information 
was often obtained from neighbours, or from a member of the household concerned, to the 
effect that the father or mother was a heavy drinker; in other cases the pinched faces of the 
ragged children told their own tale of poverty and privation” (Rowntree, 1902, pp. 115-116). 
He labelled this phenomenon ‘secondary poverty’. It defined the situation of households 
whose income was above the BSA poverty line, meaning that they could, in theory, have 
bought the full basket or a close equivalent, but who nevertheless visibly ended up in 
poverty. To quote Rowntree’s own definition: “Families whose total earnings would be 
sufficient for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency were it not that some portion of 
it is absorbed by other expenditure, either useful or wasteful” (Rowntree, 1902, p. 296).  
In other words: During their field studies, Rowntree and his researchers saw that there was 
much more poverty than their BSA measure indicated. They saw families whose destitution 
was obvious to them, but which their BSA measure could not detect. It was not clear what 
explained this mismatch. Rowntree turned to explanations like spending inefficiency, or in 
his words, “[i]gnorant extravagance, gambling, or expenditure upon drink” (Rowntree, 
1922, p. 29-30).  
He blamed the monotonous working and living conditions the respondents found 
themselves in, as well as the lack of educational opportunities, but these factors could only 
go so far in explaining the mismatch. Given the highly restrictive nature of Rowntree’s list, 
some degree of spending inefficiency would not have been surprising; and can indeed be 
seen as almost inevitable. But ‘secondary poverty’ was far from being a minority 
phenomenon. Rowntree found a total poverty rate of 27.8%, out of which only 9.9% was 
the primary poverty that the BSA could capture (Rowntree, 1902, p. 297-298). It remains an 
implausible outcome that two thirds of those living in poverty should deliberately and 
continuously deprive themselves of the necessities required for physical functioning. The 




2.2 Limitations of Rowntree’s poverty framework 
Decades later, in the 1950s, Peter Townsend offered an alternative explanation for this 
apparent paradox. He questioned the relevance of the Booth/Rowntree-type BSA for being 
too detached from people’s actual consumption patterns: 
“How those on the borderline of poverty ought to spend their money is a very different thing 
from how they do spend their money. It would be unrealistic to expect them, as in effect 
many social investigators have expected them, to be skilled dieticians with marked 
tendencies towards Puritanism” (Townsend, 1954, p. 133). 
And: 
“It was not appreciated that many in this class would have needed virtues of self-denial, skill 
and knowledge not possessed by any other class in society, if they were to spend their 
money as it was thought they should spend it” (ibid.).  
Townsend’s criticism was not just that the Booth/Rowntree poverty standards were overly 
restrictive. If that had been the only problem, it could arguably have been resolved by 
including additional components, and/or allowing for a higher margin of spending 
inefficiency. Townsend found that BSAs contained a more systematic error. He observed 
that even when poor people experienced a severe lack of resources, they never devoted all 
of their spending to physical needs, but always reserved a share for activities related to 
social life and compliance with social conventions. By focussing merely on physical needs 
and ignoring social ones, BSA-measures ignored the fact that people do not live in a 
vacuum, but in a social context, and that this necessarily affected their spending behaviour. 
Participating in wider society, people could not dispose of their resources with the same 
autonomy as a ‘Robinson Crusoe’ on a lonely island, because this participation came at a 
cost:  
“The pattern of spending among poor people is largely determined by the accepted modes 
of behaviour in the communities in which they live” (ibid., p. 134). 
This refers to expenses which could be labelled ‘social participation costs’ or ‘social 
inclusion costs’, and which can include a particular standard of clothing or the attendance 
of social events. Inability to meet these expenses does not meet the BSA’s ‘physical 
efficiency’ criteria, but it does limit an individual’s ability to participate in society.  
49 
 
This change in perspective gave rise to what would later be labelled the ‘rediscovery of 
poverty’ of the 1960s (Glennerster, 2004, pp. 85-90; Pichaud and Webb, 2004, pp. 45-47). It 
led to the abandonment of BSA poverty measures, and eventually, to their replacement by 
relative measures. The poverty literature generally treats this change in measurement as an 
automatic consequence of the change in the underlying understanding of poverty (ibid.). 
This thesis will later challenge this interpretation (subchapter 5.2), but for now, it is sensible 
to go along with it, and show why the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ led to an outright break with 
the BSA paradigm rather than an evolutionary change within it. The change in poverty 
measurement would have far-reaching ramifications later on, so it is worth devoting some 
attention to its causes.   
Is the BSA concept inherently irreconcilable with an understanding of poverty as impeded 
social participation? Up until here, it could still be argued that Townsend’s criticism could 
have been accommodated within the BSA framework, instead of requiring a fundamentally 
new definition of poverty. In devising the list of essentials, the definition of ‘needs’ could 
have been extended to include not only physical efficiency, but also social participation. 
This would have required two major changes: 
1. Social and/or cultural activities could have been included as a category in its own 
right, for example in the form of a basket component called ‘social 
participation/inclusion’.  
2. The aspect of compliance with social norms could have shaped the selection of 
items for the other categories. In selecting items for the BSA basket, researchers 
would not only have to ask whether an item contributes to physical functioning, but 
also whether it is in line with prevailing social customs. In the clothing category, for 
example, this would have meant that a garment would not just have to protect 
from the weathers. It would also have to be suitable for appearance in public, given 
time-specific and place-specific conventions.  
The question why poverty research has not taken this direction in the 1950s and 1960s is 
not directly addressed in the literature. But it is noteworthy that insofar as there have been 
attempts to integrate the two concepts – physical functioning and social participation – 
they simply did not mix well. It cannot be proven, but it is a possible reason that the 
approach was not taken further because the limited attempts that had been made had not 
led very far. It was Rowntree himself who, unusual among those who used the BSA 
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methodology, had already moved several steps into this direction over time, and found the 
possibilities limited. The evolution of Rowntree’s methodology over time can be shown by 
comparing the three different BSA-baskets underlying his three studies 
Rowntree’s 1899 pioneer basket was one of the purest examples of a measure which 
defined poverty in terms of physical efficiency. Yet even in this study, minimalistic though it 
was, one can already find very minor elements that paid heed to customs and social 
conventions. Rowntree states his criteria for the selection of items in the clothing category 
in the following way: “The clothing should be adequate to keep the man in health, and 
should not be so shabby as to injure his chances of obtaining respectable employment” 
(Rowntree, 1902, p. 108; emphasis added). Since perceptions of ‘shabbiness’ are 
necessarily specific to time and place, this was a departure from the BSA’s leitmotiv of 
poverty as a universal, objective phenomenon. But it was not a radical a departure: 
Respectable appearance was not treated as a necessity in its own right, but as a means to 
generate earnings, and thus ultimately, again, to maintain physical efficiency.  
Yet Rowntree’s approach to poverty measurement kept evolving, as his 1918 book ‘The 
human needs of labour’ shows. This book was not intended to be a poverty study, but it 
would eventually become the basis for the second poverty survey of York, in 1936. The 
1918 budget was no longer limited to physical subsistence, but saw some steps towards 
aggregating social participation components. On the one hand, this can be seen in the 
complete reworking of the ‘personal sundries’ component, which was augmented by 
several items not related to physical efficiency. In sharp contrast to its 1899 counterpart, it 
now made allowance “for newspapers, for incidental travelling, for recreation, for 
occasional presents to the children, for beer and tobacco, subscriptions to church or chapel, 
burial and sick clubs for wife and children, and the multitude of small sundries such as 
stamps, writing materials, hair-cutting, drugs, etc.”(Rowntree, 1918, p. 104). In the 1899 
measure, many of these items were not just absent, but explicitly ruled out. 
 
Social participation considerations also entered the selection of items in other categories. 
Some of the changes are rather subtle, recognisable only in the choice of vocabulary. A 
good example is the food chapter, where Rowntree explains: “[T]he choice of the dietary 
should be guided by considerations of the greatest possible economy commensurate with 
due regard to national customs” (Rowntree, 1918, p. 89). This is a consideration which was 
not present in the 1899 study. The remainder of the chapter magnifies the contrast: “In this 
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country almost every one [sic] takes a mixed diet – even the poorest try to get a certain 
amount of meat; and though undoubtedly health can be maintained without it, we cannot, 
in selecting our dietary, ignore the fact that meat-eating is an almost universal custom. 
So is the drinking of tea and coffee, and though these do not actually supply any 
nutriment, a certain amount must be included in the dietary” (Rowntree, 1918, p. 90, 
emphasis added). Interestingly, the 1899 study had also included a few meat products, but 
it had done so for a completely different reason. Then, the case for inclusion was based on 
the limited biological substitutability between animal protein and vegetable protein, not 
customary eating habits. 
 
Similar changes can be observed in the clothing chapter, where Rowntree aims “to arrive at 
the minimum sum which a working-class family must spend on such clothing as is necessary 
to keep the body warm and dry, and to maintain a modest respectability” (Rowntree, 
1918, p. 100; emphasis added).This contrasts with the 1899 survey, where the issue of 
‘respectability’ was only considered relevant insofar as it affected employment prospects. 
Along the same lines, in the rent chapter (which, this time, uses market rental rates), a 
dwelling unit with a parlour is now allowed (ibid., p. 97). The concept of secondary poverty 
is also dropped.   
 
Building on this, the second poverty survey of York went beyond the physical efficiency 
concept, and showed first steps towards an understanding of poverty based on compliance 
with social customs (Linsley and Linsley, 1993). The final 1950-study was a continuation of 
this tendency. 
 
In short, it is not true that the BSA framework cannot go beyond measuring physical 
deprivation. At least in Rowntree’s work, it showed some degree of flexibility and 
adaptability. But one can identify at least two reasons why Townsend’s criticism of the BSA 
method remained valid even when taking Rowntree’s modifications into account.   
Firstly, this new dimension of social customs did not integrate well with the existing BSA 
framework.  What defines the original BSA approach is the aspiration to universality and 
objectivity. Its premise is that ‘needs’ are a physical/biological phenomenon, and therefore 
ascertainable with very little individual discretion, through a consultation of the relevant 
scientific literature. But once social needs are taken into consideration, this whole approach 
falls apart. There is no scientific consensus on what the minimum requirements for 
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compliance with social customs are, and unlike in the cases where BSA researchers reverted 
to a second-best solution, this is not merely a matter of data availability. Social 
participation per se is a much more abstract concept than physical functioning. Rowntree 
himself was fully aware of this:  
“In the matter of expenditure upon personal sundries I was forced to rely largely upon my 
own judgment, since it was far less easy to fix a standard in considering such items as 
recreation and education than in the case of clothing and fuel” (Rowntree, 1918, p. 103) 
 
The problem was, in fact, greater than Rowntree conceded, because it was not limited to 
the personal sundries component. It also affected the selection of items for every other 
category. Rowntree pointed out that the results were not really satisfactory, but within the 
BSA framework, there was little he could do about it.  
It may well have been for these limitations that Rowntree did not take the new approach 
further. On balance, the 1936 and 1950 Rowntree studies were still predominantly about 
poverty as impeded physical functioning. Poverty as impeded social participation was an 
add-on (and arguably, it remained an alien element).The label ‘personal sundries’ can be 
seen as mistakable, because in large parts, the items in this component also served physical 
needs. It is not clear, for example, why Rowntree subsumed contributions to ‘sick clubs’ in 
this part of the basket. These were a contemporary form of health insurance, which would 
make them expenses for physical functioning.  
In other categories where social customs were considered, this remained within limits. For 
example, in the clothing chapter, Rowntree stressed that “there is nothing allowed for mere 
show” (Rowntree, 1902, p. 127), and although this seems like a perfectly logical criterion for 
a poverty standard, there is no obvious dividing line between ‘respectability’ and ‘mere 
show’.  
Secondly, there was also a more fundamental problem. Insofar as Rowntree took social 
norms into account, he referred to norms of a very static type. The fact that meat was part 
of a customary diet, or that most homes contained parlours, were not specific to the period 
of the investigation. Needs of this type may not be as fixed as the purely physical ones, but 
they still remain constant over long periods of time. Townsend, in contrast, considered 
needs to be dynamic and constantly evolving. In his interpretation, needs were almost 
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entirely socially determined, and their evolution was therefore tightly linked to the 
evolution of overall living standards:  
“Poverty is not an absolute state. It is relative deprivation. Society itself is continuously 
changing and thrusting new obligations on its members. They, in turn, develop new needs. 
They are rich or poor according to their share of the resources that are available to all” 
(Townsend, 1962, p. 225). 
Similarly, in the USA, Victor Fuchs argued: 
 
“$3,000 in 1933 [...] was not at all the same as $3,000 in 1967. It was a different world, 
inhabited by people with different habits, different needs, and different life-styles” (Fuchs, 




“The median income (in constant dollars) in 1965 was 60 percent higher than in 1947, but 
there is no evidence that the problem of poverty is regarded as less serious now than twenty 
years ago. Today's comfort or convenience is yesterday's luxury and tomorrow's necessity. 
In a dynamic society it could hardly be otherwise” (ibid., p. 93-94). 
 
In short, while the amended Rowntree studies succeeded in integrating a few socially 
determined needs, they had no mechanism of accounting for the latter’s dynamic nature.  
In the pure BSA framework, people are born with a fixed set of biologically determined 
needs. In the amended BSA framework of the later Rowntree, people may also develop 
needs that they would not have developed if they had been born into a society with 
different customs. But this remains a one-off process (or at best a very infrequent one), and 
it is largely a random one. The Townsend/Fuchs conception of poverty is even more 
centred on ‘learned’ needs, as opposed to inborn ones. But in their concept, this 
development of new needs is a constantly ongoing process rather than a one-off, and it is 
systematically linked to common consumption norms rather than a product of chance.  
 





2.3 The rise of relative poverty 
The rethinking of poverty of the 1960s meant a ‘dynamisation’ of the understanding of 
needs. The BSA concept of biologically determined and static needs was replaced by one of 
socially determined and dynamic needs. This change in perspective led to what would later 
be labelled the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ of the 1960s (Glennerster, 2004, pp. 85-90; Pichaud 
and Webb, 2004, pp. 45-47). The change in the understanding of poverty eventually 
translated into a change in the measurement of poverty. Subchapter 5.2 will later argue 
that this process was not as smooth as the poverty literature sometimes implies. But for 
now, it is sufficient to show that in the UK as well as in other developed nations, BSA 
baskets disappeared, and poverty lines set as a fixed fraction of central tendency became 
commonplace. These poverty lines have not remained unchallenged, as subchapter 5.1 will 
later show, but they became widely accepted.  
It began in academia. The previous chapter has provided an overview of the literature using 
various measures, where it already became clear that while material deprivation, subjective 
poverty or absolute poverty are still optional complements, the relative measure is always 
included. Many more poverty studies, some of which will later be presented in subchapter 
4.2, use only a relative measure. Already in the early 1980, Sen (1983, p.167) noted an 
“emerging unanimity in favour of taking a relative as opposed to an absolutist view of 
poverty”. More recently, Scruggs and Allen (2006, pp. 881-883) noticed that “research has 
focused almost exclusively on relative poverty rates [...] Virtually all studies of the 
determinants of national poverty and most comparative descriptions of poverty rates in the 
LIS9 countries use the concept of relative poverty”.  
 
Relative poverty also became the measure most widely used by national and international 
governmental institutions. In 1981, the European Commission officially adopted a relative 
view of poverty, defining the poor as “individuals or families whose resources are so small 
as to exclude them from a minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State in which 
they live” (European Commission, 1981). Reports measuring poverty on an EU-wide scale 
followed (see Atkinson, 1998, pp. 2-3).Today the EU, UNICEF, the OECD, the World Bank, 
and the International Monetary Fund regularly compile internationally harmonised relative 
                                                          
9 The LIS countries are the countries which participate in the Luxembourg Income Studies, i.e. most of Western 
Europe, Japan and North America.  
55 
 
poverty indicators (e.g. Eurostat, 2005; UNICEF, 2005; UNICEF, 2007; UNICEF, 2012; OECD, 
2008; Ravallion & Chen, 2009; Nielsen, 2009).  
Most national governments in the developed world have adopted the measure as well, 
even though exceptions remain, especially the already mentioned US ‘Orshansky’ poverty 
line. In the UK, the then Department of Social Security began publishing figures of relative 
poverty in the 1980s (Hills, 2004, p. 40). But this did not mean endorsement by the 
government, which, on the contrary, explicitly dismissed the concept (see House of 
Commons, Hansard Debates, 22 November 1990; Joseph and Sumption, 1979, pp. 27-28; 
Stewart et al, 2009, p. 7). It was not before the late 1990s that the relative poverty measure 
became the basis of official government policy. The most important step was the adoption 
of quantitative targets for the reduction of relative child poverty, followed by a similar 
pledge to eradicate relative pensioner poverty (Stewart et al, 2009, pp. 10-12). The 
promotion of relative poverty to a quasi-official status was initially a consequence of the 
1997 change in government, but it soon ceased to be a party-political dividing line. Before 
long, both of the then-opposition parties also explicitly approved of the concept (see Liberal 
Democrats, 2007; Conservative Party, 2008; BBC News, 2006; Hunt and Clark, 2007). Since 
then, this has been the basis of the political debate on poverty. When the interim child 
poverty target in 2005 was missed, the opposition parties presented this as a failure of the 
government’s policies, while the government emphasised how much progress towards the 
target had been made. Thus, the debate was now entirely about whether the government 
was successful in reducing relative poverty, not about whether relative poverty was a 
sensible policy focus (e.g. Hunt and Clark, 2007). Relative poverty had become, as Hills 
(2004, p. 42) put it, “the nearest that the UK has to an official poverty line”. 
 
2.4 The long-term impact of the 1960s ‘rediscovery of poverty’ 
The abandonment of the Booth/Rowntree framework of assessing poverty, and its 
replacement with a relative understanding and measurement, had far-reaching 
consequences. To illustrate why, it is necessary to provide an overview of how the different 
approaches to poverty measurement have, at different times, led to different perceptions 
of the phenomenon.  
As documented above, the early BSA poverty studies of the late 19th century, which had 
revealed how widespread poverty still was even by ascetic standards, had shocked many 
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contemporaries. But paradoxically, even though the initial BSA studies provided a very glum 
outlook, the period of BSA research as a whole ultimately made for an optimistic case. As 
mentioned, the poverty studies of the BSA period were local surveys, so their results cannot 
be aggregated into a national average. But taken together, they do convey the impression 
of a falling trend, even if far from linear and at times stubbornly slow (see Horton and 
Gregory, 2009, pp. 1-6; Pichaud and Webb, 2004, pp. 33-47; Linsley and Linsley, 1993). 
Unsurprisingly, the early 1930s witnessed a rebound, but not a return to the conditions 
observed around the turn of the century. Rowntree’s1936 study found a very high working-
class poverty rate of 31.1%, but this was against the expanded poverty basket described 
above. The abject poverty that Rowntree’s original indicator had measured had fallen by 
over half. Given the economic context, this shows that Britain had become more poverty-
resilient.  
If the 1930s results gave reason for a cautious, tentative optimism, Rowntree’s 1950 study 
strengthened it. This survey produced a poverty rate of 2.8% among the working class 
population, which corresponded to 1.6% of the total population. So according to the last 
Rowntree study, poverty had virtually disappeared. Hatton and Bailey (2000) document 
how this gave rise to a widespread optimism about the vincibility of poverty, visible in 
newspaper headlines like “The ending of poverty” and “Poverty almost down and out”. 
“Perhaps the most striking testimony to this is the fact that no subsequent surveys of the 
type pioneered by Rowntree, and which flourished in the interwar period, were conducted 
after 1950” (ibid, p. 518). In 1962, Townsend noted: “The belief that poverty has been 
virtually eliminated in Britain is commonly held” (Townsend, 1962, p. 210). 
 
Rowntree’s figures must not be taken at face value. Even by his rather ascetic standards, 
the declaration of the near-disappearance of poverty was premature. Hatton and Bailey 
(2000) later re-examined the findings and found that Rowntree had underestimated price 
increases, while overestimating the impact of the reforms inspired by the Beveridge report. 
Correcting for this, the poverty rate would have stood at 11.8% among working-class 
households, equivalent to 7.1% for all households (ibid, p. 530). But given the economic 
context (see Cairncross, 1995, pp. 45-86), these are still remarkably low figures. Rowntree 
erred about the level, but not about the downward tendency of BSA poverty. 
So in the end, the same BSA method which had initially produced a bleak picture was now 
promoting an optimistic outlook. It created the impression that economic progress, 
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combined with a social safety net, could eventually overcome poverty. However, this 
outcome was specific to the understanding of poverty on which the BSA was built. The new 
relative measure showed a completely different picture. Relative poverty rates were 
substantially higher than BSA poverty rates, contradicting the notion that poverty had 
disappeared, or was close to disappearing. But this was not the major difference which 
followed from the change in measurement. The relative poverty line was more generous 
than Rowntree’s 1950 BSA poverty line, but as described, this was not really a novelty 
because Rowntree’s poverty lines had also become more generous over time. The major 
difference was in the time trend. The period of BSA poverty research had produced poverty 
rates that were falling over time, albeit slowly and erratically. Relative poverty rates, in 
contrast, showed no clear trend for a long time, as the figure below shows.  
Figure 2.1: Relative poverty rates in the UK, 1961-1984, two specifications 
 
-based on data from IFS (2012) 
When the BSA concept was abandoned, the possibility of ‘outgrowing poverty’ disappeared 
with it. In the newly emerging relative understanding, economic progress ceased to be an 
effective force against poverty. In this understanding, poverty was no longer viewed as a 
lack of material resources per se, but as a lack of material resources insofar as these are 
necessary to comply with contemporary social norms. These norms, in turn, were deemed 
to become more demanding as societies grew wealthier. Participation in mainstream 
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society thus becomes costlier with rising average living standards. The effect of economic 
progress on poverty, unequivocally a benign one in the old BSA framework, now becomes 
an ambiguous one. One the one hand, it tends to raise the material living standards of the 
poor. But it also tends to raise social norms and expectations, and thus the cost of social 
inclusion which the poor face. Economic progress acquires properties of a zero-sum game, 
where increases in the living standards of the poor can be offset by the greater cost of 
social participation which the same process has produced.  
This change in the evaluation of the role of economic progress can already be seen in the 
change in vocabulary that accompanied the rediscovery of poverty. According to Townsend, 
economic progress resulted in 
“new obligations and expectations placed on members of the community” (Townsend, 
1979). 
Even more to the point, Brady (2003) later argued: 
“as a society's standard of living rises, more expensive consumption is forced on the poor to 
remain integrated into society” (ibid., p. 9). 
Such a terminology would be difficult to imagine in a BSA poverty report. The implication is 
not just that the BSA-notion of ‘growing out of poverty’ becomes impossible. It also 
becomes impossible to overcome poverty for good, because the emergence of new 
obligations and expectations is an on-going process, which can always reverse the progress 
that has been made in the past. Poverty alleviation therefore also requires an on-going 
effort; it becomes permanent ‘work in progress’ rather than a project that is eventually 
finished. Announcing an ‘ending of poverty’ would no longer be meaningful within the new 
framework.  
These are largely theoretical considerations, but from the mid-1980s onwards, they had 
important implications which could not have been foreseen at the time of the rediscovery 
of poverty. Between 1984 and 1990, relative poverty exploded, rising to 22% of the British 
population. This increase was later followed by a moderation, but it has never been 
reversed. Since 1995, relative poverty rates against 60% of the median have moved within a 
rather narrow band between 16% and 20%. These rates refer to the population as a whole, 
but the basic trend is recognisable for all household types, albeit with differences in timing 
and magnitude (see IFS, 2012).  
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Figure 2.2: Relative poverty rates in the UK, 1984-2010, two specifications 
 
-based on data from IFS (2012) 
The return of high poverty rates has not remained without consequences. As already 
mentioned, in the 1960s, Townsend (1962, p. 210) had summarised the prevailing attitude 
towards poverty with the phrase: “The belief that poverty has been virtually eliminated in 
Britain is commonly held”. Today, it is this belief itself which has become virtually 
eliminated: In a 2006 Ipsos MORI survey, it was held by only 8% of the respondents.10 
Meanwhile, the opposite view has experienced a rebound. The British Social Attitudes 
Survey contains a question which reads:  
“Some people say there is very little real poverty in Britain today. Others say there is quite a 
lot. Which comes closest to your view, that there is very little real poverty in Britain, or, that 
there is quite a lot?”(NatCen Social Research, 2012, pp. 165-166; emphasis in the original). 
The question is not included in every single year, but whenever it has been included, this 
finding has been repeated.  
 
                                                          
10This is the share of respondents who agreed with the statement “There is no such thing as poverty 
in Britain” (Ipsos MORI, 2006).  
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Table 2.1: Perceptions of the prevalence of ‘real’ poverty in contemporary Britain: % of 
respondents answering there was ‘quite a lot’ 
 % responding 








-gathered from NatCen Social Research (2012, pp. 165-166) 
A majority of the respondents choose the “quite a lot” option, and the responses appear to 
be loosely related to the evolution of relative poverty rates. Concluding that relative 
poverty figures directly inform public opinion on poverty would be too speculative, but it 
does stand out that both the sharp increase in the latter half of the 1980s, as well as the 
later moderation, find their parallels in the BSA responses.   
What exactly ‘quite a lot’ means is not specified, except for child poverty, where 
respondents are asked: 
“Of every 100 children under 16 in Britain, about how many do you think live in 
poverty?”(ibid., p. 168). 
A majority believes this rate to be at least 20%, and about a third believe it was at least 
30%. Only 2% of the respondents believe there was no child poverty.  
Table 2.2: BSA respondents’ estimates of child poverty rates in the UK 
 2001 2008 
≥10% 83% 78% 
≥20% 62% 54% 
≥30% 41% 36% 
≥40% 28% 24% 
-based on data from NatCen Social Research (2012, pp. 172) 
The evolution of poverty rates shown in the two graphs above has become the basis of a 
widely accepted ‘poverty narrative’. Pantazis et al (2006), for example, summarise the post-
war evolution of poverty in the following terms:  
“During the 1960s, just over 10% of the population lived in a low-income household. This 
rose slightly under the Conservative administration and following the oil shock in the 1970s, 
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and then declined to about 8% during the mid-1970s. In 1979 [...] changes in economic and 
social policy resulted in a trebling of the proportion of people living in low-income 
households from 8% to 25% - clearly showing that governments do have an effect on the 
amount of poverty in a country and that social policy does make a difference” (Pantazis et 
al, 2006, p. 4). 
A similar account is provided by Horton and Gregory (2009, pp. 4-10), who see poverty in 
post-war Britain as emerging in a U-shaped manner, defined by two decisive turning points. 
The foundation of the post-war welfare state is seen as the onset of a sustained decline in 
poverty. The 1980s, which the authors view as an era of ‘welfare retrenchment’, represent 
the second turning point (the bottom of the ‘U’). In their interpretation, the subsequent 
“huge increase in poverty” represents “one of the greatest social transformations of 
modern times”(ibid.). Similar views have been expressed by Stewart et al (2009, p.2), 
Andrews and Jacobs (1990), Glynn and Booth (1996), Jones and Novak (1999), Kastendiek 
(1999), Kelly (1999), Gregg et al (1999) and Sefton et al (2009). 
This interpretation, while somewhat over-stylised, is fully consistent with a relative 
understanding of poverty. But it is also very specific to this understanding, in the same way 
as the ‘ending of poverty’ narrative of the 1950s was specific to the original understanding, 
i.e. the one which underpinned BSA-research. If there had been no change in the 
measurement of poverty, the above-mentioned ‘poverty narrative’ could not have 
emerged. Within the BSA framework, the stagnant poverty rates of the 1960s and 1970s 
would have been very difficult to imagine, and the rebound of poverty from 1984 even 
more so. This is because BSA measures, even amended ones along the lines of Rowntree’s 
later studies, could only have shown a rebound if there had been a fall in the living 
standards of low earners. Chapter 3 will show that no such fall has occurred. The switch to 
a relative measure was a sine qua non of the above-described poverty narrative. Since 
poverty is not just a variable like any other, it is no exaggeration to say that the change in 
poverty measurement has shaped popular perceptions of post-war economic and social 
history as a whole.  
With this in mind, what would today’s poverty debate look like today if the ‘rediscovery of 
poverty’ of the 1960s had never occurred? In the absence of a counterfactual, this can only 
be speculated about. But an informed guess would be that without a rediscovery, the 1950s 
narrative of the ‘ending of poverty’ might well have remained unchallenged. The 
mainstream interpretation today would then be that poverty in Britain was largely 
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overcome for good in the 1950s, or slightly later. This means that poverty would today be 
seen as a problem limited to specific vulnerable groups, such as the homeless, not as a 
wider social phenomenon. If so, it would not even be expressed as a percentage of the 
population, but as an absolute number – the very concept of the ‘poverty rate’ might no 
longer be in use. The topic would probably still be part of the public policy debate, in the 
same way as homelessness is still part of it. But it would be debated in a very different way. 
First of all, it would not be seen as a function of wider social and economic policies. Social 
and economic policy debates would be largely divorced from the poverty debate, because 
the latter would be limited to marginalised groups which are beyond the reach of the 
traditional social safety net and the formal economy. Helping these groups requires 
separate, and very specific policy instruments. They cannot be reached by a change in 
benefit rates, an increase in the minimum wage, or a lifting of the income tax threshold.   
The above is necessarily speculative, but the situation in Japan provides some ground for it. 
Japan is one of the few developed countries where, according to Osamu’s (2007) social 
attitude survey, the concept of relative poverty has never gained ground. The majority of 
Osamu’s respondents believed there was no poverty anymore in contemporary Japan. The 
existence of low-paid occupations, gaps in the safety net etc. were recognised, but not 
associated with the term poverty.  
Japan and the UK are thus characterised by completely different ‘poverty narratives’, 
despite the fact that in terms of relative poverty figures, the two countries are not far apart 
(OECD.StatExtracts, 2012). This would not be especially noteworthy if it simply reflected 
differences in the general understanding of poverty between the two countries. If there 
was a ‘British understanding’, more relative than absolute,11 and a ‘Japanese 
understanding’, more absolute than relative, both narratives could be equally valid, each on 
its own terms.  
But this is not the case. It has been documented above that in poverty research, in 
international organisations and among policymakers, the predominant understanding of 
poverty is a relative one. But this is not true for the wider population. The British Social 
Attitudes Survey (BSA) contains an enquiry into how poverty is commonly understood. It 
presents respondents with the following three options, asking them to agree or disagree:  
                                                          
11The distinction between relative and absolute should be seen as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, see 
previous chapter.  
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“Would you say that someone in Britain was in poverty if they had enough to buy the things 
they really needed, but not enough to buy the things most people take for granted?” 
 
“Would you say that someone in Britain was in poverty if they had enough to eat and live, 
but not enough to buy other things they needed?” 
 
“Would you say that someone in Britain was in poverty if they had not got enough to eat 
and live without getting into debt?” 
 
The first statement can be seen as a rough description of the idea behind relative poverty. 
The last statement is closest to the old understanding of poverty which underpinned BSA 
measures. The statement in the middle falls somewhere in between. The last statement is 
uncontroversial; 90% of respondents agree that this describes a state of poverty. The 
middle statement still receives widespread support, with 47% agreeing, but the purely 
relative definition is accepted by only 19%. This shows that while poverty is generally 
measured in relative terms, it is not generally understood in relative terms. Since the 1960s, 
the statistical measurement behind the term ‘poverty’ has increasingly been replaced, but 
the connotations that the term evokes have not. This is problematic given how much 
relative poverty figures shape perceptions of the extent and evolution of poverty.  
There are no detailed enquiries into how relative poverty figures are generally interpreted 
by the public. What can be documented, though, is how these figures are generally 
represented by opinion leaders specialising on the subject, that is, by anti-poverty 
campaign groups. These groups frequently mistake relative poverty figures for figures of 
absolute poverty (or material deprivation). More precisely, they use the attribute ‘relative’ 
as if it referred to the severity of poverty: ‘relative poverty’ is used as if it was a synonym 
for ‘a less severe form of poverty’. This is not what relative poverty means – as explained in 
the previous chapter, the relative/absolute distinction is not about depth or severity – but 
this is the way relative figures are represented by poverty campaigners.  
A case in point is the ‘Zero Poverty’ campaign by Caritas Europa (2010), which argues: 
“Around 78 million people in the 27 EU member states (16% of the total population) [… ] live 
on or below the poverty line. They often lack money for the bare essentials such as fuel for 
heating, clothing and minor repairs.” The poverty rate and headcount cited here belong to 
a relative definition. But the interpretation would belong to either a material deprivation 
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index, or to an absolute measure based on the cost of the mentioned items. The figures and 
the interpretation cannot be meaningfully combined in this way. The relative poverty 
figures cited here do not convey any information about which goods people cannot afford – 
this is not what relative poverty figures are designed to do. The combination would only be 
meaningful if ‘relative’ meant ‘less severe’ – poor, but not desperately poor.  
 
The same applies to a statement by Save the Children (2009), a charity and campaign 
group, which argues: “[I]n the UK, 3.9 million children live in poverty. Many don’t have 
access to warm winter clothing, nutritious food, decent housing or education.”Again, the 
3.9m headcount is a figure of relative poverty, but the description is one of material 
deprivation or absolute poverty.  
 
A conceptual error of a similar type is committed when relative poverty rates are 
contrasted with a country’s overall level of economic prosperity. End Child Poverty (n.d.), 
for example, argues that “4 million children – one in three – are currently living in poverty in 
the UK, one of the highest rates in the industrialised world. This is a shocking figure given 
the wealth of our nation.” Similarly, Oxfam Great Britain (n.d.) comments: “The UK is the 
fifth richest country in the world. Until the recession hit in 2008, it had experienced an 
unprecedented period of growth over the last 10 years. Yet this has not benefited the 
poorest in society.” Both groups are implying that poverty rates ought to fall as an economy 
grows, and that the richer a country is, the lower its poverty rate ought to be. This would be 
a reasonable claim to make for an absolute poverty or a material deprivation index, but 
there is no theoretical reason why relative poverty rates should be related to GDP or 
growth rates. Oxfam and End Child Poverty, too, conflate the figures belonging to one 
poverty measure with an interpretation belonging to another poverty measure. This 
misunderstanding is more than just a technical one. Mixing two distinct concepts in this 
way deprives both of their meaning. It conveys the incorrect impression that economic 
progress had no impact on living standards at the bottom end of the income distribution.  
 
A different version of the same underlying fallacy is presented by the Child Poverty Action 
Group (CPAG, 2009). They argue that “international evidence [shows] that income 
inequality and poverty are very closely linked” (ibid.: 17), a point which they demonstrate 
by plotting the relative poverty rates of several OECD countries against their Gini-
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coefficients. However, the close link with inequality is already part of the mathematical 
definition of relative poverty, rather than something that needs to be shown empirically.  
 
All of these examples are different variants of the same confounding: Relative poverty 
figures are used and interpreted as if they were absolute poverty figures (or material 
deprivation figures). The misunderstanding seems to be that ‘relative’ simply meant ‘less 
severe’, as if relative poverty was merely absolutely poverty with a more generous poverty 
line.  
 
The claim made here is not that anti-poverty campaign groups are representative of the 
general public. The fact that campaign groups use relative poverty figures in the above-
described way does not mean that the wider public interprets them in this way. The claim 
made here is a more cautious one: It is unlikely that large numbers of people retrieve 
poverty figures directly from the source (the ONS and the DWP), rather, these figures will 
be disseminated through mediators. They are cited in the media, often accompanied by 
comments from poverty campaign groups. To the extent that poverty campaign groups 
affect public opinion, the above-described misinterpretations can be expected to be more 
widespread, but it is unknown how large that extent is. Ideally, the public’s understanding 
of poverty concepts and their reception of poverty figures should itself be part of poverty 
research. This will be explained further in the final chapter. For now, suffice it to say that it 
would be feasible to test the hypothesis that ‘relative’ is misunderstood to mean ‘less 
severe’. A question along the following lines could be included in the BSA, or some other 
suitable large-scale survey: 
 
“Between 16% and 20% of the British population live in relative poverty. What 
exactly does this mean? Please choose one of the five options below.  
 
1. It means that between 16% and 20% of the British population are poor, but not 
necessarily destitute – they are ‘relatively poor’, as in ‘somewhat poor’. They are 
not lacking food, or a roof over their head, but they may be unable to afford other 
necessities like a warm winter coat or public transport.  
2. It means that between 16% and 20% of the British population earn substantially less 
than the average income in Britain. This figure does not tell us what these people 
can or cannot afford.  
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3. It means that between 16% and 20% of the British population are destitute. They 
may be homeless, they may have their electricity turned off, they may rely on food 
banks, and/or they may frequently have to take out payday loans.  
4. It means that between 16% and 20% of the British population, while not desperately 
poor, are poor when compared to the wealthiest families in the UK. They are not 
lacking food or a roof over their heads. But compared to those families that have 
two or more cars, a second home etc., these 16-20% are, relatively speaking, poor. 
5. It means that between 16% and 20% of the British population, while not desperately 
poor, are poor when compared to the average incomes in the EU. They are not 
lacking food or a roof over their heads, but compared to the living standards 
observed in some of our neighbour countries, these 16-20% are, relatively speaking, 
poor.” 
 
Poverty campaign groups typically represent relative poverty figures as if Option 1 (or even 
Option 3) was the correct one. To the extent that these opinion formers influence 
perceptions among the general public, relative figures would promote a perception that 
economic progress fails to improve the material situation of the least well-off. This is not 
what relative poverty figures show, but it is not a misunderstanding that could be easily 
rectified. Arguably, the fact that relative figures contain no information on what it is that 
those on the lowest incomes can or cannot afford makes relative poverty an inherently 
counterintuitive concept. This lack of intuitiveness may well be the source of the above-
described misunderstandings. A poverty measure which cannot say anything about what 
poor people lack is just not compatible with the way the term ‘poverty’ is commonly 
understood.  
 
Yet if so, this downside would not only apply to relative figures. The quasi-absolute 
measure used in the UK, which sets the poverty line at 60% of the median of the year 1998, 
contains no such information either. Modern poverty research has largely ceased to 
document the living standards of the poverty population it identifies.  
 
Therefore, the next chapter will address this issue explicitly. It will provide a comprehensive 
account of how the living standards of the least well-off in the UK have evolved over the 




3. The evolution of living standards at the lower end of 
the distribution 
 
Poverty rates are the combined result of a measure of living standards and a method to set 
thresholds. This chapter will isolate one blade of the scissors. It will look at how living 
standards of the least well-off have evolved over the past decades, according to various 
measures. The emphasis is on living standards as such; the question of whether or not any 
particular living standard should be classified as ‘poverty’ will be of secondary importance.  
If this thesis had been written during the period of BSA poverty research, there would have 
been no rationale for including a separate discussion on living standards. The topic would 
automatically have been covered, as the measurement of poverty and the measurement of 
living standards were inseparable. 
Contemporary poverty measures, however, are at best loosely related to living standards. 
This is why contemporary poverty research is often far removed from the underlying living 
standards. From most poverty studies, it is not possible to deduce any information on what 
poor households are lacking in their everyday lives. This is problematic because, as the last 
chapter has shown, these measures are nevertheless widely interpreted as direct measures 
of material living standards at the lower end of the distribution.  
Yet measuring living standards is not nearly as straightforward as it may seem. Living 
standards do not simply ‘rise’ or ‘fall’. Relative prices change, the volatility of income 
streams changes, and so does the role of non-market determinants of living standards. The 
combined result is that contemporary low-earners find some goods and services easier to 
access than ever, while their access to other goods and services has not improved at all, or 
even worsened. Any single measure of living standards can only provide a partial picture, 
and in order to gain a comprehensive picture of how the least well-off have fared over the 
past decades, different measures need to be sensibly combined.  
Households which appear to attain similar living standards according to one indicator may 
end up with very different living standards according to another indicator. Unlike different 
poverty measures, different measures of living standards tend to be correlated, but this 
does not mean that one measure can easily substitute another. This chapter will provide an 
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overview of how the living standards of the least well-off have evolved over the past 
decades, and the aim is to do so in a more comprehensive way than previous studies. None 
of the subchapters is truly original; they are mainly discussions of, and minor additions to, 
studies which already exist. But the aim is to provide something which is novel as a 
package.  
This chapter has one immediate aim, and a more distant additional one. The immediate 
aim, as mentioned, is to fill a gap left by contemporary poverty measurement. The results 
of most poverty measures are very indicator-specific; they do not reveal much about living 
standards as such. But this chapter also has a broader function within the overall objective 
of the thesis. Chapters 6 and 7 will later propose a different approach to measuring 
poverty, and one of the principal aims will be to overcome the current measures’ 
detachedness from the living conditions of the least well-off. But this could not be done 
without first establishing a detailed and comprehensive account of what these living 
conditions look like, and where the difficulties in measuring them lie.  
 
3.1 Real incomes 
The simplest indicator of living standards among the least well-off is real incomes at the 
lower percentiles of the income distribution. The figure below shows how annual real 
disposable incomes at the 5th, the 10thand the 15thpercentile of the distribution have 
evolved from 1961 to 2010. The monetary value of the relative poverty line, i.e. 60% of the 
contemporary median, has also been included. All figures are equivalised, with the 
reference unit being a two-adult household without children, and expressed in prices of 
2010. Incomes are measured after direct taxes and cash transfers. They include wages and 
salaries, self-employment income, capital income, occupational and private pensions, as 







Figure 3.1: Real annual disposable incomes at the 5th, 10th and 15th percentiles of the 
distribution, UK, 1961-2010 
 
-author’s calculation based on data from IFS (2012) 
It shows that the 1980s were indeed a period of unusually slow income growth for the 
lower percentiles. Over the whole decade of the 1980s, real incomes at the 10th percentile 
grew by just 7%. Nevertheless, the strong increase in relative poverty between 1984 and 
1990 is mostly driven by increases in the poverty line, which grows by about 25% in this 
period. It overtakes the 15th percentile in 1986, and then pulls well ahead of it.  
During the whole period from 1961 to 2010, real income at the 10th percentile nearly 
doubled, reaching a level equivalent to median incomes in the early 1960s. The 10th and the 
15th percentile evolve largely in parallel, with the latter growing slightly stronger. A 
different picture emerges for the 5th percentile, where real incomes do indeed fall in the 
latter half of the 1980s, and where the growth path becomes increasingly erratic. The 
reasons will be explored later.  
A different way of looking at the same development is shown in the figure below, which 
shows the lower half of the income distribution, in constant 2010 prices, in ten-year 
intervals. The distributions of 1970 and 1980 can be thought of as more or less parallel 
upward shifts of the distributions of a decade earlier. The same is true for 2000 and 2010. 
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The decade of the 1980s is the outlier and the turning point, which produced a much 
steeper gradient that has remained since then.  
Figure 3.2: Income distributions (lower half) in the UK in selected years, annual incomes in 
constant 2010 prices, by percentile 
 
-based on data from IFS (2012) 
Real income data are also available net of housing costs, that is, after subtracting rents, 
mortgage payments and close equivalents. Subtracting housing costs produces an entirely 
new income distribution. Households are now sorted according to the income they have 
left once housing costs have been subtracted, regardless of the incomes they had before. 
Thus, those at the bottom of the income distribution after housing costs (AHC) are not 
necessarily the same people as those at the bottom of the income distribution before 
housing costs (BHC).  Those occupying the low percentiles of this new AHC income 
distribution are characterised by some combination of low incomes and high housing costs.  
Real incomes at the lower percentiles of the AHC income distribution convey a much more 
pessimistic impression. Between 1973 and 1994, a two-decade long virtual stagnation of 
the lowest AHC incomes can be observed. The decoupling of the 5th percentile from the 
mid-1980s onwards is much more pronounced on this measure. Income AHC cannot reflect 
improvements in the quality of housing, but the divergence between incomes BHC and AHC 
is so large that changes in housing quality alone are unlikely to explain it. From the 1970s 
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onwards, housing costs have become an increasingly strong determinant of living standards 
at the lower end. 
Figure 3.3: Real annual disposable incomes after subtracting housing costs at the 5th, 10th 
and 15th percentiles of the distribution, UK, 1961-2010 
 
-based on data from IFS (2012) 
This impression is confirmed by looking at AHC income distributions in ten-year intervals. 
The steepening of the gradient in the 1980s is also apparent here, with the magnitude of 
the upward shifts being more modest at the lower end. The decoupling of the 5thpercentile 
from the rest of the income distribution is clearly visible here. Instead of a succession of 
parallel upward shifts, it looks more like an outward rotation around an anchor, which is 










Figure 3.4: Income distributions (lower half) in the UK in selected years, annual incomes 
after subtracting housing costs  in constant 2010 prices, by percentile 
 
-based on data from IFS (2012) 
On the whole, this provides a mixed picture. Incomes at the 10th and 15th percentiles have 
about doubled, but progress is much less impressive on an AHC basis. The very low 
percentiles, meanwhile, have become decoupled from the rest of the distribution. This is 
especially pronounced for AHC incomes, but it is also recognisable in the conventional 
income distribution.  
 
3.2 Expenditure 
Whether measured before or after housing costs, income measures for selected percentiles 
are a very incomplete measure of living standards. The most obvious limitation of income 
data is that they only offer a ‘snapshot’ perspective, limited to a single point in time.   
In macroeconomics, this limitation and its implications have long been recognised. In 1957, 
Friedman (1957) first formulated the Permanent Income Hypothesis, modelling income as 
the sum of a permanent and a transitory component. Permanent income referred to a 
household’s ‘typical’ income situation, their average income over a longer period. 
Transitory income referred to unsystematic deviations, positive or negative, from this long-
term average. Friedman expressed household consumption as a function of permanent 
income alone, unaffected by momentary fluctuations. Since most people were averse to 
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large and unpredictable fluctuations in living standards, they engaged in ‘consumption 
smoothing’, building up a stock of savings and assets in some periods and drawing upon it 
in others. Momentary income can be unrepresentative of permanent income, but spending 
will usually be closer. This provides a case for approximating living standards through 
expenditure rather than income.    
It is most obvious in the case of the self-employed and freelancers, whose income situation 
is generally volatile. The income situation of employees is more even, but the split of 
income into permanent and transitory components applies to them as well. Reasons can 
include bonus payments, one-off extra income sources, parental leave, periods of 
retraining, short-term unemployment, temporary short-time work, or temporary pay cuts.  
Research on the nature and extent of consumption smoothing has therefore become 
standard in macroeconomics, but its impact on poverty research has remained limited. The 
fusion of research on consumption smoothing with poverty research is probably most 
advanced in the US, where the relationship between income and spending specifically in 
the lowest deciles has become more intensively researched and better understood since 
the 1990s (see Meyer and Sullivan, 2003 and 2006). Research covering UK data has not yet 
reached this stage, but this may be about to change, with a more substantial body of 
research on the subject building up in recent years (see Goodman and Webb, 1995; Blow et 
al., 2004; Attanasio et al, 2006; Brewer et al.,2006; Blundell and Etheridge, 2008; Brewer 
and O’Dea, 2012). The most relevant data source is the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS), 
the successor of the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS). The expenditure studies’ basic 
approach is to hold income levels at various points of the distribution constant, and 
examine the variation of expenditure at these given levels. Where systematic deviations 
and irregularities arise, expenditure studies formulate and test hypotheses which might 
explain this. Taken together, this literature significantly improves the understanding of how 
the living standards of the less well-off have evolved over the past decades. But all of these 
studies also provide notes of caution, pointing out that the reasons for the divergence of 
income and spending data are not yet fully understood. Several hypotheses can be safely 
ruled out, and some factors can safely be considered partial explanations, but that is as far 
as the research in this field currently goes. The remainder of this subchapter will summarise 
this current state of research. 
For the largest part of the income distribution, income and spending data are reasonably 
strongly correlated. There is a lot of variation in spending at any given level of income, but 
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this variation is itself not without regularity. The literature can be summarised by using a 
hypothetical numerical example which, albeit highly stylised, captures much of what is 
known about the relationship between spending and income. It is shown in the graph 
below, which plots income against spending (in gold coins), excluding, for now, the very 
bottom of the distribution. Each income level corresponds to an expenditure distribution, 
which, for the sake of simplicity, has been reduced to three levels: Low spenders, medium 
spenders and high spenders. (These could be, for example, the 25th, the 50th and the 75th 
percentile of the expenditure distribution.) Among those earning more than 150 gold coins, 
medium spenders always spend a little bit less than they earn, which is shown by the 
distance to the dotted 45°-line. High spenders’ expenditure is always substantially above, 
and low spenders’ expenditure substantially below their recorded income, which can again 
be seen by the distance to the 45°-line. Due to this large spread, the expenditure 
distributions belonging to the different income levels overlap, which means that income 
levels could not be deduced from observing individual spending behaviour alone. However, 
the spread between high spenders and low spenders does not vary systematically across 
income levels. Once somebody’s position in their respective expenditure distribution is 
controlled for, income becomes a good predictor of spending. When comparing high 
(medium, low) spenders only with other high (medium, low) spenders, the correlation 
between income and spending is very high. So despite its fluctuations, income remains a 
useful indicator of living standards throughout most of the distribution. Fluctuations are not 
completely random, and momentary income still has some impact on momentary spending. 
This relationship holds for most of the income distribution – but it ceases to hold at the 
tails. At both the upper and the lower end of the distribution, the spread between high 
spenders and low spenders becomes larger, and median spending moves further away from 
income. While income goes all the way down to zero, spending does not. It eventually hits a 
floor, giving rise to the ‘ice hockey stick’ shape shown in the graph. Real-world data is, of 
course, a lot messier than the stylised example: In the actual data, it would be difficult to 
identify where exactly the turning points of the various ice hockey sticks are. But plateau 
levels below which expenditure does not fall are clearly recognisable. At this part of the 






Figure 3.5: Stylised summary: The relationship between income and spending 
 
At the very lowest percentiles, expenditure levels of median spenders rise again, and those 
of high spenders even more so. Those whose incomes are close to zero or below attain a 
higher average spending level than those whose incomes are merely low. The spread 
between low spenders and high spenders is also much larger than for other percentiles, 
suggesting a much more heterogeneous composition. The households in these percentiles 
attain very different living standards even though they notionally record identical incomes. 
The spread is explained by the high spenders, not the low spenders, who remain on the 
same low plateau.  
Identifying those with the lowest living standards is now no longer straightforward, because 
it now depends on whether ‘living standards’ are approximated by income or expenditure. 
Those with the lowest incomes are not necessarily those with the lowest expenditure. The 
income-poor and the expenditure-poor are overlapping, but distinct groups. 
While the literature is clear on the general direction of the income-spending relationship in 
the UK, it is not conclusive enough on the precise figures, which is why it has been 
summarised via a stylised example up until here. The above graphs will now be linked to 
real-world data, but in a more tentative way, especially because almost all studies 
emphasise that there are measurement issues which have not yet been resolved.   
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The study by Goodman and Webb (1995) is a pioneer in this field. It plots income against 
expenditure using two different years, 1979 and 1992. The main finding is that the 
mismatch of income and spending at the lower end of the distribution has greatly 
intensified during this period, it could even be argued that it has only emerged then. In 
1979, median expenditure still rises almost linearly with income. Only the figures for the 
high spenders (the 75th percentile of the distribution of expenditure given income) produce 
something similar to the hockey stick shape shown above, and even for them, it is not very 
pronounced. The figures for 1992 are very different. The spread between high spenders 
and low spenders is now much wider at the lower end. High spenders in the bottom income 
decile now record a higher level of expenditure than their counterparts in the second 
decile, surpassing even the high spenders of the third decile slightly. They attain about the 
same level as median spenders in the fifth decile. For median and low spenders, 
expenditure levels in the lowest and the second decile are almost identical, implying a 
plateau-shape as in the graphs shown above.  
The authors also derive a general expenditure distribution and compare it to the income 
distribution. This is quite different from the analysis so far, which has held income constant, 
and looked at expenditure at each given income level separately. Now households are 
ranked according to equivalised expenditure levels, regardless of income, so that 
households who share a common position in the income distribution can be very far apart 
in the expenditure distribution. The purpose is to explore the extent of overlap between 
low income groups and low expenditure groups, and the result is that the overlap is not 
very large. Only a third of the households in the bottom income decile are also in the 
bottom expenditure decile, while about half of those in the bottom income quintile are also 
in the bottom expenditure quintile.  
Between 1979 and 1992, the income distribution and the expenditure distribution have 
evolved in very different ways, even though their medians have moved almost in unison. 
Spending at the 5th percentile of the expenditure distribution has increased by 17%, and by 
14% after subtracting housing costs. Incomes at the 5th percentile of the income 
distribution, in contrast, have been flat on a BHC basis, and falling on a AHC basis (as 
already shown in subchapter 3.1). So even though low-earners income has not increased, 
low-spenders expenditure has.  
The authors point out that the reasons for this divergence are not fully understood, but 
argue that the changed composition of the bottom decile must have played an important 
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role. The decile became more heterogeneous, and groups with a generally volatile income 
situation replaced groups with a stable one. The share of pensioners fell while the share of 
the self-employed increased.  
What can be ruled out is the possibility that increasing debt levels explain the gap between 
income and expenditure. Data on various types of debt is separately available for different 
parts of the income distribution, and if debt was the explanation, there would have to be a 
disproportional increase in indebtedness specifically at the lower end of the distribution. 
But the authors show that if anything, the opposite is true: There has been a general 
increase in the use of consumer credit financing, but low-income households were 
underrepresented in this development. This means that debt can explain a more general 
weakening of the relationship between income and spending, but not a weakening 
specifically at the lower end. On the contrary, debt, in isolation, should have the opposite 
effect: It should weaken the relationship of income and spending across the board, but less 
so at the lower end of the distribution. So changes in debt financing had, if anything, a 
moderating influence on the development of the hockey stick curve. This is echoed by other 
studies, and perhaps more importantly, it also becomes clear from the data on assets and 
debts, which will be discussed later.  
The study by Goodman and Oldfield (2004) also contrasts the expenditure distribution as a 
whole to the income distribution as a whole. The study shows directly what the 
hypothetical example above has alluded to: Income goes all the way down to zero while 
expenditure does not. In the early 2000s, there was virtually no household in the country 
spending less than £50 per week (on an equivalised basis), but there were about 1m 
individuals in households earning less than that. Just over 0.5m of them had reported 
incomes of zero, which, in practice, means negative incomes that are set to zero. The two 
distributions have also evolved quite differently over time. Spending at the 5th percentile of 
the expenditure distribution shows unspectacular but steady growth throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, with no major interruptions and no recognisable turning points. As a result, 
summary measures also differ. The Gini coefficient of expenditure rises over the 1980s, but 
not nearly as much as the Gini coefficient of income, and it also shows a greater degree of 
moderation in the early 1990s. The authors argue that increased income volatility 
contributed to the divergence of the two distributions, but also note that can only be a 
partial explanation.  
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In a major study using mainly data from 2001 and 2002, but also including a longer 
comparison over time, Brewer et al (2006) explore the relationship between income and 
spending after housing costs. In this study’s results, the plateau levels shown in the graphs 
above are clearly recognisable. On an equivalised basis and not counting housing expenses, 
the plateau level was about £100 per week for low spenders, just under £150 for median 
spenders, and about £200 for high spenders. For median and high spenders, this plateau 
stretched from the third to about the twentieth percentile of the income distribution. In 
the percentiles from the 10th downwards, average expenditure is above average income, 
and from the 5th percentile downwards, even low spenders (the bottom quartile of the 
distribution of expenditure given income) spend more than their recorded income. In the 
lowest percentile, median non-housing expenditure is almost £200 per week, and over 
£300 for high spenders. Those in the bottom income percentile thus recorded about the 
same average expenditure as those in the 31st percentile, as implied by the upward tick at 
the end of the hockey sticks in the above graph. 
The authors evaluate how this relationship has evolved over time, and confirm Goodman’s 
and Webb’s finding that the incongruence of income and expenditure at the bottom is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. In data from the 1970s, it was barely visible, even for the 
very bottom. This had changed completely by the early 1990s, when, in terms of median 
expenditure, the bottom percentile was closer to the median than to the 10th percentile of 
the income distribution. Over the course of the 1980s, income ceased to be a reliable 


















Figure 3.6: Median annual expenditure at several percentiles of the income distribution, 
UK, selected years, both after housing costs 
 
 
-based on data from Brewer et al (2006, p. 22) 
 
The authors also derive an expenditure distribution, and contrast it to the income 
distribution, for several years going back until 1974. Throughout this period, median 
expenditure has tracked median income very closely, but the tails of the two distributions 
have much less in common. During the 1980s, non-housing spending at the low percentiles 
of the expenditure distribution rises by between 1–1.5% per year in real terms, including at 
the very bottom percentiles. This contrasts with falling real incomes for the low percentiles 
of the income distribution. So while spending data suggests that the living standards of the 
least well-off have increased, albeit at unspectacular rates, income data suggests that their 
living standards have fallen.   
For the late 1990s and early 2000s, it is income data which provides the more positive 
impression. Incomes grow by between 2–4% at the lowest percentiles of the income 
distribution, while spending at the lowest percentiles of the expenditure distribution barely 
changes, and falls slightly at the very bottom. So when trying to identify in which periods 
the living standards of the least well-off were rising and in which they were stagnant, the 
impression one obtains can critically depend on how living standards are measured.  
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It can also be gathered from their data that those with low incomes and those with low 
expenditure have increasingly become distinct groups. The authors derive rates of relative 
income poverty and relative expenditure poverty, with the latter being defined as the share 
of households spending less than 60% of median expenditure. It is a consistent finding over 
the years that just over half of those in relative income poverty are also in relative 
expenditure poverty. However, the rates of relative poverty have also been rising on both 
counts, and that alone should produce a larger overlap. If the overlap remained constant 
overall even though one factor must have acted to increase it, another factor must have 
acted to decrease it. The relationship between income and spending must have become 
weaker at the lower end, which is just what Goodman and Webb, who hold group size 
constant, find.  
Attanasio et al (2006) concentrate on the bottom 35 percentiles of the income distribution, 
for which they compare income and average expenditure. From about the 15th percentile 
upwards, income and expenditure are largely parallel. But moving further downwards from 
there on, expenditure levels off, while income declines at a steeper pace. Towards the very 
bottom, expenditure rises again. In this study, the rise is less pronounced than in the 
previous ones, but it covers more percentiles. A comparison over time confirms the finding 
that the divergence of income and spending widened over the course of the 1980s. 
Brewer et at (2009) study the relationship between income and spending specifically for 
households with children in the mid-2000s. A particularity of this study is that expenditure 
data excludes spending on durable goods, leaving only regular purchases. The authors show 
that median non-durable spending among those earning between £50 and £200 per week is 
about £200 per week, making the stretched-out plateau shown in Figure 3.5 clearly 
recognisable. Low spenders in this income range (the bottom quartile of the distribution of 
expenditure given income) spend around £150, and high-spenders (the upper quartile) 
close to £250. Among those with no income at all, expenditure is considerably higher than 
among those with incomes in the £50-£200 range, and this is true for all expenditure levels. 
Among those earning £0, low spenders spend about £200 and median spenders just over 
£300.  
A more recent study by Brewer and O’Dea (2012) also plots income against expenditure, 
and finds that in the income range from just under £100 to just over £200 per week, 
expenditure does not differ greatly. This is, again, true for high, median and low spenders. 
At the very bottom, spending of all expenditure levels shoots upwards again. Among those 
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earning £0, median expenditure is £400 per week, about the same as among those earning 
nearly £500. This study also follows changes in the relationship of income and expenditure 
at the bottom of the distribution over time, and confirms the finding of previous studies 
that the two variables have become disconnected during the 1980s.  
What it adds to previous studies is a disaggregation by household type. It shows that the 
basic tick or hockey stick shape is repeated for all social groups, even though the angle, 
depth and exact location of the trough/plateau differ.  It also offers an augmented 
expenditure distribution, where spending on car and house purchases is excluded, and 
replaced by an imputed income stream generated by the possession of these items. 
Effectively, this means that the study pretends homeowners (car owners) were renting 
their home (car) from themselves. It is a way of making the data tenure-neutral, converting 
homeowners into notional renters. Changes in the relative price of housing are corrected 
for (because otherwise, the increase in the house price level would be counted as an 
increase in living standards).  
The graph below shows the lower half of the expenditure distribution obtained in this way, 
segmented into vingtiles rather than deciles. The idea is to show how living standards have 
evolved over time when measured by expenditure, just as Figures 3.2 and 3.4 did for 
income. There are a number of commonalities between the evolution of the income 
distribution and the evolution of the expenditure distribution. Both show general upward 
movements over time, and both show an increase in the gap between the bottom and the 
middle during the 1980s. But there are differences. Income data have shown a decoupling 
of the very bottom percentiles from the rest of the distribution since the 1980s, which is 









Figure 3.7: The lower half of the expenditure distribution in selected years, UK, by vingtile 
 
-based on data from Brewer and O’Dea (2012) 
To summarise: A number of basic findings reappear throughout the literature and can 
therefore be considered safe, but the details are more tentative because differences 
remain. In the bottom decile, income is a much poorer predictor of expenditure that in 
other deciles. In the very bottom percentiles, the correlation between income and 
expenditure does not just disappear, it even turns negative: Expenditure at the very bottom 
of the distribution is higher than in the percentiles just above. Subchapter 3.1 has shown 
the 5th percentile of the income distribution to have become decoupled from the rest. It is 
now safe to say that this is almost certainly a statistical artefact of the income data. Income 
data for the bottom of the distribution has become continuously less reliable from the 
1980s onwards. Since then, the income distribution and the expenditure distribution have 
also evolved quite differently, even though their mid-points have evolved almost 
identically. Spending levels of the lowest expenditure percentiles have shown 
unspectacular, but steady growth throughout, even when incomes of the lowest income 
percentiles have been stagnant. The least well-off have generally fared better according to 
spending data than according to income data, even though there are periods for which the 
reverse is true, and the finding is sensitive to what exact part of the distributions one is 
looking at.  
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3.3 Budget shares 
Subchapter 3.2 has focussed on levels of expenditure. Expenditure has been disaggregated 
by deciles and percentiles, but not by purpose. It is sensible to complement this by a profile 
of how low-expenditure households allocate their budgets across competing needs, and 
how this has changed over time. In particular, the relative budget shares of basic essentials 
and conveniences offers a more direct account of living standards. In poverty research 
covering developing countries, this is a common approach (see Deaton and Zaidi, 2002; 
Ravallion, 1998). It is less suitable for developed countries, but can still be used as a 
complementary measure.  
Data on household spending can be gathered from the Living Cost and Food Survey (LCFS), 
previously called the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS), with data going back until 1957. 
The table below shows a partial expenditure profile for the population as a whole at 
different points in time. It shows spending on three categories built around the key 
necessities, as a share of the total budget. The overall tendency is a falling one. In 1957, the 
average British households still had to reserve as much as 58% of their budget for necessity 
categories. Half a century later, this share had gone down to 42%. But there are huge 
differences between the categories. The combined share spent on food and clothing has 
fallen from 43% to 20%. But the share of housing has increased, partially offsetting these 
gains again.  
Table 3.1: Spending on essentials as a % of total household budget, all households, UK, 
selected years 
 1957 1967 1977 1987 1997 2006 
1. Housing, fuel and power 15 18 18 22 20 22 
2. Food and non-alcoholic drinks 33 27 25 19 18 15 
3. Clothing and footwear 10 9 8 7 6 5 
Total 58 54 51 48 44 42 
-gathered from ONS (2008) 
 
For more recent years, spending data is also available for each income decile separately.  
The table below shows expenditure profiles for households in the lowest income decile 
only, rather than the population as a whole. Unfortunately, the figures on housing, fuel and 
power are not directly comparable across the two tables. The more recent editions of the 
EFS have subtracted Housing Benefit payments and mortgage interest payments from 
housing costs, and its successor, the LCFS, has continued this practice. The other spending 
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categories are, however, comparable, and data for the housing category are at least 
comparable within each table.  
Several observations stand out. Expenditure on non-housing necessities has fallen to one 
fifth of low-earners’ budget. This is a lower share than for average households as recently 
as in 1987. In a long-term perspective, expenditure profile figures point to substantial 
increases in the living standards of low-earners, despite a recent setback. They have to 
spend less on necessities, which leaves greater proportions of their budgets for items 
related to comfort and quality of life. Spending on goods and services related to recreation, 
hotel overnight stays, restaurant visits, cultural activities and communication services 
accounts for one fifth.  
Table 3.2: Spending on essentials and conveniences as a % of total household budget, 
bottom decile by gross equivalised income, UK, selected years 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1. Housing, fuel and power 
minus Housing Benefit 
and mortgage payments 
14 14 18 18 20 21 22 21 
2. Food and non-alcoholic drinks 15 15 15 15 15 17 16 15 
3. Clothing and footwear 6 7 7 6 5 5 5 5 
Total necessities 35 36 40 39 40 43 43 41 
4. Recreation and culture 13 12 10 11 11 11 10 10 
5. Restaurants and hotels 8 7 8 8 7 7 7 6 
6. Communication 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 
Total convenience 25 23 21 23 21 22 20 20 
-gathered from ONS (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010& 2011)  
 
But the figures also show that in 2003, low-earners’ spending on necessities was lower than 
today, while spending on conveniences was higher, as a proportion of their total budgets.12 
The recent decline in low-earners’ living standard implied by these figures has occurred 
before the current recession. The figures for 2010 and 2007 are very similar, but both stand 
in contrast to the 2003 figures.   
The main driver here is housing costs, and this echoes the findings from the income figures 
in subchapter 3.1. Housing costs appear to play an especially important role in determining 
low-earners’ living standards, and the above figures understate the degree to which this is 
actually the case, due to a particularity in the way in which the LCFS/EFS treats Housing 
Benefit (HB). In the expenditure surveys, HB is subtracted from rent payments, which 
                                                          
12 Data from before 2003 is not available in the same format. 
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means that it is effectively treated as a rent rebate rather than an income source. Since HB 
is a major component of income for many households at the lower end of the distribution, 
this practice has a substantial impact on the results.  
Budget profiles are a very rough-and-ready measure. The distinction between necessities 
and optional/convenience goods is not nearly as straightforward as implied in the above 
tables. In reality, each of the above categories contains both necessities and ‘luxuries’ 
(goods with a high and goods with a low income elasticity of demand). By lumping very 
different products into large categories, these profiles miss a lot of variation. They allow a 
look below highly aggregated measures like income or spending, but replace it with a high 
level of aggregation of a different kind. But the following conclusion does not overstretch 
the data: Contemporary low-earners find it much easier to afford non-housing necessities, 
in particular food and clothing, than in previous decades. They even find it easier than 
average earners a generation ago. But at the same time, they find it harder to afford 
housing space. These two effects do not cancel each other out, but the greater weight of 
housing costs has offset some of the progress that has been elsewhere. This is an additional 
layer of information which is not contained in income or expenditure levels.  
 
3.4 Consumption and access to consumer durables 
 
The possession of durable consumer goods is another dimension of living standards. Apart 
from their value in use, durables can also act as an alternative vehicle of consumption 
smoothing, which is why some economic papers have treat the purchase of durables as an 
alternative form of saving (e.g. Bennett et al, 2001). The possession of a durable generates 
an imputed consumption stream, which contributes to a household’s living standard even if 
this is not seen in income or expenditure figures. Durable ownership rates are not simply a 
function of the level of income or expenditure. They have additional, independent 
determinants which income and expenditure data do not detect, which is why they 
contribute additional layers of information. These determinants include changes in the 
structure of relative prices; but more generally, since ownership rates are an example of 
output-based measures, they can also capture unobservable and/or unquantifiable factors 
which affect living standards.  
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Information on durables ownership can be gathered from the LCFS and its predecessors. 
The data does not allow the computation of imputed income streams, because ownership 
is only recorded on a yes-or-no basis, without adjustments for the durables’ quality or age. 
Table 3.3 shows ownership rates of four key items since 1970 for the population as a 
whole.13 All four show upward trends, and taken together, they indicate how much living 
standards have changed over time.  
Table 3.3: Percentage of households with access to selected consumer durables, whole 
population, UK, selected years 






1970 52% 30% 65% 35% n/a 
1980 60% 59% 79% 72% 57% 
1990 67% 79% 86% 87% 67% 
2000 72% 91% 91% 95% 71% 
2010 75% 96% 96% 87% 66% 
-gathered from ONS (2010), DCLG & ONS (2012) 
For more recent years, data on durables ownership is also available for each income decile 
separately. As in the case of expenditure profiles, this enables a comparison of the situation 
of contemporary low-earners with the situation of average earners in the recent past. Table 
3.4 shows access to the same goods as above, and to additional ones for which only recent 
data exists, in the lowest and the second lowest income decile. Figures for the top decile of 
the distribution have also been included, as a proxy for the highest realistically attainable 
rate (which will seldom be 100%).  
Among households in the bottom income decile today, the proportion with access to 
central heating, washing machines and telephones is higher than it was for the population 
as a whole in 1980. Contemporary low-earners are, again, in this narrow sense ‘better off’ 
than average earners a generation ago. Ownership rates of mobile phones, microwaves, 
satellite receivers as well as CD and DVD players are also above 60% in the bottom decile, 
and access to bank accounts is near-universal. There are products to which less than half of 
those in the lowest deciles have access, but these tend to be the products which even a 
sizeable share of top-earners do not have (tumble dryers, dishwashers), or where a factor 
beyond income appears to play a role. For example, home contents insurance is tightly 
                                                          
13‘Ownership’, in this case, is used in the sense of ‘access to’, it does not have to mean proprietorship. If a 
rented flat contains a central heating and a washing machine, it is counted as well.   
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linked to housing situation: Just over a third of renters have one, while 92% of homeowners 
do.  
If low-earners are better equipped with consumer durables than ever before, it also means 
that their ability of consumption smoothing has increased. Households are more likely to 
maintain a certain living standard during a period of low income, or even of low 
expenditure, if a ‘fleet’ of durables continues to provide a steady consumption stream.  
The figures for homeownership deserve a special mention because this category is not 
comparable to the others. In a growing economy, one would naturally expect ownership 
rates of the other goods to increase, while there need not be an aggregate relationship 
between homeownership and income levels. The category has been included for two 
reasons. Firstly, homeownership is simply the most obvious means of consumption 
smoothing without the use of financial products, at least for those who have paid off their 
mortgages. Other things equal, homeowners are more resilient to income fluctuations than 
renters. Secondly, the previous subchapters have highlighted the adverse impacts of the 
increase in the relative price of housing, and the distinction by housing situation allows 
some further differentiation. During the 1980s, homeownership among low-to-middle 
income households increased substantially, largely as a result of council tenants buying 
their home under the Right to Buy (RtB) programme. The evaluation of the RtB’s impact has 
remained highly controversial to this day (see King, 2010, and Forrest & Murie, 2009, for 
two views from opposite ends), but poverty researchers and poverty campaigners in the UK 
have overwhelmingly sided with the critics (e.g. CPAG, n.d.). However, one of the 
(accidental) consequences of the RtB was that many low-to-middle income earners became 
homeowners just before the increase in the relative price of housing began in earnest 
(more on which in Chapters 7-9). This means that the same RtB, on which many in the 
‘poverty community’ take such a critical view, must have ameliorated the impact of rising 








Table 3.4: Percentage of households with access to selected consumer durables, 1st, 2nd and 







Car 29% 44% 96% 
Central heating 93% 94% 99% 
Washing machine 85% 92% 100% 
Telephone 74% 87% 98% 
Mobile phone 61% 62% 88% 
Microwave 86% 90% 92% 
Tumble dryer 37% 45% 75% 
CD Player 70% 73% 96% 
DVD Player 66% 73% 98% 
Satellite receiver 63% 73% 91% 
Dish washer 11% 16% 77% 
Home computer 33% 41% 98% 
Internet connection 26% 33% 96% 
Own home 32% 52% 94% 
Bank account 95% n/a 
Home contents insurance 44% 89%* 
-gathered from ONS (2010), New Policy Institute & Joseph Rowntree Foundation (n.d.) 
*refers to the upper quintile, not decile 
 
On the whole, the figures indicate rising living standards among low-earners, but a number 
of important items counter the trend. Car ownership in the lowest decile is still far less 
prevalent than in was among the population as a whole in 1970. Also, access to a computer 
and internet connection is practically universal in the top decile, while most households in 
the bottom deciles do not have them. Given the centrality of the social participation aspect 
in poverty measurement, these are not products like any other.  
 
There are further qualifications to be kept in mind in order to avoid an overoptimistic 
interpretation of the figures. Firstly, no adjustments are made for differences in quality and 
intensity of use. For example, low-earners today are almost as likely to have a central 
heating in their home as top earners, but this does not mean that they can attain the same 
standard of heating. Secondly, as shown in subchapter 3.2, those in the bottom income 
decile are not always those with the lowest living standards. The inclusion of households 
whose permanent incomes are higher will surely result in some upward bias in the figures, 
even though for bounded figures, this is less of a problem than for the income figures 
themselves. Thirdly, the datasets only register whether a durable is there, not whether it 
has already been fully paid for. To the extent that outstanding consumer credit liabilities 
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remain, the consumption smoothing argument does not hold. Still, while they should not be 
overinterpreted, figures on durables represent a useful supplement. 
 
These figures can be extended into a broader profile of low-earners’ consumption, going 
beyond the possession of physical objects, by complementing them with the data 
underlying material deprivation scores. MD is a relatively new concept, which does not yet 
allow comparisons over time, but it allows a closer look at the living standards of present-
day low-earners. Since MD data is available in an internationally harmonised format, it can 
also be used for cross-country comparisons.  
 
Table 3.5 shows the proportion of households in the UK with access to a set of goods and 
services. The figures are obtained by simply subtracting the individual components of the 
MD score from 100%, to show access rather than non-access. MD surveys use the term 
‘access’ in the sense of ‘actual or potential access’: Those who do not have an item, but 
who report that they could afford it, and are simply not interested in it, are treated as if 
they had it. MD figures are not limited to physical objects, and they correct, to a small 
extent, for the regularity/intensity of use (“every other day”, “annual”, “adequate”). They 
also contain some information on financial stress and vulnerability to income shocks. 
Figures for the UK are compared to those of three Scandinavian countries, which, because 
of their exceptionally low rates of relative poverty, are often presented as the ‘gold 
standard’ of poverty alleviation in the literature (more on this in Chapter 4).  
 
Specified in those terms, access to many of these goods and services is nearly universal. The 
Scandinavian figures are, on the whole, a bit better than the British figures, but the 
difference is not very large. The exception is annual holidays and the ability to cover 













Table 3.5: Access to goods and services underlying the MD basket, % of population, four 
countries, 2008 or latest available year 
 UK Sweden Denmark Finland 
TV 99.9% 99.6% 99.5% 99.2% 
Telephone 99.8% 100% 100% 99.9% 
Washing machine 99.5% 100% 98.0% 98.6% 
Meals with meat, chicken or fish 
at least every other day 
95.5% 96.8% 98.3% 97.4% 
Keeping home adequately warm 95.3% 97.5% 90.7% 97.6% 
Car 95.1% 96.0% 90.7% 91.6% 
Paying bills without arrears 93.8% 92.4% 95.8% 90.4% 
Annual holidays 77.0% 85.4% 90.5% 81.5% 
Able to cover unexpected expenses 71.2% 86.4% 76.2% 69.9% 
-based on data from Eurostat (2009) 
 
 
3.5 Financial wealth 
 
The last subchapter has shown relatively high rates of home ownership. Property wealth is 
therefore not uncommon among low-earners.  
 
But property wealth is a very special type of wealth. It is a means of consumption 
smoothing, but not of expenditure smoothing, due to its non-divisibility. Property wealth 
can also be a misleading indicator as the property market is a volatile market. It is therefore 
worthwhile to consider financial wealth, i.e. savings and non-housing assets, as well.  
 
Median net financial wealth in the UK has been a mere £1,100 in the mid-2000s (Crossley 
and O’Dea, 2010). 27% of all households have negative financial wealth, with debt levels 
exceeding the value of their savings and assets. This means that the majority of households 
could not draw on financial wealth for expenditure smoothing over an extended period.  
 
Financial wealth correlates with income, but not very strongly, except in the top decile. 
There are net wealth owners and net debtors in every income decile, and the variation is 
greatest in the top half of the distribution. In the bottom half, there are not many 
households with substantial (>£20,000) wealth levels, and not many households with 
significant net debt levels either. Throughout the bottom half of the income distribution, 
the median level of financial wealth is positive but very modest, with values of up to £800 




The inclusion of data on financial wealth does not necessarily lead to a more pessimistic 
assessment of the living standards of the least well-off: Even though about a quarter of the 
population live in a household with negative financial wealth, most of them are in the 
upper half of the distribution. However, it does not result in a more optimistic assessment 
either. Most of those in the low income strata do not have net savings or financial assets 
they could draw upon on ‘rainy days’. While the incomes of the lowest earners have 
increased over the long run, and the expenditure of the lowest spenders much more so, the 
same is not true for their wealth levels. The inclusion of data on financial wealth can 
therefore provide a necessary qualification, or a cautioning against an overoptimistic 
assessment of low-earners living standards. 
 
3.6 Mixed measures 
 
In subchapter 3.4, access to consumer durables in the bottom decile has been shown to be 
fairly widespread. But subchapter 3.2 has shown that those with the lowest incomes are 
not necessarily those with the lowest living standards. The latter are more likely to be 
located at the bottom of the expenditure distribution rather than the bottom of the income 
distribution. Therefore, Table 3.6 shows access to durables in the bottom decile of the 
expenditure distribution. The figures are indeed a bit lower than those in Table 3.4. Access 
to a central heating, for example, is widespread, but not universal. One in four, rather than 
one in three, own a computer. This is a good indication that the lowest spenders, not the 















Table 3.6: Percentage of households in the bottom decile of the expenditure distribution 
with access to selected consumer goods, UK, 2001-2009 
 % with 
access 
TV 98% 
Central heating 89% 
Washing machine 84% 
DVD Player 42% 





Two cars 2% 
Private health insurance 2% 
-gathered from Brewer and O’Dea (2012) 
 
But the point remains that this describes, in a limited sense, a higher level of prosperity 
than that of average households as recently as in 1980.   
 
3.7 Other measures 
 
Life expectancy 
So far, the term ‘material living standards’ has been interpreted in a deliberately narrow 
manner, strictly limited to material aspects. For the sake of completeness, it is necessary to 
include a few key health-related indicators. The determinants of life expectancy are a topic 
in their own right, and the question whether life expectancy in developed countries is still 
related to absolute levels of living standards remains a matter of controversy (see Deaton, 
2001, and Wilkinson, 1992, for two diametrically opposed views). This subchapter will not 
touch upon these issues; it will limit itself to presenting a few selected figures.  
Average life expectancy at birth in the UK was around 71 years in the early 1960s, 72 years 
in the early 1970s, 74 years in the early 1980s, 76 years in the early 1990s and 78 years in 
the early 2000s (World Bank, 2010). For England, contemporary data on life expectancy is 
also available separately by social ‘class’ (defined by occupation). In the early 2000s, among 
members of social Class V (unskilled manual occupations), life expectancy at birth was 78.7 
years for women, and 73.5 years for men (White and Edgar, 2010). This was about two 
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years below the population average of the same period, and about equal to the population 
average of a decade earlier.  
As with all the other measures of living standard, some qualifications have to be kept in 
mind in order to avoid an overoptimistic interpretation. Firstly, figures for unskilled 
labourers refer to England alone, where life expectancy is generally a bit higher than in the 
UK as a whole (ibid.). Secondly, the results appear less positive once they are adjusted for 
health status. This is shown by the indicator of ‘healthy life expectancy’ (HLE). HLE is by 
definition lower than life expectancy as such, but the difference is larger for the unskilled 
than for the population average.  
Table 3.7: Life expectancy of unskilled manual labourers, in years, England, early 2000s 
 Women Men 
Life expectancy at birth 78.7 73.5 
Healthy life expectancy (HLE) at birth 68.6 64.2 
Conditional life expectancy at age 65 19.1 13.9 
-gathered from White and Edgar (2010) 
On the whole, though, it remains true that the least well-off live longer and healthier lives 
than ever before, notably surpassing the average for the population as a whole of less than 
a generation ago. This is true even though the figures are specifically for unskilled workers, 
who, apart from being less prosperous in material terms, are also more likely to engage in 
physical labour.  
Air travel 
In assessing living standards, it is generally not sensible to single out individual products, 
because in isolation, the consumption of any one good or service reveals more about 
preferences than about affordability. But since air travel is an especially obvious example of 
a former luxury product that has become a mass market product, it arguably merits an 
exception. The airport surveys of the British Air Transport Association (2010) provide a 
breakdown of British non-business air travellers by socio-economic group, with categories D 
and E (just under 15m of the British population) lumped into one. Between 1999 and 2008, 
the number of outgoing passengers from this group increased from 5.8m to 7.1m, before 
plunging again when the recession made its full impact. The current number is still above 
the one from 1999.  
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This does not show the proportion in these socioeconomic groups who can or could afford 
air travel, because multiple fliers have not been filtered out. Neither is it possible to show 
access to air travel specifically among those with the very lowest living standards, as D/E is 
still a broad categorisation.  
Table 3.8: Number of outgoing flights taken by UK residents in socioeconomic classes D and 
E, in millions, selected years 






-gathered from British Air Transport Association (2010) 
But what is safe to say is that before the crisis, air travel among this group has not been 
uncommon, and is likely to become more common again once the economy emerges from 
the present recession.  
Housing conditions 
Measures of housing conditions are also a direct way of assessing living standards, and the 
amount of living space available per person is an obvious candidate. The English Housing 
Survey (DCLG & ONS, 2012) contains a formula to determine the housing need of different 
household types, which is similar to the formula that determines entitlement to Housing 
Benefit. The basic idea is that a bedroom should never be shared among more than two 
household members, with some household members qualifying for a single bedroom. The 
Housing Survey then shows the proportion of households who meet this standard by 
housing type, and since almost all owner-occupiers meet the Bedroom Standard, it is 
sensible to concentrate on those in private or social rental accommodation.  
It shows that the vast majority of renters meet the Bedroom Standard, but the time trend is 
unusual, peaking in the mid-1990s and then declining to the current level of about 94% 
among private and 93% among social renters. The downward trend predates the current 
recession, it cannot be blamed on households ‘trading down’. It is a very partial indicator, 
and the magnitudes involved are not large, but it serves as a valuable reminder that not all 
measures of living standards show improvements. The more recent changes to the Housing 
Benefit formula and the ‘bedroom tax’ for social housing tenants can be expected to 
aggravate this trend. 
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Figure 3.8: % of renters meeting the Bedroom Standard, by tenure, England 
 
-based on data from DCLG & ONS (2012)  
This measure picks up a recurring theme that has appeared several times in the above 
subchapters: The rising cost of housing appears to have had an especially strong negative 
impact on the living standards of low-earners.  
Fuel poverty 
Households are defined to be in fuel poverty when the cost of heating their home to a pre-
defined standard would exceed 10% of their income, regardless of how much they actually 
do spend on fuel. The concept has many weaknesses, especially because it depends so 
critically on dwelling size. But this is a confounding measure which is unlikely to change 
suddenly, so even if the level of fuel poverty in any given year may not have a meaningful 
interpretation, its time trend still would.  
Since the mid-1990s, fuel poverty has evolved in a U-shaped manner. It fell from 5.1m 
households in 1996 to 1.2m in 2004, and then increased to 4m again, with the turning point 
preceding the recession. The turning point was also the year in which fuel prices started to 






Figure 3.9: Prevalence of fuel poverty in the UK, in m households 
 
      -gathered from DECC & ONS (2011) 
 
This re-emphasises a point which has been made repeatedly throughout this chapter: Living 
standards, and the living standards of the least well-off in particular, do not just 
unequivocally ‘rise’ or ‘fall’. They are determined by a variety of factors, among them 
changes in relative prices, which can move in opposite directions. Some important goods 
and services can become less (more) affordable despite generally rising (falling) incomes or 
expenditure.  
 
3.8 Reckoning up: How to measure living standards? 
 
The above indicators could be grouped into two categories. Income and expenditure at 
selected deciles or percentiles are overall measures, which represent ‘the bottom line’. All 
the others are partial measures, which describe selected aspects of low-earners’ living 
standards.14 Almost by definition, this makes the indicators in the second category 
complements rather than substitutes. The same is not true for the first category. As overall 
measures, income and expenditure data have very similar purposes. When they move at 
very different paces, or even in opposite directions, this does not convey complementary 
but contradictory information. This does not mean that one of them should be completely 
abandoned and replaced by the other. But there is a case for assigning a clear priority 
                                                          
14 The health-related measures are an outlier which cannot be categorised, at least as long as there is 
widespread disagreement over the extent to which they are actually related to material living standard.  
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status to one of them. The above-mentioned studies on expenditure rarely address this 
question. They contrast the impression that income data provide to the impression 
provided by expenditure data, and hypothesise about the potential explanations for 
divergences between the two. But they do not take explicit positions on which of the two 
impressions is the ‘correct’ one.  
The position taken in this chapter is that expenditure, not income, should be the primary 
measure of living standards of the least well-off. But expenditure should be extended, as far 
as data availability permits, towards a measure of consumption. Good examples can be 
found in the studies by Meyer and Sullivan (2006) for US data, and, arguably a pioneer 
study, Brewer and O’Dea (2012) for UK data. Both start with simple measures of cash 
expenses, but then augment them by adding imputed consumption streams resulting from 
the ownership of a home (subtracting the acquisition costs, where appropriate). There are 
at least three reasons why measures of this kind should take primacy over income. 
 
1. Income is poorly correlated to many other measures of living standards as well 
 
Subchapter 3.2 has shown that the relationship between income and expenditure 
disappears at the lower end of the distribution, and even turns negative at the very bottom. 
This is not a property of the expenditure data, but of the income data. Brewer et al (2009) 
have repeated the same exercise for a whole bundle of measures of living standards. They 
have plotted income against indicators of material deprivation, housing standards, 
household assets, cash flow problems, possession of durables, and food budget shares. The 
basic results are always the same as for expenditure: There is a floor level below which 
income is no longer correlated with other measures of living standards, and towards the 
very bottom, these measures show living standards rising again. Most measures show a 
considerable spread in living standards at every given income level, but this spread is 
always especially large in the bottom income decile. It is a consistent finding across 
indicators that those with the lowest incomes are not generally those with the lowest living 
standards. Meanwhile, a comparison of Table 3.4 and Table 3.6 shows that the ownership 
rate of virtually every consumer durable is lower in the bottom expenditure decile than in 
the bottom income decile. This is a strong hint that when trying to identifying the least 
well-off tenth of the population, the expenditure distribution is a better guide than the 




2. Income and expenditure: The correlation holds in reverse 
 
Expenditure data also shows an advantage over income data on a more basic level. Most of 
the above studies have plotted expenditure against the income distribution. This produces 
a ‘hockey stick’ shape, with a plateau and an upward tick at the very bottom. But the same 
does not hold in reverse. When income is plotted against the expenditure distribution, both 
the plateau and the upward tick disappear. The hockey stick shape only appears for 
expenditure given income, not for income given expenditure (see Brewer et al, 2006). 
Those on the lowest incomes do not necessarily display the lowest expenditure, but those 
with the lowest expenditure also display low incomes. Of course, variation remains: There 
are high earners, median earners and low earners at any point of the expenditure 
distribution, but the spread between them does not grow larger at the bottom – if 
anything, it narrows a bit. Down to the lowest expenditure percentile, there is an almost 
linear relationship between expenditure and the corresponding median income level. It is 
almost always true that those at the ith percentile of the expenditure distribution have a 
lower average income than those at the (i+1)th percentile. But it is not necessarily true that 
those at the ith percentile of the income distribution have a lower average expenditure than 
those at the (i+1)th percentile.  
 
3. The limits of consumption smoothing and the role of benefit underreporting 
 
Subchapter 3.2 has mentioned that deviations of temporary from permanent incomes, 
bridged by saving, dissaving and borrowing, are one explanation for the mismatch between 
income and expenditure data. Yet if consumption smoothing was the only explanation, the 
issue could still be addressed within an income-based framework. Income data could then 
simply be averaged over a longer period, to make it correspond more closely to permanent 
income. For US data, studies which use alternative accounting periods are already available 
(Wolff, 2009, pp. 121-122). Unsurprisingly, the result is that the longer the time horizon, 
the smaller the number of low-income households, because those experiencing transitory 
low-income spells are filtered out.  
 
But there seems to be an additional factor at work. For UK data, Brewer et al (2009) have 
looked at the overlap of relative poverty and several other measures of low living 
standards, controlling for the duration of the relative poverty spell. When using annual 
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data, the relationship between relative poverty and other measures of low living standards 
is very low, which is unsurprising – it confirms what all the studies reviewed in Chapter 1 
have shown. When those in short-term relative poverty are filtered out, the relationship 
becomes stronger – but not very much so. The likelihood of experiencing other forms of 
deprivation increases with the duration of relative poverty, but even after three years, the 
overlap remains weak. Some households experience some form of hardship even though 
their income always exceeds 60% of the median, while many others never experience 
hardship even though their income is always below this level. If income fluctuations and 
consumption smoothing alone could explain the lack of overlap between income and other 
measures of low living standards, then filtering out those with transitory low incomes 
should solve the problem. It does not. This is also reinforced by the findings presented in 
subchapter 3.5: Most households in the low income deciles do not have large savings or 
financial assets, they therefore could not engage in prolonged expenditure smoothing.  
 
An additional explanation, mentioned as a possibility in several of the expenditure studies, 
is misreporting of income from government transfers. ‘Misreporting’ does not have to be 
deliberate. Some transfer instruments are simply administratively complex, and subject to 
frequent changes, which makes them easily mistakable. An estimate of the extent of 
misreporting is provided in the table below. ‘Misreporting’, in this case, is defined as the 
difference between the amount the government pays out per transfer instrument, and the 
amount households report to receive. The latter has been estimated by grossing up the 
figures from the official income survey, the Family Resources Survey (FRS). The amount the 
government pays out per transfer instrument has been gathered from the relevant 
departments, which are the Department for Work and Pensions and HM Revenue and 
Customs. If all households gave an accurate account of their transfer income from different 
sources, both methods would lead to the same result (apart from what can be explained by 
sampling errors).  
 
As the table shows, for Child Benefit, contributory retirement pensions, and Council Tax 
Benefit, this is indeed the case. There is no noteworthy difference between the amount the 
government pays out and the amount households declare to receive. But for tax credits, 
housing benefit and the basic income replacement benefits, there is a huge gap between 
the two. Between a third and two thirds of the sums paid out on these transfers do not 
reappear in the income statistics. The table’s last column shows the amount that is missing 
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in the income surveys, as a percentage of the total sum paid out. The findings are in line 
with earlier estimates of benefit underreporting (cf. Brewer et al, 2008).  
 
The exact reasons why income transfers are underreported cannot be known, but the table 
shows two recognisable patterns. Firstly, the transfers which are more heavily 
underreported tend to be the more complex ones. It is probably not a coincidence that the 
gap between income surveys and administrative data is highest for tax credits, a complex 
instrument which differs from household to household, and lowest for Child Benefit, a 
relatively simple flat payment. Housing Benefit, meanwhile, is usually paid out directly to 
landlords, and does not directly reach recipients.       
 
Complexity could explain why FRS respondents err, but not why they always seem to err in 
the same direction. Many of the major transfer instruments go underreported, but there is 
almost no indication of overreporting. It is not far-fetched to suspect that underreporting 
also has a reputational component. Horton and Gregory (2009) document survey evidence 
on the variation of public support for different types of welfare spending, and find a 
relatively stable pattern: Universal and contributory benefits generally enjoy a high level of 
public esteem, while means-tested benefits do not. They find that this is closely linked to 
public perceptions of the recipients, with negative attributes more often ascribed to 
recipients of targeted transfers. The only clear exception to this are disability-related 
benefits, which are targeted to a specific group, but which still enjoy high levels of public 
support.  
There is no ‘proof’ that social stigma is the reason why some transfers are heavily 
underreported while others are not, but it is a conjecture which would broadly fit the 
pattern shown below. It is quite plausible that a combination of complexity and social 










Table 3.9: The extent of transfer underreporting by instrument, in £bn and %, 2008 
 Reported Paid out Missing 
Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit £9.2bn £29.0bn 68% 
Jobseekers’ Allowance £1.4 bn £2.9 bn 52% 
Income Support and Pension Credit £10.9 bn £16.4 bn 33% 
Housing Benefit £13.1 bn £17.1 bn 23% 
Disability Living Allowance £8.5 bn £10.5 bn 20% 
Incapacity Benefit / Employment and Support Allowance £5.9 bn £6.6 bn 10% 
Council Tax Benefit £4.0 bn £4.2 bn 5% 
Basic State Pension, SERPS and S2P £58.8 bn £61.5 bn 4% 
Child Benefit £10.8bn £11.0bn 2% 
-author’s calculation, based on data from DWP Statistics (2011), ONS (2010a) and HRMC&DWP (2010) 
This underreporting, in turn, would go a long way towards explaining the gap between 
recorded income and expenditure. Transfer income may be underreported in the FRS, but it 
will still show up as expenditure reported in the LCFS.  
To gain an appreciation of the magnitudes involved, transfer income has been corrected for 
underreporting in the table below. The second and the third column show market income, 
transfer income and direct taxes for the bottom decile and the second decile, as reported in 
the FRS. The fourth and the fifth column correct the transfer instruments for the missing 
amounts, as identified in Table 3.10. This is, of course, only a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation, which assumes that the extent of underreporting is uniformly distributed across 
all deciles. There is no reason why this should be the case, but there is no way of allocating 
underreporting to specific parts of the income distribution.  
Since Table 3.10 is not an exhaustive list, this is a conservative estimate: It assumes that all 
other benefits have been correctly reported. Figures have been chosen for 2007, in order to 
avoid a recession year which could produce atypical results. 
Table 3.10: Annual incomes of the 1st and 2nd income decile in the UK, reported and 
corrected for underreporting, in £, 2007 
 As reported After correcting for 
underreporting 
1stdecile 2nddecile 1stdecile 2nddecile 
Market income £3,424 £5,879 £3,424 £5,879 
Transfer Income £5,394 £7,511 £7,855 £10,704 
Taxes and National Insurance Contributions -£1,029 -£1,375 -£1,029 -£1,375 
Disposable Income £7,791 £12,015 £10,210 £15,146 




These adjustments raise disposable incomes by one third for the bottom decile, and one 
quarter for the second decile. This is, of course, a very broad aggregate, which lumps very 
different household types together. The pattern shown in Table 3.9 implies that the extent 
of underreporting differs a lot across household types, and this could systematically bias 
the perception of poverty risks. To give just one example: Some of the studies in Chapter 1 
have shown that disability is a poverty risk factor if poverty is defined as material 
deprivation, but not when it is defined as relative income poverty. This may well be 
explained by underreporting: For disability-related benefits, there is much less 
underreporting than for other targeted benefits, presumably due to the absence of a social 
stigma. Both the disabled and the non-disabled underreport payments, but the latter 
substantially more so, biasing the relative risk analysis.  
Underreporting could also explain why the mismatch between income and expenditure has 
grown over time. The composition of lower incomes has changed over time, with an 
increase in the share of transfer incomes and, more importantly, a shift from contributory 
to non-contributory transfers within this component. The three graphs below show the 
composition of gross incomes for the bottom six income deciles15 in three different years, 
1977, 1993 and 2007. (The years have been chosen because of their comparability in terms 
of the business cycle.) Incomes have been grouped into three categories, which are market 
income, contributory benefits and non-contributory benefits. They have not been corrected 
for underreporting, so the figures themselves are definitely inaccurate, but the emphasis 
here is purely on the time trend.  
In 1977, it is only in the bottom third of the distribution that transfer income accounts for a 
sizeable share of gross income, and within this category, contributory payments represent 





                                                          
15 The upper four deciles have been excluded because they do not show much variation over time, and thus add 
little information.  
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Figure 3.10: The composition of gross incomes by decile, % of total, UK, 1977 
 
-based on data from ONS (2010a) 
By 1993, this had changed considerably. Transfer income is now an important income 
source for the bottom half of the distribution, and the composition has shifted away from 
contributory towards non-contributory transfers.   
Figure 3.11The composition of gross incomes by decile, in % of total, 1993 
 
-based on data from ONS (2010a) 
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The figures for 2007 show a re-moderation of these developments, but not a reversal. 
Especially the shift from contributory to non-contributory transfers has been a significant 
and lasting change.  
 
Figure 3.12 The composition of gross incomes by deciles, in % of total, 2007 
 
-based on data from ONS (2010a) 
Non-contributory transfers, as Table 3.9 has shown, are particularly prone to 
underreporting. The transfer system has also become much more complex over time. In the 
late 1970s, retirement pensions, income support and child benefit alone accounted for 
more than two thirds of all reported transfer income (author’s calculation, based on data 
from ONS, 2010a). Table 3.9 also suggests that greater complexity is associated with more 
underreporting. Thus, since the 1980s, there has been a strong shift from relatively simple 
and/or contributory transfers to more complex and/or means-tested ones. Both factors 
reinforce each other, as both can be expected to increase underreporting. Transfer income 
has also become a more important income source for more households.  
These developments could go a long way towards explaining why income and expenditure 
data have increasingly diverged since the 1980s. This is not a particularly controversial 
hypothesis. The fact that income and expenditure have diverged is confirmed throughout 
the relevant literature (see subchapter 3.2), the fact that some means-tested benefits carry 
a social stigma is also well-documented (see Horton and Gregory, 2009), and so is the fact 
that underreporting explains much of the gap between income and expenditure. The only 
novel claim made here is that there is a causal relationship: that stigma and complexity 
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drive underreporting, and that a shift towards more complex and socially less well-accepted 
transfers therefore weakens the correlation between income and spending. Combined with 
increased income volatility, this provides a case for approximating living standards through 
expenditure rather than income data.  
There is also a possibility of non-random non-responses: It could be that those who receive 
the highest transfer amounts are least likely to respond at all in the income surveys. But 
this would not necessarily affect the claim made above, because the mechanism could still 
be the same: Social stigma could still be the reason why those who receive the largest sums 
decline to answer altogether. The above claim does not depend on any particular 
‘distribution’ of underreporting, and this distribution could well be non-linear. To say that 
e.g. Housing Benefit carries a social stigma, which leads to underreporting, does not mean 
that all recipients underreport their Housing Benefit income to the same extent. It could be 
that those who receive moderate sums report them accurately, while those who receive 
the largest sums do not report them at all.  
In any case, even if the explanation turned out to be wrong, it would still remain the case 
that expenditure is better able to capture underreported transfer income than income 
data. This observation does not depend on the reason for underreporting.  
Counterarguments and limitations 
In contemporary Britain, expenditure data provide a better guide to low-earners living 
standards than income – on balance. Expenditure data are not unequivocally superior. 
Some of the weaknesses of income data that have been identified above affect expenditure 
data as well, albeit in other ways, and to a lesser extent.  
FRS-respondents underreport income from transfers that are complex and/or subject to 
negative perceptions. But something very similar occurs in the LCFS for expenditure on 
socially stigmatised or complex products. The extent of this can be shown by comparing 
households’ self-reported consumption to national accounts data on recorded purchases – 
or in other words, by contrasting what people report to buy to what is actually being 
bought and sold (see Blow et al, 2004; Attanasio et al, 2006; Brewer & O’Dea, 2012). For 
most products like food and fuel, the two methods produce very similar results. But for 
alcohol and tobacco, expenditure surveys are completely inadequate, capturing less than 
half of the recorded sales volume. Something similar happens for many services, as well as 
more complex purchases, e.g. financial and insurance products. The overall accuracy has 
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been very high until about the mid-1990s, with aggregate reported purchases capturing 
more than 85% of aggregate recorded purchases. This rate has dropped considerably since 
then, presumably mostly due to falling response rates. If the downward trend in accuracy 
continues, it could eventually undermine the case presented here for preferring 
expenditure over income data.  
Up until now, however, living standards of the least well-off are best measured by 
expenditure data. Especially for basic essentials, expenditure surveys still show high levels 
of accuracy, which makes them suitable for poverty research.  This result is, however, very 
specific to contemporary Britain. Zaidi and de Vos (2001) compare income and 
consumption poverty in various EU countries, and find that in many of them, the choice 
between these two variables makes much less of a difference.  
In short: Expenditure data show, on the whole, greater improvements in the living 
standards of the least well-off than income data, and in all likelihood, the more favourable 




Taking a step back, the impression obtained by combining these different mosaic pieces is 
that the living standards of the least well-off have substantially and continuously improved 
over the last decades. Their real incomes are higher, their real expenditure is even more so, 
and their access to durable consumer goods is a lot greater. The share of their budgets 
which has to be reserved for basic necessities has declined, and the share available for 
convenience and comfort has increased. Income data for the very lowest percentile do not 
show much improvement, but this is almost certainly due to idiosyncrasies of the income 
data. At the lower end of the distribution, income has become an increasingly poor guide to 
living standards, mostly due to consumption smoothing and underreporting of transfer 
income.   
But it is equally important to notice that the results are not unambiguously positive; it is a 
picture with lots of blemishes. Above all, all measures that account for the increased cost of 
housing show much less improvement than partial measures which ignore housing, or 
overall measures which ‘drown’ this effect by improvements made elsewhere. Further, 
while it is true that low-earners reserve a much smaller share their budgets for food than 
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average earners as recently as in the 1980s, the same was already true a decade earlier. No 
improvements have been made since then, and there may even have been a change for the 
worse. Low earners’ also find it harder to attain a given standard of heating than a decade 
earlier.  
On the whole, this produces a multi-faceted picture, with improvements in some, 
stagnation in others and changes for the worse in yet other respects. No poverty measure 
could fully grasp all these layers, and it would be unrealistic to expect any single measure to 
do so. But what has to be reiterated is that none of the poverty measures discussed so far 
comes even close, neither singly or in combination. Whether separately or combined, 
neither rates of relative poverty nor rates of (quasi-)absolute poverty reveal much about 
anything that this chapter has shown. It is true that this is not necessarily their purpose. 
Relative poverty measures, for example, were not designed to show whether low-earners 
can afford to dine in restaurants, to go on a foreign holiday, or to buy a computer. But even 
if incorrectly, poverty figures are widely interpreted to be measures of material living 
standards (see subchapter 2.4). It may not be their purpose to measure living standards, 
but it should be their purpose, because that is how they will be interpreted anyway.  
It therefore poses a problem when poverty figures are entirely disconnected from low-
earners living standards. The previous chapter has explained the emergence of a widely 
accepted ‘poverty narrative’ of British post-war history: Low and slightly falling poverty 
rates  in the immediate post-war decades, a sudden explosion of poverty in the second half 
of the 1980s, followed by a stabilisation in the early 1990s, and then a moderation from the 
late 1990s on. It has been argued that this narrative has been conditional on the prior 
rediscovery of poverty, with the abandonment of the BSA method and its replacement by a 
relative measure. The important particularity of this rediscovery of poverty was that the 
statistical indicator behind the term ‘poverty’ had been replaced, but the connotations 
attached to it had not, or at least not among the wider public or even poverty campaign 
groups. With the new measurement, poverty was no longer meant to denote physical 
deprivation – but it was, and still is, widely interpreted to denote just that, or more 
precisely, a milder version thereof. ‘Relative’ is misinterpreted to mean ‘less severe’, in the 
sense of ‘poor, but not desperately poor’. But despite these misunderstandings, relative 
poverty figures affect the poverty debate. When asked about the current prevalence of 
child poverty, the vast majority of BSA respondents either name a figure close to the actual 
one, or a much higher one. It has been claimed in the previous chapter that the current 
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post-war poverty narrative could not have emerged without the prior ascent of relative 
poverty. This claim has now been substantiated. While some aspects of living standards 
show stagnation of deterioration, on the whole, living standards of the least well-off have 
improved steadily.   
This chapter has been about living standards, not about poverty per se. Nevertheless, in 
one sense, this chapter has already prepared the ground for the new poverty measure 
which will be developed later in Chapters 6 and 7: A sensible poverty measure should be 
able to capture much of the underlying information on low-earners living standards. It 
should automatically summarise much of what this chapter has explained. No single 
poverty measure could capture all of this, but current measures capture next to none. 
There must be room for improvement.  
But providing information on low-earners living standards is not the only function of a 
poverty measure. An altogether different function of poverty measures is to produce 
adequate policy signals, and it is not clear whether the inability of a measure to fulfil the 
former function impedes its ability to fulfil the latter. They could still supply sensible policy 
signals at the macro level, even if they do not contain much micro-level information on low-
earners living standards.  
The next chapter will address this question, by studying the macroeconomic policy 















4. Macroeconomic policy implications of different 
poverty definitions 
 
Chapter 1 has shown that poverty studies which apply different poverty measures to the 
same population generally come up with very different results. This goes well beyond 
merely producing different poverty rates. Above all, different poverty measures show 
different time trends, and identify different risk groups and risk factors. They also differ at 
the macro level: When identifying periods of falling or rising poverty, the choice of the 
measure is often decisive. What one indicator identifies as a period of falling poverty can 
appear as a period of rising poverty according to a different indicator.  
Chapter 2 has then shown how different poverty measures have produced different 
poverty narratives at different times in British history. In the 1950s and 1960s, the generally 
accepted view in the UK was that domestic poverty had largely disappeared. This 
interpretation, though, was intricately linked to the way poverty was understood and 
measured until then. Had poverty been measured differently, this interpretation would, 
most likely, not have arisen. What had nearly disappeared was a specific kind of poverty, 
namely, one which was still closely linked to physical deprivation, even if it had become a 
bit more encompassing than that over time.  
By the 1990s, an entirely different poverty narrative had replaced the old one. By then, it 
had become a widespread view that poverty had returned on a large scale. Time series 
from regular surveys like the British Social Attitudes Survey show that this was not just a 
momentary impression, but a lasting change in perceptions. Just as the ending-of-poverty 
narrative of the 1950s and 1960s was a specific product of the BSA method that was in use 
until then, the rebound-of-poverty narrative was a specific product of the change in poverty 
measurement which had occurred in the meantime. More precisely, it was the result of a 
blend: the blend of the new measurement with the old understanding, which was still 
widespread. The statistical measurement of poverty had changed, but the connotations 
commonly ascribed to the term had not. Thus, outside of poverty research, ‘relative’ was 
interpreted to mean ‘less severe’, not ‘relative to a reference group’.  
Chapter 3 has shown just how much the current poverty narrative depends on a relative, 
income-based indicator. While poverty rates rose, living standards of the least well-off kept 
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improving, according to a wide variety of measures. Specific aspects of low-earners’ living 
standards showed stagnation or even deteriorations, as ‘living standards’ is a multifaceted 
concept, where improvements in some respects can coexist with a worsening in others. But 
a different poverty measure could not have produced the figures which gave rise to the 
rebound-of-poverty narrative.  
Poverty measurement is not an end in itself; its ultimate objective is to derive adequate 
policy recommendations, including at the macroeconomic level. If different poverty 
measures produce different results, this raises the question whether they also lead to 
systematically different macroeconomic policy implications. More precisely, the question of 
this chapter is not whether they can produce different policy implications – it is obvious 
that they can, because it follows from the way different poverty measures are 
mathematically constructed. Due to their very design, relative measures show changes in 
the shape of the income distribution (or rather, the lower half), while absolute measures 
show changes in the real income of those at the bottom of that distribution. Thus, by 
definition, a factor that affects the income distribution (in the lower half) is also a 
determinant of relative poverty, and a factor that affects the bottom level is also a 
determinant of absolute poverty. If a factor raised the income levels of low-earners, while 
raising median incomes even more, it would decrease absolute and increase relative 
poverty. This is self-evident; it simply follows from the mathematical definition of these 
indicators.  
But the question that remains is whether these statistical properties have any practical 
relevance. To use a simple example: Critics of relative measures have long pointed out that 
in a society with widespread destitution, but very little inequality, there would be no 
relative poverty. This is mathematically correct– but it is of little relevance when looking at 
real-world data. There are no countries which fit this description. The world’s highest Gini-
coefficients can be found in Africa and the poorer parts of Latin America (see World Bank, 
2011). Apparently, some of the same factors that hinder development in these countries 
are also prone to producing large income gaps. At the same time, the Scandinavian 
countries show low levels of poverty according to almost any definition (cf. chapter 1). So 
how frequent are situations in which policymakers, explicitly or implicitly, really have to 
strike a balance between considerations of equity and economic efficiency in 
macroeconomic decisions? Are such trade-offs the rule, or are they the exception?  
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This chapter will review poverty studies which aim to identify the macroeconomic 
determinants of poverty, and to deduce policy implications. These are distinct from the 
studies reviewed in Chapter 1, where the main objective was to explore whether different 
poverty populations overlap, rather than what determines their size. The studies reviewed 
in this chapter also differ from the ones reviewed in Chapter 1 insofar as they normally 
concentrate on one single measure of poverty. An additional measure may sometimes be 
used for illustrative purposes, but it will normally have ‘observer status’ only. The policy 
recommendations are typically based on the results produced by one indicator, not both.  
Most studies of this type concentrate on relative poverty, and a few look at some absolute 
measure of living standards at the bottom of the distribution. The conventional format of 
these models is to use the poverty rate, or the change therein, as the dependent variable, 
and to express it as a function of various macroeconomic variables.  
The aim of this chapter is not simply to review the literature on the determinants of 
poverty. More importantly, after the review, the chapter will proceed to a critique, because 
especially the literature on relative poverty is seriously incomplete. Studies on the 
determinants of relative poverty draw far-reaching conclusions from models based on 
limited country samples and using few control variables. They largely fail to check their 
outcomes against the wider state of macroeconomic research. This chapter is an attempt to 
bridge this gap, by fusing two strands of literature – the literature on the determinants of 
relative poverty, and the wider literature on the determinants of macroeconomic 
performance. It will not stop here either, but go on to present a few hypotheses on a region 
which occupies a special place in the poverty literature: Scandinavia.  
 
4.1 Determinants of absolute poverty (and material 
deprivation) 
 
Harberger (1998) reviews the economic literature on the determinants of absolute living 
standards at the lower end of the distribution, covering a broad set of countries at different 
stages of economic development. He finds no evidence for the notion that living standards 
at the bottom had their own set of determinants, distinct from the determinants of overall 
economic performance:  
112 
 
“[N]othing in our experience suggests that the real level of welfare of, say, the bottom 
quintile of a society does not improve as economic growth takes place” (ibid p. 203).  
Harberger’s position is not simply that ‘a rising tide lifts all the boats’. He does point out 
that there are a lot of policy areas where the situation of the poorest could be 
simultaneously improved in both absolute and relative terms. He cites examples like 
monetary instability as factors that damage economic performance in general, but which 
affect the poorest disproportionately. In such areas, policies that boost a country’s 
economic potential can also promote greater equity. But the author also emphasises that 
the use of the tax and benefit system for redistributive purposes is not one of those policy 
areas:  
“A government that tried, for example, to squeeze a societies’ income distribution to the 
point where the richest had no more than five times the per capita command over resources 
of the poorest would end up dooming its economy to stagnation, if not extinction. On that 
definition of equity, there is enormous conflict between equity and growth. For the efficient 
operation of an economy, its resources should be, in the main, allocated so as to maximize 
their contribution to meeting economic demand. This will lead to different types of labor 
having different rewards, depending on the capacities with which they are endowed, and 
the demand for those capacities” (ibid., p. 204).  
Harberger emphasises the role of wages and prices as signals of relative scarcity, which 
coordinate economic activity. When interfered with, they can no longer transmit the 
‘correct’ signals, and their ability to steer resources to their most productive use is 
impeded. Thus, Harberger strongly rejects the implicit assumption behind many poverty 
studies, which view the production process and the income distribution as independent 
from each other. He emphasises that the latter is a result of the former, and cannot be 
interfered with without negative repercussions on it:  
“It does not make sense to think of the income distribution of a country as something the 
government can determine. Nor [...] should it be viewed as something for which the 
government should be held responsible” (ibid., p. 236). 
Harberger advocates a few targeted interventions aimed at supporting poor people, 
especially with regard to access to healthcare and education, but otherwise cautions 
against attempts to alter the income distribution. In Harberger’s account, the tax and 
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benefit system is not a tool that can be used ‘for free’. Its use always comes at a cost, which 
is why it should be used cautiously and sparingly.  
For Harberger, the tax and benefit system is only a supplementary tool for poverty 
reduction. His main emphasis lies elsewhere. In his framework, there is no distinction 
between anti-poverty policies and growth-promoting policies. His policy recommendations 
to fight poverty largely coincide with his policy recommendations to promote overall 
economic growth. He emphasises the importance of monetary stability, fiscal prudence, 
openness to international trade, the minimisation of tax distortions, and the eschewal of 
micro-interventions like price controls and quotas. These are the kinds of basic economic 
policy fundamentals which almost all schools of economic thought, whether neo-classical, 
Keynesian, Austrian or otherwise, would generally agree on. So in this framework, ‘anti-
poverty policy’ and ‘good economic policy’ are virtually synonyms. Also, there is no 
principal distinction between developing, emerging and highly developed economies.    
Dollar and Kraay (2001) also discuss the literature on the relationship between general 
economic progress and income gains for the least well-off, and show that it produces mixed 
findings, but they argue that the prior literature is incomplete. These studies have generally 
expressed the incomes of the poor as a function of economic growth and a set of control 
variables, but they limited themselves to simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations, 
without paying much attention to issues of endogeneity. Omitted variables, for example, 
could lead to a correlation between the incomes of the poor and the error term. Dollar and 
Kraay therefore add an empirical study of their own, covering 92 countries during the 
period from 1950 to 1999. They use instrumental variables (IVs) to account for endogeneity 
problems. The authors find that on average, low-earners benefit at least proportionately 
from overall economic progress, even if not everywhere and at all times. Hence the study’s 
straightforward title “Growth is good for the poor” (ibid p. 20).  
So unsurprisingly, as in the case of Harberger, there is very little difference between the 
authors’ anti-poverty policies and their general economic policies. The main reform areas 
they identify are institutional reforms to strengthen the rule of law, monetary stability, 
moderation of government spending, the removal of trade barriers, and the development 
of a robust financial sector. All of these are, again, measures which most schools of 
economic thought would consider sensible economic policy principles.  
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Finally, Clark et al (2006) use a theoretical model of endogenous growth, in which the 
incomes of the bottom quintile are determined by both income transfers and the overall 
rate of economic growth. Transfers are funded from taxation, which, in this model, reduces 
the growth rate, so transfers have an ambiguous effect on the poorest quintile. The authors 
conclude:  
 
“[B]y reducing the economic growth rate, [redistribution] reduces the welfare of all income 
groups over time. The relevant time horizon for lower income classes actually receiving 
transfers to be made worse off ranges from about 21 years to over 80 years” (ibid., p. 55). 
 
4.2 Determinants of relative poverty 
 
Most studies of the determinants of poverty have concentrated on relative measures. 
Scruggs and Allan (2006) develop a model which expresses relative poverty rates as a 
function of GDP per capita, its growth rate, government spending as a proportion of GDP, 
an index measuring the generosity of selected welfare programmes, the share of the labour 
force which is covered by trade union agreements, the cumulative share of parliamentary 
seats held by parties with a ‘left-wing’ political orientation, and a set of control variables. 
The welfare generosity index is a composite measure which contains information on 
features like wage replacement rates, coverage and duration of entitlement. Their dataset 
comprises 17 Western European and North American nations, covering the period from the 
mid-1980s to the late 1990s. Coefficients are estimated through the OLS method, so 
arguably, the issue of endogeneity is insufficiently addressed. In this model, contrary to the 
studies reviewed above, neither current nor past economic growth is a determinant of 
poverty: 
“What about income and growth effects on poverty rates? Is there any statistical evidence 
that growth rates reduce poverty controlling for other factors (such as benefit generosity)? 
In all our results, estimates for growth rates are not statistically significant” (ibid. p. 900). 
 
When the welfare generosity variable is not included, the party-political composition of 
parliament, unionisation rates and total government spending have a substantial impact on 
poverty. But once the welfare variable enters the model, it absorbs most of the effect, 




“[O]ur results are broadly consistent with previous research that points to a relationship 
between welfare states, left institutions, and poverty reduction”, and in particular, 
“generous welfare benefits play some nontrivial role in reducing poverty” (ibid p. 901). 
 
Scruggs and Allan also specify a similar model in which the dependant variable is an 
absolute, rather than a relative poverty rate, but arguably, this model only has ‘observer 
status’, in the sense described above. It broadly repeats the same findings as for relative 
poverty, but it adds little to the study because it is specified in such a way that the results 
could barely be otherwise. The reason is that it uses the poverty rate for market incomes, 
i.e. before taxes and transfers, as an independent variable. Once this variable is treated as 
exogenously given, redistributive spending must necessarily reduce absolute poverty, 
unless the government redistributed from the low-income to the high-income strata. So 
what this model does not test is whether redistribution itself increases pre-tax/pre-transfer 
poverty in the long run, by causing adverse economic side effects.  
A similar model by Kenworthy (1999) expresses relative poverty rates as a function of 
government redistribution, real GDP levels of 1960, and the poverty rate of pre-tax/pre-
transfer income. By controlling for an initial level of GDP, growth effects are indirectly 
captured. Redistribution is approximated in three different ways, one of which is social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and the other two are composite indices measuring 
the income that people can obtain without participating in the labour market.  His sample 
covers 15 Western European and North American countries, during the period from 1960 to 
1991. Coefficients are estimated through the OLS method with no further adjustments, so 
again, arguably, endogeneity issues are improperly addressed.  
In his model, the level and growth of GDP is not a determinant of poverty: 
“The coefficients for the 1960 GDP per capita variable have the expected negative sign but 
do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in any of the three equations” 
(ibid. p. 1129). 
Instead, it is the three measures of redistribution which drive cross-country differences in 
poverty rates. Kenworthy also includes an ‘observer status’ model in which absolute 
poverty takes the role of the dependent variable. But again, since poverty at market 
incomes is controlled for, the model design already precipitates the result: 
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“Pretax/pretransfer poverty is the most important determinant of posttax/posttransfer 
poverty” (ibid. p. 1129).  
 
The model by De Fina and Thanawala (2004) explores the combined effect of taxes and 
transfers on relative poverty, controlling for poverty at market rates and a number of 
economic control variables. Their data cover 17 Western European and North American 
countries, and the period between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s. The authors find that 
“the estimates consistently indicate that government transfers and taxes policy reduce 
poverty” (p. 336).  
Brady (2003a) specifies a comprehensive model in which relative poverty rates are 
expressed as a function of economic, demographic and political variables. The most 
important ones are GDP growth, a measure of economic productivity, the unemployment 
rate, the rate of economic inactivity, union density, public social expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP, the share of children in single-parent households, and several variables 
capturing the relative strength of political parties with a ‘left-wing’ orientation. The model 
covers data from 16 Western European and North American countries for the period from 
1967 to 1997. Brady finds that economic growth is not an important determinant of 
poverty, in line with the findings of Kenworthy as well as Scruggs and Allan. But Brady’s 
results go further because in his model, it is not just GDP growth which fails to affect 
poverty: 
“[N]one of the economic and demographic variables consistently affect state-mediated16 
poverty” (ibid p. 571).  
In Brady’s model, social expenditure is the key determinant of poverty, and social 
expenditure is, in turn, driven by the political variables:  
“[L]eft political institutions trigger an expansion of the welfare state. As past research also 
demonstrates, this welfare-state expansion reduces state-mediated poverty” (ibid p. 577). 
Moller et al (2003) construct a similar, but more comprehensive model of this type. The 
relative poverty rate is, again, expressed as a function of a set of economic, demographic 
and political variables. The most important ones are GDP per capita, the unemployment 
rate, the number of trade union members as a proportion of the total labour force, social 
                                                          




expenditure as a proportion of GDP, government revenue as proportion of GDP, several 
variables capturing the generosity of individual welfare programmes, and a whole set of 
variables capturing the relative strength of political parties with a ‘left-wing’ orientation. 
This includes an indicator which awards points for every year a ‘left-wing’ party is in 
government, with a lower score if its power is shared with a non-left coalition partner. 
There are three model specifications. The first one is a standard OLS estimation, but the 
other two go beyond and seek to address endogeneity problems more carefully. The 
authors’ findings are similar to Brady’s:  
“When states spend more of their financial resources on citizen welfare, poverty is reduced. 
When they spend it under the influence of left-wing parties, they spend it in a more 
redistributive way and are particularly effective at reducing poverty” (ibid p.44).  
Lohmann (2009) looks at relative in-work poverty, using data from EU member countries in 
2003 and 2004. The poverty rate is modelled as a function of a broad set of demographic 
variables, labour market characteristics, and the level of various transfer benefits. It turns 
out that not many of the economic and demographic variables are significant. Pre-transfer 
poverty among this group is mostly determined by the extent of centralised collective wage 
bargaining, while for conventional poverty rates, “the extent of poverty reduction is higher 
in countries with higher replacement rates and more generous family benefits” (ibid. p. 
498). 
What the above studies have in common is that welfare state redistribution comes out as 
the main determinant of cross-country differences in poverty rates. By emphasising the 
centrality of income transfers, they reaffirm what earlier studies in this field had already 
found (see Mitchel, 1991; Förster, 1993; Korpi & Palme, 1998; Kim, 2000).  
It would be wrong to conclude that all studies on the determinants of relative poverty 
reach the same results, or provide the same policy recommendations. There clearly is 
diversity in these studies: Some emphasise the size of the welfare budget, while others 
place greater weight on how these programmes are structured, i.e. how accessible and 
redistributive they are. Some draw attention to the party-political balance of power, but 
the more common approach is to concentrate on institutional characteristics of different 
welfare regimes that are largely independent of party politics. These studies distinguish 
between more broadly defined models of welfare provision, a common distinction being 
between social democratic, liberal and Christian democratic (or alternatively Nordic, Anglo-
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Saxon, and Continental European) welfare states (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990). Some 
studies treat the tax and benefit system as one large block, while others focus on the role of 
particular transfer programmes within it. Some see redistribution as almost the sole 
determinant of poverty rates, while others find that labour market institutions also have a 
role to play. But they agree on the centrality of redistributive government spending. 
Studies by international organisations into the determinants of poverty rates reach similar 
conclusions. A study by UNICEF (2005) on relative child poverty argues:  
 
“[A]ll OECD governments make significant interventions to reduce the levels of poverty that 
would theoretically result from market forces being left to themselves. For the most part, 
this intervention takes the form of cash or other benefits to the unemployed or the low-paid. 
On average, the result is a more than 40 per cent reduction of ‘market poverty rates’. [...] 
[T]he greater the proportion of GDP devoted to these purposes the lower the risk of growing 
up in poverty” (pp. 20-23).  
 
This finding is reconfirmed in follow-up studies (UNICEF, 2007 & UNICEF, 2012). All UNICEF 
studies also include a measure of material deprivation, but material deprivation has only 
‘observer status’, as its determinants are not explored.  
 
In study on poverty in the EU member countries, Eurostat (2000) argues: 
 
“Social benefits reduce the percentage of "poor" people in all the Member States, but to 
very disparate degrees. The reduction is smallest [...] in Greece, Italy and Portugal. In all 
other Member States it is well over 25%; in Denmark it is around two-thirds, almost double 
the EU average. Denmark also has the lowest "poverty rate" after payment of benefits” 
(ibid., p. 6). 
 
Finally, there are econometric models similar to the ones reviewed above, except that the 
dependent variable is not the relative poverty rate as such but a close equivalent (i.e. 
inequality). The results of these models are very similar to the ones discussed above. 
Bradley et al (2003) find:  
 
“[T]he best estimate of the determinants of reduction in inequality [...] yield our most 
important and striking finding: leftist government very strongly drives the redistributive 
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process directly by shaping the distributive contours of taxes and transfers and indirectly by 
increasing the proportion of GDP devoted to taxes and transfers” (pp. 225-227). 
 
Similarly, Allan and Scruggs (2004) find:  
 
“Just as government by the left tended to lead to more rapid expansion of the welfare state, 
particularly the expansion of rights to reasonable income outside of the market nexus, 
government by parties of the neo-liberal right since the 1980s (or even since the mid-1970s) 
has tended to result in greater retrenchment” (p. 509).  
 
4.3 The trade-off: Taxation and growth 
 
It is clear from their statistical definitions that changes in relative and absolute poverty 
show different things, and can therefore respond differently to the same policy. But what 
the two subchapters above have shown is that this is much more than just a mathematical 
truism. It is relevant in practice because depending on whether they measure poverty (or 
living standards) in an absolute or in a relative sense, poverty studies really do identify 
different determinants, and provide different policy implications. Studies based on absolute 
measures suggest that there is no principal difference between anti-poverty policies, and 
policies to boost general economic prosperousness. Studies based on relative measures 
suggest that poverty reduction requires an entirely separate set of policies. Poverty is now 
seen as primarily determined by the extent of government redistribution, while general 
economic performance is not seen as especially relevant. But this still leaves the question of 
whether these implications merely different, or whether they actively contradict each 
other.  
As shown in subchapter 4.1, Harberger (1998), Clark et al (2006), and to a lesser extent 
Dollar and Kraay (2001) concede the possibility that the policies they advocates may lead to 
a more uneven income distribution. But they regard this as inevitable if economic scarcity 
signals are to fulfil their coordinating function without impediments. Thus, in the case of 
the studies discussed in subchapter 4.1, it is clear that their recommendations presuppose 
a prioritisation of low-earners absolute purchasing power over distributive concerns. The 
authors of these studies do not claim that their recommendations could also inform a 
policy agenda built on a relative understanding of poverty. The claim made in these studies 
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is a more modest one, in the sense that there is an implicit recognition that the policy 
recommendations are only appropriate for tackling one type of poverty. Supporters of a 
relative concept will not find these recommendations sufficient, and they will find some of 
them actively counterproductive, but there is at least clarity about what this agenda can 
and what it cannot achieve. There is still much in these studies that can be critiqued, and 
will be critiqued later on in this thesis, but these studies are more open about their own 
limitations.  
The same is not true for the studies discussed in subchapter 4.2. Most of them are not 
explicit about the fact that their recommendations presuppose a relative understanding of 
poverty, and may not be suitable for a policy agenda that aims to raise low-earners’ 
purchasing power in a more absolute sense. The exceptions are the studies by Kenworthy 
(1999) and Scruggs and Allen (2006), which address this concern. They argue that while 
their recommendations are primarily relevant for relative poverty, they are also 
appropriate for raising low-earners’ absolute incomes. They concede that redistributive 
measures may have growth-damaging effects, but argue that their magnitude is likely to be 
small, and certainly not substantial enough to outweigh the gains to the least well-off.   
Looking at the country samples covered by these studies, it is not difficult to see how the 
authors have reached this judgement. Almost all studies on the determinants of relative 
poverty use data from North America and Western Europe. They include the Scandinavian 
countries, which combine some of the world’s narrowest income distributions (see World 
Bank, 2011) with high absolute levels of living standards at the lower end. And they also 
include the example of the USA, which is at the other end of the inequality spectrum in this 
country set. When these countries are ranked by their PPP-adjusted median income, the 
USA easily comes out on top, as the American median income exceeds the Swedish median 
by almost one third. However, the gradient of the income distribution (shown in Figure 4.1) 
is so much steeper that in the bottom deciles, the ranking reverses. Low-earners in Sweden 
and Denmark are better off than their counterparts in the USA – in relative terms anyway, 






Figure 4.1: The income gradient in the USA, Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark; mid-
2000s, annual income in PPP-adjusted Dollars, bottom seven deciles 
 
-based on data from OECD (2008) 
The extremely low income of the US bottom decile is probably a statistical artefact: As 
Chapter 2 has documented, income has become an increasingly poor predictor of the 
lowest living standards in the UK and the US, but less so in most European countries. But 
Chapter 2 has also shown that this divergence is largely limited to the very bottom of the 
distribution, while Figure 4.1 shows that it is only from the fourth decile upwards that the 
USA shows a clear lead over the Scandinavian countries. At least in this country sample, a 
trade-off between low-earners’ absolute and relative position is not recognisable. Over 
most of the range, real incomes in the US are well above Scandinavian levels, but at the 
given gradient, this lead is simply not large enough to lift the lowest income strata above 
Scandinavian levels as well.  
And these are only the polar cases of the country sample’s inequality spectrum. The sample 
also includes the Mediterranean countries, where the real incomes of low-earners are 
substantially below Scandinavian levels, while median incomes are lower as well (see OECD, 
2008). On the whole, in this country sample, there is a mildly positive correlation between 
absolute and relative living standards among the least well-off (Kenworthy et al, 2008). The 
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most equitable countries also record some of the highest absolute living standards at the 
lower end, while some of the least equitable countries also record some of the lowest 
absolute living standards at the lower end. In this sample, countries which engage in 
extensive income redistribution do not necessarily show low rates of overall income 
growth, and countries where the extent of income redistribution is more limited do not 
necessarily show high rates of overall income growth.  On the basis of this country sample, 
it would be easy to conclude that there simply is no trade-off between redistribution and 
growth.  
Effectively, the studies discussed in subchapter 4.2 conclude precisely that, insofar as they 
address the question. But this is a very strong conclusion given how limited the country 
sample is, and how little the studies attempt to control for other factors that might affect a 
country’s economic performance and distributional outcomes. It would not be sensible to 
criticise the selection of countries, because this is not the authors’ choice: It is largely 
dictated by the availability of income data in an internationally harmonised format. But the 
weakness of these poverty studies is that they largely fail to consult the wider economic 
literature on the relationship between taxation, redistribution and growth. They fail to 
double-check whether their results are, in this respect, in line with those of the larger body 
of literature, and especially with the studies that use larger country samples and include 
more control variables.  
Do high levels of taxation deter economic progress by discouraging work, saving, 
investment in physical and human capital, an efficient factor allocation, entrepreneurship, 
innovation etc.? Or do the positive effects of the corresponding government spending on 
education, infrastructure, R&D, social stability etc. outweigh such costs? This relationship is 
among the most extensively researched topics in economics. Since the emergence of 
modern growth models beginning with Solow (1956), literally hundreds of economic papers 
have studied the relationship between the level and/or structure of taxation, government 
spending, and economic growth (or some of its components). Literature summaries are 
available from Engen and Skinner (1996), Bleaney et al (2001), Slemrod (2000), Fölster and 
Henrekson (2001), as well as Bergh and Henrekson (2011). The literature is far from 
conclusive, and a lot of unresolved issues remain. This is perhaps not surprising given that 
some of the most important confounding factors, especially cultural ones, may not be 
expressible at all in a quantitative model, unless one counts makeshift variables like 
‘country-specific fixed effects’ as a substitute. What complicates matters further is the fact 
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that the models differ greatly in specification and sophistication, and are therefore not 
always easily comparable to one another. But nevertheless, taken together, a few features 
stand out from the literature:  
 More sophisticated models, which study the impact of specific tax rates on specific 
economic agents, are more likely to find adverse impacts than simple models 
which remain at the level of broad national aggregates. To put it simply: Models 
which express the GDP growth rate as a function of the economy’s average tax 
rate, or the level of GDP as a function of the level of government spending, are not 
likely to find conclusive evidence either way. But models which examine the impact 
of, for example, changes in the top rate of income tax on the labour supply of 
those with (potential) earnings in the relevant income range are more likely to do 
so. This is a generalisation: There are highly aggregated studies which find strong 
effects of taxation, and there are disaggregated studies which do not. But by and 
large, the more specific studies are more likely to find effects than the highly 
aggregated ones, and this pattern favours the notion that economic incentives 
matter greatly for economic performance. The studies which fail to find a 
relationship may often fail to do so because their level of aggregation is too high, 
not because the relationship does not exist.  
 Economic agents can respond to a given tax (dis)incentive in a variety of ways, and 
this has to be kept in mind when interpreting the inconclusive studies. For 
example, if a model tests whether a change in income tax has had an impact on the 
number of hours worked, and fails to find it, it has not ‘proven’ that the tax has no 
effect whatsoever. People may still respond to the incentive, but just not in this 
particular way. More sophisticated models therefore explore several avenues, for 
example by incorporating some measure of labour ‘quality’ or ‘effort’ (e.g. 
Feldstein, 1995), or by extending the analysis to potential second-earners in a 
household (e.g. Zimmermann, 1993). Such models are more likely to find responses 
to taxation than models which allow for only one type of response. Again, this is a 
pattern which strengthens the notion that tax incentives play an important role for 
economic performance.  
 It would overstretch the literature to claim that the negative effect of overall tax 
levels on economic performance is safely established. But it does not overstretch 
the literature to make this claim for the more redistributive forms of taxation. The 
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effect of marginal tax rates is more firmly established than the effect of average tax 
rates (e.g. Koester & Kormendi, 1989; Padovano & Galli, 2002; Mullen & Williams, 
1994). It is well established that the taxation of capital and/or business activity 
comes at an economic cost (e.g. Lucas, 1990; Clausing, 2007; Johansson, 2008). It is 
well established that top incomes are especially responsive to taxation (Slemrod, 
2000). It is thus safer to speak of a trade-off between redistribution and growth, 
rather than a trade-off between taxation and growth. 
This is not a coincidence. Even those studies that do not support the notion that 
high tax levels damage economic performance do not argue that taxation is 
irrelevant. Rather, these studies tend to argue that the structure of taxation is far 
more important than its level. They argue that taxation is only economically 
harmful insofar as it distorts economic behaviour, and the degree to which a tax 
does that is not simply a function of its rate. Studies of this type often recommend 
behaviourally neutral taxes rather than low taxes (e.g. Mirrlees et al, 2011). But the 
aim of neutrality collides with the aim of progressivity. Progressive taxes are almost 
by definition non-neutral; they are designed to be selective and targeted.    
A similar consideration applies to social security contributions. Contributions which 
are actuarially linked to future entitlements are not taxes; they are more akin to 
compulsory savings, or the compulsory purchase of an insurance product. To the 
extent that they are genuinely actuarial contributions, social security contributions 
need not have a negative impact on work incentives, even if their level is very high. 
But to the extent to which this is the case, social security systems are not 
systematically redistributive, or no more so than private insurance or private 
savings. Social security systems only become redistributive by deviating from the 
contributory principal, and insofar as they do, contributions become de-facto-taxes 
(see James, 1997; Orszag & Stiglitz, 1999; Edwards & Cox, 2002).  
 
The economic analysis of the impact of taxation on economic performance is far from 
straightforward, which is why it is not surprising that disagreement in the literature 
remains. There is no shortage of studies which find the economic effects of taxation to be 
modest. But it is notable that the more sophisticated models, which allow for a variety of 
behavioural responses rather than just e.g. a reduction in working hours, are more likely to 
find substantial efficiency losses associated with taxation. This is also reflected in a 
literature survey by Keane (2011), which begins with a discussion of simple models that fail 
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to find much of an effect, and then progresses to the more elaborate ones. The former still 
represent the majority: “At least for men, it is fair to say that the majority of studies ﬁnd 
rather small elasticities with respect to after-tax wage rates. This, in turn, implies that 
efﬁciency costs of distortionary income taxation are small” (Keane, 2011, p. 962; emphasis 
in the original). But once a wider range of possible behavioural responses to taxation is 
considered, the assessment changes: “My review suggests that labor supply of men may be 
more elastic than conventional wisdom suggests. When I simply average the Hicks elasticity 
across twenty-two well-known studies of males, I obtain 0.31. […] [I]f one weighs studies by 
features I argued are desirable, such as […] accounting for human capital, one gets a larger 
value of the Hicks elasticity. For women, most studies ﬁnd very large labor supply 
elasticities. This is especially true of papers that calculate “long run” elasticities—meaning 
some combination of fertility, marriage, work experience, and education are allowed to 
respond to wage changes, rather than being held ﬁxed” (ibid, p. 1071).  
The emphasis so far has been on tax systems, even though it would be more accurate to 
refer to tax and transfer systems. The literature on the impact of income transfer systems 
on labour supply is interwoven with the tax literature, especially in the case of means-
tested transfers: Since these transfers are withdrawn as the recipients’ earned income 
rises, the withdrawal rate acts like an implicit tax on labour. The effects of this implicit tax 
are studied in the same way as the effects of explicit taxes, and they do not seem to be any 
different (e.g. Blundell, 2001; Meghir and Phillips, 2008). Other parts of this literature are 
sufficiently different from the tax literature, but complementary to it. Perhaps the most 
well-established finding is that economic inactivity has a self-perpetuating effect, as both 
formal skills and work-related ‘soft skills’ deteriorate with the time spent outside of the 
labour market (e.g. Pissarides, 1992; Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Strulik et al., 2006; Ljungqvist 
and Sargent, 2008). There is also substantial evidence that controlled for other factors, 
higher income replacement rates are associated with lower levels of work search effort 
among jobseekers (Krueger and Mueller, 2008a; Krueger and Mueller, 2008b; Layard et al., 
2005; Meyer, 1990; Feldstein and Poterba, 1984). This is not an argument against generous 
support systems. Other aspects of system design can counter the disincentive effect, for 
example work search conditions or time limits. But the literature shows that work 
incentives have a real effect. Evaluating an income replacement system solely on the 
grounds of ‘generosity’, as some of the models described in subchapter 4.2 do, is not 




The implication of the literature is not that all countries ‘should’ aim to establish low-tax 
systems with a flat structure (or conditional welfare systems). There can be no ‘optimal’ 
level of taxation and no ‘optimal’ level of progressivity, even if the impact on growth could 
be precisely known. The design of tax system is always about balancing competing aims, 
and economic theory cannot offer any guidance on what weight should be given to which 
aim. What it can do is stated in the Mirrlees Review as follows: “Optimal tax theory is all 
about the choice of a system of taxation that balances efficiency losses against the 
government’s desire for redistribution and the need to raise revenue. It provides a way of 
thinking rigorously about these trade-offs, and ensuring that value judgements reflecting 
concerns about income distribution and well-being are made explicit while the efficiency 
costs of achieving that redistribution are properly taken into account” (Mirrlees et al, 2011, 
p. 36).  
 
Judged against this standard, the studies discussed in subchapter 4.2 do not come out well. 
They do not phrase their recommendations in terms of a trade-off, but present them as if 
they were a win-win situation. They do not make underlying value judgements explicit. 
They do not acknowledge the existence of efficiency costs of redistribution. They mention 
the benefits, but not the cost, which makes them an unbalanced account.  
 
4.4 The gap between the poverty literature and the economic 
literature 
 
In studies on relative poverty, the Scandinavian countries, and especially Sweden and 
Denmark, occupy a special place.17 They achieve some of the lowest relative poverty rates 
in the world, and as some studies have pointed out, the low levels of relative poverty do 
not come at the expense of greater absolute poverty (Scruggs and Allen, 2006; Kenworthy, 
1999). Poverty in Scandinavia is low by virtually any measure. On measures of quasi-
absolute poverty or material deprivation, their position is less outstanding, but still clearly 
among the better examples. How can this be reconciled with the literature discussed in the 
                                                          
17 The case of Iceland is not considered in this chapter because Iceland is much less frequently included in either 
poverty studies or economic studies. Data for Norway are generally included in these studies, but not especially 
emphasised, presumably because the country’s oil wealth makes the results less generalisable. In what follows, 
‘Scandinavia’ means ‘Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland’.  
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previous subchapter, which has, on balance, suggested a long-term trade-off between 
redistribution and growth?  
There is no obvious answer, because the economic literature tends to concentrate on 
either aggregate outcomes for larger country samples, or on time series within a single 
country. It is not common in this field to subdivide countries into regional clusters, and 
compare them to one another. Poverty studies are very different in this regard. They 
frequently form country groups, not based on geography but on common characteristics of 
the country’s social policy tradition. The most common grouping is into ‘Anglo-Saxon’, 
‘Nordic/Scandinavian’ and ‘Continental European’, or some variation thereof, with 
Mediterranean countries sometimes forming a cluster of their own. Economic models of 
taxation and growth rarely do this, and the result is that the poverty literature and the 
economic literature are, in a sense, ‘talking past each other’. The latter shows an adverse 
impact of high marginal tax rates on long-run economic performance, the former points to 
the low poverty rates, relative and absolute, in Scandinavia. These two findings are not 
necessarily in conflict. It is entirely possible that country-specific features enable the 
Scandinavian economies to withstand higher levels of redistribution than other economies, 
and it is also possible that these features are beyond the reach of the control variables used 
in economic models. But the problem is that economic papers do not usually explore this 
possibility. They do not explore whether the sensitivity of economic performance to tax 
rates/levels varies systematically across regions, let alone what causes the variation. They 
often assume, implicitly, that the responsiveness to taxation is the same everywhere. They 
therefore leave many questions unanswered, which can be illustrated with a quote by 
Sweden’s former Prime Minister Göran Persson, referring to the country’s economic 
performance: “Think of a bumblebee. With its overly heavy body and little wings, 
supposedly it should not be able to fly – but it does” (quoted in Thakur et al, 2003). 
To stay within this metaphor: The economic literature is akin to a collection of studies 
showing that when looking at all insects taken together, body mass is negatively, and 
wingspan is positively associated with the ability to fly. Within the same metaphor, the 
poverty literature would be more like a set of studies pointing out the high flight 
performance of bumblebees. If the latter can be criticised for concentrating too much on 
selected species while ignoring the whole, the former can be criticised for looking only at 
the whole, thus failing to explain much systematic variation.  
128 
 
There are exceptions. Bergh and Henrekson (2011) find a negative relationship between 
taxation and growth on the whole, but argue that cultural particularities of the 
Scandinavian economies make them more resilient to high tax levels than other economies. 
Still, what is striking is that while these authors state their general economic findings in 
rather certain terms, their discussion of Scandinavian particularities is much more tentative. 
This illustrates how well-researched the former and how under-researched the latter area 
is.  
In short, there are complex unresolved issues in the economic literature. This chapter 
cannot even begin to fill this gap. But it can point into the general direction where some of 
the answers are likely to be found.  
How special is the Scandinavian welfare model? 
There are many difficulties in comparing social expenditure internationally, one of the more 
obvious ones being the differences in the tax treatment of transfer income. A particularity 
of the Scandinavian welfare systems is that they treat almost all types of state transfers as 
taxable income, and tax them at relatively high rates: In Sweden and Denmark, tax 
‘revenue’ from these sources amounts to almost 5% of GDP (Eurostat, 2009b, pp. 1-3). It is 
therefore more sensible to compare net social expenditure, i.e. social expenditure minus 
tax revenue collected through the taxation of transfers, because this automatically corrects 
for cross-country differences in the tax treatment of transfer income.  
Table 4.1 ranks Western countries by net public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
On this basis, the Scandinavian countries still occupy very high ranks, but the region loses 
its exceptionality. There is a divide between Western Europe and the Anglosphere, but no 
obvious geographical pattern within Western Europe. The UK, in terms of social 
expenditure, is more ‘Western European’ than ‘Anglo-Saxon’. So to some extent, the special 
role that the Nordic countries play in the poverty literature is the result of an idiosyncrasy 
of accounting. This idiosyncrasy must also be kept in mind when comparing figures on total 
government expenditure, which, in an unadjusted format, are shown in the column on the 





Table 4.1: Net social expenditure and total government expenditure, % of GDP, selected 
OECD countries, 2007 
 Net social expenditure 
(% of GDP), 2007 
Total government  
expenditure 
(% of GDP), 2007 
France 29.9% 52.4% 
Germany 27.2% 43.5% 
Belgium 26.2% 48.4% 
Sweden 26.0% 51.0% 
Italy 25.8% 47.9% 
Austria 24.8% 49.0% 
Denmark 23.9% 50.8% 
Portugal 23.6% 44.4% 
UK 22.7% 44.1% 
Finland 22.6% 47.3% 
Spain 21.6% 39.2% 
Netherlands 20.4% 45.3% 
Japan 20.3% 35.9% 
Norway 20.0% 41.2% 
Canada 19.4% 39.4% 
US 18.9% 36.8% 
New Zealand 18.4% 39.6% 
Australia 18.2% 33.4% 
Ireland 16.8% 36.7% 
-gathered from OECD Social Expenditure Database (2011), OECD (2011) and OECD (2011a) 
Not all of the models discussed in subchapter 4.2 use social expenditure as an independent 
variable. Some prefer a composite index of ‘welfare generosity’, usually based on the 
replacement rates of various programmes. The problem with these generosity indices is 
that they conflate two distinct functions of welfare states: intra-personal and inter-personal 
redistribution. The latter refers to redistribution from X to Y, the former to redistribution 
from the young/healthy/employed X of today to the old/sick/workless X of tomorrow. This 
latter function is not ‘redistribution’ in the everyday sense of the term; rather, it is an 
alternative form of saving and/or insurance.  
The extent to which a transfer payment is redistributive in the inter-personal sense has 
nothing to do with how generous it is. In a purely actuarial/contributory system, there 
would be no redistribution at all, regardless of how high the replacement rates are. In 
contrast, a system based purely on need (e.g. a purely means-tested system) will be 
redistributive even if it is very minimalistic. From this perspective, the above-mentioned 
poverty models by Kenworthy (1999) and Scruggs and Allen (2006) miss the point. They 
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intend to show that redistribution does not have adverse economic impacts, but their 
indices of generosity do not measure redistribution. To put it bluntly: A private fire 
insurance policy could also attain a high generosity score on these indices, provided the 
insurance sum is high. But this is certainly not the kind of redistributive generosity which 
the authors have in mind. It would have been more conducive for their purposes to use an 
‘index of redistributiveness’ rather than an index of generosity.   
There are no indices of redistributiveness, but there are indices of progressivity, which 
measure to what extent transfer payments systematically favour the lower end of the 
income distribution. This is not quite the same as the extent of redistribution, because it is 
based on income at a single moment in time, and a transfer that is redistributive in a 
snapshot perspective need not be redistributive in terms of permanent income (see 
Chapter 3 on this distinction). Neither does it really show to what extent entitlement to 
transfers has been earned through prior contribution or tax payments. But progressivity 
should be at least correlated to redistributiveness. Progressivity measures for several 
welfare programmes are shown in the table below. Values are normalised to a range 
between +1 and -1, with negative values indicating that low-income earners receive a 
disproportionate share of spending. Programmes which record positive values are not in 
themselves redistributive.18 A value of zero means that a transfer does not, in itself, alter 
the income distribution.  
The comparison shows that Nordic welfare programmes are not generally more 












                                                          
18 What is probably redistributive is the overall effect of these transfers and the corresponding tax payments 
taken together. If middle-income earners receive a little bit more than low-earners, but pay vastly greater 
amounts into the system, the overall effect is still redistributive. 
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Table 4.2 Measure of progressivity (–1 = most progressive; +1 = least progressive) for 












Nordics:      
Denmark -0.18 -0.04 -0.22 -0.58 -0.37 
Finland +0.07 -0.07 -0.24 -0.61 -0.39 
Norway -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.65 -0.24 
Sweden 0.25 -0.07 -0.10 -0.66 -0.16 
Anglosphere:      
Australia -0.35 -0.33 -0.44 n/a -0.40 
Canada n/a -0.46 -0.06 n/a -0.22 
Ireland -0.27 -0.21 -0.07 -0.46 +0.02 
New Zealand -0.35 -0.43 -0.38 n/a -0.14 
UK -0.20 n/a n/a -0.46 -0.37 
USA n/a -0.56 0.07 n/a -0.10 
OECD average -0.31 -0.33 -0.19 -0.37  
-based on figures from OECD (2008, pp. 105-106) 
Table 4.2 only shows selected welfare programmes, without adjusting for their relative 
importance, and it only shows the spending side in isolation. The total volume of 
redistribution achieved by the tax and benefit system as a whole can be shown by 
contrasting Gini coefficients of market income to Gini coefficients of disposable income. 
The difference between the two is, by definition, explained by taxes and cash transfers. The 
figures are shown in Table 4.3, where the countries are sorted by the point reduction in the 
Gini coefficient they achieve through redistribution (the right-hand column).  
The Scandinavian countries do indeed achieve large decreases in inequality. But again, the 
divide is between Western Europe and the Anglosphere (minus the UK), not within Western 
Europe. By Western European standards, the amount of redistribution in the Scandinavian 
countries (except Finland) is high but not exceptional. The UK and Sweden, which are often 
at opposite ends in relative poverty studies, achieve practically the same point reduction in 
Gini coefficients.  
The reason why Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Finland is different in this respect) achieve 
very low levels of income inequality is not just government redistribution. Rather, these 
countries already start off with remarkably low levels of inequality at market incomes. Their 
point reduction in the Gini coefficient is about the same as in the UK, but the UK starts off 
with a much higher level of inequality before redistribution.  
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Table 4.3 Gini coefficients before and after taxes and transfers, selected OECD-countries, 
mid-2000s 
 Gini coefficient 
before taxes  
and transfers 
Gini coefficient 
after taxes  
and transfers 
Point reduction in 
Gini coefficient 
through taxes  
and transfers 
Belgium 0.408 0.256 0.152 
Austria 0.406 0.261 0.146 
Finland 0.436 0.258 0.145 
France 0.403 0.292 0.139 
Denmark 0.374 0.243 0.131 
Italy 0.465 0.334 0.130 
Norway 0.376 0.256 0.120 
Germany 0.420 0.300 0.120 
Portugal 0.458 0.347 0.111 
UK 0.456 0.345 0.111 
Sweden 0.368 0.259 0.109 
Australia 0.418 0.324 0.094 
Netherlands 0.391 0.297 0.094 
Spain 0.405 0.313 0.092 
Canada 0.416 0.328 0.087 
US 0.453 0.370 0.083 
New Zealand 0.403 0.323 0.080 
Japan 0.392 0.323 0.068 
Switzerland 0.338 0.290 0.048 
Iceland 0.346 0.301 0.045 
South Korea 0.323 0.300 0.023 
-based on data from OECD (2011a) 
In short, due to the indicators they choose, the poverty studies discussed in subchapter 4.2 
exaggerate the exceptionality of the Scandinavian tax and benefit systems. The low levels of 
poverty in these countries cannot be ascribed to welfare policies lone.   
The wider economic environment 
Taxation is only one among many determinants of economic performance. Economic 
models always include controls variables, but they often focus on large, readily quantifiable 
aggregates, e.g. in areas like demographics or human capital. More subtle features of the 
business environment are therefore, arguably, improperly accounted for.  
‘Business environment’ is an abstract concept, but there are summary measures of factors 
which are generally associated with economic competitiveness. The most well-known data 
source for this is probably the World Economic Forum’s ‘Global Competitiveness Report’ 
(World Economic Forum, 2012). Alternative measures with a similar purpose are available 
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from the OECD’s Economic Surveys (e.g. OECD, 2011b), the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ 
reports (e.g. World Bank, 2009), the annual surveys of the Heritage Foundation (2012) and 
those of the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al, 2012). Figure 4.2 shows a selection of such 
indicators, with values normalised to a scale from 0 to 10, with higher values representing 
greater competitiveness.  
On this account, the Scandinavian economies show a profile dominated by extremes. They 
attain some of the lowest competitiveness scores in the world on measures which capture 
dimensions of taxation and public spending. But they also attain some of the highest scores 
in the world on almost every other measure.  
Figures 4.2: Summary indicators of the business environment, 0-10, 10 = most competitive, 
five countries 
 
-gathered from Gwartney et al (2012) 
This result does not seem to be sensitive to how the indicators are constructed. With 
varying intensity, the different data sources listed above find the same basic pattern, which 
also shows little variation over the years.  
Studies on relative poverty often point to the solid performance of the Scandinavian 
economies, and present it as evidence that concerns about adverse economic side-effects 
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of redistribution are unfounded. The above profile, however, is compatible with a rather 
different interpretation: On its own, the Scandinavian economies’ high level of taxation 
could well be a competitive disadvantage, but a disadvantage which is compensated for by 
their exceptionally good performance on so many other accounts. If so, the basic trade-off 
would still be present. To go back to Göran Persson’s bumblebee metaphor: The 
bumblebee compensates for its weight and short wingspan through other means, but it 
does not ‘prove’ that weight and wingspan are irrelevant.  
Public support 
There is a substantial body of research showing how public attitudes towards taxation and 
redistribution differ systematically across developed countries (e.g. Svallfors, 1997; Edlund, 
1999; Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Brooks and Manza, 2007; Mau, 2007; Sefton, 2009; Horton 
& Gregory, 2009). It is a consistent finding that support for collective provision and 
generous welfare spending is much higher in Scandinavian countries than in the 
Anglosphere. This is, of course, a generalisation. There is enormous variation between 
different components of welfare states within countries. The British NHS, for example, 
enjoys phenomenal levels of public support, while the Norwegian social housing sector has 
considerable reputation problems. There is also variation within both country clusters. But 
the splitting of attitudes into an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and a ‘Nordic’ country cluster it is 
nevertheless not an oversimplification.   
The reasons for these differences in attitudes are not yet fully understood, and remain a 
topic of disagreement. But there is agreement that they are persistent phenomena, and 
that they are often important determinants of the social policies a country adopts (Bergh & 
Bjørnskov, 2011; Bergh &Henrekson, 2011), even if they can be overridden by other factors. 
In poverty studies, in contrast, levels and structure of social expenditure are often treated 
as easily malleable policy choices, readily transferable from one country to another. Yet if 
they are reflections of different social consensuses, a given tax and benefit policy may also 
have different economic impacts in different countries.   
While there is no consensus on what exactly drives international differences in attitudes 
towards redistribution, what is clear is that there is a close correlation between support for 
redistributive spending, and trust in other people’s willingness to reciprocate and 
cooperate (e.g. Sefton, 2009, pp. 228-242; Horton and Gregory, 2009, pp. 110-130). 
Scandinavian societies in particular are characterised by an exceptionally high level of 
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confidence in their fellow citizens’ cooperativeness. Trust that welfare recipients are 
genuinely in need of help, that levels of fraud and misuse are low, and that recipients are 
doing their best to find work again, is highest among Scandinavians. They are also least 
likely to believe that poverty had behavioural explanations.  
Such considerations may not be quantifiable in the same sense as a variable in an economic 
model, but there are nevertheless indicators which provide some impression about the 
extent of international variation. An example which is sometimes used in literature on 
‘social capital’ is the ‘Trust Index’, which is based on two statements from the World Values 
Survey: “Most people can be trusted”, and “You can’t be too careful in dealing with people”. 
A country’s score on the Trust Index is simply the share of respondents who agree with the 
first statement, minus the share who agree with the second statement, plus one hundred 
(to avoid negative values). Unfortunately, this index does not necessarily measure the kind 
of trust that is of interest in here: Confidence that most people behave honestly in 
everyday dealings is not necessarily the same as confidence that most people will not 
overuse government transfers. But the Trust Index is at least available for a large set of 
countries, and for several years. The scores are shown in the table below. The Scandinavian 
countries come out on top, while the English-speaking countries form no particular cluster.  
The index attempts to measure respondents’ trust in their fellow citizens. But since 
politically mediated redistribution involves government institutions, trust in these has to be 
considered separately. The perhaps most well-known proxy for this is the Corruption 
Perceptions Index compiled by Transparency International. It is not necessarily a measure 
of ‘true’ levels of corruption, but a measure of corruption as perceived by those who 
interact with public institutions. The score is normalised to a scale between 0 and 10, with 
lower values indicating higher levels of corruptions. Again, the Scandinavian countries come 









Table 4.4: Indicators of trust, selected OECD countries 
 Trust index 
(0 – 200) 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index (0 – 10) 
Norway 148 9.0 
Sweden 135 9.3 
Denmark 132 9.4 
Finland 118 9.4 
Switzerland 107 8.8 
New Zealand 102 9.5 
Australia 92 8.8 
Netherlands 91 8.9 
Canada 86 8.7 
Japan 80 8.0 
USA 79 7.1 
Germany 76 8.0 
Ireland 72 7.5 
Austria 70 7.8 
Great Britain 62 7.8 
Italy 61 3.9 
Greece 55 3.4 
Spain 41 6.2 
Portugal 22 6.1 
-gathered from ASEP/JDS (2011), World Values Survey (2011); Transparency International (2011) 
 
Do these findings have any implications for poverty research? Could it be that the 
disincentive effects of a given level of taxation are less pronounced in environments 
characterised by high levels of trust? Do high trust levels make higher tax levels more 
economically viable?  
It is an open question. There are economic models which have tried to incorporate 
measures of trust (e.g. Berggren et al, 2008; Delhy and Newton, 2005), there is no direct 
evidence suggesting that high levels of trust cushion the disincentive effects of taxation. In 
a high-trust environment, people may be more likely to support public spending levels on 
an abstract level, but this need not affect their responses to tax incentives at the micro 
level.  
To claim that high levels of trust offset the negative impacts of taxation would mean 
reading too much into the literature. What is safe to say, however, is that levels of public 
expenditure are affected by long-term cultural factors, like trust levels, the determinants of 
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which are not fully understood. They are not as readily transferable from one country to 
another as some poverty studies have effectively assumed them to be.  
Time-series evidence 
Models which look at responses to taxation within individual countries over time are 
generally more conclusive than cross-country studies. Their results may be less 
generalisable, but their strength is that they automatically control for some of the long-
term confounding factors that are difficult to incorporate into a quantitative model.  
In time series studies, the results for the Scandinavian countries are far from unusual. They 
show the kind of responses that ‘orthodox’ economic models would predict (e.g. Holmlund 
& Söderström, 2007). Scandinavian economies show a high resilience to tax levels, but 
major changes in tax rates have generally had the expected effects.  
Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) have estimated country-specific Laffer-curves for the taxation of 
labour, capital, and consumption. From this, they derive an estimate of the extent to which 
a modest tax reduction would be self-funding, by stimulating additional economic activity. 
If there is any discernible self-funding effect, tax rates must already be in a region where 
they suppress some economic activity.19 
On this measure, the taxation of labour income in Denmark, Finland and Sweden is in a 
region where reductions in the tax burden would have such a strong stimulating effect on 
labour supply that the expansion of the tax base would offset more than two thirds of the 
initial revenue shortfall. For the taxation of capital in Sweden and Denmark, the self-
funding effect exceeds 100%, which is the theoretical extreme case of an economy being 
‘on the wrong side of the Laffer curve’. The results are strengthened, and exacerbated, by a 
sequel by the same authors, which also takes account of responses in human capital 
formation (Trabandt & Uhlig, 2011). These findings support the hypothesis that the 
Scandinavian economies are able to offset the negative impacts of taxation through 
strengths in other areas which determine economic performance. But they are not immune 
to the effects of taxation, and their economic outcomes do not ‘prove’ that taxation is 
irrelevant.   
                                                          
19 In theory, tax rates could also be below the growth-maximising level, in which case the self-funding effect 
would be negative.   
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In the three English-speaking countries for which data is available, the self-funding effects 
are lower, but not trivial. 
It has been argued above that the willingness to pay taxes differs substantially across 
countries, by reference to studies which use survey evidence. A more direct indicator of 
whether a given tax level is appropriate for a given country, in the sense of being backed by 
public support, is the size of the shadow economy. The shadow economy is the informal 
part of the market economy; the part which takes place outside of the legal framework, but 
which could theoretically take place within it, because the activities are not in themselves 
illegal.  
Estimates of the size of the shadow economy, expressed as a proportion of official GDP, are 
shown in the right-hand column of Table 4.5. The same study contains a brief overview of 
the literature on the determinants of the shadow economy’s size, which concludes: “In 
almost all studies it has been ascertained that the overall tax and social security 
contribution burdens are among the main causes for the existence of the shadow economy” 
(Schneider, 2007, p. 5).  
Even a brief glance at the data shows that tax levels cannot be the only determinant. The 
Scandinavian shadow economies are much smaller than tax levels alone would predict, 
which provides additional support for the trust/cohesiveness hypothesis. Nevertheless, the 
size of the Scandinavian shadow economies is above the (unweighted) OECD average, 
accounting for between one sixth and one fifth of their economies. For a narrower country 
sample, similar results have been found by Pedersen (2003). ‘Tax tolerance’ may be 
unusually high in this region, but it is not unlimited. It has reached economically distorting 
levels.  
It is important to note that the relatively large size of the shadow economies in the Nordic 
countries is not simply the result of better detection capabilities or data collection. The 
estimates of shadow activity in Table 4.5 do not come from national sources. They have 
been inferred from macroeconomic indicators which are thought to be closely correlated 
with illicit activity (e.g. demand for cash). The resulting estimates are then corroborated 
through more direct evidence from sources like anonymous surveys. It may well be that the 
administrative capacity to detect shadow activity is higher in the Nordic countries than in 
e.g. the Mediterranean countries. But this would not affect the estimates in Table 4.5, 
which are not related to how much of the illicit activity is detected by the authorities. If 
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anything, better detection capabilities should lower those figures, because the risk of 
engaging in shadow activities is higher in countries where administrative capacities to 
detect such activities are greater.    
Table 4.5: Indicative measures of the economic cost of taxation  
 Degree to which 
a cut in labour taxes 
would be self-funding 
Degree to which 
a cut in capital taxes 
would be self-funding 
Shadow economy  
in % of official GDP 
Nordics    
Denmark 79% - 83% 126% - 137% 16.1% - 18.0% 
Finland 68% - 70% 90% - 92% 15.8% - 18.1%  
Norway n/a n/a 16.8% - 19.1% 
Sweden 83% - 86% 109% - 116% 16.3% - 19.2% 
Anglosphere    
Australia n/a n/a 12.8% - 14.3% 
Canada n/a n/a 14.1% - 16.0% 
Ireland 34% - 35% 48% - 50% 14.1% - 15.0% 
New Zealand n/a n/a 10.9% - 12.8% 
UK 42% 73% 10.3% - 12.7% 
US 30% – 32% 46% -51% 7.9% - 8.7% 
OECD average n/a n/a 14.8% - 16.8% 




The short summary is that there is a trade-off between relative absolute and relative living 
standards of the least well-off in so far as both are affected by the tax and benefit system, 
and that the literature on relative poverty fails to acknowledge this trade-off. This chapter 
should not be read as an endorsement of the studies on absolute living standards discussed 
in section 4.1, which can be critiqued on many other grounds. But at least, these studies 
acknowledge the existence of a trade-off explicitly, and take a position on it. One finds no 
such acknowledgement in the studies on the determinants of relative poverty, which 
generally identify government redistribution through the tax and benefit system as the 
major determinant of poverty. These studies either do not address the trade-off at all, or if 
they do, they take ‘absence of evidence’ for ‘evidence of absence’. Since no trade-off is 
visible in their country samples – which seldom include more than about a dozen Western 
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European and North American countries – they conclude that no trade-off exists at all. To 
some extent, their results are driven by the Scandinavian countries. This region achieves 
some of the world’s lowest rates of relative poverty, but living standards of the least well-
off are also high in absolute terms. Judging from a country sample in which Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland and Norway account for a marked share of the variation, the 
interpretation that relative and absolute poverty can be minimised jointly is indeed not far 
to seek. Based on such a country sample, it seems natural to conclude that relative and 
absolute poverty respond either largely to the same policies, or that they respond to 
policies which are distinct but easily compatible.  
But how generalisable are these findings? Subsection 4.3 has addressed this question by 
contrasted the poverty literature to the wider economic literature on taxation, public 
spending and growth. Once the poverty literature is properly placed into this context, one 
obtains a very different impression. The economic literature is somewhat ambiguous about 
the role of overall tax levels, but much more conclusive about redistributive taxation. High 
tax rates on labour and capital, and especially high marginal tax rates, tend to have 
negative long-term effects on economic performance through a variety of channels. The 
forms of taxation which are least economically damaging are those which are most 
behaviourally neutral. But the more neutral forms of taxation – especially consumption 
taxes – are also the least redistributive ones, and they can even be regressive.   
Section 4.4 has concentrated on the solid economic performance of high-tax Scandinavia, a 
region which occupies a special place in the poverty literature. This region is one of the 
reasons why the poverty literature and the economic literature appear to be ‘talking past 
each other’, with the latter emphasising the disincentives arising from redistributive 
taxation on the whole, and the former pointing to the Scandinavian counterexample. The 
economic literature is not especially helpful in this regard: With a few noteworthy 
exceptions, economic papers have not commented on the Scandinavian results, treating 
them merely as a ‘special case’. 
The suggestions made in subchapter 4.4 are necessarily tentative and indicative. This thesis 
is not about the economic and social history of Scandinavia. But the tentative suggestion is 
that the ‘special case’ is not that special. The region combines a number of favourable 
features which enable it to cope with high levels of taxation, and while none of these 
features is unique to Scandinavia, their combination and intensity is. The Scandinavian 
economies achieve very high scores on almost every determinant of economic 
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competitiveness except taxation, which explains their high overall positions in 
competitiveness rankings. They do not ‘prove’ that taxation is irrelevant. If anything, they 
show that compensating the effects of a heavy tax burden requires extraordinarily good 
performance in virtually every other area of economic policy. Further, the region is 
characterised by high levels of interpersonal trust and trust in government institutions, 
which could also make higher tax levels more viable than elsewhere.  
With all that in mind, within-country time series studies of the Scandinavian economies 
nevertheless produce results that are fully in line with the ‘orthodox’ tax literature. In time 
series studies, which automatically control for factors which are difficult to quantify and 
which cross-country studies therefore find difficult to account for, the Scandinavian 
economies respond to changes in tax incentives in the predicted way. At the same time, 
while the size of the Scandinavian shadow economies is not as large as tax levels would 
predict, they are still above the OECD average. The region may be more ‘tax tolerant’ than 
any other, but it is not immune to tax disincentives.  
There are further particularities of the Scandinavian welfare states and income distributions 
which ought to be kept in mind when interpreting the results of relative poverty studies. It 
is an unusual feature of these countries’ tax and benefit systems that transfer income is 
highly taxed. For most countries, the difference between gross social spending and net 
social spending – a measure which accounts for differences in the tax treatment of benefits 
– is small or negligible. In the Scandinavian countries, the difference is substantial. It is a 
coincidence that the countries with the lowest relative poverty rates are also the ones 
which share this unusual accounting practice, and if this particularity is not accounted for, it 
must result in an overestimation of the impact of social expenditure.  
On a net basis, the Scandinavian welfare states are still among the largest in the world, but 
their size is not exceptional. Neither is their redistributive effect. These countries’ income 
distributions are already very narrow before taxes and transfers. Studies on the 
determinants of relative poverty, however, simply take the distribution of market incomes 
as given. Factors which might reduce differences in market incomes – e.g. high employment 
rates and/or high skill levels among low earners – can therefore not be identified as 
determinants of poverty.  
Thus, studies which claim that other developed countries could achieve Scandinavian 
poverty levels by simply importing Scandinavian levels of taxation and social spending are 
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not comparing like with like. They imply a win-win situation where trade-offs exist. The 
trade-off, meanwhile, is not just a theoretical one. It is not a trade-off that could arise in 
hypothetical situations, but a trade-off which permeates large areas of actual economic and 
social policy. Changes to the tax and benefit system almost always involve both 
distributional and incentive considerations. They may not always be explicitly evaluated in 
terms of their impact on poverty, but as long as poverty is measured in a way that is so 
intricately linked to the shape of the income distribution, the two are hardly separable. In 
different variations, the basic trade-off described in this chapter is constantly present.  
None of this means that a commitment to economic progress requires acceptance of, or 
indifference to inequality. The OECD (2011a) has conducted a major review of the drivers of 
inequality in developed countries, and finds that some of them are, at the same time, 
hindrances to economic performance. There are policy options which would narrow the 
income distribution, and which would also promote overall economic efficiency. There is no 
conflict between the goals of economic progress and of an equitable income distribution as 
such. But a conflict arises when the latter aim is pursued through redistributive tax and 
benefit policies, rather than e.g. improvements in skill levels among the least well-off, or 
increases in labour market attachment.  
How important are such considerations for poverty research? As long as we accept the 
assumption that poverty in developed countries is a purely, or at least predominantly 
relative phenomenon, the answer is: not very. The critique of relative poverty studies 
developed here could then be easily dismissed, because even if reducing relative poverty is 
not a win-win situation, within the assumptions of a relative understanding of poverty, it 
does not have to be. There may be a trade-off, but within these assumptions, it would be a 
trade-off between an important and an unimportant aim. Thus, the policy implications 
would be almost the same as if there was no trade-off at all. This chapter would then have 
done no more than remove a non-loadbearing column from an edifice which can still easily 
stand without it.  
But this is clearly not the way in which studies on the determinants of relative poverty 
frame it. When spelled out explicitly, the implications can be quite stark. Policymakers can 
be faced with a situation in which an economic reform could increase low-earners’ incomes 
in absolute terms, while also risking greater inequality in the bottom half of the 
distribution. If a purely relative understanding of poverty is followed through consistently, 
the implication would be that this reform should not be passed. Within this understanding, 
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the consistent position would be to prioritise relative over absolute living standards. A 
widening of the gap between the bottom and the middle of the income distribution would 
have to be avoided, even if it means letting low-earners forego improvements in their living 
standards. But it is not a position which one will find spelled out explicitly in a study on 
relative poverty. Arguably, this is the main difference between the studies reviewed in 
subchapter 4.1 and those reviewed in subchapter 4.2. The former find it much easier to 
acknowledge the downsides of their policy recommendations, and to spell out the 
potentially controversial aspects which follow from their analyses. Studies on relative 
poverty find it difficult to do this.    
This is why the focus of the attention will now shift to the theory of relative poverty itself. Is 
the theoretical case for relative measures strong enough to justify their policy implications, 














5. Relative to what? Testing the robustness of relative 
poverty measures 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 have documented the emergence of a relative understanding of poverty, 
and showed how much this has affected public perceptions of the phenomenon, by giving 
rise to a particular ‘poverty narrative’. This has been underscored by Chapter 3, which has 
documented how weak the connection between this narrative and the living standards of 
low-earners really is, illustrating the extent to which the narrative has taken on a life of its 
own. This is problematic because, as Chapter 2 has also shown, relative measures are 
widely used but frequently misunderstood. They are frequently mixed up with entirely 
different concepts of poverty. And as Chapter 4 has now shown, the policy implications of 
relative measures differ strongly, and are often in conflict, with the policy implications that 
follow from other measures. 
Relative measures are widely used in poverty research as well as by international 
organisations and government departments. They have, of course, never been universally 
accepted. Critique of relative poverty measures is far from new; in fact, the concept has 
been subject to criticism from the very beginning. But much of the criticism has arguably 
missed the point. Critics have often failed to engage with the theory behind relative 
measures, and have merely criticised some of their statistical properties, and/or the 
supposed implausibility of the figures they produce.  
This chapter will take a very different approach. It will draw a strict distinction between the 
general theory behind relative poverty – poverty as impeded social participation, not 
physical deprivation – and the actual statistical indicator. This chapter will not critique the 
theory. It will accept the proposition that poverty is the inability to fully participate in 
society, insofar as this is caused by a lack of material resources. There may well be valid 
objections against this theory, but this chapter will not explore them. It will, instead, 
evaluate relative poverty measures from within their own premises. It will do so by merging 
two strands of literature which have thus far stood separately: the poverty literature and 
the literature on the determinants of ‘Subjective Well-Being’ (SWB). More precisely, this 
chapter will ask whether the latter can inform the former, since it concentrates explicitly on 
the importance of relative and absolute incomes. This is a novel approach insofar as studies 
on the determinants of relative poverty simply assume that welfare is determined by 
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relative income, while studies on the determinants of absolute poverty simply assume that 
welfare is determined by absolute income. Studies on the determinants of SWB, in contrast, 
actually test this relationship. They test the relative importance of both, controlled for 
other factors, while also enquiring through which precise channels relative income affects 
SWB.  
 
5.1 A critique of previous critiques 
The conventional criticism of relative poverty measures (e.g. Saunders, 2009; Lomasky and 
Swan, 2009; Clark et al, 2006; Sarlo, 2007; Sen, 1983) holds that these measures 
 
 are no more than measures of inequality, 
 can produce very low figures amidst widespread misery, 
 produce figures that do not generally fall as the economy grows, and 
 often produce very high figures in rich countries, which is seen as implausible. 
 
The problem with this line of critique is that it concentrates too much on the measure’s 
statistical properties and too little on the idea behind it. This can lead to a premature 
dismissal.  
Sen (1983), for example, points out that relative poverty could be low under conditions of a 
famine, provided the famine also reached the middle of the income distribution. Clark et al 
(2006, p. 53) liken a relative understanding of poverty to “the belief that if everybody has a 
toothache, then it does not really hurt.” Critics also take issue with the fact that relative 
measures generally produce high figures in prosperous countries, which do not generally 
fall over time. As Clark et al (ibid.) put it: “[T]he people classified as poor in the United 
States today have many privileges that Louis XIV did not have”, while Saunders (2009, p. 14) 
criticises: “We do not change the baseline measure on other phenomena when they start to 
decline, so why do it with poverty? We do not constantly redefine disease, for example, to 
keep the numbers up when reported cases of smallpox or TB fall. We do not change the 
definition of functional literacy when more people learn to read, or the definition of infant 
mortality when more babies start to survive.” 
 
The same critique is applied to cross-country comparisons. Saunders (2009, p. 6) calls it a 
“surprising finding that there is more child poverty in Britain than there is in, say, Poland”, 
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because “the people in Britain who get defined as poor actually enjoy a standard of living 
far higher than that of most Poles”. 
Thus, the critics repeat one of the misunderstandings which is also common among many 
supporters of the concept: They seem to see relative poverty as an attempt to measure 
destitution, or physical deprivation. They then reject it because of its unsuitability for this 
task. However, as explained in Chapter 2, relative poverty was not originally meant to be a 
measure of destitution. The concept only came up once destitution had practically 
disappeared in the UK. With this in mind, high figures in rich countries need not be 
implausible. A statement like ‘18% of the British population live in poverty’ is only 
implausible when it is interpreted to mean ‘18% of the British population live in physical 
hardship’, or ‘… lack basic essentials like food or clothing’. But a look at the history of ideas 
behind poverty measurement (see Chapter 2) shows that this is not what relative poverty 
was initially meant to be about. When the statement is interpreted to mean ‘18% of the 
British population do not have the means to fully participate in contemporary British 
society’, or ‘…do not have the means to engage in all the consumption habits that are 
customary in contemporary Britain’, there is nothing per se implausible about it.    
It is true that in practice, relative poverty measures have inadvertently come to be used as 
if they were measures of destitution and material hardship, with the attribute ‘relative’ 
being misinterpreted to mean ‘less severe’ rather than ‘relative to average incomes’. 
Chapter 2 has shown that poverty campaigners frequently, and erroneously, use the figures 
in this way. But the critics of relative measures are falling into exactly the same trap, 
because their criticism focuses on the misunderstanding rather than the original meaning. 
And while the critics are right to highlight the discrepancy between the common 
interpretation of relative figures and low-earners’ actual living standards, their criticism 
does not invalidate relative measures, because it does not invalidate the original idea 
behind them. If poverty is interpreted as the inability to participate in a society’s customary 
consumption habits, the above points of criticism do not hold. Today’s low-earners may 
indeed have “many privileges that Louis XIV did not have” (Clark et al, 2006, p. 53), but this 
tells us nothing about their ability to participate in contemporary British society. If the 
poverty line is meant to represent the cost of social participation, and if that cost can rise 
over time as new consumption habits become the norm, there is no reason why the 
poverty line should not also rise over time. The purpose of raising it would then not be “to 
keep the numbers up” (Saunders, 2009, p. 14), but to keep the poverty line relevant. 
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Neither does it have to be a contradiction that some Eastern European countries have low 
relative poverty figures, despite absolute living standards being much lower than in 
Western Europe. Relative poverty figures for Eastern Europe are meant to measure 
whether low-earners in these countries are able to participate in their own societies – not 
whether they are able to emulate Western consumption habits.  
Ultimately, most conventional critiques of relative poverty boil down to a single one: that 
relative poverty is a measure of inequality. Saunders (2009, p. 5) expresses this in the 
following way:  
 
 “[T]he idea that poverty is relative – that you are poor if most other people can buy things 
you cannot afford – confuses poverty with inequality. Having less than other people have 
does not necessarily mean you are poor; it rather indicates unequal shares”. 
 
The problem with this criticism is that it only concentrates on a statistical property, while, 
again, ignoring the original theory behind the measurement. In purely statistical terms, it is, 
of course, true that relative poverty indicators measure inequality in the bottom half of the 
distribution. This follows from their mathematical definition, and it can also, unsurprisingly, 
be seen in the results. Figure 5.1 shows this relationship for a cross-country sample of 30 
OECD-countries in a snapshot perspective, and Figure 5.2 shows the same relationship for a 












                                                          
20 In both cases, relative poverty rates have been measured against the conventional threshold of 60% of the 
median, while inequality in the bottom half has been measured by the ratio of median incomes to incomes at 
the 10th percentile (P50/P10).  
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Figure 5.1 Relative poverty rates vs. inequality (P50/P10) in 30 OECD countries, mid-2000s 
 
-based on data from OECD (2008) 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Relative poverty rate vs. inequality (P50/P10) in the UK, 1961-2010 
 
-based on data from IFS (2012) 
Nevertheless, it is not true that adherents of relative measures ‘confuse’ poverty with 
inequality. Rather, they subscribe to a set of very specific assumptions, and within these 
assumptions, inequality is poverty. It is expressed, for example, in Townsend’s (1962, p. 
225) statement: 
“They [the members of a society] are rich or poor according to their share of the resources 




Or in Fuchs’ (1967, pp. 88-91) words: “When most Americans have a great deal, those that 
have much less are poor, regardless of their absolute level of income [...] When we talk 
about reducing or eliminating poverty, we are really talking about changing the distribution 
of income”. 
Clearly, these authors did not ‘confuse’ poverty with inequality. Rather, they understood 
poverty as inequality. The same is true for present-day adherents of relative measures, 
which is why they reject the conventional critique: 
“[I]t has been argued that because median incomes rose sharply during the period of rapid 
growth from the late 1990s, tackling poverty has become more difficult because the poverty 
line has been rising rapidly along with the median. But this is the point of a relative poverty 
measure. It reveals that if the poorest are falling behind the rest during a period of rapid 
prosperity growth, they may be absolutely better off but they are still relatively poorer” 
(Lansley, 2010; emphasis added).  
The conventional critique of relative measures has failed to engage with these assumptions. 
It is not sufficient to critique statistical properties of relative measures, or the widespread 
misunderstanding of these measures, without addressing the original idea. This chapter will 
evaluate relative measures from an entirely different angle. It will enquire whether they 
achieve what they are meant to achieve.  
 
5.2 Separating theory from measurement 
Chapter 2 has documented the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ of the 1950s and 1960s, the change 
in the understanding of poverty which preceded the adoption of the new relative poverty 
measure. This was not a seamless flow of events. There was a considerable time lag 
between the change in the understanding and the change in the measurement.   
Fundamental criticism of the BSA method already emerged just years after the publication 
of Rowntree’s last poverty study. Townsend’s (1954) paper ‘Measuring poverty’ can be 
seen as an early draft of what would become the new understanding of poverty. In this 




“In considering the spending habits of poorer people, it seems that due regard must be paid 
to the conventions sanctioning membership of their community [...] and to the standards 
encouraged by advertisers, the press, the B.B.C. [sic] and the Church” (ibid., pp. 133-134). 
What follows is a reflection about new ways of measuring poverty, but the paper does not 
yet contain anything resembling a relative measure. It proposes a reworked version of what 
can still be considered a BSA, and a measure with a poverty line based on the rate of basic 
income replacement benefits (ibid., pp. 134-136). The rethinking of poverty had begun, but 
there was still no statistical proxy for this idea which resembles contemporary relative 
measures.  
About a decade later, Townsend’s (1962) paper ‘The meaning of poverty’ presented a much 
more refined verbal description of the idea of relative poverty. This paper also contains an 
early description of what would become the new measurement:  
“Perhaps more use might be made of the concepts of ‘average disposable income per head’, 
or ‘average household income’ for different types of household. A possible definition of 
poverty might be developed on the basis of measuring how many households or families of 
certain types have a total income of less than, say, 50 per cent or 66 per cent of the 
average” (Townsend, 1962, p. 223).  
But it remained at this stage. The paper is not a forceful endorsement of a poverty line 
pegged to average incomes. It is a general reflection on how poverty ought to be 
understood, and on what a poverty measure ought to do. The above passage represents no 
more than a tentative proposal.      
This proposal remained without practical consequences for the time being. The subsequent 
empirical study ‘The poor and the poorest’ (Townsend & Abel-Smith, 1965) contained 
another verbal description of the new understanding (ibid. pp. 16-20), but it ultimately used 
a poverty line similar to the one Townsend had described in 1954. This sequence shows 
that by then, a fully worked out theory of relative poverty had emerged, but poverty lines 
pegged to national average incomes were not yet part of it.  
The idea and the measurement did not evolve jointly. The former had been around well 
before the latter, and had gained traction without it. This distinction is not just a matter of 
sequencing. In hindsight, it may seem as if the rethinking of poverty in the 1950s and 1960s 
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had set poverty research on a one-track road, which could not have led anywhere but to 
the adoption of relative measures. Hence, the poverty literature generally devotes little 
attention to the question of when and how exactly the new understanding translated into a 
new measurement. The change in the understanding is explained, and the adoption of a 
relative measure is then treated as a technical detail which followed automatically. An 
example is the description by Glennerster (2004, p. 88): 
“There was controversy about the report [by Townsend and Abel-Smith from 1965] and 
criticism particularly of the comparisons with 1953/54. National Assistance rates had risen 
in real terms since 1953, critics said, so of course the numbers of poor had risen. […] To meet 
these criticisms later official measures were to use income relative to a national mean or 
median income – 40 percent, 50 per cent of the mean income or more recently 60 percent of 
the median. These technical arguments aside, […]” [emphasis added]. 
But are these merely ‘technical arguments’ which can be left aside? A closer look at the 
verbal description, from the years when the new understanding of poverty was not yet 
connected to a statistical measurement, does not warrant such a deterministic view. As 
described in Chapter 2, what characterised this new understanding of poverty was the 
notion that needs were socially rather than physically determined. Therefore, they were 
seen as dynamic and context-specific, rather than static and universal. But this idea did not 
necessarily require a poverty line that is pegged to national average incomes. What it did 
require was a poverty line that bore some relationship to consumption-related social 
norms, and which could evolve over time as these norms evolved. The same idea could 
potentially have been operationalised in other ways. Relative poverty lines are not the only 
way of operationalising it, and in fact, it is not even clear whether relative poverty lines are 
an especially suitable way of operationalising it. Is the cost of social inclusion a linear 
function of national median incomes? Supporters of relative measures provide no evidence 
that it is, and no explanation why it might be. They may have convincingly made the case 
that poverty lines have to be rooted in social context, but from then on, they have simply 
taken the leap of faith that pegging them to national average incomes makes them so. But 
is ‘context-specific’ the same as ‘relative’, in the sense of ‘relative to the national average’? 
This is the question that this chapter seeks to address. It accepts the notion that needs are 
socially determined and context-specific. But it does not a priori accept the notion that the 




5.3 The problem of defining the reference territory 
When relative measures were first devised, there was no way of knowing how exactly 
individual perceptions of what represents an ‘adequate’ living standard were affected by 
the living standards of others. Today, such information could be obtained from the 
literature on ‘Subjective Wellbeing’ (SWB). SWB-studies investigate the determinants of 
self-reported life satisfaction, or sometimes a narrower subset such as ‘job satisfaction’ or 
‘consumption satisfaction’. They do this by using respondents’ self-assessed SWB-score as 
the dependent variable, and expressing it as a function of a set of potential explanatory 
variables. The latter typically include the respondents’ age, family status, employment 
status, health status etc. Most studies also include fixed time effects and individual random 
effects. The latter variable allows these studies to control, to some extent, for factors that 
are constant over time, but specific to the individual, especially unobservable personality 
traits. In this way, the studies can account for the fact that some respondents will simply be 
of a more ‘cheerful’ disposition than others, and that SWB scores will therefore not be 
mechanistically determined by any set of control variables. SWB studies vary in 
sophistication: Many are limited to a simple OLS method of estimating coefficients, while a 
few use more sophisticated techniques to account for issues like endogeneity and reverse 
causality. (For example, an ‘optimistic’ attitude could manifest itself in a high SWB score, 
but it could also contribute to an individual’s success in the workplace, eventually leading to 
a higher income. The causality would then run both ways, rather than just from income to 
SWB.)  
SWB studies almost always include both the respondent’s own income, and the income of 
an imputed reference group, the latter either as a money amount or as a percentage of the 
respondents’ income. The idea is to evaluate, among other things, whether SWB is more 
responsive to absolute or to relative income. Do people evaluate their living standards 
mostly on their own terms, or in comparison to a benchmark? What is the net effect on 
SWB if respondents’ income rises (falls) in absolute terms, but falls (rises) relative to the 
benchmark level?    
The results for variables such as age, health and family status are not of interest for the 
purposes of this chapter. But they can be treated a control variables, allowing an 
assessment of how SWB is affected by absolute and relative income provided other factors 
are held constant. Of course, SWB research is not, and cannot be an exact science. The very 
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idea that SWB is measurable, and expressible in such a mechanistic way remains 
controversial. Quite apart from general problems with the overall approach, these studies 
also suffer from a range of statistical shortcomings on a more practical level (see Johns and 
Ormerod, 2007, for a discussion). SWB studies do not permit strong conclusions, and are 
certainly not intended to serve as a gold standard here. At best, they can identify very 
general patterns.  Yet a few findings from the SWB literature are so consistent that they 
cannot be entirely ignored.  
Can the SWB literature hold any lessons for poverty research? Potentially, yes – as long as a 
number of caveats are kept in mind. If it turned out that income-related variation in SWB is 
largely determined by relative (absolute) incomes, with absolute (relative) incomes 
explaining only a minor share, then this would represent an argument against absolute 
(relative) poverty measures. SWB studies cannot ‘prove’ or ‘refute’ any theory of poverty. 
There are too many competing explanations for any given SWB data pattern. But the SWB 
results can be more easily compatible with one poverty theory than with another. It cannot 
prove, but it can lend support; it cannot refute, but it can cast doubt. In this sense, a fusion 
of poverty research and SWB research can be useful.  
Relative poverty studies are based on the assumption that an increase in overall living 
standards raises the cost of social inclusion, as well as expectations of what constitutes an 
‘adequate’ standard of living. If this assumption holds, then it should manifest itself in the 
SWB results. A decrease in low-earners relative incomes should then lead to a decrease in 
SWB, even if it coincides with an increase in absolute incomes. The higher average living 
standards should have raised the social participation costs, so that their income, even if 
higher in absolute terms, ‘buys less social inclusion’. The change in median incomes, in this 
perspective, could be thought of as the ‘social participation cost inflation rate’.  
Moreover, in order to be compatible with a theory of relative poverty, relative income 
would have to be more important to those at the bottom of the income distribution than to 
those further up. In order to lend support to a relative poverty theory, SWB research must 
do more than show that relative income is a determinant of SWB. It must show that relative 
income is a determinant for a particular reason. For example, it could turn out that the SWB 
of middle income-earners is negatively affected by income differences vis-à-vis top earners. 
But this would be a kind of inequality which has nothing to do with relative poverty. In this 
case, the negative impact could be explained by considerations of status competition, 
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fairness considerations, a perception that the lead enjoyed by top earners is undeserved, or 
simply by envy. Relative poverty is not concerned with either of these. It has nothing to do 
with envy, and it has nothing to do with whether a given distribution is perceived as ‘just’ or 
‘fair’.  
Relative poverty is not about income comparisons, but about social exclusion. Income 
comparisons can take place at any point in the income distribution, even between the top 
and the very top. But if the impact of relative income on SWB was especially pronounced at 
the bottom of the distribution, it would suggest that something else apart from mere 
income comparisons is taking place. This could then be the independent effect of being cut 
adrift from the ordinary consumption patterns of society, as opposed to just having less 
than somebody else.   
SWB-studies suggest that interpersonal comparisons take place and that, other things 
equal, falling behind a reference group has a negative impact on SWB. The variable which 
measures relative income – the ratio of the respondent’s income to the imputed peer 
group’s income – is usually statistically significantly. Its magnitude is often in the same 
region as that of the respondent’s own income. The literature does not conclusively answer 
the question whether absolute or relative income is a stronger determinant of SWB, but it 
is safe to say that both matter. This could be compatible with a notion of poverty that is 
somewhere in between a purely relative and a purely absolute one.  
However, there is one crucial piece of information which cannot be gathered from the SWB 
literature: It cannot establish who exactly constitutes the benchmark group whose income 
level is supposed to be the reference point. A few SWB studies have assumed that the 
reference group is made up of the inhabitants of the national territory, and have therefore 
taken the national average income (or a close equivalent) as the benchmark income 
(Easterlin, 1995; the UK model in Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). Implicitly, conventional 
relative poverty studies do the same: When poverty lines are pegged to the national 
median, the national territory is implicitly assumed to be the domain over which customary 
consumption habits are formed.  
But many authors have assumed that benchmarking takes place on a much narrower 
geographic scale. In some SWB studies, the reference group is defined at the level of the 
region (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; the US model in Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004), the 
municipality (Luttmer, 2004; Clark and Oswald, 1996), or even the vicinity (Kuhn et al, 
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2008). It is not clear at all which of these levels is more appropriate, because no clear 
hierarchy between these models is recognisable. There is no indication that one of them is 
better able to achieve unbiased estimates than the others. Whether a benchmark defined 
at the national level is superior to a benchmark defined at the regional level, or vice versa, 
is an unresolved question. There is evidence that income comparisons vis-à-vis some 
benchmark takes place, but it is not clear what that benchmark is. Relative income matters, 
but the question ‘relative to what?’ remains unanswered. As far as the formation of 
consumption-related norms and expectations is concerned, there is nothing special about 
the national level.  
If this is the case, then neither is there a particular reason why relative poverty standards 
have to be defined at the national level. In practice, almost all studies on relative poverty 
peg the poverty line to the national median, but this is not part of the definition of relative 
poverty. Indeed, when the idea of a relative measure was initially formulated, the relative-
to-what question was still left open:  
“Our general theory, then, should be that individuals and families whose resources, over 
time, fall seriously short of the resources commanded by the average individual or family in 
the community in which they live, whether that community is a local, national or 
international one, are in poverty” (Townsend, 1962, p. 225; emphasis added).  
It is not for reasons inherent in the theory that de facto, ‘relative’ has come to mean 
‘relative to the national average’. It is merely a consequence of administrative 
arrangements: The key social policy decisions, too, are generally taken at the national level 
(Eurostat, 2008, p. 39). However, if the case for a relative measure is made in on the 
grounds of context-specific social norms, then the geographic area over which this measure 
is specified must be selected on the same grounds – it must approximate the territory 
where these social norms apply, independent of political or administrative technicalities. 
Competences for social policy can be relocated upwards (e.g. in the course of European 
harmonisation) or downwards (e.g. in the course of devolution or ‘localism’), but this would 
not change the way in which customary consumption habits are formed. 
Are these considerations relevant in practice? The answer can be found by looking at the 
few poverty studies which have experimented with poverty indicators defined over 
alternative territories. Rainwater et al (2003) as well as Kangas and Ritakallio (2004) show 
regional relative poverty rates measured against poverty lines based on regional, rather 
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than national medians. In countries with substantial regional differences in living standards, 
this has a large impact on the poverty rates of regions with an income level far above or far 
below the national average. As shown in Table 5.1, when switching from a national to a 
regional poverty line, relative poverty soars in the more prosperous and plummets in the 
less prosperous regions.  
Table 5.1: Relative poverty rates with national and regional poverty lines 
Poverty line → 





Italy   
 Milan 7.3% 14.5% 
 Sicily 46.6% 27.3% 
Spain   
 Catalonia 6.7% 17.5% 
 Andalucía 27.3% 17.9% 
France   
 Greater Paris 10.5% 18.7% 
 Calais 23.8% 13.9% 
Ireland   
 Dublin 15.0% 20.6% 
 West Ireland 25.4% 11.5% 
UK   
 South East England 14.6% 20.4% 
 Northern Ireland 29.3% 16.9% 
USA   
 New Jersey 13.6%* 21.8%* 
 Arkansas 25.7%* 14.1%* 
-based on data from Kangas and Ritakallio (2004) and Rainwater et al (2001) 
*: child poverty rate only, threshold = 50% (not 60%) of median 
 
The argument made here is not that the regional level is more appropriate for setting 
poverty lines than the national level. The argument is that it is unknown what the ‘correct’ 
reference territory is, and yet, relative poverty rates are highly sensitive to this choice. They 
are non-robust, in the sense that changes in the geographical boundaries which are entirely 
compatible with the overall theory can completely overturn the results.  
To illustrate the effect of a change in boundaries in the other direction – merging 
neighbouring countries rather than splitting existing ones – Table 5.2 shows relative 
poverty rates in three hypothetical countries. The examples have been selected in such a 
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way as to make them fully compatible with a relative conception of poverty: The selected 
countries have either a shared history or mutually intelligible languages, and cannot be 
considered entirely separate societies as far as social norms and the concomitant 
consumption habits are concerned. The figures are only order-of-magnitude 
approximations.21 
The first example shows a hypothetical merger of Austria with Hungary into Austro-
Hungary, which produces a new median income and hence a new poverty line. Against this 
poverty line, relative poverty would virtually disappear in Austria, and about quadruple in 
Hungary. The second example shows a merger of Norway and Sweden into ‘Nordland’, a 
less extreme example because the two constituent countries are less far apart 
economically. Still, this merger would result in a notable increase in relative poverty in 
Sweden. Finally, merging Spain and Portugal into ‘Iberia’ results in a large increase in the 
Portuguese relative poverty rate.  
Table 5.2: Relative poverty rates in three hypothetical countries 
 Median income in 
PPP-$, 2005 
Poverty line in PPP-
$ (60% of median 
income) 
Poverty rate 
Austria 25,100 15,100 13% 
Hungary 9,800 5,900 12% 
‘Austro-Hungary’ 15,700 9,400 26% 
Austria as a region of ‘Austro-Hungary’  25,100 9,400 3% 
Hungary as a region of ‘Austro-Hungary’ 9,800 9,400 46% 
    
Sweden 20,700 12,400 11% 
Norway 26,600 16,000 12% 
‘Nordland’ 22,600 13,600 14% 
Sweden as a region of ‘Nordland’ 20,700 13,600 16% 
Norway as a region of ‘Nordland’ 26,600 16,000 9% 
    
Spain 18,000 10,800 21% 
Portugal 12,300 7,400 21% 
‘Ibera’ 16,700 10,000 21% 
Spain as a region of ‘Iberia’ 18,000 10,000 18% 
Portugal as a region of ‘Iberia’ 12,300 10,000 36% 
-data from Niemietz (2010) 
 
                                                          
21 They are based on OECD data for income deciles instead of percentiles, so the simplifying assumption was 
made that, within each decile, the income difference between two adjacent percentiles is constant. 
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The emphasis of this numerical exercise is not on the fact that the relatively poor of one 
society can be well-off by the standards of a different society. That is as obvious as it is 
irrelevant. Relative poverty is concerned with low-earners’ ability to participate in their own 
society, not with how they fare by the standards of some distant, unrelated society. This is 
why conventional critiques of relative measures have often missed the point. An example is 
the statement by Clark et al (2006, p. 53): “The homeless in Washington, DC may live quite 
poorly by American standards, but by the standards of India, they are rather well off[...] 
Their medical attention in particular is better than anything available until very recently.” 
Adherents of relative measures would justifiably reject this comparison as flawed. They 
would point out that the poverty of the homeless in Washington DC consists of the fact that 
they are unable to participate in mainstream American society. Their ability to participate in 
their own society does not depend on how their living standards compare to those 
observed in distant parts of the world. But if the comparison of living standards across 
entirely unrelated societies represents one extreme, then nation-centred relative poverty 
measures represent the opposite extreme, and the failure of one extreme does not validate 
the other. In a relative poverty framework, it is effectively assumed that consumption-
related norms are uniform within a country, and then stop abruptly at the national border.  
 
The Austro-Hungary example is somewhat extreme, but it is not an isolated outlier. The 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia also record some of the lowest relative poverty rates 
in the world. The possibility that consumption-related norms in these countries might by 
affected by the norms in their much more prosperous Western neighbour countries, with 
which they maintain close economic ties, is not considered in relative poverty studies (see 
e.g. UNICEF, 2005; UNICEF, 2007).  
 
To repeat: The case made in this subchapter is not that the national level is the ‘wrong’ 
level for poverty measurement; it is not claimed that the regional or the supranational level 
is in any way superior. The argument is that it is unknown which level is the most 
appropriate, and that small, plausible changes to the boundaries can have a large impact on 
the results. UNICEF (2007, p. 6) argues that “in today’s OECD nations the cutting edge of 
poverty is the contrast, daily perceived, between the lives of the poor and the lives of those 
around them.” But if plausible changes to the definition of who exactly ‘those around them’ 
are can fundamentally alter the results, then this statement cannot be translated into a 
robust indicator.  
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5.4 The problem of defining the social reference group 
SWB studies differ in their specification of the territory for deriving the benchmark income. 
But whichever territory they specify, they rarely assume that the benchmark group is made 
up of all inhabitants of this territory. It is much more common to assume that reference 
groups consist of individuals who share some socio-economic characteristics. In other 
words, they assume that there is no single, common reference group, whose consumption 
habits define ‘the norm’ for all of society.  
McBride (2001) uses a model in which individuals benchmark their income against the 
average income of their own age group, defined as the respondent’s age plus/minus five 
years. Thus, benchmarking is assumed to take place in comparison to age-mates, not 
society as a whole. There are now a variety of benchmark groups – as many as there are 
age groups – rather than a single one. In addition, the author notes that the intensity of 
benchmarking varies over the lifecycle, with absolute income being more important in 
some and relative income being more important in other stages of life. Neither is the 
intensity of benchmarking uniform across the income distribution. It seems to be weaker at 
the lower end, where absolute income is a greater concern than relative income. This is 
difficult to reconcile with a relative understanding of poverty.  
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) takes a similar approach, but includes education as an additional 
variable. In her model, individuals benchmark their income vis-à-vis those in the same age 
group who also have a similar education level. With the inclusion of this additional variable, 
the number of reference groups becomes larger yet.  
Van de Stadt et al (1985) define an even more ‘tailor-made’ reference group, consisting of 
people of the same age group, education level and employment status. Clark and Oswald 
(1996) go a step further and specify a model in which the comparison group consists of 
people of the same age group, education level, employment category, and industry.  
There is, again, no discernible hierarchy between those models in terms of their ability to 
deliver unbiased, consistent estimates. It is not clear whether the specification of more and 
more tailor-made reference groups is sensible, but neither is there a reason to assume that 
there is one single, common reference point for consumption-related norms. People in 
different circumstances differ in the living standards and consumption habits they consider 
‘the norm’.  
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The findings of Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) further complicate this picture. They show that 
the process of reference group formation is not uniform within a country or over time. It 
varies with the extent to which a locality is integrated into wider patterns of market 
exchange, and thus with exposure to geographically distant people’s lifestyles. The intensity 
of benchmarking against a reference standard also varies with the composition of the 
consumption basket. For some goods, respondents’ perceptions of what constituted 
acceptable standards depended a lot on what was available to others around them. For 
other goods, respondents were rather indifferent to what others had. For example, most 
respondents tolerated differences in the standard of clothing, but not in the standard of 
healthcare.  
In short, there is no reason why the cost of social inclusion should be a fixed fraction of 
median income or, more generally, why median income earners should be treated as the 
standard setters of social norms. Whether a given living standard is perceived as adequate 
does not necessarily depend on the distance to the national median, but rather, on the 
distance to some highly personal, unobservable peer group. Minimising that difference, 
however, is not a feasible policy objective. If benchmark groups are defined by common 
socioeconomic characteristics, their members will often be in the same income tax bracket 
and/or qualify for the same income transfers. Traditional redistributive instruments will 
therefore not necessarily affect within-group income differences.  
It is important to note that the problem of reference group specification cannot be easily 
overcome. In the context of SWB models, terms like ‘comparison’ or ‘benchmarking’ must 
not be taken literally. They might include, but are by no means limited to conscious, 
deliberate comparisons. If they were, one could overcome the problem by simply 
conducting a survey, and asking people who they compare themselves to when evaluating 
their living standards. But in the context of SWB studies, this is not an option, because this 
is not necessarily the kind of benchmarking that these studies investigate. A respondent 
may never consciously ask themselves ‘How does my income compare to the typical 
incomes in group X?’, but changes in the incomes of group X could still have an impact on 




5.5 The problem of defining the reference timeframe 
Relative poverty standards count increases in average living standards against material 
gains enjoyed by the poor, on the grounds that these increases raise consumption-related 
norms. They also treat this offsetting as taking effect instantaneously. Relative measures do 
not account for the dimension of time in the formation of norms and expectations. 
Effectively, the assumption is that what people perceive as a ‘normal’ standard of living is a 
function of the standards they presently see around themselves. There is no account of 
what they experienced in the recent past, what the reference level was in the recent past, 
or what they expect to experience in the near future.  
The same is true for virtually all SWB studies, which is why very little is known on the role of 
time in the formation of consumption norms and the catching-up of expectations. SWB-
studies, like poverty studies, are set in a timeless world with no past and no future. But 
there are no intrinsic reasons for this, and a few exceptions do exist. Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman (2008) develop a model in which respondents benchmark their income 
against three different reference levels. Apart from the reference group’s present income, 
its past income is also included, as is the respondent’s own past income. The study is too 
tentative to permit any conclusions about the relative importance of each, but to say the 
least, there is no reason to reject the notion that hindsight-benchmarking takes place and 
affects current perceptions.  
By implication, this also means that there is no reason why poverty studies have to be set in 
a timeless world. It would be entirely coherent within the relative poverty framework to 
adopt a notion of ‘inter-temporal relativity’. Callan et al (1998), for example, state the case 
for the use of relative measures in the following way: “[O]ver time, increases in general 
living standards will come to be fully reflected in expectations about what is sufficient to 
participate fully in society” [emphasis added]. Current relative indicators, however, omit 
this intertemporal aspect. They do not allow for a time lag that has to elapse before a rise 
in overall living standards has translated into changed perceptions of what is a ‘typical’ 
lifestyle. They assume that this adjustment always takes place instantaneously. If they did 
take time into account, they would have to differentiate between societies that record 
similar living standards at present, but that have reached their current positions through 
different time trajectories. 
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The experience of Ireland during its high-growth period is a case study which reveals the 
limits of the ‘time-blind’ approach, as even adherents of relative poverty measures have 
acknowledged. UNICEF (2005, p. 7), for example, notes: “In the 1990s […] Ireland saw 
sustained economic growth that brought a near doubling of average incomes. Clearly, child 
poverty has in one sense been reduced. But relative poverty remained largely unchanged.” 
Hills (2004, p. 42) explains this phenomenon, which he labels the ‘Irish Paradox’, as follows: 
“The poor were a lot better off in real terms than they had been, but relative poverty still 
rose. This jarred with public perceptions of what poverty constituted, since it had not 
adjusted upwards as fast as average living standards.” 
Still, the tendency among many poverty researchers has been to treat this phenomenon as 
a mere “short-term quirk” (Stewart, 2010). The term ‘Irish paradox’ already implies that the 
phenomenon was unique to Ireland. But while the Irish growth rate was indeed unique in 
magnitude, the basic logic is universal: The higher the growth rate of low-earners’ income, 
the shorter the time period that has to elapse before they reach current median levels. 
An intertemporal measure which included the median of a previous generation as a 
reference point would not be compatible with the theory of relative poverty: A different 
generation would be seen as akin to a different country. Contemporary low-earners live 
here and now, and if they are to avoid poverty, their income has to enable compliance with 
the consumption norms of here and now. Proponents of relative measures rightfully reject 
the benchmarking against a distant and unrelated point in time, such as “the people 
classified as poor in the United States today have many privileges that Louis XIV did not 
have” (ibid.). However, this does not automatically validate the opposite extreme of 
excluding the dimension of time altogether.  
A version of relative poverty which included an intertemporal dimension could provide very 
different results. The greater the weight it attached to past incomes, the more it would 
respond to changes in low-earners absolute income – without turning it into a measure of 
absolute poverty. It would still be a firmly relative measure, which would differ from 
conventional relative measures only insofar as it would answer the ‘relative to what?’ 
question differently. To give an example: In the mid-2000s, Ireland, the USA and New 
Zealand recorded very similar rates of relative poverty. These countries were similar in one 
particular dimension of relativity: the income gap between contemporary low-earners and 
contemporary median earners. And yet they differed radically on an intertemporal 
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dimension of relativity, for example, relative to domestic median incomes in the mid-1980s. 
Low-earners in the USA and New Zealand had experienced only modest improvements in 
their incomes since then, which meant that they were still a good distance away from their 
countries’ mid-1980s median. Irish low-earners, in contrast, had reached that level already. 
Under a relative measure with an intertemporal dimension, Ireland would have recorded a 
lower poverty rate than the USA and New Zealand. The three countries looked similar in 
terms of ‘snapshot inequality’, but the rapid improvements in the living standards of Irish 
low-earners would be counted as ‘intertemporal equity’. 
Figure 5.3 shows a calculation for the crudest possible form of intertemporal relativity: It 
uses a relative poverty line defined as 65% of a 20-year moving average of median income. 
Thus, the poverty line for 1980 (1981, 1982 …) is the average of the median incomes 
recorded in all the years between 1961 (1962, 1963 …) and 1980 (1981, 1982 …). The 
purpose of this calculation is a purely illustrative one; the figures themselves are entirely 
arbitrary. There is no reason why 20 years should be the ‘correct’ reference period, or why 
65% should be the ‘correct’ threshold. Nevertheless, the calculation provides a glimpse of 
what the addition of an intertemporal dimension into relative poverty measures would look 
like.  
The solid black line shows the conventional weekly relative poverty line (for a childless two-
adult household), expressed in 2010 prices. The dotted black line shows the intertemporal 
relative poverty line. The threshold has been chosen in such a way that the two start from 
about the same position (hence, the choice of 65%), to ensure that the two methods 
compare like with like. The grey line shows real incomes at the 15th percentile of the 
distribution.  
The evolution of conventional relative poverty has already been described in subchapters 
2.4 and 3.1: It crossed the 15% mark in 1986, climbed well above that level in subsequent 
years, moderated slightly later on, but never reverted back the pre-1980s levels. This 
trajectory has defined the conventional ‘poverty narrative’ described in Chapter 2. The 
evolution of intertemporal relative poverty does not completely overthrow this narrative, 
but it differs in subtle yet important ways. First of all, the explosion of poverty in the 1980s 
is not repeated. Poverty only climbs above the 15%-mark in 1990, and even then not by 
very much. It falls below that level again in 1999, to rise above it once more at the onset of 
the present recession. The deviation between conventional and intertemporal relative 
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poverty is easily explained. There is no explosion in relative poverty in the 1980s, because 
the fast growth in median incomes recorded between 1982 and 1988 does not 
instantaneously translate into a steeply rising poverty line. When the poverty rate rises 
above the 15%-mark eventually, it does not happen for the same reason as under the 
conventional relative measure: Under the intertemporal approach, it happens because 
incomes in the relevant region fall in absolute terms, and then take time to recover while 
the poverty line continues to grow. Something similar happens during the financial crisis 
and the subsequent (and at the time of writing, still ongoing) recession.  
Figure 5.3: An intertemporal relative poverty line for the in the UK, 1980-2010, £ per week, 
2010 prices 
 
-author’s calculation, based on data from IFS (2012) 
The intertemporal poverty line developed here is still clearly a relative poverty line. It is just 
as firmly pegged to median incomes as a conventional relative measure. Nevertheless, in 
practice, it shares some commonalities with an absolute measure. It is not decoupled from 
the median, but it is largely decoupled from the median’s short-term fluctuations, which it 
neutralises through averaging. Therefore, it does not suddenly jolt up in periods of fast 
growth, and it does not drop in periods of downturn.  
Under an intertemporal relative poverty line, the cost of social inclusion ultimately rises 
with the median in the long term, but without repeating every one of the latter’s jumps and 
jolts. This is not quite the same as the idea of intertemporal relativity described above: In 
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Figure 5.3, a permanent increase in inequality would still increase relative poverty, albeit 
with a time lag. When intertemporal relative poverty is defined by the pace it takes for 
current low earners to catch up with current median earners over time, then even a 
permanent increase in inequality need not raise poverty, as long as it is accompanied by a 
rise in trend growth. But for a period of no more than thirty years, the two can be seen as 
similar enough.   
An intertemporal measure would also eliminate another anomaly of conventional relative 
measures: The fact that relative poverty regularly increases during recessions. In the UK, 
this has happened during the first oil crisis of the mid-1970s, the second oil crisis of the late 
1970s and the prolonged recession which followed it, the recession of the early 1990s 
(Muriel & Sibieta, 2009), and the present recession (Brewer et al, 2011). This pattern occurs 
because market incomes are more volatile than state transfers, at least during recessions. 
Median incomes consist mostly of market incomes, with incomes at the lower end consist 
mostly of state transfers. Hence, during recessions, median incomes fall faster than bottom 
incomes, a development which lowers relative poverty. 
Taken together, this shows that relative measures produce a number of anomalies which 
are difficult to justify even within their own set of assumptions. The theory of relative 
poverty holds that the cost of social inclusion rises over time with overall living standards, 
but this does not mean that any increase in median incomes immediately offsets gains 
made by the less well-off. Yet this is what happens under a relative approach. Neither is it 
explicable within the theory why poverty rates should fall during recessions, as they 
regularly do. Some adherents of relative measures have acknowledged the existence of 
these anomalies, but they have tried to dismiss them as occasional aberrations which can 
be ignored for practical purposes. Stewart (2010) calls the rising relative poverty rates in 
Ireland, which arose amidst spectacular income growth for the less well-off, as a “short-
term quirk” (Stewart, 2010). Hills (2004) called it the ‘Irish Paradox’, implying it was an 
idiosyncrasy of one country. By the same token, Lansley (2010) calls the phenomenon of 
rising poverty rates in recessions a “statistical quirk”.  
But attempts to downplay the anomalies produced by relative measures as mere ‘quirks’ 
are not convincing, given how frequently these supposed quirks occur. There have been 
four major recessions in British post-war history (counting the recent ‘double-dip’ as one 
single recession), and relative poverty rates fell by various percentage points in every one 
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of them. At the same time, relative poverty rates showed their strongest increase during a 
period of prolonged above-trend growth (the late 1980s), and something similar happened 
during the latter half of the 1990s. Such results are not defensible within the assumptions 
of relative poverty measurement, because neither is there a reason why the cost of social 
participation should suddenly drop during a recession, nor why it should immediately jolt 
up during a boom period. Yet this pattern – falling poverty during recessions, rising poverty 
during booms – occurs on a very regular basis, which is not surprising given the differences 
in the composition of incomes at different points of the distribution.  
In summary, relative measures are, again, non-robust to modifications within their own 
framework. They are highly sensitive to plausible changes in the reference period, a change 
which is fully compatible with the theory of relative poverty. The critique developed in this 
subchapter has been, again, a critique ‘from within’, which has evaluated relative measures 
by their own standards, accepting the assumptions on which they are based as given.  
 
5.6 The problem of defining the median elasticity of the poverty 
line  
Relative poverty measures are based on the implicit assumption that the cost of social 
participation rises with the national median, which, in itself, is already a leap of faith. But 
the implicit assumption is stronger than that. It also holds that the cost of social 
participation rises at exactly the same pace as he national median. Conventional relative 
poverty measures are a fixed fraction of median incomes, so if the median rise by p%, the 
poverty line automatically rises by the same p%. One could call this relationship the 
‘median elasticity of the poverty line’ (MEP). Under conventional relative measures, the 
MEP is always equal to 1 (and under conventional absolute measures, it is always equal to 
0). 
There is no theoretical reason why relative poverty measures should have an MEP of 1. The 
theory holds that the cost of social inclusion rises with the median, but not that it rises in 
exactly the same proportion. There is little research on how to determine a plausible figure 
for the MEP, but the so-called ‘Leyden Poverty Line’ (see Wolff, 2009, pp. 96-99), as well as 
the research by Madden (2000), could be interpreted as attempts to do so. The Leyden 
Poverty Line is derived from the survey data used to produce a majoritarian subjective 
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poverty line. Households are asked what they consider the minimum amount needed to 
live a decent life in their society, and the responses are plotted against the respondents’ 
income. For US data, a gradient of about 0.6 results: If people’s income increases by 10%, 
their perception of what constitutes a necessary minimum amount increases by 6%.A 
disadvantage is that respondents have not been followed for long periods of time, so it is 
unknown how this relationship changes as all incomes rise over time. But it is currently the 
next best thing to an estimate of the MEP. 
Madden (2000) uses a similar logic, but looks at actual purchasing decisions instead of 
relying on survey responses. He derives the income elasticity of demand for several 
necessities, taken from a Material Deprivation list. The average of these income elasticities 
can also be interpreted as an approximation of the MEP. The author finds a MEP between 
0.5 and 0.7, depending on the weighting. The same disadvantage that applies to the Leyden 
Poverty Line applies to Madden’s weighted average of income elasticities as well: The 
figures refer to relatively short time periods, so it is unknown whether they would also hold 
in the long run as overall income levels change. Overall, it is not quite clear whether these 
two estimates can really be used as MEP proxies, so no claim is made here that these 
estimates represent the ‘correct’ MEP. But at the very least, such estimates do show that 
there is nothing special about an MEP figure of 1. The above estimates have at least some 
evidence base, shaky as it may be, while the figure of 1 is no more than an implicit 
assumption. 
Figure 5.4 shows how the weekly poverty line (for a two-adult household) in the UK would 
have developed over time using alternative MEPs. The starting point is the poverty line of 
the year 1961, as 60% of the 1961 median income. From then on, each poverty line is 
adjusted each year by the growth in median income, multiplied by the respective MEP. The 
MEPs used are the lower and upper bound from Madden’s estimate, and the mid-point 
between them, which happens to coincide with the Leyden Poverty Line estimate. The 






Figure 5.4: The evolution of the weekly UK poverty line for a two-adult household in £, 
1961-2010, 2010 prices, under different median elasticities of the poverty line (MEP) 
 
-author’s calculation, based on data from IFS (2012) 
The choice of the MEP barely makes a difference in the first years, but a lot over time. Table 
5.3 uses the poverty lines that have been calculated for the year 2010 under the different 
uprating regimes, and applies each to the income distribution of 2010, to calculate the 
alternative poverty rates that would have resulted.  
Table 5.3: UK poverty rates in 2010 when updating the poverty line with alternative median 
elasticities  
MEP Poverty line 
(in 2010 prices) 
Poverty line 
in % of the  
2010 median 
Poverty line 
in % of the  
1961 median 
Poverty rate 
0.5 £177 49% 86% 6% 
0.6 £190 45% 93% 8% 
0.7 £204 42% 99% 9% 
1.0 £251 60% 122% 16% 
-author’s calculation based on data from IFS (2008) and DWP & ONS (2012) 
The figures should not be taken at face value. There is no especial reason why 1961 should 
be the staring year, the poverty lines are applied to an income range where income figures 
are no longer reliable (see Chapter 3). But what it does show is that, again, plausible 
changes within the relative framework can make substantial differences to the results. The 
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rates shown in Table 5.3 are all relative poverty rates; they are all measured against poverty 
lines that have followed the median over time. 
A relative poverty line uprated with an MEP of less than 1 would reflect an implicit 
assumption that in a growing economy, the cost of social participation rises over time as 
median incomes rise, but not to such an extent that this ‘eats up’ all the gains experienced 
by low-earners. Social participation would then slowly become relatively ‘cheaper’ as a 
society grows more prosperous. Within limits, growth could reduce poverty even if it is 
achieved at the expense of greater inequality. But unlike with an absolute poverty line, this 
measure would not automatically count every improvement in low-earners’ income as a fall 
in poverty. It would still demand some relationship between growth of low-earners’ income 
and growth of the median.  
Once again, plausible changes within the framework of relative poverty have led to 
fundamentally different results.  
 
5.7 Do relative poverty indicators measure relative living 
standards? 
Critics of relative poverty indicators have argued that these indicators measure nothing but 
inequality, a criticism which adherents reject on the grounds that these measures are 
intended to do precisely that. Both sides agree, however, that relative poverty indicators 
measure inequality in living standards in the bottom half of the distribution. That is, both 
sides assume that income inequality is the same thing as inequality in living standards. The 
analysis in Chapter 3, however, has shown that the relationship between ‘income’ and 
‘living standards’ is a much more complicated one, and by extension, the same must apply 
to inequality.  
Chapter 3 has shown how low-earners’ living standards have evolved over the past 
decades, mostly in absolute terms, but also in comparison to overall living standards at 
different points in time. It has shown that ‘living standards’ are a multifaceted 
phenomenon, which do not simply ‘rise’ or ‘fall’. Rather, they can show improvements in 
some aspects combined with stagnation or deterioration in other aspects. Measures like 
real income or real expenditure, indispensable though they are as summary measures, can 
hide substantial variation across these different dimensions. 
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One of the main results was that there have been many changes in low-earners living 
standards which cannot be seen in income or expenditure figures, and by extension, by 
poverty figures which are based on them. Living standards can change substantially while 
income/expenditure and poverty figures remain unchanged.  
The structure of relative prices 
One of the more obvious reasons for this phenomenon is changes in the structure of 
relative prices. In effect, households at different parts of the income distribution experience 
different inflation rates, because of differences in the composition of their typical 
consumption baskets (see subchapter 3.3). A typical consumption basket for a low-income 
family is not simply a miniature version of a typical consumption basket for a middle-
income family (i.e., the CPI basket). It is a basket in which basic essentials like food and 
housing occupy a much larger share, which is why price changes in these product categories 
have a larger impact on low-earners than on average earners. Changes in the structure of 
relative prices therefore entail changes in relative living standards, even if the distribution 
of nominal income/expenditure remains constant. Income-based or expenditure-based 
poverty figures, be they relative or absolute, cannot detect such effects on their own.  
Figure 5.5 shows a disaggregation of the CPI, highlighting the evolution of prices for some 
of the product categories which occupy a disproportionately large share in low-earners’ 
household budgets. Unsurprisingly, there is huge variation across the different 
components; the CPI itself is not a good predictor for any of its individual components. But 
these variations are not neutral in their impact on different parts of the income 
distribution. Between 1996 and the early 2000s, the evolution of the relative price structure 
has been mildly biased in favour of low-earners. With the exception of transport, the sub-
price levels of components which have an especially large impact on this group rose slower 
than the overall price level. If there had been a specific ‘low-earners’ inflation rate’, it 
would have been below the official inflation rate in these years. But in the mid-2000s, this 
pattern began to reverse. For the period as a whole, the change in the structure of relative 
prices has been biased against people on low incomes. Between 1996 and 2011, the overall 
price level increased by just over one third, but the price level of food, transport and fuel 
rose by much more than that. The one component which showed the opposite trend was 
clothing and footwear.  
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Figure 5.5: Change in relative prices in the UK, CPI vs. selected CPI-components, 1996-2011, 
100= 1996-level 
 
-based on data from ONS (2012) 
By the end of the last decade, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS, 2009 and 2008a) 
published estimates of subgroup-specific inflation rates, differentiated by demographics 
but also by income. One result was that as a consequence of these changes in relative 
prices, those on low incomes had experienced inflation rates well above the rate of CPI 
inflation. Counterexamples like the clothing category helped, but did not have enough 
weight to offset the other changes. Figure 5.5 shows that the same trends have accelerated 
since these studies were published, so their results must hold a fortiori now. Yet even 
though this development must have had a negative impact on the living standards of low 
earners, both in absolute terms and relative to average earners, neither the income 
statistics nor the poverty statistics could show it. The relative poverty line was uprated by 
the rate of change in the median income, which contains no information on factors like 
food prices or fuel prices. The absolute poverty line could not show these developments 
either. It was uprated by the rate of change in the CPI, but the CPI basket models the 
purchasing patterns of average households. It cannot capture differential impacts on low-
earners. It is therefore not an appropriate tool to uprate a poverty line, even though there 
is no obvious alternative. Insightful as the IFS studies are, it is not practically feasible to use 
a different inflation rate for every point in the income distribution. Moreover, while the 
product categories used in the IFS studies and in Figure 5.5 represent a disaggregation of 
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the CPI, they are still large aggregates themselves. In short, this means that conventional 
poverty measures are blind to an important determinant of low-earners – relative and 
absolute – living standards, and there is no obvious way how this shortcoming could be 
corrected within these approaches.   
The product market structure  
Relative prices are only the tip of the iceberg. Several authors have criticised consumer 
price indices for not taking account of important developments in product market 
structures, and consumers’ responses to them. Meyer and Sullivan (2006, p. 5), for 
example, show that CPIs are affected by the so-called ‘outlet bias’, which arises when 
consumer purchases shift towards low-cost discounters without price level measures taking 
account of it.  
These considerations can be taken further, and applied to poverty research. The emergence 
of low-cost discounters and ‘no-frills’ market segments is also a development which has the 
potential of making the consumption patterns of low-income earners more similar to those 
of middle income earners within a given income distribution. It is another determinant of 
absolute and relative living standards which is not captured by either income statistics or 
poverty statistics.  
This idea can be illustrated by considering two highly stylised, hypothetical societies with 
three income groups, each representing one third of the respective population, and three 
types of consumer goods. Within each income bracket, all individuals are assumed to have 
identical incomes and preferences, and there is neither saving nor borrowing. The three 
income brackets are the ‘poor’, the ‘middle-class’ and the ‘rich’. Median incomes are 
identical in both societies, but, as Table 5.4 shows, the income distributions differ.  





Society 2 is clearly the more unequal one in terms of the income distribution. But to know 
whether this translates directly into more unequal living standards, information about 
other characteristics of these societies is needed, foremost, about the structure of their 
 Society 1 Society 2 
Poor  600 500 
Middle-class  1100 1100 
Rich  1600 1700 
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product markets. The products available in both societies, and their respective prices in 
gold coins, are given in Table 5.5. The three consumer goods are a basic (B), a convenience 
(C) and a luxury (L) good, and the exact same good carries the same price across both 
societies.  
 








Product markets differ between both societies. Society 2 has diversified product markets, 
where each good comes in three versions: A basic ‘no-frills’ version (N), a standard version 
(S), and a ‘gold-plated’ version (G) with extra features (airline travel or household 
electronics would be realistic examples.) There is no product market diversification in 
Society 1, where only the standard version of each product is available. Table 5.6 shows 
how this results in different consumption patterns. For the sake of simplicity, it will be 
assumed that the poor only buy no-frills products, the middle class only buys standard 
products, and the rich only buy gold-plated ones. 
 
Table 5.6: Consumption patterns in two hypothetical societies; quantities purchased 
 Society 1 Society 2 
 Basic Convenience Luxury Basic Convenience Luxury 
Poor  10 (S) 5 (S) 0 10 (N) 5 (N) 1 (N) 
Middle-class  10 (S) 5 (S) 1 (S) 10 (S) 5 (S) 1 (S) 
Rich  10 (S) 5 (S) 2 (S) 10 (G) 5 (G) 1 (G) 
 
In Society 1, more money buys more goods and services; in Society 2, more money buys 
extra product features and enhancements. It is now no longer obvious which society is the 
more unequal one. In Society 1, an outside observer could immediately tell who is rich and 
who is poor by simply observing consumer behaviour. In Society 2, to an outside observer 
who is not familiar with the characteristics of the products, consumption behaviour in 
Society 2 would appear fairly similar across all income brackets. Due to differences in the 
 Society 1 Society 2 
Product category → 
________________ 
Product ↓ 
Standard No-Frills Standard Gold-Plated 
Basic (B) 10 5 10 15 
Convenience (C) 100 30 100 170 
Luxury (L) 500 300 500 700 
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nature of the product markets, consumption decisions in Society 1 are more often ‘binary 
decisions’; where people can or cannot afford a good. In Society 2, this ability becomes a 
continuum. It is no longer about whether they can afford a product, but to what standard. 
This makes Society 2, in one sense, the more inclusive one. In this society, nobody is shut 
out from a consumption habit altogether. There are differences in the standards that 
people in different income brackets can attain, but not in their ability to participate at all.  
 
Relative poverty measures cannot capture this dimension of relativity, but again, absolute 
measures are not an alternative. They are just as inept at detecting these changes as 
relative measures, because they are updated by the changes in the CPI, which provides no 
information on changes in product markets which are specifically relevant for the poor.  
 
Nor could the CPI be easily reworked to make it more relevant. Differentiation by quality 
standard is not part of CPI measurement. It is not impossible to construct quality-adjusted 
price indices, and there are examples of such adjustments for selected product categories 
(e.g. Schreyer, 1996; Lucarelli & Nicholson, 2009). But this is mostly limited to markets 
where quality changes occur at an especially rapid pace, and/or are of such a magnitude 
that the upgraded version could as well be considered a new product (e.g. information 
technology and innovative medicines). Yet such estimates are not provided on a regular 
basis, or for the CPI as a whole.    
 
Why does it matter? 
  
These are not just theoretical considerations. Market outcomes are, to a large extent, 
policy-shaped. Policymakers do not set prices or determine industry structures, but such 
variables are often responses to the regulatory policy environment that economic agents 
find themselves in. This environment, in turn, is created by economic policy choices.  
 
A real-world example which comes close to the hypothetical product markets in Table 5.5 is 
the European aviation industry. Up until the early 1990s, the market for air travel in Europe 
was a lot like the product market of Society 1 in Table 5.5. From then on, the market has 
diversified hugely, making it a lot more like the product market of Society 2 in the same 
table (see also subchapter 3.7). This was not a product of chance. It followed a deliberate 
and concerted EU policy of removing regulatory barriers that had thus far hindered the 
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diversification of business models. The no-frills sector developed, because policymakers 
allowed it to develop.  
 
Policymakers choose what kind of business environment they want to create. These choices 
affect the (relative and absolute) living standards of low-earners just as much as changes in 
the (shape or level of the) income distribution. And yet, poverty research virtually ignores 
the product market side, and limits itself to the study of the income distribution.     
 
The implications will be explored later on. For now, suffice it to say that poverty research 
ought to be as much about product market developments as it is about the income 
distribution. Poverty research ought to be able to identify the poverty-reducing effects of 
competition and productivity growth in markets which are of especial relevance to low-
earners, as well as of diversification and the emergence of low-cost segments. Such 
developments affect low-earners’ living standards in both a relative and an absolute sense, 
and yet neither relative nor absolute poverty measures are able to see these effects. This 
area is a blind spot in the current arsenal of poverty measures, and a blind spot of poverty 
research.  
 
5.8 The role of income in kind 
 
The measurement of living standards poses a few general problems which affect poverty 
measurement in general, regardless of whether a relative or an absolute measure is used. 
Poverty measures are limited to one aspect of living standards, the aspect which is defined 
by market transactions or near-market substitutes. Income-based measures are limited to 
reported cash income; expenditure-based measures are limited to reported cash purchases. 
Yet living standards are also defined by the consumption of publicly provided services that 
are offered for free at the point of use, or below cost. Two broad categories can be 
distinguished here: 
 
 Universally provided public services, such as healthcare and education in the UK. 
Since they are open to all income groups, they need not be relevant for relative 
poverty figures, but if they are used more intensively by low-income groups, they 
have a distributional impact as well.  
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 Benefits in kind, such as social housing or free medical prescriptions in the UK. 
These are targeted towards low-income groups via a means-test, but not counted 
as part of income (or expenditure), which means that they affect the distribution of 
living standards, but not the distribution of income (or expenditure).  
 
One result of this is that poverty figures are sensitive to the structure of welfare provision. 
Cash transfers are registered, implicit subsidies in the form of below-cost public provision is 
not. The implications are shown in Table 5.7, which contrasts the living standards of welfare 
recipients in two hypothetical welfare regimes, one based on cash transfers and one based 
on public provision. In the former, recipients receive a total cash transfer of 320 gold coins, 
to cover general living expenses, housing costs, health insurance costs and transport costs. 
In the second system, recipients only receive a cash transfer of 100 gold coins for general 
living expenses, but are entitled to the use of equivalent services provided publicly without 
user payments. Put differently, the first system is based on subject subsides and the second 
on object subsidies. Provided the quality and accessibility of the services is the same in both 
societies, this means that welfare recipients in both societies attain the same living 
standards, but the second society would record vastly higher poverty rates.  
 
Table 5.7: Cash-based vs. in-kind based welfare state 
Welfare system based on 
cash payments 
Welfare system based on 
In-kind provision 
Instrument Cost Instrument Cost 
Income support 100 Income support 100 
Housing benefit  
 
150 Cost of public/social 
housing provision used 
150 
Payment for health  
insurance contribution 
50 Cost of publicly provided  
healthcare services used 
50 
Payment for  
transport costs 
20 Cost of public transport 
services used 
20 
Total cash income 320 Total cash income 100 
 
There is no obvious way to make poverty figures neutral with regard to the composition of 
welfare provision. The cost of service provision cannot simply be added to household 
income. In the above example, the three spending categories – housing, healthcare and 
transport – have been treated as monolithic blocks. The possibility that within each 
category, what the state assigns to recipients is not necessarily what they would have 
chosen to buy if they had been paid out the monetary equivalent has been assumed away. 
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But in a real-world case, if a money equivalent is not fungible, it cannot really be treated as 
money income. This is why poverty figures cannot easily be corrected for differences in the 
structure of welfare arrangements. If the relative importance of in-kind and in-cash benefits 
differs across countries and/or changes over time, cross-country comparisons and/or time-
series are biased.  
There have been attempts to correct poverty figures for this bias in favour of transfer-based 
welfare states. Wolff (2009) recalculates US poverty rates treating the cost of Medicaid, 
Medicare, food stamps and subsidised housing as income. The poverty rate can fall by up to 
five percentage points, but there is a lot of variation between the estimates, depending on 
how these services are valuated and apportioned to individuals. Food stamps are the 
easiest case, as their high degree of fungibility makes them near-money substitutes. They 
are ring-fenced for one product category, but as every household spends money on food, 
this is a non-binding constraint. The treatment of public health insurance programmes and 
public housing is more complex and has its limitations, but it is still feasible. Similar services 
are also bought and sold on markets.  
No similar evidence is available for the UK. Sefton (2002) provides an estimate which adds 
the cost of some public services to household incomes, corrected for differences in 
utilisation rates. On this basis, the income distribution is significantly more even. The lowest 
income groups contain a disproportionately large share of children and elderly people, 
leading to greater consumption of health and education services. The figures show a 
snapshot analysis, but since public spending on these items has increased over time, it 
follows that this approach would also produce time series figures different from the figures 
for cash income.  
The OECD (2008, pp. 224-245) provides a similar estimate for its member countries, adding 
the cost of publicly provided services to household incomes, with some adjustment for 
differences in service utilisation rates. This produces a more equal income distribution in all 
OECD countries, but it does not greatly affect the ranking of countries by measures of 
inequality. So the bias produced by the omission of income in kind does not seem to be a 
systematic one for cross-country comparisons.  
Time-series comparisons may be more affected, as Browning (1989) shows for US data. 
When the US poverty measure was devised in the 1960s, benefits in kind were not 
widespread yet, as Medicaid and Medicare were just about to be created. By the mid-
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1980s, benefits in kind had come to represent 70% of US welfare spending (ibid). Browning 
points out that increasing the provision of free services can actually raise the poverty rate, 
by crowding out some of the corresponding cash income.  
The estimates by Sefton, the OECD and Browning provide an impression of differences in 
service consumption between income groups, and of the cost of service provision. But they 
remain problematic for the reason described above: they take ‘cost’ as a proxy for ‘value’. 
Sefton (2009, p. 40) simply asserts that “the amount of expenditure is a reasonable measure 
of its worth to recipients”, without substantiating this claim.  
The incorporation of in-kind provision can be considered one of the unresolved issues in 
poverty research. Many of the specific problems of income data could be overcome by 
replacing them with expenditure data, but this would still leave the valuation of in-kind 
provision unresolved. It is common to income and expenditure data, just as it is common to 
relative and absolute measures. It is, again, important to point out that unlike e.g. the 
definition of the reference territory, the problems described in this subchapter are not 
specific to relative measures. They have been included here for the sake of completeness, 
but when assessing relative measures in a comparative perspective, the problems 




A standard approach in the poverty literature is to explain the case for defining poverty 
within a social context rather than in an empty space, and then jump from this directly to a 
relative measurement.  The synonymity of ‘context-specific’ and ‘relative’ is too quickly 
taken for granted. But a closer look at the history of poverty measurement shows that the 
theory and the measurement have not evolved jointly. The synonymity of the two is a post-
hoc construction. The idea that poverty has to be defined with due regard to social norms 
and customary consumption habits has been around well before poverty lines were pegged 
to national mean or median incomes. It is possible to separate the theory from the 
measurement, and it is possible to critique the latter without rejecting the former.  
 
Conventional critiques of relative measures have generally failed to draw this distinction. 
They have criticised relative measures for some of their statistical properties, without 
179 
 
engaging with the theory that these measures ought to embody. In particular, they have 
criticised relative measures for being measures of inequality, despite the fact that this is 
exactly their purpose. Supporters of relative measures do not ‘confuse’ poverty with 
inequality, rather, they subscribe to a set of very specific assumptions under which poverty 
is inequality. The failure of critics to engage with the theory behind relative measures may 
be a result of the fact that in the public policy debate, relative measures are rarely used in 
the sense in which they were originally intended. The frequent misunderstanding is that 
relative measures are used as if they were measures of physical deprivation, with the 
attribute ‘relative’ misinterpreted to mean ‘less severe’. Still, it is not enough to criticise the 
misunderstanding. In academic poverty research, as discussed in Chapter 4, relative poverty 
rates are still used very much in line with their original intention. This chapter has ignored 
the misunderstanding, and evaluated relative measures on their own terms. It has 
evaluated whether ‘relative’ is really an accurate and robust approximation of ‘context-
specific’.  
 
The result is that they are not robust. Plausible changes within the framework of relative 
poverty measurement can lead to completely different results. Relative poverty rates 
depend crucially on the specification of the reference territory, the reference group and the 
reference timeframe. Yet the current specifications are not grounded in either the theory of 
relative poverty, or in any empirical evidence. They mostly reflect administrative 
arrangements: For example, income statistics are gathered at the national level, and by 
implication, so are relative poverty figures. Yet there is nothing in the theory of relative 
poverty which implies that the boundaries of the reference territory have to coincide with 
national boundaries. Nor is there any empirical evidence suggesting that the national level 
is more relevant for the formation of social norms than alternative boundaries. A similar 
logic applies to other dimensions of relativity. There are neither theoretical reasons nor 
empirical evidence that the cost of social participation should rise linearly, and 
instantaneously, with median incomes.  
 
Relative poverty measures are not just non-robust, they also fail on their own terms 
because they miss key determinants of relative living standards. What they measure is 
income inequality, not inequality in living standards. Inequality in living standards is also 
determined by the structure of relative prices and the degree of diversification in product 
markets. Yet relative poverty measures do not contain any information on prices or product 
180 
 
markets. They are blind to many of the developments which affect low-earners relative 
living standards.  
 
The aim of this chapter is not to judge relative measures by impossibly high standards. 
‘Social participation’ is necessarily an abstract concept, and any attempt to compress it into 
a statistical measure will be open to challenge. But the conclusions drawn from studies 
based on relative measures depend critically on the assumptions. If, for example, income 
benchmarking occurred mostly within relatively homogenous reference groups rather than 
vis-à-vis a country’s population as a whole, the case for narrowing the national income 
distribution weakens. The same would be true if norms of consumption crossed national 
borders, rather than being strictly confined to the domestic level: This, too, would mean 
that relative measures exaggerate the importance of the domestic income distribution in 
the formation of social norms.  
 
None of these objections would matter greatly if the policies required to address relative 
poverty came at no economic cost. But Chapter 4 has shown this not to be the case. Other 
things equal, high levels of redistribution through the tax and benefit system hamper 
economic progress, even if most studies on relative poverty prefer not to acknowledge it. If 
there were no trade-offs in poverty alleviation, no particularly strong evidence base on 
what exactly constitutes poverty would be required. The notion that poverty really is 
defined by the distance to the contemporary national median, not command over goods 
and services, would then not have to be especially scrutinised. It is the existence of trade-
offs which makes a higher level of scrutiny necessary, and this chapter has sought to 
provide that scrutiny. It has shown relative measures to be non-robust, which means that 
the policies of relative poverty alleviation come at a very real economic cost, but offer only 
highly speculative gains in return.   
 
Apart from the economic cost, there is also a more subtle opportunity cost to consider. The 
above-described focus on enabling competitive product markets and market diversification 
may not conflict with policies of income redistribution, as the former do not entail any fiscal 
costs. These two approaches do not compete for resources – but they may still compete for 
attention. At least in poverty research, it is fair to say the focus on the income distribution 
has crowded out other concerns. None of the studies reviewed in Chapter 4 addresses the 
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issues of market prices or product market structure, neither the studies on relative nor 
those on absolute poverty.  
 
This chapter has criticised existing measures, especially relative measures, and to a lesser 
extent absolute ones. But it has not formulated any suggestions for improvement. It has 
identified a number of flaws of existing measures, but it has not brought forward any 
counterproposals. Can a different kind of measure avoid these flaws, or are they just 
inevitable?  
 
The next chapter will address this question, by turning the critique developed here into a 


























6. Deriving a new measure of poverty 
 
Relative poverty measures have gained a degree of influence which is not commensurate 
with the measure’s strengths. Chapter 2 has shown how the measure has come to 
dominate poverty research, social policy, and public perceptions of poverty. As far as the 
latter is concerned, the measure has given rise to a specific ‘poverty narrative’ which could 
not otherwise have emerged, and which, as Chapter 3 has shown, is very far removed from 
the evolution of the underlying living standards. The use of relative measures has become 
commonplace because these measures were widely seen to embody the insight that 
poverty measures have to be defined within a social context rather than in a vacuum. As 
Townsend (1980) put it, “a relative measure's greatest theoretical virtue is that it is entirely 
grounded in national and historical context”. Since the ‘rediscovery of poverty’, poverty has 
been understood as the inability to comply with consumption-related social norms, and 
relative poverty measures have been seen as the translation of this abstract idea into a 
tangible indicator. The poverty line has been treated as a proxy measure of the cost of 
participating in a specific society in a specific time period.  
But Chapter 5 has challenged the notion that ‘context-specific’ is the same as ‘relative’. 
Relative measures do not contain information about time-specific and place-specific social 
norms; they simply tie the poverty line to a statistical average which may or may not have 
much social relevance. These measures do not assess the cost of complying with social 
norms; they merely treat increases in median incomes mechanistically as a burden on the 
poor. Studies on relative poverty state the broad, abstract idea of context-specific poverty, 
and then jump directly from this description to a relative measure, as if the latter 
automatically followed from the former. It does not, and a closer look at the history of 
poverty measurement in the previous chapter has also shown that the general idea was 
already fully worked out well before the statistical measure emerged.  
At the same time, relative measures fail to register developments which do affect the least 
well-off in very tangible ways. The emergence of relative measures began with an apt 
critique of the Budget Standard Approach which had dominated poverty research until 
then. This approach was criticised because the hypothetical baskets it used bore little 
resemblance to poor people’s actual purchasing behaviour. These baskets were therefore, 
justifiably, dismissed as socially irrelevant. But ironically, Rowntree-style poverty baskets 
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had at least some overlap with poor people’s actual consumption habits, while the relative 
standards which replaced them are completely detached from them. Relative standards 
contain no information about what it is that poor people can or cannot afford. Based 
exclusively on the distribution of nominal incomes, they are blind to any developments in 
product markets which affect the living standards of the least well-off.  
In the course of the rediscovery of poverty, critics of the old BSA method have significantly 
advanced poverty research. The critique of relative measures developed here is not 
intended to subtract, in any way, from these achievements. On the contrary: As Chapter 5 
has shown, it is entirely possible to separate the theory from the measurement, and accept 
much of the former while rejecting the latter. The insights that needs are to some extent 
socially determined; that there is nothing intrinsic in goods which makes some ‘necessities’ 
or others ‘luxuries’; that social needs are just as real as physical ones – these are the 
insights which poverty research owes to the critics of the BSA method.  
Nevertheless, this thesis rejects relative measures. These measures do not provide any 
additional insights beyond what is already contained in a standard measure of inequality of 
the bottom half of the distribution, e.g. the P50/P10 ratio. Statistically, the P50/P10 is a 
nearly perfect substitute for relative poverty measures (see subchapter 5.1). The difference 
is that the P50/P10 ratio commands no comparable influence on research, public opinion 
and public policy. It does not produce any broad-brush narratives, and there are no 
‘P50/P10 targets’ enshrined in law. Researchers do not read properties into it which it does 
not possess: The P50/P10 is never taken to be a measure of social inclusion or exclusion. It 
is interpreted as no more than what it is: a measure of income inequality in the bottom half 
of the distribution. There is no reason why relative poverty figures should carry greater 
weight than P50/P10 figures.   
 
6.1 What a poverty indicator should achieve 
The last chapter has been a critique of relative measures ‘from within’, it has evaluated 
relative measures by their own standards rather than, as many previous critiques have 
done, by the standards of a different poverty measure. It has been found wanting, on this 
basis, but this does mean that the conventional alternatives are any better. Chapter 5 has 
merely singled out relative measures because this is the ‘headline measure’ which draws 
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most of the research attention – not because the critique developed is unique to this class 
of indicators. This chapter will begin by showing that much of the critique applies to other 
measures as well. There is currently no fully convincing alternative.  
Yet the main purpose of this chapter is not to criticise, but to develop an alternative. By 
implication, the same criteria which have been developed in the previous chapter to 
critique relative measures can also be used as a blueprint for developing an alternative:  
 Relative measures have been critiqued for their high degree of sensitivity to the 
choice of the reference point. Small and plausible changes to the territory, the 
social group or the time horizon can completely overturn the results. By 
implication, this means that the challenge consists of finding a measure which is 
more or less immune to changes in such variables. 
 Relative poverty lines have been critiqued for lacking a clear interpretability. For all 
the faults that the Rowntree-style BSA poverty line had, it was at least clear what it 
stood for: It corresponded to a well-defined quantity of goods and services. A 
construct like ‘60% of the equivalised median’ has no such interpretability. This may 
well be the reason why it is prone to such widespread misunderstandings, for 
example the mistaking of relative poverty for material deprivation, and/or the 
misinterpretation of ‘relative’ to mean ‘less severe’. By implication, this means that 
the challenge consists of finding a measure which has as clear an interpretability as 
the BSA. 
 The poverty line should not just be understandable. There should also be a 
theoretical justification why a living standard below this line should be classified as 
‘poverty’, and a living standard above it should not. More precisely, the poverty line 
should be related to some estimate of the cost of social participation. This is what 
relative measures attempt to do, but, it has been argued here, fail to do.  
 Relative measures have been critiqued for their inability to detect changes in 
product markets which affect low-earners disproportionately. By implication, this 
means that the challenge consists of finding a measure which absorbs relevant 
information about market prices.  
 Relative measures, and income-based measures more generally, have been 
critiqued for their sensitivity to the structure of welfare provision. Cash transfers 
are counted as part of income, equivalent implicit subsidies are not. By implication, 
this means that the challenge consists of finding a measure that shows which goods 
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and services people can afford, regardless of how exactly they are being provided. 
Due to issues of valuation, this problem may not be fully solvable, but there must 
be a better alternative than not addressing it at all.   
The previous chapter has not simply dismissed relative poverty. It has fully acknowledged 
the merits of some of the key ideas embodied in this measure. The thrust of the critique 
has been that relative indicators do not measure what they are supposed to measure, a line 
of critique which already contains an acknowledgement that some of the main ideas are 
worth preserving, even if they ought to be expressed in a different way. In particular: 
 A sensible poverty measure must be context-specific rather than universal. Poverty 
measures must therefore differentiate between social contexts, and reflect 
differences in perceptions of what constitutes a necessity and what does not. This 
involves a recognition that poverty in developed countries, or nowadays, even 
middle-income countries, can no longer be limited to physical deprivation. It must 
recognise the social nature of needs, and the importance of social participation as a 
necessity in its own right. 
 A poverty measure must reflect the fact that needs are dynamic and evolving, 
rather than static. It is not sufficient for a poverty measure to be socially relevant at 
a single point in time. It must also find a way to remain relevant as new 
consumption habits become the norm over time.  
 A poverty measure must not assume implausibly high levels of spending efficiency. 
It must not be built on an idealised pattern of economical consumption that is too 
far removed from people’s actual consumption patterns.  
 A poverty measure must recognise that there are no ‘objective’ needs which can be 
ascertained by researchers alone. If a good or service is near-universally perceived 
to be a necessity, then it is a necessity, at least in that particular society at that 
particular time.  
These are the some of the key criteria by which poverty measures ought to be judged. The 
BSA measure was abandoned because it failed on (at least) the last four accounts. Relative 





6.2 Why (quasi-)absolute measures are not an 
alternative 
The insight that poverty is context-specific is no longer controversial, which is why absolute 
poverty lines in the pure sense of the word have practically disappeared in the developed 
world. Most figures of absolute poverty in developed countries are not ‘absolute’ in the 
sense of ‘fixed for all times and places’. They are mostly used for snapshot cross-country 
comparisons limited to highly developed economies, or for medium-term time series within 
a country (see Chapter 1). If the latter, they normally take the relative poverty line of a 
selected year, decouple it from the median, and couple it to the CPI instead. In the UK, the 
second child poverty target has so far been specified in terms of a measure which uses the 
relative poverty line of the year 1998, and updated it by the rate of CPI inflation. For the 
2020 target, the base year will be changed from 1998 to 2010, which makes the measure a 
‘step-fixed relative poverty line’. It is absolute in the short run and relative in the long run.  
But if the national median is not the relevant benchmark for poverty measurement, then 
quasi-absolute measures are just as flawed as relative ones, because they are just as firmly 
pegged to the national median. Whether this is the median of the current year or a fixed 
year in the recent past is immaterial. If there is no good reason why 60% of the 
contemporary median income should be a reasonable approximation of the cost of social 
participation, then neither is there a good reason why 60% of a past year’s median income 
should be.  
Hence, a quasi-absolute poverty line has no meaningful interpretation of its own. A poverty 
line should correspond to a living standard which can, by some theoretical criterion, be 
interpreted as a decent minimum standard for a particular society at a particular time. An 
absolute poverty line cannot be interpreted in this way, nor is it necessarily meant to fulfil 
such a role. In the UK, and sometimes in publications by international organisations (e.g. 
OECD, 2008, pp. 129-130), absolute poverty is used as an auxiliary measure. Its purpose is 
to supplement relative rates by giving an impression of how absolute living standards have 
evolved over the same time. It is a measure which is used because of the trend it produces. 
The rate of any given year is not meant to have a meaning of its own.  
However, if the measure’s only purpose is to check the direction of change in low-earners’ 
absolute living standards, one might as well look at a measure of living standards directly, 
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without benchmarking it against a reference level. The trend in e.g. real expenditure at the 
5th and/or the 10th percentile, or the bottom decile, would then be just as informative. If a 
relative poverty measure provides no additional information beyond what is already 
contained in a standard measure of inequality in the bottom half, then an absolute poverty 
measure provides no additional information beyond what is already contained in a 
standard measure of living standards at the lower end. The former could then just as well 
be replaced by e.g. the P50/P10 ratio, and the latter could then just as well be replaced by 
e.g. real expenditure of the bottom decile.   
Albeit for a different reason, quasi-absolute poverty standards also share the other major 
weakness of relative ones: They are blind to product market developments which affect the 
living standards of the less well-off. Fixed poverty lines are updated by the rate of CPI 
inflation, which is the wrong tool in the context of poverty measurement. It measures 
changes in the cost of a basket of goods which resembles the consumption pattern of 
average households, not of low-income households. This makes those quasi-absolute 
measures just as unable as relative ones to appreciate the role of product market 
competition, frugal innovation, market diversification etc. in the alleviation of poverty.  
 
6.3 Why material deprivation measures are at best a 
partial alternative 
Of the poverty measures currently in use, it is the material deprivation measure which best 
fulfils the criteria outlined above. Based on a tangible list of goods and services, this 
measure has a clear and meaningful interpretation. Outcomes such as falling poverty rates 
amidst falling living standards, common when relative measures are used, do not occur 
with this measure. To some extent, material deprivation standards are even able to capture 
product market developments and changes in access to benefits in kind. Other things equal, 
changes in the market prices of the items in the basket will affect people’s ability to afford 
them, and hence the material deprivation score. Also, increases (decreases) in the 
generosity of benefits in kind will free (bind) resources for the purchase of other things, 
which will affect the material deprivation score. Misreporting of some income sources, or 
short-term fluctuations, are not an issue either. What determines the material deprivation 
score is whether a household can afford the items on the list, not how they manage to 
achieve this.  
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But material deprivation has its shortcomings nonetheless. First of all, the basket of 
necessities is assembled in an arbitrary way. There is no guarantee that the items in the 
basket resonate with what a majority of the population, or what most poor people 
themselves, would consider ‘necessities’. The basket need not coincide with common 
perceptions of what represents a decent minimum standard. Therefore, strictly speaking, 
material deprivation indicators measure low consumption standards, but they do not 
actually measure poverty.  
Secondly, material deprivation measures have great difficulties in distinguishing between 
material constraints and preferences. It has been shown that respondents who lack some of 
the ‘necessities’ specified on a material deprivation list often possess ‘luxuries’ (McKay, 
2004; Myck, 2005). It has also been shown that high material deprivation scores can still 
occur even among high-income groups, albeit less frequently than among low-income 
groups (Brewer et al, 2008). This is why, in practice, material deprivation measures are 
more often used as part of a blend than in their pure form. In the UK, the material 
deprivation indicator which forms the basis of the third child poverty target is really an alloy 
of material deprivation and relative poverty. To be classified as materially deprived, a 
household does not just have to attain a minimum deprivation score, it also has to record 
an income below 70% of the contemporary median. This second condition ensures that 
about a third of those who would otherwise be counted as materially deprived are filtered 
out, but it is a very crude mechanism. The fact that many households on very low incomes 
avoid material deprivation is not remarkable: Chapter 3 has shown that income fails to 
predict living standards at the tails of the distribution. But what is remarkable is the fact 
that about a third of the materially deprived have incomes above 70% of the median. As 
Chapter 3 has also shown, in the middle deciles of the distribution, income remains an 
adequate predictor of living standards. Hence, if a high proportion of the materially 
deprived have incomes in this region, it is a manifestation of the difficulties that this 
mechanism has in identifying those with low living standards. Excluding this group from the 
statistics does not really solve the problem, it merely removes the most obvious symptom. 
Most material deprivation surveys attempt to control for the conflation of preferences and 
constraints directly: When survey participants lack an item, they are asked whether this 
was because they cannot afford it, or because they do not want it. But this is only a very 
small step towards solving the problem. The control question merely filters out those who 
do not value the respective item at all, i.e. those who would not want it even if it was 
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available for free. It does not filter out those who do value the respective item, but who 
value other items more, with the latter not included in the list. It treats ‘wanting’ and ‘not 
wanting’ an item as a binary variable, when it really is a matter of a ranking of priorities. As 
a result, material deprivation levels will be systematically inflated. Their main problem is 
their inflexibility. As soon as a household substitutes a few items which are not on the list 
for items which are on the list, they are counted as materially deprived. Material 
deprivation measures do not allow substitution, which makes them sensitive to minor 
variations in people’s priorities. 
This downside cannot be corrected further. Material deprivation is an outcome-based 
measure of living standards, unrelated to inputs like income or expenditure. It measures 
whether people attain a particular outcome, not how they do it. This can be a strength. It 
enables the measure to capture unobserved inputs that also affect living standards. But it is 
also a weakness, because this is what makes the measure is so inflexible. In order to count 
as non-deprived, people have to attain the outcome specified in the list. Not a similar 
outcome, not an equivalent outcome, but the exact same outcome.  
In theory, this shortcoming could be avoided by specifying the items on the list in a more 
general way, to allow some substitution. But insofar as this is already being done, it seems 
to exacerbate the problem rather than solving it. There is already a lot of variation in the 
level of generality in material deprivation lists, from concrete goods (‘a car’) to general 
purposes (‘keep the home in a decent state of decoration’). The broad pattern that is 
recognisable is that the higher the level of generality, the greater the proportion of people 
who claim to be unable to afford the item. This proportion is always lowest for the items 
that are specified in the most straightforward manner. The more room for interpretation a 
question leaves, the higher the share of respondents who declare to be unable to access 
the item. Apparently, when the level of generality is high, the items on a material 
deprivation list mean different things to different people, which will invariably affect their 
answers.  
This pattern can also be observed when comparing material deprivation studies that differ 
in the level of generality. The EU’s material deprivation measure asks whether respondents 
are able to eat meals with meat, poultry or fish at least every second day. The result is that 
in Western Europe, virtually every household can afford this (Eurostat, 2005a). The OECD’s 
material deprivation measure contains a similar entry, but phrased in a more general way, 
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asking participants whether they could ‘buy the food the family needed’ (Boarini & 
d’Ercole, 2006). The share of respondents who answer in the negative is now vastly greater, 
and there is now a lot of variation between countries that score similarly on the equivalent 
question in the EU’s indicator. More generally, for those questions that leave more room 
for interpretation, material deprivation measures often show wide variation between 
countries which appear very similar in terms of low-earners’ living standards according to 
more objective data.  
 
Within countries, the variation across items is often simply implausible; bearing no relation 
at all to the item’s cost. Table 6.1 shows a selection of items, alongside with the percentage 
of households who report to be unable to afford them. According to these figures, almost 
half of the population cannot afford small savings, or to let their children go swimming once 
a month. A third of all parents cannot afford allowing their children to invite their friends 
for tea or a snack once a fortnight, an activity which costs virtually nothing. But for items 
which can be genuinely costly, such as those related to family holidays, housing space and 
heating, similar or even lower rates are recorded.   
 
Table 6.1: Material deprivation rates for selected items, UK, 2007 
  % of respondents 




Regular savings of £10 a month or  
more for rainy days or retirement 
44.5% 
Child(ren) can go swimming at least  
once a month 
43.0% 
Have friends or family around for a  
drink or meal at least once a month 
40.2% 
Child(ren)’s friends around for tea  




A family holiday away from home  
for at least one week a year 
35.5% 
Enough bedrooms for every child of  
10 or over to share their bedroom 
only with siblings of the same sex 
24.9% 
In winter, able to keep  
accommodation warm enough 
7.5% 
-based on data from Brewer et al, 2008, p. 62 
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The problem with these figures is not just their implausibility, but also the fact that they are 
unrelated to relevant objective data. Chapter 3 and Subchapter 5.7 have shown that the 
affordability of housing space and fuel has become a more pressing issue over time. Prices 
of these product categories have risen at rates well above inflation, and spending on them 
has increased as a proportion of low-earners budgets. Yet the material deprivation figures 
do not record these developments.  
In short, material deprivation is a back-of-the-envelope indicator of a low consumption 
standard. It is not an accurate indicator of poverty.  
 
6.4 Why ‘all of the above’ is not an alternative 
Poverty researchers often respond to critiques of relative or other indicators by pointing 
out that no single indicator can capture all dimensions of poverty. According to this 
argument, each poverty indicator may be flawed on its own, but a package of indicators 
provides an adequate account. This tendency may well explain why the number of child 
poverty targets in the UK has increased from initially just one – relative poverty –to three, 
and then later to four.  
It is certainly true that poverty is a multi-faceted phenomenon, even when limiting it to its 
material aspects. Chapter 3 has documented some of the difficulties in measuring living 
standards at the lower end, and concluded that no single indicator captures all its 
dimensions on its own. If this is true for living standards, it must be a fortiori true for the 
much more abstract concept of poverty.  
However, in order to deflect critique of an indicator, it is not sufficient to point to its role as 
part of a package. Proponents of this position would have to show that different measures 
complement each other sensibly, and neutralise each other’s flaws. There is no a priori 
reason why indicators which are flawed on their own become accurate as soon as they are 
bundled together.  
Bundling is sensible when measures can be shown to complement each other. This is clearly 
the case for the relationship between e.g. a poverty headcount rate and a poverty gap 
measure: The former shows what proportion of a population falls below a poverty line, the 
latter shows how far below it they fall. Movements into opposite directions have a clear 
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and meaningful interpretation. If, for example, the poverty rate falls while the poverty gap 
increases, this is most likely to indicate movements from just below to above the poverty 
line. It could reveal an anti-poverty strategy which succeeds by picking ‘low-hanging fruits’, 
and which is thus less successful than headline figures suggest. However, no such 
relationship exists between e.g. absolute poverty and material deprivation, or between 
either of the two and persistent relative poverty. There is no obvious interpretation for a 
situation in which, for example, absolute poverty falls while material deprivation rises. The 
situation may be reasonably explicable with recourse to more background data, but the 
two poverty indicators are certainly not natural complements.  
On a more practical level, while the use of a whole package of measures may be 
appropriate for poverty research, Chapter 2 has shown that the public policy debate does 
not take place in this way. Rather, one measure tends to become the headline measure, 
and the figures it produces tend to be reported as ‘the number of households below the 
poverty line’, or ‘the number of households in poverty’. This is not an argument against the 
use of a package of measures, but it is an argument for at least establishing a clear 
hierarchy within the package. There should be one single indicator which captures the most 
important dimensions of poverty on its own. Other measures can then fill in the inevitable 
gaps, provide supplementary information, and add nuance. But there should be one 
indicator which, by itself, enables a rough assessment of the extent of poverty, its time 
trend, some of its causes, its geographical concentration, its risk groups and risk factors. 
This key indicator should be able to perform this task single-handedly – not in conjunction 
with two or three other indicators. If it misses important information, the adequate 
response should be to restructure it in such a way that it takes this information on board, 
not to add yet another indicator to the package. This measure would then enable an 
informed poverty debate even if it was used out of context. It would miss many subtleties if 
so used, but it would not suffer from systematic biases. None of the measures so far 
discussed can perform this task. The claim that they can do so as a package is itself 
questionable, and not especially relevant, since the public policy debate on poverty does 
not use packages.  
It is not even clear whether it would improve the quality of the poverty debate at all if it 
could be broadened to use the full package rather than just the headline measure. Unless 
there is a clear priority ranking among the indicators, the use of a bundle entails the danger 
of a ‘pick-and-choose’ approach among policymakers, with each side selectively using the 
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indicators that suit their argument. There are advantages to having a single measure of 
poverty which is not negotiable, at least in the short term. When, for example, GDP falls or 
the unemployment rate rises, no government could credibly argue that according to some 
alternative measure, the economy had actually grown, or unemployment had actually 
fallen. A robust poverty indicator should impose the same rigour.  
 
6.5 Promising developments in poverty research, Part 1: 
Consensual material deprivation 
 
In the 1980s, Mack and Lansley (1985) pioneered a new approach to poverty measurement 
within the overall framework of material deprivation. It is based on large-scale surveys 
which attempt to establish a consensus on which goods and services constitute necessities 
in the context of contemporary Britain. This ‘consensual material deprivation’ (CMD) 
approach has been developed into the Breadline Britain Survey, and later into the Poverty 
and Social Exclusion Survey (PSE) (see Gordon et al, 2000; Pantazis et al, 2006; PSE, n.d.).  
 
The basic idea is that what qualifies as a necessity should not be determined by 
researchers, but by the public, through the mentioned large-scale survey (which, technically 
speaking, is not a survey of its own, but the PSE authors’ input into the Omnibus survey). 
Respondents are presented with a large list of goods and services, and are asked to identify 
which of them they consider necessities that everybody should have, and which of them 
they consider desirable but not essential. An item qualifies as a necessity when the majority 
of respondents consider it so. Once the list is established, the CMD approach continues just 
like a conventional material deprivation measure. The CMD list, which is available with data 
from 1983, 1990, and 1999, possesses a number of interesting properties: 
 
 ‘Necessities’, as understood by the majority of the population, include much more 
than what is necessary for mere physical survival. Several household electronics, 
durables and modern conveniences have become necessities, and so have various 
items related to social participation, comfort, mobility and quality of life. The PSE 
list is very far away from the poverty baskets of the BSA era. It reaffirms the insight 
that needs are context-specific and evolving.  
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 But it is also true that respondents use the term ‘necessity’ cautiously. They do not 
apply it indiscriminately; they do not simply label everything a necessity. A number 
of items which were already widely used during the survey years were rejected 
with a clear majority. The survey is not treated as a personal wish list.  
 There is a surprisingly robust consensus about what constitutes a necessity and 
what does not. Of course, there are a few borderline cases of items which just over, 
or just under 50% of the respondents classify as a necessity. But the tails of the 
distribution outweigh the middle section.  
 The authors also perform a subgroup analysis, testing whether there are systematic 
differences between the responses of different social subgroups. They argue that if 
this is the case, “the definition of a necessity would just become the opinion of one 
group against another” (Pantazis et al, 2006, p. 114). Hence, respondents are split 
along different variables, according to region, gender, age, ethnicity, markers of 
social class etc. It turns out that for those items that enter the CMD list, deviations 
from the majority view are random ones. With a few exceptions, responses do not 
differ systematically across social subgroups. This subgroup-neutrality, albeit 
imperfect, means that CMD stands in stark contrast to relative measures, which 
have been shown to be extremely sensitive to changes in such variables. Median 
incomes and hence relative poverty lines differ vastly across regions and social 
subgroups, but the CMD list does not. England and Scotland, for example, differ in 
median incomes, so their relative poverty rates would be very different if they were 
treated as sovereign states. But when asked to assemble a list of necessities, 
English and Scottish respondents include, by and large, the same items. With a 
CMD poverty measure, a secession of Scotland from the UK would be relatively 
unimportant for the English and Scottish poverty rates.  
 A comparison of the results from 1983, 1990 and 1999 shows that people’s 
understanding of what constitutes a necessity becomes more encompassing over 
time. The 1999 basket contains a number of items which the 1983 basket did not 
yet contain: the telephone entered, as did an outfit for social occasions, inviting 
friends and children’s friends for a meal or a snack at regular intervals, and a few 
other items. But this happens gradually. There is no evidence that the implicit CMD 
poverty line tracks median incomes, or any other macro-variable. 
 And while this is not discussed by the authors, an interesting pattern becomes 
recognisable when comparing goods that have crossed the 50% threshold between 
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1983 and 1999 to those that have not. The relationship between the prevalence 
rate of a good (see Chapter 3) and the share of respondents who consider it a 
necessity is a loose one; an item does not become a necessity just because many 
people have it. In the 1999 PSE list, items like video recorders and foreign holidays 
were clearly rejected, even though a large majority of the population had access to 
them. It is not prevalence rates per se that determine necessity status. What seems 
more important is whether a good or service also changes social interactions and 
thus raises social participation costs. The telephone has become a necessity 
because it is the perhaps most conventional textbook example of what economists 
call a ‘network good’, a good which becomes more valuable (and eventually 
indispensable) as more people acquire it. In a society in which few people own a 
telephone, it is not a prerequisite for social participation. The infrastructure of 
communication will be based on other means. But as more and more people 
acquire a telephone, this social infrastructure itself changes. Arguably, the same 
logic applies to internet access nowadays. If, for example, job adverts are gradually 
moved from newspapers to online platforms, internet access becomes a different 
kind of good altogether. As long as these adverts are placed both in newspapers 
and online, internet access is merely a more convenient way to access the same 
core product. But as internet access spreads and job adverts are eventually shifted 
entirely to this medium, it becomes an instrument for social participation. This is a 
social change which is not related to median incomes in any obvious way. It could 
occur with stagnant median incomes as well – just as rising median incomes could 
be channelled into the acquisition of goods and services which do not affect social 
norms, or only to a minor extent. This is, necessarily, a tentative observation. There 
is no systematic research on what determines perceptions of necessities. But it is 
an observation that is consistent with PSE data so far. 
 
Taken together, it turns out that the CMD/PSE approach solves some of the key problems 
that Rowntree was unable to solve with his overhauls of the BSA method (see Chapter 2). 
Simultaneously, it avoids most of the problems of relative and quasi-absolute poverty 
measures that have been identified in Chapter 5. With a CMD measure, the identification of 
the reference territory is not a problem: The ‘correct’ territory is the territory in which 
there is no systematic regional variation in the identification of necessities. As long as this is 
the case, the territory can be expanded, and when regional variation can be detected, the 
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territory ought to be split. Within the UK, there is no substantial systematic variation, so 
one single CMD list can be applied to the country as a whole. But it would also be possible 
to compile four separate, regional CMD lists – an English, a Scottish, a Welsh and a 
Northern Irish one – and derive the respective material deprivation rates separately, each 
one based on the respective regional CMD list. The weighted average of the four regional 
CMD rates would be very close to the national CMD based on the list for the country as a 
whole, since the national and the four regional CMD lists are very similar.  
 
There is good reason to assume that the inclusion of some of the neighbour countries 
would also make little difference.  There is no European version of the PSE, but the CMD 
survey by Guio et al (2009), albeit not nearly as encompassing, has to be the nearest 
equivalent. It suggests that there are large overlaps in the consensual identification of 
necessities even across the EU-27. The common denominator is probably not large enough 
to justify the use of a pan-European poverty measure, but much of the difference is 
explained by the gap between Eastern and Western Europe, and even this difference is not 
nearly as large as the difference implied by national relative poverty lines. For North-
western Europe alone, it is very likely that the use of one single CMD list would be feasible. 
But this is no more than an extrapolation. If an equivalent of the PSE survey would cover 
the whole of North-western Europe, it would still have to pass several tests. It would have 
to be established that the CMD list compiled by UK respondents does not differ 
systematically from the CMD list compiled by e.g. German respondents, and this 
relationship would have to hold across the regions as well. The CMD list compiled it e.g. 
Scotland would have to be plotted against the CMD list compiled in e.g. Saxony to check 
whether there is more variation than what can be explained by chance.  
 
But either way, the CMD poverty rate can be computed in every constituent region 
separately. On this measure, the UK poverty headcount based on a national CMD list would 
be about equal to the sum of the English, the Welsh, the Scottish and the Northern Irish 
poverty headcounts based on regional CMD lists. It does not make a large difference 
whether the CMD is compiled in each region separately and if the results are aggregated 
into national figures later on, or whether it is compiled at the national level and then 
broken down into regional figures later on. Regional medians may differ, regional CMDs do 




Neither is the question of timing an important one. Under the CMD approach, an item 
becomes a necessity as soon as the majority of the respondents consider it so. If 
perceptions of what constitutes a necessity catch up quickly with increases in overall living 
standards, the CMD list (and thus the implicit poverty line) expands quickly. If there is a 
considerable time lag, then the CMD list (and thus the implicit poverty line) expands only 
slowly. It depends on how the diffusion of new goods and services affects social 
interactions.  
 
Having said all that – the CMD remains a measure of material deprivation, and as such, it 
suffers from the same disadvantages that have been described in subchapter 6.3. For all its 
interesting properties, it is not in itself an alternative. 
 
6.6 Promising developments in poverty research, Part 2: 
Qualitative Consensual Budget Standards 
 
Rowntree’s BSA method fell from grace in the 1950s, but it never completely went away. In 
developed countries, rates for income replacement benefits or minimum wages can 
sometimes be traced back to some form of minimum budget standard calculation, albeit 
often in an arcane way (see Veit-Wilson, 1998). More recently, there have been a number 
of attempts to revive the methodology by ‘democratising’ it, i.e. exploring ways to 
assemble the baskets in a more consensual manner (Collins et al, 2012; Hoff et al, 2010; 
Bradshaw et al, 2008). This approach is interesting insofar as it attempts to tackle an 
acknowledged weakness of the BSA method in a targeted manner. The BSA method had 
originally been abandoned because its detachedness from social conventions had made it 
socially irrelevant. The attempts to produce a ‘Consensual Budget Standard’ (CBS) can be 
seen as attempts to tackle this flaw directly, and thereby, whether this is the researchers’ 
intention or not, rehabilitate the BSA method.  
So far, the method which CBS studies have chosen to assemble consensual baskets has 
been the focus group discussion. Thus, up until here, CBS research has been qualitative 
research. In the UK, the general idea of gathering a minimum basket in this way has been 
first formulated by Walker (1987). It has been developed further at the Centre for Research 
in Social Policy at the University of Loughborough and the Family Budget Unit at the 
University of York, and finally evolved into the ‘Minimum Income Standard’ (MIS) published 
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by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Bradshaw et al, 2008; Hirsch et al, 2009). Similar 
approaches have been tried in the Netherlands (Hoff et al, 2010) and Ireland (Collins et al, 
2012). The qualitative CBS method has also been used to derive minimum standards in 
selected areas of consumption or for selected population subgroups (see PSE, n.d.). Once 
the basket is assembled, the CBS becomes essentially a BSA: Prices of the items in the 
basket are gathered, and the total cost of the basket then becomes the poverty line.  
But as appealing as the idea of rescuing the strong aspects of the BSA method, while 
discarding its original flaws, may be, CBS research has thus far not achieved this aim. The 
previous subchapter has argued that the CMD survey method has shown to have a number 
of desirable features. However, the CBS’ focus group discussions have failed to replicate 
these features. In the CMD survey, respondents have used the term ‘necessity’ in a 
comprehensive, but not in an indiscriminate fashion. For the vast majority of respondents, 
‘necessities’ are much more than what is necessary for physical functioning; it also includes 
a range of modern conveniences and social participation. But at the same time, 
respondents have used the term in a balanced and considered way; they have not simply 
classified everything as a ‘necessity’. 
The same cannot be said about the baskets which the CBS focus group discussions have 
produced. In the 2008 pioneer study, the minimum budget for a family of two adults and 
two children already amounts to 89% of median income even before housing costs are 
included (author’s calculation, based on data from Bradshaw et al, 2008, p. 27 and IFS, 
2008). If realistic rent levels were included, the cost of the CBS basket would have to rise 
above the median, resulting in a poverty rate above 50%. This is, however, avoided through 
the use of an implausibly low housing cost allowance for the calculation of the final MIS. 
The housing cost item in the MIS basket is the local authority rent level recorded in the 
town of Loughborough, where the focus group discussions take place. Including this rent 
level, the cost of the MIS basket rises to just above 100% of the equivalised median. This 
relationship is, however, not reported in this format. The cost of the MIS basket is 
expressed as a proportion of median incomes, but only on a basis which excludes several 
items (Bradshaw et al, 2008, p. 37). The main issue, however, is that Loughborough is highly 
unrepresentative of rent levels in the UK, because it is one of the cheapest rental markets 
in the country (see LHA Direct, 2012). The use of local authority rents is also problematic, as 
not every low-income household qualifies for council housing. Table 6.2 shows the 
hypothetical MIS levels that would result if private rental rates for the same dwelling type 
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in different cities were included. When substituting the Housing Benefit rate for a family of 
four in Glasgow for the local authority rate in Loughborough, the MIS poverty line would 
rise to 111% of median incomes. When doing the same with Housing Benefit rates of 
Brighton, the cost of the MIS basket rises to 127% of the median, more than twice the 
relative poverty threshold.     
Table 6.2: The Minimum Income Standard for a family of four, 2008, per month 
 in £, 
2008 prices 
in % of the 
2008 median 
Minimum income standard  
excluding housing costs  
£2,414 89% 
Minimum income standard  
including housing costs 
£2,715 100% 
Hypothetical Minimum Income Standard 
using Glasgow rents 
£3,022 111% 
Hypothetical Minimum Income Standard 
using Brighton rents 
£3,443 127% 
  -authors calculation, based on data from Bradshaw et al (2008), p. 27; IFS (2008) and LHA Direct (2012) 
Poverty rates around or in excess of 50% are not problem when an absolute measure is 
used, and applied to a poor country. But for a context-specific poverty line which attempts 
to approximate the cost of social inclusion, it becomes self-defeating: The interpretation 
would have to be that about half of the population is excluded from the consumption 
norms of society, but at the same time, they themselves are about half of that same 
society.  
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to enquire why the focus group methodology 
produces these results. Whether it is due to the more general limitations of this 
methodology (e.g. Stycos, 1981), or whether it produces some form of ‘outbidding’ or 
‘logrolling’ among the participants, or something else entirely, cannot be assessed here. But 







6.7 A synthesis: A CBS based on the PSE, and aided by the 
LCFS 
The CMD method is strong in identifying a list of necessities, reflecting a robust and 
subgroup-neutral consensus. But in identifying who can and who cannot afford the items 
on the list, it suffers from the general problems of material deprivation measures. The focus 
group-based CBS produces a tangible poverty line based on actual market prices of goods 
and services. But is has problems in identifying what should and what should not go into 
that basket.  Their strengths and weaknesses are thus complementary. Therefore, this 
thesis makes the case for combining the best of the two approaches, and to upgrade the 
blend with additional information from the expenditure surveys.  
It could work like this: In a large-scale survey, respondents would select a basket of 
necessities by majority decision. This survey could either be the PSE itself, or an equivalent 
which takes account of the changed purpose. As soon as the list of necessities is assembled, 
it would be converted into a consumption basket containing concrete goods and services, 
rather than general product categories. Once this transition is finished, the CMD list would 
have become a CBS basket. However, the gap between the broad item categories identified 
in the CMD survey and the tangible products that form the CBS baskets is rather large. This 
is where the Living Cost and Food Survey (LCFS) comes in. The LCFS contains information on 
revealed preferences, it shows which goods and services are really being bought and sold in 
the country. This makes it suitable to perform the task of an ‘interpreter’ between the CMD 
list and the CBS. By taking account of revealed preferences, the CBS would contain an 
additional layer of information which no other poverty indicator currently contains. This 
would anchor the CBS even more firmly in its social context. Potentially, other tools could 
complement the LCFS. 
For example, the PSE survey’s entry ‘a hobby or leisure activity’ could mean a lot of things; 
it is far too general to be included in the CBS basket, but second-guessing which activities 
the survey participants might have had in mind would be far too arbitrary and 
discretionary. Therefore, the LCFS should be used to identify a leisure service which really is 
frequently bought on the market. This item should then enter the poverty basket, and its 
market price should become part of the poverty line. In cases where this is not clear, the 
LCFS can also be a guide to deciding the frequency of a purchase.  
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The use of the LCSF is not unproblematic. There could be sampling problems which leave 
the poor underrepresented, and even though the LCFS is much more detailed than the PSE, 
it is still a list of product categories rather than a fully defined consumption basket. This is 
why the LCFS does not go the whole way. Or to remain within the ‘interpreter’ analogy: If 
the translation of the PSE into a fully specified CBS basket is thought of as a translation 
from English into German, then the LCFS would be like an interpreter who can only 
translate from English into Dutch: Their translation would be intelligible to German-
speakers who listen closely, but it would still leave room for interpretation, so 
misunderstandings could not be ruled out.    
Fortunately, as will become clear in Chapter 7, the recourse to the LCFS does not have to be 
made often. But the final chapter will still contain a section of how this, and other 
methodological issues, could be dealt with in future research.  
Prices should be collected at the local level, to account for geographical variation. Here, a 
trade-off between accuracy and simplicity arises: The more the price collection is localised, 
the greater the number of poverty lines that result. The ability to take account of local 
variation is one of the key strengths of the BSA, but there is nevertheless a limit to how 
local the poverty lines can be.  
The price of goods which are provided free at the point of use would be set to zero. For 
goods and services which are highly subsidised and offered outside of a market setting, the 
price at the point of use would be included. For example, the fact that most healthcare in 
the UK is provided by the tax-funded NHS means that the British CBS basket would differ 
from the CBS basket of most other developed countries. The price of goods and services 
related to healthcare would be set to zero, or limited to payments like prescription charges 
(which are more like an administrative fee rather than a price for the good consumed). In 
most other countries, the CBS would have to include the cost of a standard health 
insurance policy (provided healthcare is identified as a necessity in the preceding survey, 
but this is virtually guaranteed). This makes poverty measurement neutral to the structure 
of welfare provision.   
The treatment of means-tested benefits in kind would be slightly more complex, but it can 
be resolved. Social housing, for example, represents an implicit rent subsidy. Yet since not 
all households are entitled to social housing, the social housing rent cannot itself be part of 
the poverty line, as this would underestimate the cost of housing for those who do not 
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qualify. The CBS poverty line should only be built on the prices of goods that are, in 
principle, available to everybody. So this issue has to be resolved on the 
income/expenditure side. It would be too complex to work out for every individual social 
housing resident what the market rent for their dwelling would be under market 
conditions. But with the information given in the income/expenditure surveys, it is possible 
to derive an approximate value. These surveys record tenure and place of residence, so it is 
possible to work out to what extent private sector rents exceed social housing rents in the 
respective area, and add the difference to the income/expenditure of social housing 
residents. In this way, object subsidies would be treated just like subject subsidies, or more 
precisely, the implicit rent subsidy provided through social housing would be treated as if it 
was a Housing Benefit payment.22 In theory, this would already be possible within the 
current approach to poverty measurement; changing the poverty line is not a prerequisite 
for changing the treatment of subsidies in kind in the income/expenditure statistics. But 
within the current approach to poverty measurement, this would create more problem 
than it would solve. The reason is that the current poverty lines do not incorporate the cost 
of living (which is precisely what they have been critiqued for here), let alone local variation 
in it. If implicit subsidies were converted into their explicit monetary equivalence, the 
income/expenditure of social housing residents in high-rent areas such as London and the 
Southeast would surge. Especially in Inner London, where the Housing Benefit rate alone is 
already about equal to the relative poverty line23, some of these households could suddenly 
find themselves in the upper income deciles just because of a statistical change. Yet for CBS 
poverty measurement, this would not pose a problem at all. In high-rent areas, the regional 
CBS poverty line would also be very high. So even though social housing residents would 
have very high notional incomes, the CBS poverty line, being built entirely on market prices, 
would reflect the fact that these notional incomes do not stretch nearly as far as they 
would elsewhere in the country. A switch to CBS poverty measurement would thus solve 
two problems at once: The inconsistency of treating benefits in cash different from benefits 
in kind would disappear, and differences in local purchasing power would be accounted for. 
                                                          
22cf. Chapter 3: This is precisely the opposite of the way in which the LCFS currently treats government support 
with housing costs. At the moment, Housing Benefit is subtracted from rents rather than added to income, so it 
is treated as if it was a rent rebate, and thus a subsidy in kind. In short, the status quo is to treat benefits in cash 
as if they were subsidies in kind, while the approach proposed here would treat benefits in kind as if they were 
benefits in cash.  
23 In 2010/11, the median income for a two-adult household was £419, while the Housing Benefit rate for a one-
bedroom flat in most Inner London Boroughs was £240 (57% of the median). Thus, if the full rate is claimed and 
reported, Housing Benefit alone can already take a household within reach of the poverty line in these boroughs 
(see IFS, 2012; and LHA Direct, 2012).  
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In the same way, for elderly individuals, the local price of a standard off-peak bus ticket 
could be added to income/expenditure. In this way, the monetary equivalent of the 
Freedom Pass, which is also a benefit in kind, would be added to income/expenditure. Its 
monetary value would differ a lot across the country, but this is, again, not a problem for 
CBS poverty measurement, because the cost of the transport component in the CBS basket 
would differ just as much.  
Another potential problem for the CBS poverty line is the treatment of highly irregular 
expenses. If these are related to an incidence which is insurable, the solution would be to 
include the price of a standard insurance policy. If they are not insurable, a long-term 
average would be a second-best solution.  
The poverty line, or the separate poverty lines for various household types, would then be 
the yardstick against which household’s living standards are benchmarked. Living standards 
should be approximated by household expenditure (net of debt repayments), not by 
household income. Chapter 3 has shown that due to volatility and benefit underreporting, 
income is no longer a reliable guide to living standards at the lower end, while expenditure 
offers a much better guide. This thesis argues for a complete overhaul of poverty 
measurement: Not just the poverty line(s) should be replaced, but also the whole way of 
measuring living standards. The ultimate aim is the redefinition of the ‘poverty rate’ as the 
percentage of individuals whose expenditure falls below the CBS poverty line. In other 
words, ‘the poor’ would be those who could not afford the full CBS basket even if they 
dedicated all their expenditure to items included in the basket.  
This also means that the poverty status would be unaffected by actual purchasing 
decisions. Households whose expenditure is above the poverty line, but who nevertheless 
forego some of the basket’s items because they chose to buy different things, are not 
classified as poor. They could have afforded the whole basket, but chose not to do so. This 
makes the PSE-based CBS much more flexible than a CMD measure, which is important 
because the existence of a minimum consensus on what constitutes necessities does not 
imply that everybody shares the majority view, or will conform to the majority’s purchasing 
decisions. It only means that when a majority classifies an item as a necessity, deviations 
from this majority view are unlikely to be systematically related to socio-demographic 
characteristics. But deviations will, of course, occur. Also, there is no reason why there 
should always be a perfect overlap between what respondents consider necessary in 




While not without faults of its own, the PSE-based CBS could avoid many of the shortfalls of 
conventional poverty measures. Relative indicators change whenever the imputed 
reference group is changed. This would not be the case for the CBSA. Whether the list of 
necessities is decided on by consensus of the citizens of Greater London, of England, of the 
UK, or of North-western Europe is unlikely to make a large difference. Only if societies at 
very different stages of economic development were amalgamated into a single poverty 
assessment domain, the approach would cease to be applicable. Countries or regions which 
differ systematically in popular perceptions of necessities would assemble different CBS-
baskets, and ultimately, use different poverty lines – as they should. Presumably, CBS 
poverty lines of neighbouring country would often be much closer to one another than 
relative poverty lines, because consumption-related social norms do not abruptly stop at 
national borders. Guio et al (2009) show that perceptions about what constitutes 
necessities differ across the EU, but less than what relative poverty lines would imply. 
Nevertheless, a CBS is a context-specific measure of poverty. It is not absolute, and it would 
differ between countries as well as over time.  
The CBS is not indifferent to inequality, but unlike relative measures, it is not itself a 
measure of inequality. The CBS depends more on the composition of common spending 
patterns, not so much on the aggregate level of spending or income. Sometimes a good or 
service can become a necessity when access becomes more widespread. This happened 
with telephones in the past and, arguably, with internet access more recently. In these 
cases, the spread in the ownership rate has changed social interactions. However, there are 
many goods and services which do not become necessities for social participation, even 
when ownership becomes near-universal. Whether or not widespread ownership turns an 
item into necessity depends on the nature of the item. Telephone and internet access 
represent a polar case, as they are pure examples of ‘network goods’. Pure network goods 
are rare, but many goods and services may have network good-like elements. For example, 
the LCFS shows that eating out was still an activity reserved for special occasions when the 
predecessor surveys began, but has now become a common activity. This change has 
implications for the cost of social participation. In the 1950s, a person who never 
frequented a restaurant would not have been excluded from a common way of socialising. 
Today, they would. Eating out has therefore become a different kind of good altogether. 
Frequenting a restaurant is no longer just about food consumption, it has become a social 
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venue as well. Thus, even though eating out does not meet any of the textbook criteria of a 
network good, the parallels are clear. The strength of the CBS is that it can respond to such 
developments. If a good or service changes social interactions, more people will perceive it 
as a necessity, and as soon as it has become a necessity in the eyes of half of the 
population, it would enter the basket. The cost of social participation would have increased, 
and the poverty measure would have captured it, which is exactly what a poverty measure 
should do. A consensual basket of necessities is fine-grained enough to differentiate 
between goods which change social interactions and goods which do not.  
This measure would also manage to take the factor time into account. Items enter the list 
of necessities as soon as they have acquired necessity status in the view of the majority. It 
is not enough for the item to be affordable for median earners; perceptions of what is a 
necessity have to catch up as well. If this happens quickly, the poverty line rises quickly, if it 
takes a longer time lag, then so does the adjustment of the poverty line. A CBS indicator 
would become more demanding with changing social norms – but it would not 
mechanistically follow median incomes. Contrary to a relative indicator, a CBS indicator 
could display falling poverty rates in times of rising inequality in the bottom half of the 
distribution. This would occur whenever expenditure at the bottom grew faster than social 
norms adjust upwards. Therefore, the ‘Irish paradox’ phenomenon would not have 
occurred if poverty in Ireland had been measured by the CBS method. Presumably, the CBS 
basket at the end of the high-growth period would not have been very different from the 
CBS basket at the beginning of the period. Social norms change with rising overall 
prosperity, but not instantaneously, and not independent of absolute rates of growth. At 
the very least, an Irish CBS poverty line would not have grown nearly as fast as median 
incomes.  
Relative measures frequently show falling poverty rates during recessions. With a CBS, this 
would not happen, because the list of necessities is highly unlikely to adjust downwards 
again in the short term. If at all, only a prolonged decline in living standards might lead to a 
downwards adjustment, but anomalies like poverty rates falling by several percentage 
points during a recession would not arise. Under a relative measure, it has happened in 
every single one of the British post-war recessions. 
A CBS would respond to changes in relative prices. If the price of one or several items on 
the list increased (decreased), then, other things equal, the poverty line would rise (fall) and 
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a higher (lower) poverty rate would result, even if the inflation rate and the nominal 
income distribution were unchanged. A BSA-list could also be amended regularly to 
accommodate emerging low-cost alternatives of hitherto expensive products. It could thus 
reflect developments in product markets with relevance for low-earners. This would not be 
as straightforward in practice as it appears here, but it would still be a huge improvement 
over relative and conventional absolute indicators, which do not incorporate such 




‘Poverty’ is and remains a highly abstract concept, and any measurement will suffer from 
ambiguities, anomalies and inaccuracies. The one proposed here is no exception. To name 
just a few points: 
 
Not all households have the same needs. People with a health condition that leads to high 
medical expenses, for example, may end up with a much lower living standard than 
observable variables reveal. The CBS measure is not fine-grained enough to recognise this.  
 
This argument also holds in reverse. Some households may have non-market means of 
accessing some of the items in the basket, so they may be able to access the full basket 
even though their expenditure level is below the basket’s cost. The CBS is not fine-grained 
enough to recognise this either. Taken together, this means that the poverty population 
identified by the CBS would still not necessarily be those with the lowest living standards. 
Some of those not included in the poverty population would have lower living standards 
than some of those included. Attempts to overcome such problems would come at the cost 
of much greater complexity, which would, in turn, undermine the claim that a CBS poverty 
measure was easily interpretable.  
 
It is also true that household surveys do not include data on the homeless or on people 
who live in shelters. Therefore, ironically, the people who are poor in the most obvious way 




In addition, no information is provided about the effort people have to make in order to 
remain above the poverty line. Some people may be able to cross the poverty line, but only 
through very long working hours or holding more than one job.  
 
Also, even if there was a very solid consensus on what constitutes necessities, this would 
still not be the same as a consensus on what constitutes poverty. The CBS poverty status 
would often deviate from people’s self-assessed poverty status. There would almost 
certainly be households who lack the means to afford all the items they have identified as 
necessities, and who will nevertheless not consider themselves poor. And there will also be 
households who can comfortably afford all the items they have identified as necessities, 
and who will still consider themselves poor.  
 
It has been shown how the CBS could detect relevant developments in product markets. It 
could indeed do so, but only in a rather clumsy way. There is no clear-cut way of 
establishing whether product X is a low-cost alternative for product Y, or whether it lacks so 
many of Y’s features that it has to be considered a distinct product. Microeconomic theory 
offers no guideline on where one market ends and another one begins, so decisions would 
involve discretionary judgements, undermining the aim of non-arbitrariness.  
 
The way in which the CBS would account for in-kind provision is even cruder. When a 
necessity is publicly provided and free at the point of use, the CBS would price it at zero. 
However, there is often a large difference between what is officially covered by public 
provision, and what is actually accessible. If, for example, medicines and healthcare 
treatments are officially universally available at no direct cost, but strictly rationed and 
therefore difficult to access in practice, the CBS would have great difficulties in taking this 
into account. The CBS works best for goods which are bought and sold on markets, because 
for those goods, increased scarcity takes the form of higher prices rather than waiting lists 
or indirect means of rationing. The CBS can easily detect rising prices, but it cannot detect 
more covert ways of rationing; it cannot detect differences in actual availability. In extreme 
cases, a solution would be to ignore public provision altogether and just assume that 
people have to buy the respective good on the market, so that the market price would be 
included in the CBS. But extreme cases are rare. It is more likely that some types of public 
provision will be readily available while others are not, which may require difficult 




Last but not least, much of what has been elaborated here depends on the existence of a 
minimum common denominator in people’s views on what constitutes necessities, with 
only random deviations from it. The PSE survey suggests that this condition holds, but there 
is no guarantee that future surveys will repeat this result. It is the case at the moment, but 
whether it remains to be the case cannot be known.  
 
On a more practical note, it is also a potential disadvantage that the PSE survey is only 
conducted at irregular intervals. This does not currently pose a large problem: So far, each 
round of the PSE has produced a basket that was slightly more encompassing than the 
previous one, but the additions were relatively minor, so that it would not have produced 
sudden jumps in the poverty line (if a monetary poverty line was available). However, this 
could have been an idiosyncrasy of the first three rounds. Future rounds might well 
produce sudden increases, so if the approach to poverty measurement proposed here were 
to be more widely adapted, the PSE survey or an equivalent would have to be conducted 
much more regularly.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
Social norms and expectations become more demanding as societies grow wealthier, and 
social participation can become more costly. Budget Standard Approach measures have 
largely been discarded in the developed world, partly because they do not recognise this 
context-dependency of poverty. Instead, relative poverty standards, which define the 
poverty line as a fixed fraction of mean or median incomes, have become widely accepted 
in the industrialised world. These indicators respond strongly to redistributive policy 
measures, but not to overall growth and employment creation (see Chapter 4). Yet since 
social policy choices usually imply trade-offs and opportunity costs, such conclusions are to 
be handled with caution. There are reasons to doubt the notion that a poverty standard is 
automatically anchored in social context only because it is tagged to median incomes. SWB 
research confirms that individuals do evaluate their material situation to some extent in 
relative terms, that is, relative to the situation of one or several ‘reference groups’. But it 
seems unlikely that this process of reference group formation follows a generalisable, 
identifiable pattern. To the very least, we have no reason to assume that national median 
income earners should occupy an especially prominent space in this process, i.e. that they 




At the same time, relative poverty indicators do not capture developments in product 
markets which affect the relative situation of the poor. Price increases which affect the 
poor disproportionally, e.g. increases in the price of staple food, housing, energy or 
transport, are not reflected in poverty indicators. Policies which make such increases less 
(more) likely are not identified as poverty-reducing (increasing) measures. Further, the 
emergence of ‘no-frills’ versions of luxury goods is a development which can potentially 
make everyday life experiences more similar across income strata, but such effects are not 
identified by relative poverty indicators either.  
 
This chapter has shown that conventional absolute poverty indicators do not solve these 
problems either. Being tagged to overall inflation rates, they cannot identify any changes in 
the price or product market structure with particular relevance to the poor. Their level 
usually has no meaningful interpretation, and they lack a mechanism of adjustment to 
changes in social norms and expectations.  
 
A combination of a consensual budget standard approach’ with a consensual material 
deprivation survey could go a long way towards meeting these challenges. The poverty line 
would be equal to the cost of all items on a list of ‘essential’ goods and services. The items 
would be obtained through a large-scale survey similar to the PSE, to ensure a degree of 
social relevance. The survey would yield a number of broad product categories. In 
identifying specific products for each product category, the list would then be streamlined. 
In this way, inability to purchase a particular item could be separated from unwillingness to 
do so, and structural changes in the relevant product markets could be incorporated. Like 
relative poverty indicators, the CMD poverty line would rise over time. But it would not 
mechanistically follow changes in median incomes. Under many circumstances, it could 
deviate substantially from the development of median incomes. One example would be a 
country where all real incomes remain constant, but through increased cultural integration, 
exposure to the lifestyles of wealthier countries increases. If this exposure has an impact on 
domestic social norms, then the list would become more encompassing, and poverty would 
rise. On the other hand, if all incomes grow fast and social norms only adjust with a 
substantial time lag, then poverty could fall even if the income distribution widens. Median 
incomes would grow faster than low incomes, but low incomes would still grow faster than 
the poverty line. Increased inequality would not have an impact per se, but only if it affects 
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perceptions of what are necessities. If the additional income growth enjoyed by median 
income earners vis-à-vis low income earners is channelled into the consumption of goods 
which have little impact on social norms, then poverty would not necessarily rise. On the 
other hand, if income inequality reduces slightly, but consumption patterns become more 
‘rivalling’ and positional, then poverty could rise. In the meantime, structural changes in 
product markets could be reflected by the CBS indicator. Items would regularly be replaced 
with more suitable substitutes, and market prices frequently updated. This indicator would, 
as described, still have a number of pitfalls. But it could at least broadly resonate with what 
most people at a particular time and place associate with ‘poverty’, and thus provide a 
more realistic account of how poverty evolves over time, who is affected, and which factors 
are effective at tackling it. Having presented the outline of the new measurement of 

























7. Constructing the Consensual Budget Standard 
 
This work was based on data from the Quarterly Price Quotes produced by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) and supplied by the Secure Data Service at the UK Data 
Archive. The data are Crown Copyright and reproduced with the permission of the 
controller of HMSO and Queen's Printer for Scotland. The use of the data in this work 
does not imply the endorsement of ONS or the Secure Data Service at the UK Data 
Archive in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the data. This work uses research 




The previous chapter has established the theoretical case for a new poverty measure, 
namely a consensually established, survey-based Budget Standard Approach. This chapter 
will proceed to construct such a poverty measure, using actual British price data. It will 
convert the latest PSE list into a consumption basket, gather the market prices of the goods 
in this basket, and establish its total cost. The cost of the basket will be the poverty line. 
Price data has been gathered in two different ways. The prices of food, clothing, household 
goods, childcare and social activities have been taken from the price surveys conducted by 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS). These surveys produce the raw data from which 
both the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Retail Price Index (RPI) are constructed. The 
data is confidential, which is why no individual prices can be reported here, but only 
processed composite measures from which the original raw price data could not be 
reconstructed. The price data has been accessed through the Secure Data Service (SDS), 
and previously at the offices of the ONS’ Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML). The 
restrictions mentioned in the opening paragraph apply. 
Where the SDS/VML price data was unavailable, insufficient or inappropriate, the poverty 
line has been built on prices collected directly from local authorities, public transport 
providers and trade associations.  
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One important caveat that should be mentioned right from the start is that the latest PSE 
survey refers to the year 1999. A new round is currently being produced, but at the time of 
writing, the results were not yet available. In the past, each round of the PSE has produced 
a slightly longer list of necessities than the previous one, and it is very likely that the new 
list will not be exactly identical to the 1999 list either. To compensate for this shortcoming, 
this chapter has tended to ‘err on the side of generosity’ when judgement calls in 
interpreting the PSE list were required. Also, a few household electronics that have seen 
particularly steep increases in ownership rates (e.g. computers) have been added for later 
years. But this is clearly an ersatz solution. The first-best solution would have been a PSE list 
which is fully up to date.    
The road from the PSE to a tangible basket, containing goods and services that people 
actually buy on the market, is a long one. The PSE identifies many broad product categories, 
but not many individual goods and services. What is therefore required is a ‘middle man’, a 
mechanism to assign individual products to the PSE’s broad categories. Chapter 6 has 
argued that expenditure surveys, like the LCFS, could fulfil this middle-man-function. They 
will indeed do so in this chapter, but only indirectly, because for the food and clothing 
baskets, a more suitable candidate has been found: the Market-Based Measure (MBM) 
compiled by Statistics Canada (see Human Resources and Social Development Canada, 2007 
and 2006; Michaud et al, 2004; Human Resources Development Canada, 2003; Hatfield, 
2002). The MBM is a poverty measure that shares some similarities with the understanding 
of poverty advanced in the preceding chapters. Statistics Canada does not explicitly outline 
the poverty theory on which the MBM is based, but describes the way in which the items 
have been selected in some detail. Judging from this description, the MBM, too, can be 
interpreted as an attempt to adjust the BSA method to the conditions of a modern, 
developed country. The MBM also takes public perceptions into account, albeit in a rather 
roundabout way: The products are selected according to customary consumption patterns, 
as recorded in expenditure surveys. The resulting MBM basket is highly encompassing, 
indeed, the MBM poverty rate is even higher than Canada’s relative poverty rate. 
But there are differences between the MBM and the measure that will be developed here. 
The poverty line constructed in this chapter must not be interpreted as a replication of the 
Canadian MBM with British prices. The MBM is not based on anything resembling the PSE, 
it does not involve a direct consultation of the public. It is therefore not a CBS at all. 
Essentially, the MBM is just a very generous reinterpretation of the conventional BSA.  
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Both the MBM and the CBS developed in this chapter make use of expenditure surveys, but 
they use them in different ways. The CBS will use them as a bridge between general 
product categories and concrete products, the MBM uses them to identify these product 
categories themselves. In the CBS, this latter task will be performed by the PSE.  
Nevertheless: For the food and clothing category of the CBS, the MBM subcategories are 
entirely suitable. The PSE does not specify detailed food or clothing baskets; it outlines only 
a general description, and the MBM’s food and clothing baskets turn out to be fully 
compatible with this description. It can therefore adequately fulfil the ‘middle man’ 
function described above. 
 
7.2 Price data 
 
The prices used in this and the following three subchapters have been taken from the ONS 
price surveys, the raw data behind the CPI and the RPI. As mentioned, the data is 
confidential, which is why no individual price can be reported. Price data has been accessed 
through the Secure Data Service (SDS), and previously at the offices of the ONS’ Virtual 
Microdata Laboratory (VML).  
The price survey data is entirely adequate for the prices in the food basket, the clothing 
basket, household goods, as well as childcare services and some items related to social 
inclusion. Rent levels in these datasets, however, do not differentiate according to flat size. 
This is why rents will be collected from Local Housing Allowance Direct (LHA Direct) instead. 
The LHA Direct rates, i.e. Housing Benefit rates, are available separately for flats with one, 
two, three, four and five bedrooms. The prices of local transport travelcards will also be 
collected directly from local transport providers or local authorities, and the price of a 
household contents insurance will be gathered from the British Insurance Premium Index.   
Prices have been recorded separately for each UK region. The choice of the geographical 
level represents a trade-off. Ideally, a poverty line would take account all local variations in 
retail structure. If, for example, one town is characterised by intense competition between 
retailers, while another is dominated by a local oligopoly, then a poverty line should be able 
to detect this. The ability to capture local variation is one of the great strengths of a CBS 
poverty line, and one which sets it apart from conventional poverty measures. Hence the 
case for collecting prices as locally as possible. 
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But at the same time, regional differentiation increases the complexity of the poverty 
measure. The compromise chosen here – collecting prices at the regional level – already 
means that there will be twelve different poverty lines rather than a single one. Breaking it 
down to the level of the county, or even the municipality, would result in literally hundreds 
of poverty lines. Going below the regional level may be sensible for items that are 
intrinsically local and cannot be traded across a distance, resulting in wider price variations. 
This is the case for housing and local public transport, so these will be collected at the local 
level. For the other items discussed in this chapter, the ‘marginal benefit’ (=the increase in 
precision) of increased localisation does not justify the ‘marginal cost’ (=the increase in 
complexity). Hence, their prices will be collected at the regional level, resulting in separate 
poverty lines for: 
 London 
 the South East 
 the South West 
 the East 
 the East Midlands 
 the West Midlands 
 Yorkshire and the Humber 
 the North West 
 the North 
 Wales 
 Scotland 
 Northern Ireland 
 
A trade-off also arises in the choice of the price range for each product. On the one hand, 
by definition, a poverty line ought to represent a minimum acceptable level. In the context 
of a CBS poverty line, this would provide a case for selecting a price quote from the bottom 
of the price range for each product, e.g. the second-cheapest or the third-cheapest 
product. However, this would violate one of the criteria set out in subchapter 6.1: It would 
require a level of spending efficiency that is probably difficult to attain is practice. 
Townsend (1954, p. 133) had once pointed out that it “would be unrealistic to expect them 
[the poor], as in effect many social investigators have expected them, to be skilled dieticians 
with marked tendencies towards Puritanism”. Analogously, it would also be unrealistic to 
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expect them to be skilled market researchers with market tendencies towards Homo 
Oeconomicus behaviour.  
On the other hand, taking the average of all price quotes per item, as the CPI does, would 
deprive the measure of one of its major potential advantages: the ability to reflect 
differences in the industry structure of the retail sector.  When price quotes are averaged, 
luxury stores and discounters cancel each other out. A highly diversified market, able to 
cater to a wide variety of income ranges, could produce the same average price as a market 
which offers only one standard product. But the actual experience of low-income 
consumers would clearly differ across the two market structures (see subchapter 5.7 on this 
issue). The market structure has implications for poverty, and unlike the poverty measures 
currently in use, the CBS offers the possibility of capturing this. But in order to fulfil this 
function, it has to concentrate on the lower part of the price range, even if it is advisable to 
avoid the very bottom of that range.  
Putting it simply, the idea is to devise a basket for a consumer who is price-conscious, but 
not a ‘bargain hunter’. The CBS ought to be a low-budget basket which does not require the 
consumer to be particularly well-informed, or to make an especial effort to find the 
cheapest items. To put this idea into practice, prices at the 25th percentile of the price 
distribution have been selected. This means that a consumer who commands over this 
budget could theoretically afford one out of four products within each product category. 
Since this choice is somewhat arbitrary, price quotes at the 20th and the 33rd percentiles of 
the price distribution have also been selected, to allow a sensitivity analysis. This produces 
two alternative poverty lines, a more generous one which could afford one out of every 
three products per category, and a less generous one which could only afford one out of 
every five products. The result is a BSA basket which captures some of the possibilities of 
‘economy class’ shopping, while still leaving substantial efficiency reserves.  
This choice requires some explanation, because differentiation could also work in the 
opposite direction. Subchapter 5.7 has described a differentiated market in which the low-
budget segment of the market caters specifically for the needs of low-budget consumers. 
They thereby obtain an ‘economy class’ shopping basket which, while being lower in quality 
and lacking some product features, is a lot more similar to the shopping basket obtained by 
middle-income consumers than it would have been if product markets were more 
homogeneous. Market differentiation, in this case, moderates inequalities in consumption 
standards. In theory, however, differentiation could also have the opposite effect of 
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exacerbating such inequalities. This would happen when a market offers different packages, 
some representing better value for money than others, and when the better-value 
packages are, for whichever reason, less accessible to low-budget consumers. The result 
would be a ‘poverty premium’, a situation in which low-income consumers pay more than 
the majority of consumers for a given standard of consumption. The term goes back to 
Caplovitz’s (1967), who identified various instances in which the poor paid higher prices 
than most people for comparable products.   
Poverty premiums may still exist, but they are no longer the same ones as those identified 
by Caplovitz. The author describes a highly fragmented retail market structure 
characterised by high search costs, in which consumer groups that are less mobile and less 
knowledgeable are systematically disadvantaged. Yet the author’s description predates the 
modern retail market, with its dense networks of large discount supermarket chains. The 
emergence of the current market structure has minimised search costs, because nowadays, 
each supermarket chain is associated with a particular price and quality level. By the simple 
act of choosing one supermarket chain over another, customers are making a choice about 
the price level they are prepared to pay across the board. It is no longer necessary to do 
this separately for each individual product category. Thus, ‘low-budget shopping’ in the way 
in which the term is used here does not require the incurrence of search costs. It is 
sufficient to choose a discount chain (e.g. Aldi, Lidl, Netto, Iceland, Asda) over a more 
upmarket one (e.g. Marks & Spencer). Even where no discount store is within reach, 
consumers can still opt for the low-budget in-house brand of the nearest supermarket, an 
option which does not require the incurrence of search costs either. This is why, at least for 
products which can be bought and sold in such outlets, the use of prices at the 25th 
percentile of the price distribution is justifiable. There is nothing special about the 25th 
percentile as such, but the idea that a CBS budget should afford one out of four products on 
the market is a good enough rule of thumb for a prototype. At least in urban areas, it 
should be feasible for virtually every household to adhere to this consumption pattern with 
minimal search costs. The Competition Commission provides comprehensive data on the 
density of retail store networks, and the accessibility of those stores, in the UK. It shows 
that in urban areas, virtually all households have at least one large grocery store within a 
driving distance of 10 minutes or less from their home (Competition Commission, 2008, pp. 
45-46).24 Within a drive-time of 25 minutes, virtually all urban households have access to at 
                                                          
24 CBS shoppers are assumed to have no car, but given average urban driving speed, a driving distance of ten 
minutes should also represent a walkable distance, in case the supermarket is not serviced by public transport.    
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least three large grocery stores (ibid.). Even in rural areas, nine out of ten households have 
access to at least one large store within a driving distance of just over twenty minutes, and 
to at least two large stores within a driving distance of just under thirty minutes.  
However, even if the poverty premiums of Caplovitz’ days no longer apply, they may simply 
have been replaced by other poverty premiums. Indeed, Hirsch (2013) examines this issue 
using contemporary UK data, and finds evidence for the existence of poverty premiums in 
today’s markets. They arise because of differences in internet use, and in access to financial 
services. For example, a short-term loan from a bank comes at a much lower cost than an 
equivalent loan from a payday lender, and for utility services, the more attractive tariffs are 
often reserved for online payments.  
Still, the poverty premiums that Hirsch identifies do not undermine the idea of selecting 
CBS prices mostly at the 25th percentile of the price distribution. If the poor face higher 
borrowing costs than most households, then in the approach proposed here, this would be 
accounted for in the consumption figures. Debt and interest payments are subtracted from 
expenditure, so other things equal, a household repaying a bank loan would attain a higher 
consumption standard than an otherwise identical household repaying an equivalent 
payday loan. Thus, adjusting the poverty line for differences in financing costs would 
represent a form of double-counting. Of course, a poverty measurement should be able to 
take account of the fact that some households are more credit-constrained than others, but 
it is more appropriate to deal with this issue in the consumption data, not through the 
poverty line. A person who buys a fridge using an unsecured high-interest loan pays more 
than a person buying the same fridge using a short-term bank loan – but the first person 
does not pay more for the fridge itself. They pay more for the ‘package’, that is, the product 
plus the financing costs, but it would be misleading to add those costs to the cost of the 
fridge. An increase in the use of unsecured loans indicates a problem with the financial 
situation of low-income households – not a problem in the market for household 
appliances. A poverty measure should detect the problem, but it should also be able to 
correctly ascribe it to its source. In other words, insofar as poverty premiums arise in the 
form of financing cost premiums, they are already dealt with in the expenditure data.  
The other poverty premiums Hirsch identifies relate to genuine price differences, rather 
than differences in financing costs. But they do not constitute a problem for the price 
collection method chosen here either, because the CBS that will be constructed in this 
chapter will not contain any prices that refer to online payments. Thus, the CBS that will be 
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built here differs from Hirsch’s study insofar as it uses a different baseline. In Hirsch’s study, 
the low price of online payment packages is defined as the ‘normal’ price, and sums which 
exceed this baseline are classified as ‘penalties’. In this chapter, the higher ‘offline price’ is 
defined as the baseline, and sums which fall below that are considered ‘discounts’ – and 
therefore ignored, because the CBS will not contain discounts, other than child discounts 
for transport ticket prices.  
For the fuel budget, an estimate which contains a ‘poverty premium’ as defined by Hirsch 
has been chosen. For a few other categories – in particular, household contents insurance – 
average prices rather than prices at a lower percentile have been selected. For the majority 
of products, though, the use of prices at the 25th percentile is defensible. Poverty penalties 
are real, but they do not occur across the board. In the final chapter, proposals for a more 
sophisticated approach in future research will be presented.  
In what follows, the individual components of the CBS poverty line will be described.  
 
7.3 The food poverty line 
 
As mentioned, for the food component of the CBS, the food basket of the Canadian MBM 
will be adopted with minor modifications. The reason is that the PSE does not contain a 
food basket as such. It contains the following entries:  
 ‘Two meals a day’ 
 ‘Fresh fruit and vegetables daily’ 
 ‘Meat, fish or vegetarian equivalent every other day’ 
 ‘Friends or family round for a meal’ 
 ‘Roast joint/vegetarian equivalent once a week’ 
 ‘Three meals a day for children’ 
 ‘Meat, fish or vegetarian equivalent at least twice a day for children’ 
 
The MBM food basket clearly covers all of these components, so it is fully compatible with 
the PSE in this regard. It has been selected for three reasons: 
1. The MBM food basket is easily compatible with the poverty theory used here, even 
if it is not explicitly built on any particular theory of poverty. As Statistics Canada 
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explains, the MBM food basket “is neither “an ideal diet” nor the cheapest diet 
which meets nutritional requirements. Instead, it represents a nutritious diet which 
is consistent with the food purchases of ordinary Canadian households. It contains 
healthy foods that “people like to eat”” (Human Resources and Social Development 
Canada, 2007, p. 55; Human Resources Development Canada, 2003, p. 37). This 
means that the MBM avoids the pitfalls of the historical BSA, even if that was not 
its intention. The MBM does not require consumers to be ‘skilled dieticians’, and it 
does not assume ‘marked tendencies towards Puritanism’ either. It is modelled on 
actually observed eating habits rather than some idealised notion.  
2. Prior to gathering the individual prices, the MBM has been compared to typical 
food purchases in the UK as recorded in the LCFS. No major differences have been 
found. The reason for this is that the MBM does not contain any national or 
regional or specialties; it does not represent a specifically ‘Canadian cuisine’. 
Rather, it is a generic ‘Western’ diet that would fit a range of developed countries.  
3. The MBM food basket is not ascetic, it is not a ‘poverty diet’. It contains a wide 
variety of meats, fish, fresh vegetables, fresh fruit, dairy products etc. This is 
desirable: Poverty in developed Western countries is no longer a matter of physical 
deprivation, and poverty measurement should reflect this. The MBM food basket is 
a food standard designed for a highly developed country. It would certainly be 
possible to use a more economical food basket, but this would create problems of 
its own. Firstly, the PSE survey identifies celebrations on special occasions as a 
necessity. With a more economic diet, this would require additional allowances for 
special food items for these occasions, which would involve discretionary choices. 
The MBM, in contrast, is comprehensive enough to cover this automatically. It 
could also be argued that the spread of take-away food is a development which 
has changed social norms, and which a CBS food basket should take account of. 
With a more economic basket, this would also require a discretionary separate 
allowance. This is not necessary when using the MBM, which is, again, broad 
enough to accommodate substitutions of this kind.  
 
The items in the MBM food basket have been matched with their closest equivalent in the 
UK price data. In a few cases, no adequate match has been found, in which case the item 
has been dropped, and the quantity of an already selected similar item has been increased 
accordingly. This means that the food basket developed here is slightly less diverse than its 
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Canadian counterpart (see Annex), but a decrease in variability is preferable to making 
arbitrary choices.  
In some cases, prices have been missing for some years, in which case the prices of the 
previous and the subsequent year have been averaged. Some items have been dropped 
from the CPI halfway during the period covered here. In this case, a substitute has been 
used from then on. In cases where substitution would have led to an unreasonably sharp 
drop or increase in price, the price has been updated or deflated by the relevant 
subcomponent of the CPI. The reference household in the Canadian MBM is a family of two 
adults and two children. By implication, this is also initially the case for the CBS food basket. 
The evolution of the food poverty line for different household types 
Twelve different food poverty lines result, one for each UK region. They are shown below 
for a family of four in 2009, with the upper bound (prices at the 33rd percentile) and the 
lower bound (prices at the 20th percentile) also included.  
Figure 7.1: Food poverty lines for a family of four, 2009, in £ per week 
 
The Southeast of England comes out as the costliest region on this basis. In 2009, a family 
of four would have required a weekly sum of £95.53 to purchase the full food basket (when 
using prices at the 25th percentile).  
221 
 
Statistics Canada uses a standard equivalence scale to extend the food poverty lines to 
other household types, but this approach has not been adopted here. Equivalence scales 
reflect economies of scale in household consumption, but for the vast majority of 
households, the largest source of economies of scale is housing. In food consumption, 
economies of scale are very minor.   
An equivalence scale which avoids this problem is the McClements scale, because for this 
scale, there is an after-housing-costs (AHC) version, with weights which reflect the fact that 
economies of scale have already been largely exhausted. Based on this version of the 
McClements’ scale, Figure 7.2 shows the food poverty lines for five different household 
types in the Southeast region, and their evolution in the period from 1996 to 2009. The 
Southeast is best suited for times series comparisons, because this region has broadly 
maintained its position in the regional price ranking throughout the period. The trend in the 
Southeast is therefore representative of the trend in many other regions as well.  
Figure 7.2: The food poverty line in the Southeast, £ per week, various household types, 
1996-2009 
 
Figure 7.3 provides some context for these figures. It shows, again, the cost of the food 
basket for a family of four in the Southeast of England, for the period between 1996 and 
2009. Alongside with the actual trajectory of the food poverty line, the dotted grey line 
shows a hypothetical one which would have resulted if the cost of the food basket had only 
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increased in line with the general rate of inflation. Up until 2001, there is not much 
difference between this hypothetical scenario and the actual evolution of the food basket’s 
cost. But from then on, and especially since 2005, the cost of the food basket has risen 
sharply in real terms. This shows, again, how little the rate of CPI inflation reveals about the 
cost of the basic necessities which make up an especially large proportion of low-earners’ 
budgets.  
The solid grey line shows another hypothetical cost evolution of the food basket, this time 
simulating a situation in which it rises in line with the Food Price Index, which is the food 
subcomponent of the CPI. For obvious reasons, this simulation is much closer to how the 
cost of the food basket has actually evolved. But a gap between the two remains. This 
suggests that even within the food price category, price changes have been unfavourable 
for low-earners, with more basic foodstuffs increasing at a faster rate than food prices on 
the whole. This is compatible with the observation that the Food Price Index shows 
especially steep increases for basic products like cereal and fruits.  




There is considerable regional variation in the cost of the CBS food basket. A 95% 
confidence interval for the national mean (in 2009) has been calculated, and it turns out 
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that the three costliest regions are above the interval’s upper bound, while three least 
costly regions are below its lower bound.  
The Southeast tops the regional ranking. In 2009, a family of four would have required a 
weekly sum of £95.53 to purchase the full food basket. The cost of the food basket has 
been lowest in Scotland, where an equivalent family could have purchased an equivalent 
basket for £86.29 a week. This amounts to a spread of ten per cent, which adds up to a 
difference of nearly £500 over a course of a year.   
Regional variation is not explained by a few atypical regions. When representing the 
regional variation in food basket costs in the form of a standard boxplot, all regions fall 
inside that range.  




The ranking of regions by the cost of the food basket has remained broadly similar over the 
years, but there are exceptions. In 1996, the region which recorded the highest cost for the 
food basket was Northern Ireland, which is now among the low-cost regions. Similarly, 
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Scotland was among the high-price regions in 1996, and is now at the bottom of the price 
ranking. In contrast, Wales recorded the lowest food poverty line in 1996, and is now in the 
middle of the regional ranking.  




This suggests is that it might be worthwhile exploring how the industry structure of the 
retail sector has changed over this period, and whether Northern Ireland and Scotland have 
been outliers in some sense.  
 
7.4 The clothing poverty line 
 
The clothing basket is constructed in a similar way to the food basket: The PSE provides the 
general categories, and since the clothing basket of the Canadian MBM fits this general 
description, it has been taken for the detailed specification. Again, the MBM clothing 
basket has been selected in a way which is compatible with the understanding of poverty 
used here. It “reflected an effort to provide clothing and footwear for common work, school 
and social occasions” (Human Resources and Social Development Canada, 2007, p. 56). This 
shows that the social participation aspect is also an important consideration for the MBM. 
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The standard of clothing must be suitable protect from cold and the weathers, but while 
these functional qualities are necessary, they are not sufficient. Clothing must also be 
suitable to meet social expectations as perceived by the respondents. This is the common 
understanding behind both the MBM and the CBS. 
Unlike in the food category, however, the compatibility of the MBM with the PSE is not 
perfect: The PSE demands a slightly more generous standard for children’s clothing than 
the MBM. In these cases, the PSE overrides the MBM. A consensual BSA must be based on 
what respondents deem necessary, not poverty researchers. The role of the latter is only to 
find specific items which match the respondents’ general description.   
As above, the nearest matches in the ONS price data have been selected, assembling a 
clothing basket which comes as close to the MBM’s clothing basket as British price data 
permit. The quality and suitability of these items cannot be assessed on this basis, but 
preference has been given to items which contained signal terms like ‘branded’, ‘fashion’, 
‘suitable for work’ or ‘suitable for school’.  The prices of these items have been collected at 
the regional level, and at the 25th percentile of the price distribution. As above, prices at the 
20th and the 33rd percentile have also been selected as lower and upper bounds.  
The reference household is, again, a family of two adults and two children. The 2009 
clothing poverty lines for the reference household are shown below for all regions, 
including upper and lower bound. As in the food subchapter, the South East comes out as 
the costliest region. On an annual basis, a family of four in the South East needs £786.68 to 











Figure 7.6: The clothing poverty line for a family of four, 2009, in £ per week 
 
The MBM applies a common equivalence scale to the total poverty line, but this practice 
has not been followed here, because a higher level of precision can be achieved without 
much further complication. In the clothing basket, each item is allocated to one specific 
household member, so the basket for e.g. a childless couple can simply be derived by taking 
the baseline basket and removing the items assigned to the children. The clothing poverty 
line has therefore been gathered separately for each household type, without the use of an 
equivalence scale. This produces an implicit equivalence scale, but it does not have to be a 
constant one.  
The evolution of this poverty line from 1996 to 2009 is shown in the graph below. The 
South East has been selected to illustrate the trend because, again, while it is not a typical 
region in terms of its price level, its trend is broadly representative of the trend in many 
other regions as well. It shows that in nominal terms, the cost of the clothing basket is now 
lower than it was in 1996, and this is true for all household types, albeit not to the same 
extent. This time, the poverty lines are not exactly parallel to one another, as the implicit 
equivalence scale has changed over time. The cost of clothing a child is now a bit higher 
than the cost of clothing an adult. This shows the inappropriateness of applying a 
conventional equivalence scale to this category. A conventional equivalence scale would 
imply that there are economies of scale in clothing consumption, but calculating a poverty 
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line for each household type separately shows that a family of four needs 4.4 times as much 
as a single adult to purchase its clothing basket, and 2.2 times as much as a childless couple.  
Figure 7.7: The clothing poverty line in the Southeast, £ per week, various household types, 
1996-2009 
 
The graph below puts the figures into perspective. The dotted line shows how the clothing 
poverty line would have developed if it had risen in line with the overall rate of inflation. 
This shows that the clothing basket has become considerably cheaper in real terms over 
time. It also shows that the cost of the clothing basket shows no correlation with the overall 
CPI, casting, once again, doubt on the practice of updating poverty lines by the general rate 
of inflation. The solid grey line shows how the cost of the clothing basket would have 
evolved if it had grown in line with the clothing component of the CPI. This scenario is, 
unsurprisingly, much closer to what has actually happened. Still, even the clothing price 
















A 95% confidence interval has been calculated for the national mean cost of the clothing 
basket. The two least costly regions are below the interval’s lower bound, and the three 
costliest regions are above its upper bound.   
While there has been a modest regional convergence of food poverty lines, the opposite 
has happened for clothing poverty lines. The spread between the costliest (the West 
Midlands) and the least costly region (Northern Ireland) has increased from 10% to 33%. In 
absolute terms, it adds up to just over £300 per annum for a family of four. But again, these 
two regions are not driving the variation alone. All regions remain within the range of a 







Figure 7.9: Boxplot for the regional variation in clothing poverty lines, 2009 
 
 
There have also been changes in the regional ranking. As the graph below shows, in 1996, 
the cost of the clothing basket (for a family of four) in Wales, London and the West 
Midlands was virtually identical. But from 2000 on, London and Wales continued the 
downward trend while the West Midlands did not. There is no obvious answer as to why 
this happened, but if differences persist, the structure of the clothing retail sector may 
















7.5 The poverty line for household goods, personal services and 
social participation 
 
Household goods and personal services 
 
The PSE contains a few consumer durables and household electronics, the prices of which 
have been included here. For each of these, a duration of two years – the legal minimum 
warranty period – has been assumed. Many items will surely last longer than that, but 
limiting the period to the legal minimum avoids the arbitrariness associated with including 
the price of repair services, or with making a more sophisticated price-quality trade-off. 
Also, it is a potential weakness of BSA poverty lines that they find it difficult to 
accommodate expenditure shocks, i.e. expenses which are sudden, unexpected and 
irregular. Expenses associated with durables breaking down fit into this category. Historical 
BSAs have often been based too much on ‘if-all-goes-well’ conditions, and too little on 
‘Murphy’s law’ conditions. This added to their difficulties in capturing real-world situations.   
The PSE also identifies home contents insurance as a necessity. This item is not included in 
the ONS’ local price data survey, so the prices have been gleaned from the British Insurance 
Premium Index instead (AA, 2012). The BIPI contains home content insurance premiums for 
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the national level and for some selected regions, with regional variation being mostly 
explained by differences in climatic conditions (risk of flooding etc.). Where available, the 
regional premium has been taken for the CBS basket, and where none was available, the 
national figure has been taken as a second-best solution. For this product, the average 
premium rather than a low-cost insurance has been chosen: A lower price may imply a 
lower level of insurance coverage, which could then entail other expenses in the event of 
damage.   
Kitchen equipment and cleaning utensils are not included in the PSE, but a few basic items 
in these categories have been included here for the sake of completeness. This poses no 
major difficulties because these are either low-cost items, or they are items which last for a 
longer period, so that their cost is negligible when converted to a weekly basis. This 
component of the CBS basket also includes allowances for personal services like a haircut 
once every two months.  
Childcare 
Households with children have been assumed to require full-time childcare. But it has also 
been assumed that they qualify for the childcare element of the Working Tax Credit (WTC), 
which reimburses 80% of all formal childcare costs, subject to a cap.25 Hence, childcare 
services have been budgeted at 20% of the market price. This is surely not fully accurate. It 
will underestimate the childcare costs of families who do not qualify for the full amount of 
the WTC childcare element, and it will overestimate the childcare costs of families whose 
children are 3 or 4 years old, because they qualify automatically for 15 hours of free 
childcare under the Early Education programme. The childcare costs of families who can 
access employer-sponsored childcare or childcare vouchers will also be overestimated. 
However, given the huge diversity in childcare requirements and funding arrangements, 
some simplification is necessary in this category. The treatment of the WTC childcare 
element as a cost rebate rather than an income source is defensible on the grounds that it 
is an earmarked transfer, which cannot be spent on anything other than childcare. 
Social participation 
Unfortunately, in the field where a detailed account would be most useful – social 
participation – the PSE is at its most general. The most important entry in this field reads ‘a 
                                                          
25 In the beginning of the period, the WTC childcare element reimbursed only 70% of childcare costs. More 
recently, it has been cut back to this level again.  
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hobby or leisure activity’. This part of the basket will therefore be the least precise one, 
which could, however, be changed if future rounds of the PSE specified more detailed 
activities.  
In actual practice, the PSE’s lack of precision in the social participation category proves less 
of a problem. The LCFS has been used to identify a few standard leisure activities that are 
reasonably common, and which have therefore been included in the CBS. These are: 
 Membership in a health centre/ fitness club 
 A meal in a restaurant once a month, including drinks 
 Admission to a theatre once a month 
These activities have not been chosen for their own merits – no single activity is widespread 
enough to be included on this basis alone – but simply on the grounds that the prices of 
these activities (especially the first one) display a number of useful characteristics. First of 
all, compared to other leisure activities for which price quotes are available, these activities 
are among the costlier ones, albeit not at the very top of the price range. This means that a 
whole range of alternatives is affordable on the same budget, or a lower one. So while the 
selection of the items as such is fairly arbitrary, this matters less than in the case of goods 
which are not substitutable, such as housing or transport. The resulting sub-poverty line 
which acts mostly as a generic budget. Membership in a health centre or fitness club is 
mostly a placeholder: It can be replaced by almost any social activity which involves 
membership in a club, association or society (except high-end ones like golf clubs) without 
extra costs, and it most cases, at a lower cost. So this entry could as well have been named 
‘membership in a club/society/association’.  
Secondly, the advantage of membership in a health club/fitness centre is that is represents 
a flat rate purchase. For activities which are bought in discrete units, a discretionary choice 
about the quantity and frequency of the purchase is required. In this case, once the 
membership fee has been paid, it allows unlimited access to the premises and to any 
activity within them. This is also the reason why restricted membership options, which limit 
access to particular times of the day and/or which exclude some of the activities offered on 
the premises, have not been considered. In some places, local authorities run their own 
health clubs, which offer membership at subsidised rates. However, their availability and 
access criteria differ too widely, so this option has been ignored, even though it will often 
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be the preferred option for low-income households. The rates included here refer to 
private health centres only.   
Unsurprisingly, restaurant prices differ widely in any given region, but for this item, the 
usual distinction between prices at the 20th, the 25th, and the 33rd percentiles has not been 
made. Instead, only the median price has been taken. There are two reasons for this. 
Firstly, as in the case of club membership, the idea is to find a placeholder activity which 
has many substitutes in the same or a lower price range. Restaurant meals fulfil this 
function on average, but not at the lower percentiles of the price range. When the median 
price is taken, all close substitutes – pubs, cafes etc. – and some more distant ones are 
comfortably within the reach of the same budget. Secondly, the emphasis here is on the 
social participation function, not on the activity per se. Restaurant visits have been 
interpreted to be primarily a socialising activity: It has been assumed that their main 
purpose is not food consumption, but meeting other people in a public venue. In order to 
fulfil this function properly, the budget must allow low-income households to frequent the 
same places as most other people. The price has therefore been interpreted as a kind of 
entry ticket to a social venue.  
There is no especial reason for the inclusion of theatre visits. It is, again, only a placeholder, 
because a price comparison within the ONS price surveys shows that it can be replaced by 
many other activities – visits to cinemas, museums, sports events etc. – even though for 
this item, it is more of a second-best solution. The case is less clear-cut than for the above 
items, because all of the activities in this category show considerable price variation within 
a given region.  
A number of problems remain. Even if the activities included are treated as placeholders 
rather than taken at face value, the social participation category is not especially realistic. 
Firstly, it treats children as ‘miniature adults’, who simply accompany their parents to every 
social activity rather than engaging in age-appropriate activities. The CBS basket contains 
no leisure activities suitable for children. The result is that the social participation budget 
for a single parent with one child is identical to that of a childless couple, which is scarcely 
plausible. However, while it is relatively easy to identify a few standard leisure services for 
adults, the number of possibilities for children is vastly greater, and the PSE survey is too 
general on this account. It is simply not possible to compose a ‘children’s hobbies and 
activities’ basket with any degree of objectivity here, so what the above approach 
effectively does is to derive a budget for adults only, and then assign the same figures to 
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children. Since a whole range of substitutes are within reach of this budget, this approach, 
although not particularly elegant, is defensible on an as-if-basis.  
Secondly, this budget assumes a family which only engages in social activities that take 
place outside of the home, and that involve the purchase of leisure services on the market. 
Activities that require only one-off payments, or that take place outside of the realm of 
market exchange altogether, are not considered. This assumes, quite unrealistically, that 
every social activity must be bought on the market. However, the idea is to produce a ‘flat-
rate budget’, which can be rearranged to cover spending on special occasions as the case 
arises. The PSE lists the celebration of special occasions as a necessity, but it is not feasible 
to derive separate budgets for every possible occasion here. However, some of the 
activities specified above would also be realistic activities for special occasions. Effectively, 
the above approach attempts to devise a social participation budget which automatically 
subsumes such occasions. It may not be a realistic spending pattern for every single month 
of the year, but it allows enough substitution and rearrangement to also cover irregular 
events. It is, again, not a particularly elegant solution, but it obviates the need for separate 
‘special events budgets’ for all sorts of occasions.  
Thirdly, even though this is only a matter of semantics, it should also be mentioned that the 
labels ‘social participation’ or ‘social inclusion’ for this category are somewhat misleading. It 
implies that social participation/inclusion was one single, isolated component of the basket, 
when in reality, it is the leitmotiv that permeates all components of the basket. The poverty 
line as a whole ought to approximate the cost of social participation, defined as not just 
socialising, but the attainment of a customary living standard. The label has been chosen to 
flag out that the items in this category are not purchased in their own right, but as a means 
to participate in society. But it should be noted that this deviates from the way in which the 
terms ‘social inclusion’ and ‘social participation’ are used elsewhere in this thesis.  
For a family of four, the 2009 total budget for household goods, personal services and 
social participation is shown below. What is immediately apparent is that for this 
component of the basket, the extent of regional variation is much higher than for the 





Figure 7.11: The budget for household goods, services and social participation for a family 
of four, 2009, in £ per week 
 
As in the case of the clothing basket, each activity is assigned to a specific household 
member, so no equivalence scale is required. Figure 7.10 shows the budgets for each 
household type, and their evolution between 1996 and 2009. As above, these figures refer 
to the Southeast, because this is the most typical region as far as price trends over time are 
concerned. It shows immediately that child-related expenses have experienced the greatest 
cost increases. In the late 1990s, a family of four needed 4.3 times as much as a single adult 
to attain the same living standard. In 2009, that ratio had increased to 5.0. This reflects the 
increase in childcare costs, which has made the implicit equivalence scale less favourable 
for families with children. The drop in 2006 reflects the increase in the proportion of 
childcare costs reimbursed through the WTC, which was raised from 70% to 80% in that 








Figure 7.12: The poverty line for household goods, personal services and social participation 




For childcare costs, much of the variation is driven by the lower and the upper end of the 
ranking. Unlike with food and clothing, not all regions remain within the range of a standard 
boxplot. London and Wales (denoted ‘1’ and ‘10’ in the graph below) are above, while the 
North West and Northern Ireland (‘8’ and ‘12’) are below. The remaining regions are 
clustered much more closely together. This is mirrored by the 95% confidence interval 
which has been calculated for the national mean cost. All regions except for the four 
outside of the boxplot remain within that interval. Thus, childcare costs show a very 
different pattern of cross-regional variation than food and clothing costs.  
The fact that London is so far apart from the other data points is not surprising at all; as will 
later be shown, London is an outlier in more than one respect. Yet it is not clear what 
explains the deviation of Wales, Northern Ireland and the North West. It does, however, 
not seem to be an idiosyncrasy of the data. The number of price quotes per region is about 
the same as for most other products, so there is no reason to suspect that the figures have 
been drawn from an inadequately small and potentially unrepresentative sample. More 
importantly, a similar pattern can be observed for preceding years, whereas random 
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measurement errors should be one-off phenomena. It is also notable that the findings are 
not incompatible with those of the Daycare Trust (2012), which collects its own childcare 
cost data independent of the ONS. In short, while it is not clear where this regional pattern 
comes from, there are no obvious ‘warning signs’ that would caution against using the data.         
Figure 7.13: Boxplot for the regional variation of the childcare costs, 2009 
 
 
A 95% confidence interval has also been calculated for the national mean cost of the social 
participation/leisure activities basket. Three regions are below the interval’s lower bound, 
and two regions are above its upper bound.  
The graph below shows a standard boxplot for this subcategory. Only London (denoted ‘1’ 
















The variation in the cost of social participation in particular raises the question whether it is 
a genuine variation in the cost of these services, or whether it is simply variation in the cost 
of commercial rents, passed on to consumers. Rent levels will be dealt with in a separate 
subchapter, but it can already be foreclosed that the latter seems to be the case. The cost 
of leisure activities cannot be analysed in its own right, because it appears to be mostly a 
function of the cost of business premises. If so, it would be blind alley to analyse regional 
differences in the industry structure of the leisure industry. The proper focus would then be 
the property markets.  
 
7.6 The poverty line for transport 
 
The PSE specifies transport for a number of selected and irregular occasions, which cannot 
meaningfully be priced in this format. So instead, for transport, the CBS basket will use the 
cost of season tickets as a proxy.  
239 
 
Season ticket prices have been gathered from local transport providers for the largest city 
in each region. These will not be representative for the region as a whole. In smaller towns 
and rural areas, local transport will tend to be cheaper, but also patchier, and this is the 
kind of trade-off which the CBS has difficulties incorporating. There are surely more 
sophisticated ways of accounting for transport costs, but for now, preference is given to 
simplicity over accuracy in this category.  
In each of the twelve cities, the price of a season ticket which covers the whole area of the 
town itself, and the closer surroundings, has been selected. The budget is therefore also 
suitable for commuters from the city fringe or suburbs who do not have a car. The ticket 
has to cover all large bus companies operating in the town, and where available, also 
underground and local train services. Here, an exception has been made for Greater 
London, where an all-purpose ticket covering all zones and all means of transport would be 
prohibitively expensive. Instead, a ticket which covers underground and railway in the inner 
zones, and bus services in all zones, has been chosen. Elsewhere, where the price of season 
tickets differs by zones, all zones have been included, except when the outer zones are far 
beyond the city’s boundaries. Discounts for children have been taken into account. The 
figure below shows the resulting budgets for a family of four in 2009, expressed on a 
weekly basis.  




Regional variation is difficult to interpret in this case, because the budgets do not represent 
exactly the same product in each region. It cannot be established to what extent 
differences in ticket prices reflect differences in the quality and availability of transport 
services, rather than regional variation in the price of a given standard of service.   
With this qualification in mind: A 95% confidence interval has been calculated for the 
national mean of transport costs. Three regions are above the upper bound, and three 
regions are below the lower bound, of that interval.  
Even though the way in which the ticket prices have been selected could be prone to 
producing outliers, all regions fall within the range of a standard boxplot.  




Prices have been dated back until 1996 using the relevant subcomponent of the CPI. This 
means that regional variation in time trends will not be captured. Between 1996 and 2009, 
the public transport sub-index of the CPI has increased by about 60%, but this development 
has surely not been uniform across all regions. Backdating all transport costs by the same 
deflator also means that changes in the implicit equivalence scales will not be detected. 
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This is not ideal, but since time series for specific ticket prices are not available, a second-
best solution has to suffice.   
The figure below shows transport budgets for different household types using the example 
of Greater Manchester. The implicit equivalence scale can be seen in e.g. the difference 
between the budget of a two-adult household, and that of a single parent with one child, 
with the latter being below the former. The budget for a two-adult household, in contrast, 
is simply twice the budget of a single adult. 
Figure 7.17: The transport poverty line in the North West (Manchester), £ per week 
 
 
7.7 The poverty line for housing 
 
Rents are included in the ONS data, but it is not differentiated by flat size, which makes it 
inappropriate for the purposes of this chapter. Therefore, rental rates have been gleaned 
from Local Housing Allowance Direct (LHA Direct, 2012). It shows the Housing Benefit (HB) 
rates for different household types in every local authority, and the HB rate is, by virtue of 
its formula, always equal to the local median rent. As in the case of transport, it is not 
possible here to derive a separate poverty line for every town and village in the country, 
which is why the largest city of each region has been selected. The resulting poverty lines 
will therefore have a heavy bias towards larger towns and cities. It will be a collection of 
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‘metropolitan poverty lines’, with housing and transport components that cannot easily be 
extrapolated to the country as a whole. However, this problem could be solved in future 
versions of the CBS by grouping towns and villages into price bands.  
Until recently, HB rates have been set equal to local median rents, which has now been 
changed to rents at the 30th percentile of the local rent distribution. The HB rate is 
therefore sufficient to afford three out of ten flats in each locality without a co-payment. In 
theory, it would be sensible to do the same for the CBS basket. Nevertheless, the rent levels 
chosen here for the CBS basket follow the old rather than the new HB formula: They are 
based on median rents rather than rents at the 30th percentile. The reason for this is as 
follows: The HB price distribution is built on price quotes from local landlords, which are 
differentiated by flat size, but not by whether the flat is furnished, and what bills are 
included. Thus, it cannot be verified whether a flat at the 30th percentile of the distribution 
is really cheaper than a flat at the 50th. It might just be less furnished, and/or cover fewer 
ancillary rental costs, in which case additional allowances would have to be made 
elsewhere in the CBS basket.  
A housing budget equal to the median rent should be sufficient to cover the rent of a flat 
which is at least partly furnished, and where the rent already includes a few bills. As 
mentioned, the ONS price data on rents does not differentiate flats by the number of 
bedrooms, so the figures from this source cannot be used here. Nevertheless, some useful 
information can be derived from the ONS rent data. Firstly, unlike the LHA data, the ONS 
data differentiates between furnished and unfurnished properties. It shows that most flats 
are at least partly furnished, but these are unlikely to be found among the lowest 
percentiles of the rent distribution. At the distribution’s mid-point, however, there is a high 
chance of finding flats that are fully or partly furnished.  
For this reason, median rents have been selected, and the flat has been assumed to be 
partly furnished. No separate allowance has been made for tables, chairs, beds, 
refrigerators, fridge-freezers and washing machines. It has been assumed that the flat is 
partially furnished, but not decorated, so items like rugs have been included in the 
household goods category (see subchapter 7.5). Water rates and the cost of services like 
refuse collection have also been assumed to be included in the rent. The cost of fuel and 
electricity, meanwhile, has been assumed not to be included. A separate allowance for this 
purpose will be added later.  
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The Housing Benefit formula assigns 
 a one-bedroom flat to single adults, and to childless couples 
 a two-bedroom flat to single parents with one child, and to couples with one child 
 a three-bedroom flat to a couple with a son and a daughter (children of the same 
sex are expected to share a bedroom). 
 
This assignment has been adopted for the CBS. For the family of four, the children have 
been assumed to require a separate bedroom each. The results for 2009 are shown below, 
in weekly amounts. To be precise, these figures are the standard HB rates in the respective 
towns as recorded in January 2010, so they capture all rent increases that have taken place 
over the course of the year. A few towns have more than one HB rate per flat type. 
Manchester, for example, has one set of rates for Southern and one for Central Greater 
Manchester. In such cases, preference has been given to the cheaper one, because the 
transport budget is already designed to enable commuting. Nevertheless, the HB rates have 
been taken for the area of the town or city itself, not for suburbs or neighbouring villages. A 
borderline case is Leeds, where the fringes of the city overlap with Bradford and South 
Dales, which have a lower HB rate. The latter has been chosen, because it is still part of the 
same conurbation, and within reach of the transport budget. The least clear-cut case is 
Greater London, which is subdivided into twelve different HB rates. Here, the rate for an 
area which falls mostly into zone 3 of the underground map has been chosen, because the 
season ticket chosen for the transport component still covers all means of transport in this 
zone. The results are shown in Figure 7.14, and since housing is such an important 










Figure 7.18: The housing budget (=the standard rate of Housing Benefit), £ per week 
 
A 95% confidence interval for the national mean rent has been calculated. Two regions are 
above the upper bound, and another two are below the lower bound, of that interval.  
London and Brighton with their very high rent levels account for a disproportionate share of 
the variation. As the figure below shows, these two cities fall outside of the range of a 
standard boxplot. If they were excluded, the spread between the costliest (which would 
then be Southend-on-Sea) and the least costly city would drop from 95% to 57%. While this 
is a much narrower range, it still amounts to almost £4,300 per annum for a family of four.   
The fact that London and Brighton are far apart from the rest of the sample is not 
implausible. It is well known that the UK’s housing cost pressures are strongest in the 
Southeast and London, and the pattern is also mirrored by Demographia’s (2012) data on 











Unfortunately, HB rates are not available for prior years, so the ONS rent figures have been 
used as an auxiliary device. As mentioned, the rent rates from this source cannot be used 
because they are not differentiated by flat size. However, there is no reason why this 
should affect the trend. Therefore, the time trend in rent levels has been calculated 
separately for each region, and then used to track back the rent levels shown in Figure 7.14 
until 1996. This is a second-best solution, HB rates for the whole period would have been 
preferable. But for a prototype measure, it is a close enough approximation.  
The figure below shows the evolution of rents in the Southeast, represented here by 
Brighton. The Southeast, as in the cases above, is a representative region as far as price 
trends are concerned, as it rarely changes its position in regional price rankings. It shows 





Figure 7.20: The housing poverty line (rent levels) in the Southeast (Brighton), £ per week, 
1996-2009 
 
This trend of high rent increases has not been limited to the Southeast. The figure below 
shows the evolution of rent levels in the three most populous regions apart from the 
Southeast, which are London, the North West and the East. The solid lines show how rent 
levels have actually evolved, and the dotted lines show how they would have evolved if 
they had only risen in line with inflation. It shows that the hypothetical evolution has 










Figure 7.21: The housing poverty line in London, the North West, the East and Northern 
Ireland, £ per week, 1996-2009 
 
The poverty line is now nearly finished. It has been assumed that fuel costs are not included 
in the rent, which is why the fuel allowance from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s 
Minimum Income Standard has been adopted for each household type. The last chapter 
has explained that the MIS is, on the whole, a highly problematic measure of poverty, which 
is why it will not be used for any other purposes here. However, determining a fuel budget 
should be a relatively practical matter, for which the MIS should be as good as any other 
specification. The figure has been taken for the year 2008, and then updated and deflated 
by the fuel subcomponent of the CPI.  
After all items have been added up, a discretionary allowance of 5% of the total has been 
added for miscellaneous items and spending inefficiency. With this, the CBS poverty line is 
finished.  
Price variation 
Before its results will be presented in the next chapter, it is necessary to provide an 
additional note on price variation. The previous subchapters have shown that while there is 
a considerable extent of cross-regional variation in price levels, this usually reflects a 
general spread – it is not explained by one or two atypical regions. There are exceptions to 
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this, i.e. there are a few cases where one or two regions are very far apart from the rest. 
But in those cases (e.g. rent levels in London), the outcomes are plausible, and can be 
corroborated by consulting alternative price data sources.  
As far as price variation within categories is concerned, there is, by design, a clear divide 
between the categories. The food and the clothing baskets are highly diversified baskets; 
they contain large numbers of items, and no single item has, on its own, a discernible 
impact on the total cost of the respective sub-basket. For the housing, childcare, social 
participation and transport baskets, the opposite is true: these sub-baskets only contain up 
to three individual items, so each individual price has a strong influence on the total cost of 
its respective sub-basket (indeed, it often is the cost of that sub-basket).  
As a result, these sub-baskets are a lot more sensitive to which precise product is chosen 
and how the price is selected. Fortunately, these are also often the categories for which 
alternative price data sources are available, which decreases the reliance on any one price 
recording mechanism. But these are also the categories for which the PSE is at its vaguest, 
and while the aid of the LCFS can mitigate this problem, it remains a roundabout selection 
mechanism. This problem can ultimately only be overcome by redesigning the PSE, which, 
after all, was not designed for the purpose of being distilled into a consumption basket. The 
final chapter will elaborate on this in detail. For now, suffice it to say that the CBS poverty 











8. The CBS poverty line 
 
8.1 The CBS poverty line net of housing costs 
 
The CBS poverty line is the sum of the different sub-poverty lines discussed in the previous 
chapter. One result that becomes immediately apparent is that housing costs occupy a 
special place in the CBS basket, representing by far the single biggest cost item. It is 
therefore sensible to discuss the poverty line including and excluding housing costs 
separately, because otherwise, there is a danger that housing costs overshadow everything 
else. (Upper and lower bounds are dropped in this part of the discussion.) 
For this purpose, rents have been subtracted from the total poverty line. The total poverty 
line includes a discretionary element of 5% of the total for miscellaneous items and 
spending inefficiency. This element has been left untouched in this subchapter, so housing 
costs have not been entirely removed, as the discretionary part also contains 5% of housing 
costs. The figure below shows the non-housing CBS poverty line for 2009, differentiated by 
household type and region, expressed in £ per week.  




On this basis, a family of four in London would have required a non-housing budget of £370 
per week to afford all consensually established necessities, and to fully participate in 
society. In Northern Ireland, a budget of £279 would have afforded the same standard, so 
there was a spread of 28% between the most expensive region and the least expensive one. 
This drops to 10% if London is excluded. London, as the graph below shows, falls outside of 
the range of a standard box plot.  




A family of four needed about 3.2 times the budget of a single adult, 1.9 times the budget 
of a childless couple, and 30% more than a couple with one child. These implicit 
equivalence scales show some variation across regions, however, due to differences in cost 
structures. They have also changed over time. The figure below shows the evolution of the 
non-housing poverty line in the Southeast since 1996. The Southeast best illustrates this 
time trend because it is the most typical region in this regard: When ranking regions by the 
rate of change, the Southeast occupies a middle position. This time, the figures are 
expressed on an annual basis.  
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Figure 8.3: The annual non-housing CBS poverty line in the Southeast, 1996-2009, in £ 
 
The cost increase has been substantial for all household types. Over the period from 1996 
to 2009 as a whole, the non-housing poverty line has risen almost twice as fast as the 
overall price level. Thus, even though it has been a period of moderate overall inflation, the 
experience of low-earners has been more akin to a high-inflation period.  
The fastest increases occurred since 2000. If the CBS non-housing poverty line had risen 
only in line with the rate of CPI inflation since 2001, then for a family of four in the 
Southeast, the 2009 level would have been almost £1,800 below the level actually 
observed. This is shown in Figure 8.3, which shows the same non-housing CBS poverty line 
for a family of four in the Southeast as in Figure 8.2, and plots it against a hypothetical line 
that rises in line with inflation from 2001 onwards.  
The figure also includes a second simulation, in which the non-housing poverty line rises at 
the same rate as median incomes AHC. In other words, this simulation lets the CBS non-
housing poverty line rise in line with the relative poverty line AHC from 2001 onwards. This 
simulation is closer to the actual outcome than the first simulation. This is remarkable 
insofar as the CBS poverty line is not, in itself, relative. In the short run, the basket is more 
or less constant. The resulting poverty line should therefore behave more like an absolute 
than like a conventional relative poverty line, unless low-earners effectively face a higher 
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rate of inflation than average earners. Figure 8.3 shows that this is precisely what has 
happened.  
Figure 8.4: The evolution of the non-housing poverty line for a family of four in the 
Southeast, actual vs. hypothetical, in £ per year 
 
Finally, it is now possible to compare the non-housing poverty line to median incomes after 
housing costs (AHC). Relative poverty AHC, which measures AHC incomes against a 
threshold of 60% of the AHC median, is a standard variation of relative poverty.  Figure 8.4 
shows the results for a family of two adults with one child in two separate years, 2007 and 
2009. 2009 is the most recent year, but being a recession year, it may not be the most 
representative one. Figures for 2007 are therefore also included. In both cases, the 
denominator is the national AHC median income in the respective year, expressed in prices 
of the respective year. It shows that in all regions except London, the non-housing CBS 
poverty lines for this household type are clustered in a range between 35% and 45% of the 
national AHC median. Three regions are below the lower bound, and three above the upper 
bound, of a 95% confidence interval around the mean. Yet even the highest value, which is 
recorded for London, remains just below 50%, and thus well below the conventional 
relative poverty threshold of 60%. Figures for a single adult household are in a similar 





Figure 8.5: The AHC poverty line in % of the AHC median, 2 adults & 1 child 
 
Figure 8.5 shows the same for a childless couple. For this household type, non-housing 
poverty lines are clustered in a range between 30% and 40% of the AHC median. Figures for 
a family of four, as well as a single parent with one child, are mostly between 40% and 50% 


























Figure 8.6: The AHC poverty line in % of the AHC median, 2 adults without children 
 
The most striking observation is that on an AHC basis, the relative poverty line consistently 
exaggerates the cost of social participation. It is possible to purchase a consumption basket 
which covers all non-housing necessities as defined by the majority of the population, and 
interpreted in a generous way, at a non-housing budget well below 60% of the AHC median. 
This is true for every household type and in every region. Only the London non-housing 
poverty line comes within reach of the relative poverty line AHC, and then only for some 
household types. For most household types in most parts of the country, a non-housing 
budget of about 40% of the national median or less is sufficient to cover the cost of food, 
clothing, transport, regular leisure activities, fuel, household goods, personal services, and 
some miscellaneous items.  
This result is remarkable for at least two reasons. Firstly, AHC measures do not really filter 
out the cost of housing. Via commercial rents, the cost of business premises enters the cost 
of all goods and services which require more than a minimum amount of space. The term 
‘after housing costs’ is arguably a misnomer; a more accurate term would be ‘after direct 
housing costs’. Secondly, on top of the increases that can be explained as a pass-through of 
rising housing costs, there have been substantial increases in the cost of food and especially 












with the non-housing CBS poverty line rising at a rate not much below the growth rate of 
the AHC median income. Yet nevertheless, even after a decade of a fast-growing non-
housing poverty line, the latter remains far below the relative poverty line AHC. This 
suggests that product markets in the UK have been sufficiently competitive to cushion 
some of the adverse developments in other areas, an asset of the UK economy which is 
underappreciated in poverty research.  
 
8.2 The complete CBS poverty line 
 
The figure below shows the complete CBS poverty line for 2009, differentiating by region 
and household type. The data is exactly the same as in Figure 8.1, except that rent, as 
derived in subchapter 7.7, has been added. The poverty line for a family of four is now 
between £400 and £500 per week in all regions except the Southeast and London at the 
high-cost end, and Northern Ireland at the low-cost end. The cost of the full CBS basket 
climbs to £560 for the Southeast, and £660 for London.  




The poverty lines of eight regions are within a 95% confidence interval around the national 
mean, with two regions above the upper and two regions below the lower bound. London 
falls outside of the range of a boxplot, while the other regions are contained within it.  
Figure 8.8: Boxplot for the regional variation of CBS poverty lines, 2009 
 
 
The table below shows the implicit equivalence scale that can be calculated from this, even 
though a note of caution is required: This equivalence scale varies a lot across the country, 
as the underlying cost structure varies a lot, leading to substantial differences in the extent 
of economies of scale in household consumption. Since the cost structure varies over time, 
so does the implicit equivalence scale. Nevertheless, the scale is interesting because it 
differs a lot from conventional scales, two of which are included for comparison. Since 
housing costs occupy such a large proportion of the poverty line, and since a childless 
couple has been assumed to share a bedroom, a single adult needs as much as 77% of the 
budget of a childless couple to attain the same standard. The economies of scale that result 
from two adults moving together are therefore much larger than conventional equivalence 
scales imply. Meanwhile, the economies of scale associated with adding children to the 
household are much smaller. This is because children have been assumed to require an 
additional bedroom, and also because of childcare costs being relatively high, despite the 
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subsidy contained in the Working Tax Credit. To a lesser extent, it is also an artefact of the 
rather arbitrary assumption that children require the same leisure activity budget as their 
parents (see subchapter 7.5).  
Table 8.1: The implicit equivalence scale of the CBS (2009, unweighted average of all 
regions) 
Household member Equivalence value 
CBS 
(implicit) 
McClements OECD modified 
First adult 0.77 0.61 0.67 
Second adult 0.23 0.39 0.33 
First child 0.39 0.18 – 0.27 0.2 – 0.33 
Second child 0.36 0.18 – 0.27 0.2 – 0.33 
 
The figure below shows the evolution of the CBS poverty line for different household types 
in the Southeast. Poverty lines for all household types have increased by about two thirds, 
which means that the implicit equivalence scale has remained relatively constant, at least in 
this region.   
 
Figure 8.9: The annual CBS poverty line in the Southeast, 1996-2009, in £ 
 
The graph below puts these figures into perspective. As in the above subchapters, it shows 
the evolution of the actual poverty line for a family of four in the Southeast, and contrasts it 
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to two hypothetical scenarios. In the first scenario, the CBS poverty line grows only in line 
with inflation from 2001 on. In the second scenario, it grows in line with median incomes, 
and thus the relative poverty line. The actual outcome ends up in between these two 
scenarios, but closer to the latter than to the former. Neither the rate of growth in the 
relative poverty line nor the rate of growth in the CPI track the evolution of the CBS poverty 
line especially well, which is, of course, unsurprising given that they are driven by entirely 
different factors.  
 
Figure 8.10: The evolution of the non-housing poverty line for a family of four in the 
Southeast, actual vs. hypothetical, in £ per year 
 
The Southeast is fairly representative trend-wise, but the trend in the CBS poverty line has 
shown a lot of variation across regions. This is shown in the figure below, which contrasts 
four patterns. London has experienced the most explosive growth, with the CBS poverty 
line almost doubling in nominal terms. The West Midlands represent the opposite extreme 
with an increase of 40%, the lowest of all regions. But given that the CPI has only grown by 
a quarter in the meantime, this still represents a substantial increase in real terms. The 
North West shows a more typical pattern, and the East, while not in the same league as 




Figure 8.11: The evolution of CBR poverty lines for a family of four in four regions, in £ per 
year 
 
It is now possible to express the poverty rates of various household types as a percentage 
of the national median, to compare them to relative thresholds. The figure below shows 
this for a couple with one child.  
The contrast with the outcomes net of housing costs is stark. While non-housing CBS 
poverty lines were substantially below the relative poverty line AHC, almost all CBS poverty 
lines with housing costs are above the relative poverty line BHC. The CBS of most regions is 
between 60% and 70% of the national median. The most extreme case is London, where it 















Figure 8.12: The CBS poverty line in % of the median, 2 adults & 1 child 
 
Figures for a family of four are even higher, with most regions clustering around 70% of the 
national median. In London, the cost of the CBS basket for a family of four is about equal to 
the national median income (equivalised to a family of four). Figures for a single adult and a 
single parent with one child are similar. It is only for the two-adult household that the CBS 
poverty line of most regions is lower than 60% of the national median (shown below), but 
even then, not by very much. 




Location and choice 
 
CBS poverty lines differ across household types and over time, but London consistently 
comes out as the region with by far the highest poverty lines. This raises the question to 
what extent location ought to be treated as a (constrained) choice, rather than an 
exogenous variable. In the above subchapters, only relocations within a commutable 
distance have been treated as within the control of the individual, while the possibility of 
movements beyond those boundaries has not been considered. Thus, a household with an 
expenditure level just above the London poverty line, and living in central London, would 
not be considered poor. This is despite the fact that rent levels in central London vastly 
exceed the housing cost allowance in the CBS, meaning that this household’s non-housing 
expenditure would almost certainly be below the non-housing CBS poverty line. But they 
would not be considered poor because their decision to live in central London would be 
treated as a choice, not a constraint. Should this logic be taken further? Why assume that 
people can move freely within London, but not out of London?  
 
The borderline between choice and constraint is, in this case, a fairly arbitrary one. Ideally, 
this issue should be addressed through the PSE survey itself: Participants could be explicitly 
asked how much mobility can be reasonably expected from a family faced with cost 
pressures, and to what extent staying geographically close to one’s neighbourhood could 
itself be considered a necessity. No such data currently exists. But the ‘commutable 
distance’ criterion used in this thesis can nevertheless be justified on other grounds: 
 
If location was treated as a choice over which families have full control, there would be a 
high risk of repeating one of the major fallacies of the historical Rowntree-style BSA. The 
original BSA overestimated the extent to which people have autonomous control over their 
spending habits, ignoring the influence of factors like social conventions. As explained in 
Chapter 2, the BSA therefore assumed a consumption pattern that was rarely adhered to in 
the real world. It was far removed from the choices people actually made, and instead 
reflected the choices social scientists thought they should make. Treating location purely as 
a matter of choice would lead to a similar result. Whatever the theoretical reasons why one 
might expect population movements away from London, motivated by the rent price 
escalation, it is important to note that this simply does not happen. Between 2001 and 
2013, London’s population has increased by 13.5%, the largest increase recorded anywhere 
in the UK (ONS, 2013). As shown above, this has happened against the backdrop of an 
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escalation of rent levels and house prices in London, both in absolute terms and relative to 
other parts of the country. Movements occur between London boroughs, and immigration 
from outside of the UK is a large confounding factor, but there is clearly no exodus from 
London to other British cities. A CBS which underestimates poverty by overestimating 
mobility would be self-defeating. The assumption that people can move freely between 
London boroughs, but not outwards across the municipal border, may seem arbitrary 
indeed. But it is quite consistent with the population movements recorded by the census.  
 
8.3 Correlations within the CBS poverty line 
 
CBS poverty is mostly driven by the cost of living, or more precisely, the cost of the basic 
essentials. The table below shows the share of the five largest items in the poverty lines of 
the UK’s five most populous regions. The single most important factor driving the CBS 
poverty line is rent levels, followed by the cost of food, with social activities, childcare and 
transport also occupying major shares. As documented above, there have been sustained 
above-inflation increases in the cost of each of these items. If relative and absolute poverty 
lines were replaced by a CBS poverty line, it would completely reorient the focus of poverty 
research. It would reorient it towards the determinants of the cost of the basic essentials, a 
topic which contemporary studies on the determinants of poverty rates (see Chapter 4) do 
not focus on at all.   
Table 8.2: The composition of the poverty line for a family of four, 2009 
 Southeast London North West East West Midlands 
Rent 44% 44% 31% 38% 30% 
Food 17% 14% 21% 19% 21% 
Social Participation 11% 10% 10% 11% 12% 
Childcare 9% 10% 10% 10% 11% 
Transport 4% 10% 11% 6% 10% 
 
Not all of these components are independent of each other. The figure below plots the cost 
of the leisure service component against rent levels, in order to get a first impression of the 
extent to which regional differences in the former are explained by differences in the cost 
of space. This is not an exact comparison because the horizontal axis shows private rents, 
not commercial rents, which are not available in the same format. But if the former is a 
reasonable proxy for the latter, then the cost of leisure activities is driven by the same 
factors which also drive housing costs.  
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Figure 8.14: Rents vs. cost of leisure activities, 2009, £ per week 
 
The cost of childcare is also positively correlated to rent levels, as shown in the figure 
below, even though this case is much less clear-cut. A number of regions have almost 












Figure 8.15: Rents vs. cost of childcare, 2009, £ per week 
 
 
Rent has been found to be positively correlated with most other sub-poverty lines as well, 
but for all the other components, the correlation has not been statistically significant at the 
5%-level. Still, the non-housing CBS discussed in subchapter 8.1 as a whole is positively and 
significantly correlated with the one component it excludes – rents –, even though the 














Figure 8.16: Rents vs. CBS poverty line excluding rents, 2009, £ per week 
 
 
The table below shows the correlations that have been shown to be statistically significant 
at (at least) the 5%-level.  
 
Table 8.3 Correlation matrix of selected CBS subcomponents 
 Rent Social 
participation 
Childcare Non-housing  
CBS  
poverty line 
Rent 1 0.87 0.78 0.63 
Social participation  1 0.74 0.75 
Childcare   1 0.76 
Non-housing CBS  
poverty line 
   1 
 
 
The short summary is that rent is not just the CBS basket’s largest component in in its own 
right, it is also positively correlated with at least two other large components. There are 
good reasons to suspect causality rather than just correlation behind this: The cost of 
commercial space is, after all, an important component of business costs in the leisure 
industry and the childcare sector.  
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To summarise: The total cost of the non-housing essentials in the CBS basket is well below 
60% of the AHC median, in all regions and for all household types. This is remarkable 
because many of these items have experienced cost increases well above inflation in recent 
years. However, once housing costs are added to the CBS poverty line, it exceeds 60% of 
the median in almost all regions for most household types. If the most important 
implication had to be distilled into one sentence, it would have to be: The problem in the 
UK is not that incomes at the lower end are too low, but that housing costs are too high. 
This is currently not reflected in either poverty research or the wider poverty debate.  
 
8.4 Is CBS poverty greater than relative and quasi-absolute 
poverty? 
 
In most regions and in for most household types, the CBS poverty line is above the relative 
poverty line, and it is well above the quasi-absolute poverty line. But this does not mean 
that CBS poverty is greater than relative or even quasi-absolute poverty. If the relative 
poverty line was replaced by the CBS poverty line, and everything else remained constant, 
then poverty rates would indeed increase. But this thesis has argued for an overhaul of 
poverty measurement as a whole, not just for changing one element in it. The relative 
poverty line should be replaced by the CBS, but the overhaul of poverty measurement 
should not stop here. The way in which living standards are measured for purposes of 
poverty measurement should also be changed. For the reasons explained in Chapter 3, 
income should be replaced by expenditure – not ‘expenditure’ in the sense of mere cash 
expenses, but expenditure augmented by information on debt, savings and consumption, 
so that it comes closer to a measure of net worth. It would include cash expenses, but it 
would subtract both savings and debt repayments from them, and where applicable, it 
would add an estimate of the imputed income stream generated by home ownership. For 
social housing tenants, the implicit rent subsidy of this tenure would also be added. Thus, 
the CBS poverty rate would not be the share of households who report to earn less than the 
CBS poverty line, but who report to consume less than the CBS poverty line. In the context 
of the results discussed above, this has important implications: 
 In high-rent areas, Housing Benefit rates are also higher, and more people qualify 
for this payment. In London, 25.5% of all households receive Housing Benefit, and 
average payments are much higher than elsewhere in the country (DWP, 2012). In 
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theory, income statistics should already account for this, but as subchapter 3.8 has 
shown, Housing Benefit is one of those payments for which underreporting is 
particularly pronounced. A switch from income to expenditure statistics would 
capture a greater share of the underreported benefit income that is associated with 
higher housing costs in high-rent areas. This would tend to lower poverty rates in 
those areas.    
 The measure of expenditure suggested here would add the imputed consumption 
stream derived from homeownership to homeowners’ expenses. An estimate of 
imputed consumption for homeowners is already available from Brewer and O’Dea 
(2012), albeit only on a highly aggregated level. In this paper, homeowners are 
essentially assumed to ‘rent their house from themselves’. If such a measure were 
adopted as a proxy for living standards, the situation of homeowners who have 
already repaid their mortgage would appear more favourable, especially if they live 
in an area where house prices and rents have surged after they bought their house. 
If house prices showed no systematic trend over time, this distinction would not 
matter a lot, because renting and buying a dwelling would then merely be different 
ways of spreading consumption over time. But house prices in the UK have clearly 
shown a systematic upward trend over time (more on which in the next chapter).  
 The previous chapter has suggested that the monetary equivalent of implicit 
subsidies should be added to expenses. In many areas of in-kind provision, this is 
not feasible, but it is not a large problem for near-market equivalents. Social 
housing is the most important example. It is a near-market equivalent for private 
rented accommodation, so the difference between social housing rates and 
comparable market rents in each area should be added to the expenditure of social 
renters. This would also increase recorded living standards of social renters in high-
rent areas. Within the current approach of poverty measurement, this would not 
be sensible: Social renters in Inner London would suddenly end up in the higher 
income deciles just because market rents in their boroughs are so high. But in the 
framework of CBS poverty measurement, this is not a problem: The fact that these 
households are also faced with much higher living costs is already contained in the 
local poverty line.  
 
In short, while a replacement of the relative poverty line by the CBS poverty line would 
produce higher poverty rates when done in isolation, the impact of introducing the whole 
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package proposed here is ambiguous. This thesis makes the case for replacing the relative 
(and the absolute) poverty line with the CBS, while also replacing income measures by a 
broadly defined measure of expenditure.  The latter, in isolation, would produce lower 
poverty rates. It would account for a larger share of underreported benefits; it would 
augment the recorded living standards of homeowners by imputed housing consumption, 
and it would augment the recorded living standards of social renters by the monetary 
equivalent of the implicit rent subsidy they receive. Thus, the introduction of the whole 
package would mean that higher recorded living standards would be benchmarked against 
a generally higher poverty line, with the overall impact being indeterminate.  
It now becomes clear why the two large components of the package – the change in the 
way the poverty line is set, and the change in the way living standards are approximated – 
are not two isolated components which just happen to be compatible. They reinforce each 
other.   
Replacing income with expenditure plus imputed housing consumption would not be 
feasible within an approach to poverty measurement that cannot account for regional 
differences in living costs. If it was implemented without a change in the way the poverty 
line is set, it would produce absurd outcomes: Poverty would drop sharply in the high-cost 
areas, because the added monetary equivalent of implicit rent subsidies would be very 
high. But be at the same time, replacing the relative poverty line with a CBS poverty line 
would not be sensible within the current approach to measuring living standards. While 
current poverty measures cannot account for the cost of living at all, the CBS poverty line 
would do the opposite extreme if applied to income statistics:  It would ‘overaccount’ for 
differences in the cost of living. It would disregard the fact that in the high-cost areas, not 
everybody is exposed to these high costs to the same extent.  
For most components of the CBS poverty line, this is not a problem. Consumption of food 
and clothing is universal. Consumption of transport and childcare services will be more 
varied, and the budget designated for these purposes will not apply to every household – 
but this is the kind of variation by individual circumstances that no approach to poverty 
measurement can account for. Cyclists who do not use public transport will not need the 
transport budget, and parents who can rely on their extended families for childcare will not 
need the childcare budget; but in devising the budget, favourable individual circumstances 
must be assumed away. The CBS is not a worst-case-budget, but it is a prepared-for-the-
269 
 
eventuality budget. It will often be overly pessimistic, but this is inevitable as no poverty 
measure can account for individual circumstances, and the CBS errs on the side of caution.  
In the housing component, however, there are systematic reasons why the rent budget in 
the CBS will overestimate the housing cost needs of many families, and since the rent 
budget represents such a large component of the poverty line, CBS poverty measurement 
will be sensitive to this. When applying the CBS poverty line, it is therefore also necessary 
to account for systematic variation in housing circumstances, and the 
expenditure/consumption measure proposed here does that.  
To use an example from the above results: For some household types, the CBS poverty line 
for London is about equal to the (equivalised) national median income. If applied to current 
income statistics, this would produce a regional poverty rate for London of over 40% 
(author’s calculation, based on data from DWP & ONS, 2012). Incomes in London are higher 
than in all other regions of the country except the Southeast (Phillips, 2008), but the higher 
incomes in London do not generally compensate for the higher cost of living. This is 
precisely what a CBS poverty measure should detect – but only to the extent that this really 
leads to lower living standards in London. If applied to current income data, the CBS 
poverty line would overestimate poverty in London (and to a lesser extent in other high-
rent areas) because it would assume that everybody was either a private renter, or a 
mortgage payer faced with similar expenses. Yet for social housing residents, or 
homeowners who bought their house before local property prices exploded, this budget 
greatly overstates their housing needs. The expenditure/consumption measure proposed 
here can take account of this. This is why the change in poverty measurement ought to be 
comprehensive. The CBS should replace the absolute and the relative poverty line, and the 
income measure should be replaced by an expenditure/consumption measure. These are 
not isolated proposals, but proposals which reinforce, and indeed almost require one 
another. This is how, finally, the arguments presented in Chapter 3 merge with the 
arguments presented in Chapter 7.  
 
8.5 Who are the poor? 
 
As mentioned, data on expenditure augmented by imputed housing income is currently 
only available as a national aggregate, and data on expenditure augmented by implicit rent 
subsidies is not currently available at all. It is therefore not possible to show actual poverty 
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rates for the approach proposed here. But it is not really necessary at this stage either, 
because the most important information contained in a poverty indicator is not the rate. It 
is the risk group analysis and the identification of the drivers of poverty. With the 
information that is currently available, a few general statements about these factors can 
already be made. This can be done by combining the insights from the literature on 
expenditure and consumption poverty (Chapter 3) with the results for the CBS poverty lines 
presented above.  
Work status 
First of all, expenditure-based and consumption-based measures of living standards show a 
much closer relationship between labour market attachment and living standards than 
income-based measures. Even after controlling for income, those in paid employment 
display higher living standards than those not in paid employment on virtually every 
measure. They show higher levels of expenditure, lower rates of material deprivation, 
higher levels of financial asset wealth, a lower food budget share, higher ownership rates of 
consumer durables, lower levels of debt, a lower incidence of arrears, higher standards of 
housing etc. (Brewer et al, 2009, pp. 86-111).This remains true even when the self-
employed are filtered out. The risk of relative poverty is also negatively associated with 
work status, but the relationship is much weaker, and more erratic, than for measures of 
expenditure/consumption. Income-based and expenditure/consumption-based measures 
do not fundamentally contradict each other in this regard; the difference between their 
findings is a matter of degree. But it is a large difference of degree. A likely explanation for 
this is the fact that, as shown in subchapter 3.8, the underreporting of transfer income 
tends to be more pronounced for in-work benefits than for out-of work benefits.  
This difference in risk factor analysis has important implications. The weak relationship 
between work and income is, in all likelihood, an artefact of the income statistics. The 
current approach to poverty measurement exaggerates the relative risk of in-work poverty, 




Another difference between income-based and expenditure/consumption-based measures 
is that the latter identify single parenthood as a poverty risk factor, while the former do 
not, or only to a minor degree (Brewer et al, 2009). It is not clear whether this is really a 
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function of income-based measurement per se, or whether it has a more simple 
explanation, e.g. it might be an idiosyncrasy of the equivalence scale. If the latter, the issue 
could also be resolved within the current approach, but either way, the change in poverty 
measurement proposed here would emphasise the poverty risk of this household type 
more strongly than the status quo. This is exacerbated by the fact that the CBS poverty line 
for a single adult with one child, for example, is higher than the CBS poverty line for a 
childless couple. Under the current approach, the opposite is true. Thus, both the change in 
the poverty line and the change in the measurement of living standards would work in the 
same direction to emphasise the poverty risk of this household type more strongly. The 
policy implications, however, are much less clear in this case.  
 
Housing situation and geography 
 
The poverty risk of private renters who do not qualify for Housing Benefit would definitely 
increase under the poverty measurement proposed here, and in all likelihood, this would 
be the case in all regions. The reason is simply that the CBS poverty line accounts very 
directly for rent levels, and real-term rent levels have increased in all UK regions over the 
period examined above. The current approach cannot remotely account for this; even the 
distinction between relative poverty BHC and AHC is inadequate for this purpose.  
 
The situation of private renters who do receive Housing Benefit and social renters (with or 
without access to Housing Benefit) is somewhat more ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
underreporting of Housing Benefit would play less of a role, as expenditure measures 
indirectly capture this transfer. The difference between market rents and social rents would 
also be added to the expenditure of social tenants, as implicit subsidies would be treated as 
if they were explicit subsidies. These two techniques would increase the recorded living 
standards of Housing Benefit recipients and social housing tenants. But at the same time, 
their living standards would now be directly benchmarked against market rent levels, which 
have been shown to be very high in all regions. These changes work against each other, and 
their net effect is ambiguous.  At least in the very high-rent areas, though, it is probably 
safe to say that poverty rates under the new approach would be higher than under the 
status quo. In these areas, the difference between the regional CBS poverty lines and the 
current national poverty line is so large that it is simply implausible that a change on the 
other side of the equation (living standards) could cancel this out.  
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8.6 Policy implications 
 
Chapter 4 has shown that studies on absolute living standards emphasise economic growth, 
while studies on relative poverty emphasise income redistribution. But the role of product 
market structure and relative prices is not really part of poverty research. This is also true 
for poverty research in the UK, which is wholly focussed on social policy instruments, 
especially income transfers and social programmes, while entirely ignoring product markets 
(see Hills et al, 2009, for an overview).  
But the findings of this and the previous chapter suggest that at least for the UK, this is the 
wrong focus. The high cost of living, not low incomes, is the primary constraint on low-
earners living standards. None of this would be especially relevant if these high costs of 
living were the result of factors outside of policymakers’ control, but this is emphatically 
not the case. There is a vast amount of econometric literature which conclusively 
establishes that housing costs are largely determined by the degree to which the land use 
planning system restricts residential development (Brueckner, 1990; Pollakowski & 
Wachter, 1990; Malpezzi, 1996; Glaeser & Gyourko, 2003; Chi-man Hui & Sze-mun Ho, 
2003; Anthony, 2003; Glaeser et al, 2005; Saks, 2005; Andrews et al, 2011; Glaeser et al, 
2005a; Hilber & Vermeulen, 2010; Cox, 2011).  
Demographia (2011 and 2012) shows that as a historical long-term average, the ratio of 
regional median house prices to regional median annual incomes (the ‘median multiple’) 
used to cluster between values of 2.0 and 3.0 in English-speaking countries.   
The graph below shows a back-of-the envelope simulation of what would happen to the 
CBS poverty line if median multiples (MMs) in all UK regions were to revert to a level of 2.9, 
while holding the ratio of rent levels to house prices constant. The CBS poverty line for a 
couple with one child would then fall below 60% of the national equivalised median income 
in every region except London. This is remarkable because it would still be a ‘metropolitan 










Raising housing costs is not the only effect of land use planning restrictions. Cheshire et al 
(2011) have shown that the planning system also depresses productivity in the retail sector, 
as an example of a space-intensive industry. Presumably, the same mechanism is at work in 
other industries that require more than a minimum amount of business space.  
There are many other policy options to decrease to CBS poverty line. The net effect of the 
European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is to raise food prices in the EU by between 
one tenth and one fifth, the exact figure differing from year to year (OECD.StatExtracts, 
2012a). The distortive effects of the instruments the CAP comprises have long been 
theoretically and empirically well-established, and there is a broad agreement in the 
literature that a removal of such measures would lead to a net welfare gain (e.g. Thies and 
Porche, 2007; Anderson et al, 2006; Hoekman et al, 2004). This is corroborated by 
international evidence from countries which have abolished CAP-style instruments (see 
Evans et al, 1996; Kalaitzandonakes, 1994; Sandrey & Scobie, 1994).  
Current energy policies also have a major impact on gas and electricity prices for 











2012). It is well-established that the aim of these policies – reducing CO2 emissions – could 
be achieved in much more efficient ways, such as a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system 
(Frondel et al, 2009; Nordhaus, 2007).  
 
In short, policymakers have a very high degree of control over many determinants of the 
level of the CBS poverty line. This does not mean that there is a simple or uncontroversial 
way of tackling CBS poverty. But it does mean that poverty research should at least pay 
attention to systematic, politically malleable drivers of the basic cost of living. At the 
moment, these issues are not even part of the research agenda, which evolves exclusively 




For most household types and in most regions, the cost of a consensually established 
basket of non-housing necessities is between 35% and 50% of the median after housing 
costs, even though there is a lot of variation across regions and between household types. 
Yet it is safe to say that the relative poverty line AHC greatly overstates the amount of 
resources that households need to stay out of poverty in modern Britain. However, as soon 
as housing costs are added, the cost of this consensual basket of necessities jumps to 
between 50% and 80% for most regions and most household types.  There is now an even 
greater amount of variation across regions and household types, but in general, the relative 
poverty line BHC now underestimates the cost of being fully included in society, at least for 
those who are faced with the full cost.  
This does not mean that relative poverty measures underestimate the true extent of 
poverty. The total cost of attaining full social participation is higher than the relative 
poverty line in most regions, but at the same time, income measures do not take account of 
important determinants of living standards. Income from Housing Benefit is, to a large 
extent, underreported, and in high-rent areas, this can represent a substantial proportion 
of income. Social housing residents are, to some extent, shielded from developments in the 
housing market. And finally, housing costs in the UK have not always been this high. Those 
who have bought a house before the surge in house prices started may have expenses 
below the CBS poverty line, but presumably much higher living standards than those on 
similar incomes who are faced with current rent/mortgage rates. This is why a 
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simultaneous change in the poverty line and the measurement of living standards has been 
proposed here.  
The rate of CBS poverty may be higher or lower than the relative rate, but the most 
important information that a poverty measure reveals is not the rate. CBS poverty would 
have completely different drivers. Its most important determinant would be the cost of 
housing, followed by other aspects of the cost of living, part of which is itself correlated to 
housing costs.  
One would therefore expect the determinants of the cost of housing, alongside with the 
determinants of the cost of other CBS elements, to be an essential part of poverty research. 
Yet it is not part of poverty research at all. Poverty research in the UK is wholly focussed on 
social policy instruments, especially income transfers and social programmes (see Hills et al, 
2009). The determinants of the cost of living are ignored.  
The findings of this and the previous chapter suggest that at least for the UK, this is entirely 
the wrong focus. If the aim is to find cost-effective anti-poverty solutions, poverty research 













9. Conclusions and outlook 
 
9.1 What this thesis has tried to achieve 
 
This thesis has made the case for measuring poverty in a different way, and for addressing 
it in a different way as well.  
It has begun by demonstrating, in Chapter 1, how crucial the role of poverty measurement 
is for poverty research. The choice of the poverty indicator is not a technical detail; it is not 
a question comparable to the choice of the equivalence scale or the purchasing power 
conversion formula. Rather, it is by far the most important decision in a poverty study, 
because the study’s outcomes are not just sensitive to this choice, they are virtually 
determined by it. This has been shown by reviewing a number of studies which apply two 
or more poverty measures to the same population, and compare the results. Whether 
these are micro-level studies on poverty risk groups and risk factors, or macro-level studies 
on time trends, it is a consistent finding that different measures produce different 
outcomes. This is seldom reflected in the poverty debate, where poverty measures are 
often treated as if they were close substitutes for one another.  
While Chapter 1 has concentrated on statistical properties of different indicators, Chapter 2 
has concentrated on the ideas they (attempt to) embody. More precisely, it has 
documented the history of poverty research in the UK, highlighting the interplay of theory 
and measurement at different times. Poverty research has started with a theory of poverty 
as impeded physical functioning. In this theory, poverty can be defined in an objective and 
universal way, because ‘needs’ are seen as physically and biologically determined. This 
theory found its expression in the Budget Standard Approach (BSA), a poverty measure in 
which the poverty line is defined as the cost of a basket of goods and services necessary for 
physical functioning. BSA studies blossomed in the interwar period, but came to an abrupt 
end in the early 1950s, when poverty in this most basic sense was about to disappear. Yet 
in retrospect, poverty researchers discovered serious flaws in the BSA methodology, which 
cast doubt on the then dominant interpretation that poverty had been eradicated and was 
now an issue of the past. Peter Townsend and others pointed out that poor people’s actual 
consumption patterns had very little in common with the ascetic, extremely economical 
pattern implied in the BSA baskets. They did not just argue that the BSA baskets assumed 
277 
 
an unrealistically high level of spending efficiency; they also questioned the whole notion of 
‘needs’ as being universal and biologically/physically determined. ‘Needs’, they argued, 
were primarily socially determined, and to a large extent, spending was determined by the 
need for social inclusion. The cost of social inclusion, in turn, was seen as linked to overall 
living standards, and assumed to rise with them. Eventually, this rethinking of poverty lead 
to the adoption of relative measures, with the poverty line set as a fixed fraction of average 
incomes. This redefinition would have far-reaching consequences later on. From 1983 
onwards, relative poverty exploded, giving rise to a particular ‘poverty narrative’.   
This narrative was a product of the new relative measure which had emerged in the 
meantime. It could not have arisen if Rowntree’s approach of simply making the BSA 
baskets a bit more generous from survey to survey had been continued. Chapter 3 has 
documented how the living standards of the least well-off have evolved over recent 
decades, with most measures showing unspectacular but steady improvements. Yet the 
more important finding of Chapter 3 is that while low-earners’ living standards have 
improved on the whole, there have also been retrograde steps in some important 
dimensions. These appeared to have more to do with changes in relative prices rather than 
incomes per se, and they are not detected by current poverty measures. In addition, 
Chapter 3 has shown that in the lower percentiles of the distribution, incomes are no longer 
a reliable guide to living standards. Underreporting of transfers, combined with increased 
income volatility, has undermined the reliability of these data. Expenditure data have been 
shown to be a better guide, since they are more closely correlated with other, more direct 
measures of living standards. They are also simply more plausible: There are more than a 
million people with reported incomes close to zero, while for expenditure, there is a clear 
lower bound. On the whole, Chapter 3 demonstrates how little current poverty measures 
reveal about the actual underlying living standards. It has compiled a profile of what the 
lives of the least well-off in modern Britain look like, and the fact that a dissertation on 
poverty requires a separate chapter to document this can itself be seen as an indictment of 
modern poverty research. Ideally, poverty measures should already contain information 
about this. If they did, it would not be necessary to discuss poverty rates and living 
standards in separate chapters.  
Chapter 4 has continued with a discussion of the macroeconomic policy implications 
resulting from studies which use different poverty measures. Given how these measures 
are mathematically constructed, it is obvious that they respond to different factors. But the 
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important question is whether this also causes them to produce systematically different 
policy conclusions in practice, and if so, the even more important question is whether these 
policy conclusions can be in conflict with one another. Chapter 4 has argued that the 
answer to both questions is yes – but problematically, studies on relative poverty do not 
point this out. Studies on absolute living standards at the lower end acknowledge that the 
policies they recommend would not necessarily lead to a more equitable income 
distribution. Studies on relative poverty either do not address the question, or if they do, 
they dismiss the possibility of adverse impacts on absolute living standards. In the country 
samples which these studies typically cover, a trade-off is indeed not recognisable. But 
Chapter 4 proceeded to integrate the studies on the determinants of relative poverty into 
the wider economic literature on the relationship between taxation, government 
expenditure and overall economic performance. It showed that ‘absence of evidence’ is not 
the same as ‘evidence of absence’: The weight of the economic literature suggests that 
beyond a certain level, redistributive taxation has adverse effects on economic 
performance. Chapter 4 went on to discuss the particularities of the Scandinavian 
economies, because this is a region which occupies a special place in the poverty literature. 
Chapter 4 did not question the empirical findings of the studies on the determinants of 
relative poverty, but interpreted these findings in a very different way. The experience of 
the Scandinavian countries does not ‘refute’ the findings of ‘orthodox’ economic models. 
Instead, these countries compensate for their high tax levels through exceptionally good 
performance on almost every other determinant of economic competitiveness, while also 
representing a cultural environment that is uniquely suited to cope with high levels of 
redistributive taxation. Nevertheless, even in Scandinavia, adverse effects can be 
recognised in within-country time series studies.  
The bottom line of Chapter 4 was that there are trade-offs in anti-poverty policies. If these 
policies come at a cost, poverty indicators have to fulfil higher quality standards. The 
‘burden of proof’ that the side-effects are justified is on them. Chapter 5 therefore 
enquired whether relative measures really are plausible and robust measures of poverty. 
The chapter began with a critique of previous studies which had dismissed relative poverty, 
rather than engage with the concept. It then went back to the origin of the concept, and 
showed that the connection between theory and measurement is not as straightforward as 
the poverty literature implies. There was never a one-way street leading from the new 
understanding of poverty to the adoption of relative measures. Rather, in adopting relative 
measures, poverty research has taken a leap of faith. From the rather general insight that 
279 
 
needs are context-specific rather than universal, and (at least) as much about social 
inclusion as about physical functioning, it did not automatically follow that the poverty line 
had to be a fixed fraction of median incomes. And yet at some point, relative poverty 
figures developed a life of their own, and their synonymity with the broader idea was just 
taken as a given. This has been shown to be problematic, because there is nothing special 
about the contemporary national median as a reference point. It is an arbitrary convention 
which has developed a path-dependency, and yet, the outcomes of relative poverty studies 
are highly sensitive to this specification. Chapter 5 experimented with a few variations of 
relative poverty, and showed that plausible changes which remain entirely within the 
relative approach can completely overturn the findings. Substituting a regional or 
supranational median for the national one, adopting a notion of ‘intertemporal relativity’, 
changing the elasticity of the poverty line with regard to median incomes – each of these 
variations has a profound effect on the results. At the same time, relative measures do not 
even measure relative living standards. They fail to capture many important factors that 
affect low-earners’ living standards in both relative and absolute terms. In particular, they 
are completely blind to developments in the product markets. They study one blade of the 
scissors in isolation, ignoring the structure of relative prices, or the availability of market 
segments tailored to low-earners’ budgets. Relative measures are neither robust, nor 
comprehensive, nor plausible. 
Unfortunately, as Chapter 6 went on to show, the same is true for quasi-absolute measures. 
Material deprivation measures, while an improvement, suffer from other shortcomings, 
and simply packaging all measures together is not a solution either: It would only be a 
solution if their flaws cancelled each other out, or at least, if they complemented one 
another in a sensible way. Chapter 6 then turned the critique into a positive agenda. It 
changed the focus from ‘This is why current poverty measures are flawed’ to ‘This is what a 
poverty measure would have to be like to avoid these flaws’. It documented two interesting 
concepts which avoid some of the flaws of current measures: consensual material 
deprivation, and qualitative (focus group discussion-based) consensual budget standards. 
Neither of the two approaches was in itself a convincing alternative, but Chapter 6 showed 
how their strengths and weaknesses were complementary. It went on to blend the strong 
aspects of both approaches into a new one, resulting in a quantitative consensual budget 
standard. The CBS benefits from the fact that large-scale surveys (as opposed to focus 
group discussions) on what constitutes ‘necessities’ show a robust consensus, which 
displays no major systematic variation across regions or subgroups. A CBS should convert 
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this consensus into a tangible basket. The resulting measure is not ‘relative’ or ‘absolute’. It 
is context-specific. It shows the cost of attaining consensually identified necessities.  
Chapter 7 went on to do construct the corresponding basket, with price data gathered from 
a variety of sources. Many of the findings produced in this way complemented information 
from Chapter 3. The fact that food budgets rose again from the mid-2000s on, that clothing 
budgets fell, that fuel poverty increased, and above all, the repeated finding that housing 
costs had become a much larger strain for low-earners – all of this was fully compatible 
with the way in which the relevant sub-poverty lines evolved. The way in which the sub-
poverty lines in Chapter 7 marry up with the living standard measures in Chapter 3 could be 
an idiosyncrasy of this period, but it also be a validation of the CBS method. It could be an 
indication that the CBS really does capture the product market developments which affect 
low-earners.  
Chapter 8 went on to present the resulting CBS poverty lines, which are available separately 
for each household type and each region. The most salient finding was this: Before housing 
expenses were added, the CBS poverty line was far below the relative poverty line AHC, and 
this was true for every household type and every region. However, as soon as housing costs 
were added, the CBS poverty lines jumped to levels above the relative poverty line BHC for 
most household types and in most regions. This simply shows that high housing costs are a 
more pressing problem than low incomes as such. The figures have to be interpreted in 
context, however. One key proposal advanced in this thesis is that relative and absolute 
poverty lines should be replaced by the CBS poverty line. The other key proposal is that 
income should be replaced by expenditure/consumption as a proxy for living standards. The 
first proposal produces a (generally) higher poverty line, the latter proposal produces 
(generally) higher recorded living standards. The underreporting of transfer income, most 
forms of consumption smoothing, and the value of benefits in kind, are better accounted 
for by expenditure/consumption data than income data. It is therefore not clear whether 
the CBS poverty rate would ultimately be higher or lower than the relative poverty rate. 
However, the most important information produced by a poverty measure is not the rate. It 
is the risk group analysis, the geographic profile, the time trend, and the correlates. It is 
safe to say that in these respects, there would be profound differences between CBS 
poverty and relative poverty, and Chapter 8 has listed some of those differences. 
With all this in mind, Chapter 8 then went back to the theme of Chapter 4: the policy 
implications resulting from different poverty indicators. Relative and absolute measures, as 
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Chapter 4 had documented, direct the attention to ‘the big picture’, the characteristics that 
define a social and economic model as a whole. As far as the expenditure side is concerned, 
this would also be true for a CBS measure. But CBS poverty would also depend on the cost 
of basic necessities, which is clearly not a ‘big picture’ area. It is a fairly practical matter, 
requiring policy solutions that would be compatible with a variety of economic and social 
models. But it would also mean that a CBS poverty agenda would have to be highly country-
specific and time-specific. It could not be easily derived from the kind of cross-country 
studies that Chapter 4 has reviewed. Deriving a CBS policy agenda would mean studying 
how different layers of the CBS poverty line have evolved, and identifying the drivers 
behind their evolution. To the extent that these drivers turn out to be outside of 
policymakers’ control, there are no policy implications. But to the extent that the drivers 
are policy-related, the next step would be to enquire what it would take to ensure greater 
affordability. In the UK, there is a lot of room for policy measures that would improve 
affordability in important areas.    
In summary:  If taken up on a larger scale, the approach to poverty measurement proposed 
here could reorient the focus of poverty research. It would point to areas which are 
currently not part of the research agenda at all, because the current instrumentarium of 
measurement is not suitable for them. At the moment, poverty research in the UK is heavily 
focussed on social policies (see Hills et al, 2009). Issues like the ones which have been 
discussed in this and the previous chapter are not taken into account, or only very indirectly 
so. The approach proposed here has the potential to broaden the scope of poverty 
research, and make it more receptive to important problem areas that cannot be detected 
with the current measurement toolkit.  
The claim made here is not that focussing on product markets and living cost issues was per 
se more important than the traditional social policy issues. Rather, this depends entirely on 
what a country’s initial situation is. Presumably, there are countries in the world where 
such a focus would be inappropriate and/or irrelevant. But in the case of the UK today, a 
case can be made that the traditional social policy tools are already being used extensively, 
while the issue of basic living costs has long been neglected. Chapter 4 has shown that as a 
proportion of GDP, public social expenditure in the UK has already reached Scandinavian 
proportions, even if poverty research retains the dichotomy of a high-spending ‘Nordic 
model’ and a low-spending ‘Anglo-Saxon model’. If social policy instruments do not 
currently fulfil all of their objectives, it is not because of an underuse. It is because the 
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effectiveness of these instruments is blunted when they are used in an environment of high 
basic living costs.  
Neither the CBS nor the focus on living costs are panacea. Poverty measurement is not an 
exact science; there are many unresolved issues in this discipline, and the CBS leaves a lot 
of them unresolved. Even if all the statistical problems addressed while constructing the 
CBS could be resolved in a more sophisticated future version, it would still be a very 
imperfect measure that would miss a lot of variation. Individual needs vary much more 
than the CBS could ever hope to account for. Neither would the adoption of a CBS measure 
do much to address the divisive issue of whether reductions in inequality are more 
important than economic growth or vice versa. At best, within a CBS poverty framework, 
this issue would no longer have to be at the centre of poverty research, but this does not 
mean that it would be resolved.  
There are also clear limits to how much can be achieved on the living costs side. There may 
be large efficiency reserves in some sectors, but only trivial ones in others. This thesis has 
focussed on cases where outcomes that come close to win-win situations are feasible, due 
to the existence of efficiency reserves. But while such cases exist, they are not necessarily 
the rule. The aim of cutting living costs in a particular area will often conflict with some 
other valid policy objective. Difficult trade-offs would not go away. The type of trade-off 
described in Chapter 4 would play less of a role, but this does not mean that it would 
always be replaced by win-win situations. Difficult trade-offs would often just be replaced 
by other difficult trade-offs.  
Nevertheless, a strong case remains for rebalancing the anti-poverty agenda in the way 
described here. If one possible approach (the use of social policy instruments) is already 
used extensively, while another approach (focussing on living costs) is neglected, then the 
latter approach will still be characterised by high ‘marginal benefits’ and low ‘marginal 
costs’. The CBS could thus be a useful tool to identify cost-effective anti-poverty policies.  
 
9.2 Suggestions for future research: How to improve the CBS 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 have presented the prototype of a new poverty measure. There are, of 
course, a number of ways in which this measure could be further improved if it was more 
widely adopted and if the corresponding research funding was available. This subchapter 
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will develop proposals for how this could be done. It will also show how additional quality 
tests and feedbacks can be devised.  
 
Data collection, Part 1: Replacing the PSE survey with a CBS survey 
 
The obvious downside of the prototype CBS developed in this thesis is that it had to be 
constructed from datasets which were not designed for the purposes of this thesis. This has 
led to a number of limitations. The data sources used here were second-best solutions 
which were suitable enough for constructing a prototype, but an ideal CBS would be built 
on datasets explicitly tailored to its purposes.  
 
The PSE has been used to derive a consumption basket, but the PSE was never devised for 
this purpose, and if it had been, it would have been a rather different survey. The PSE was 
devised as the basis for an indicator of material deprivation, and as a result, it is specified 
on a high level of generality. It does not contain individual products, but product categories 
and consumption purposes. A somewhat ad-hoc method of matching concrete products to 
the rather vague descriptions of the survey participants therefore had to be found. The use 
of expenditure surveys is a plausible way of doing this, but there is ultimately no guarantee 
that the resulting basket really reflects the kind of consumption standard that the survey 
participants had in mind.  
 
For some of the CBS basket’s components, this did not pose a problem. The food and 
clothing sub-baskets are highly ‘diversified’ baskets, in which no single item has a 
discernible influence on the respective sub-poverty line, and in which most items have 
numerous substitutes in the same price range. It would therefore be possible to compile 
dozens of alternative sub-baskets for the same budget. This is why, for example, no 
separate sub-poverty line has been calculated for a ‘vegetarian food basket’: It is clear from 
a glance at the price data that a vegetarian alternative would be easily within the reach of 
the same budget. This does not, of course, mean that any specification of the food and 
clothing baskets is as good as any other. But it does mean that once a plausible method of 
compiling the basket has been found – and the Canadian MBM, based on real-world 
consumption habits as recorded in expenditure surveys, certainly fits that description – the 
resulting basket can tolerate a lot of variation. Dietary habits or clothing habits would have 
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to change dramatically and in a short time to render the corresponding CBS sub-baskets 
irrelevant.  
 
But as acknowledged in Chapter 7, the PSE survey’s high level of generality can pose a 
problem for the social participation and the transport sub-baskets. There are two reasons 
why this problem arises. Firstly, these two categories are dominated by a small number of 
relatively large purchases, which makes them more sensitive to what exact product is 
chosen for inclusion in the basket. Secondly, it is for these categories that the PSE survey is 
at its most general. The former problem cannot be solved, as these purchases are 
inherently ‘bulky’. But the second problem could be solved by a different survey design, a 
design tailored to the purposes of a CBS basket rather than a consensual material 
deprivation list. At least for categories like these, a CBS survey would have to ask more 
specific questions than the PSE survey.  
 
The solution is not, however, to replace broad categories with individual products, because 
the high level of generality has the advantage of making the questions more encompassing. 
A survey which only offered specific products would be more sensitive to which exact 
products the survey designers choose to include. The survey might then fail to identify 
products which most survey respondents do consider necessities, but which happened not 
to be among the options offered in the survey. A very specific survey would therefore risk 
missing some of the items that constitute necessities in the eyes of a majority, it might not 
adequately reflect the consensus on necessities. A survey that offers general categories 
rather than specific products is a lot less sensitive to what the researchers choose to 
include, because the categories in the PSE survey are so broad that it is harder for a 
necessity to ‘escape’ detection. It may be difficult to put a price tag on a general category 
like ‘a hobby or a leisure activity’. But it is this very breadth which enables the PSE to 
identify a general consensus even if the survey designers have little knowledge about what 
precise activity the respondents might have in mind. If the entry ‘a hobby or a leisure 
activity’ was replaced by one or several more specific entries, it might fail to capture the 
views of those who do consider a hobby/leisure activity a necessity, but just not those 
specific examples that happen to be listed in the survey. On a more basic note, it would also 
risk ‘splitting the vote’. If, for example, 30% of respondents consider a spectator sport 
season ticket a necessity, and another 30% consider membership in a social club so, then 
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neither entry would qualify as a necessity, even though the combined vote would have 
been 60% if only the question had been phrased in slightly more general terms.  
 
The solution, then, is not to replace the product categories with specific products, but to 
introduce a second layer into the survey. The first layer would consist of broad product 
categories, the second layer would consist of more specific ones, and they would be linked 
through a question like “If yes, which of the following?” For the above-mentioned example, 
the first layer would look just like in the PSE survey:  
 
Table 9.1: An excerpt from the hypothetical ‘CBS survey’ 
 Necessary Desirable  
A hobby or leisure activity   
   
But the difference would be in the second layer, which could look like this: 
If you ticked ‘necessary’, which of the following would you count as a 
suitable hobby or leisure activity? 
(You can choose more than one option.) 
 
 A season ticket for a spectator sport  
 Membership in a social club or association  
 Membership in a fitness/leisure/health club  
 Dining at a restaurant in the local area at least once a month  
 Subscription allowing access to cultural events/activities  
 None of the above  
 
Survey designers might still pick the ‘wrong’ activities, but at least, this error could then be 
detected, because it would show in a high proportion of respondents choosing the ‘none of 
the above’ option. Vote-splitting would not be a problem in this format: A price could be 
collected for each of these options, including for combinations, and the price which enters 
the basket would have to be sufficient to afford the activities chosen by the majority of the 
respondents. This is illustrated below with a stylised, hypothetical example, in which 80% of 
the respondents tick the ‘necessary’ box in the first layer. These 80% are then redirected to 
the second layer to identify specific products. The products and product combination which 
are chosen by at least one respondent are listed below, sorted by their price, which is 
shown in the second column. The third column shows how many respondents chose the 
respective activity or combination of activities, expressed as a share of all respondents, not 
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just those 80% of respondents that ticked the ‘necessary’ box. The fourth column shows 
their cumulative share. The price which would enter the CBS basket is 35 gold coins. Even 
though only 20% of respondents have chosen a combination of activities that costs exactly 
35 coins, another 45% have chosen activities which cost less, so a budget of 35 coins would 
allow the pursuit of the activities chosen by them as well.     
 










A season ticket for a spectator sport 10 5% 5% 
Membership in a social club or association 15 10% 15% 
Membership in a fitness/leisure/health club 20 5% 20% 
Dining at a restaurant in the local area at least once a month 25 5% 25% 
A season ticket for a spectator sport AND  
Membership in a social club or association  
25 5% 30% 
Subscription allowing access to cultural events/activities 30 10% 40% 
A season ticket for a spectator sport AND  
Membership in a fitness/leisure/health club 
30 5% 45% 
A season ticket for a spectator sport AND  
Dining at a restaurant in the local area at least once a month 
35 20% 65% 
More expensive combinations >35 15% 80% 
 
The example is, of course, somewhat idealised. The activities listed in the second layer are 
still fairly general, there will be a price range for each of them rather than one single price. 
Even if this methodology was adopted, the CBS would still require a degree of 
standardisation. But again, poverty research is not an exact science. The above specification 
would probably come closer to identifying and pricing majority perceptions of necessities 
than any methodology currently employed – at least if conventional pitfalls of survey 
design, like sampling errors and non-randomness in missing responses, can be avoided. 
A similar two-layer method could be used for the transport and the childcare budget. In this 
way, a genuine CBS survey could be compiled, and replace the PSE. It would not be superior 
to the PSE in every respect, but it would be much more appropriate for the identification 




Data collection, Part 2: Replacing CPI/RPI price quotes with CBS price quotes 
Chapter 7 has described a specific kind of consumer, defined by particular characteristics of 
their consumption behaviour. This consumer is, to a degree, price-conscious, but they are 
not especially well-informed about local price differentials, and not especially mobile. They 
are not able, or not willing, to expend discernible search efforts, but if a low-cost option is 
easily enough available on a permanent basis, they will choose it.  
This rather detailed concept has then been approximated in a very ad-hoc way, by choosing 
prices at the 25th percentile of the price distribution. While close enough for a constructing 
a prototype, this approximation is clearly not ideal. The reason why it has been chosen 
nonetheless is, again, that the CBS constructed in this thesis had to rely on a dataset which 
was compiled for a completely different purpose. The CBS was built on the raw data from 
which the CPI and the RPI are derived. Inevitably, these price quotes are gathered in a way 
which suits the purposes of the CPI and the RPI, not those of the CBS. The purpose of the 
CPI/RPI is not to allow a reconstruction of the consumption habits that match a particular 
consumer profile. Their purpose is simply to gather a large number of price quotes, in order 
to build broad aggregates. The datasets contain no information on to the characteristics of 
the product behind any given price quote, or on its availability, target market etc., because 
this information would not be relevant for the construction of aggregate price indices. But 
it is relevant for the CBS. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 have placed a lot of emphasis on the 
issue of market diversification and no-frills sectors, and the inability of existing poverty 
measures to incorporate information on these phenomena has been identified as one of 
their major weaknesses. Yet even the prototype CBS constructed in this thesis has not fully 
resolved this issue. Whether the price quotes used in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 really do 
relate to no-frills sectors and low-budget stores cannot be verified, as the price datasets 
simply contain too little information on each price quote.  
An ideal CBS would be constructed from datasets specifically gathered to meet CBS 
purposes. This would require a separate price collection process, independent of the 
existing one which produces the datasets used in this thesis (although the two could be 
integrated). Rather than relying on a price distribution for all prices, CBS price collectors 
would deliberately seek out discount stores, provided that these are realistically accessible 
for low-earners without extensive search efforts. Where this is not the case, they would 
seek out no-frills products in more widely accessible stores. CBS price collectors would 
ignore most of the rest of the market, and concentrate on the segment which is relevant for 
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the construction of a poverty line. In this way, the above-mentioned criteria to define the 
‘CBS consumer’ – moderately price conscious, not very well informed, not very mobile – 
would be met. The CBS consumer cannot be expected to be aware of every high street 
store and corner shop in their area, but they can be expected to be aware of a large 
discount supermarket. In most areas, CBS price collection can be limited to a small number 
of large discounters, because the CBS consumer is not expected to shop around and 
compare prices. They can be assumed to buy most, if not all, of their weekly essentials in 
one single discounter, because in this way, search effort is minimal.     
The price collection process could take advantage of the fact that supermarket chains rely 
on sophisticated market research. They will have extensive data on who their customers 
are, what their catchment area is, what type of consumer buys which products etc. To the 
extent that they are willing to share their data (which will be confidential) with poverty 
researchers, this could be the starting point for CBS price collection. Market research data 
would allow CBS price collectors to identify the relevant stores and the relevant products 
from which the prices in the CBS basket should be taken. This will be an identification based 
fully on revealed preferences. It would not rely on researchers’ judgement, or on focus 
groups discussing hypothetical consumption habits, but on actual, observed consumption 
habits.  
The sub-category where CBS price collection would differ most drastically from CPI/RPI 
price collection is housing. As described in Chapter 7, the price quotes for rental rates in the 
CPI/RPI (or even the price quotes gathered by LHA Direct) do not compare like with like. 
This is why Chapter 7 had to construct a hybrid measure combining data from the CPI/RPI 
price quotes with data from LHA Direct, but even so, the fundamental problem with the 
rental price quotes currently collected has not really been solved. The fundamental 
problem is that there is currently no dataset of rental price quotes which refer to the same 
basis. Price quotes are taken at face value, without accounting for the fact that they differ 
widely in what ancillary rental costs they include. Quotes can range from full-package rents, 
where even optional items like broadband connection are already included, to bare-bones 
rents, which include no bills at all. Most quotes fall somewhere in between, including some 
bills while excluding others, and they also differ in the extent to which the corresponding 
flats are furnished. As a result, the resulting rental ‘price distribution’ is not really a 
distribution at all. There is no way of knowing whether a flat at e.g. the 33rd percentile is 
really cheaper than a flat at e.g. the 50th percentile, or whether it merely includes fewer 
289 
 
bills (which is why, in Chapter 7, the selection of prices according to percentiles has been 
dropped for the housing category).  
CBS price collectors would have to record rents in a very different way. They would have to 
record not just the face-value quote, but also an account of what is and what is not 
included in each quote. With that information separately recorded, rental price quotes 
could be converted to a common basis. What that basis is is not especially important as 
long as it is used consistently. This is illustrated below with a hypothetical numerical 
example of three rental price quotes (in gold coins) which include different bills. On the 
face of it, the rent is lowest for Flat 1, followed by Flat 2, followed by Flat 3.  
Table 9.3: Non-standardised rent price quotes 
 Flat 1 Flat 2 Flat 3 
Refuse collection fees included? yes no no 
Water rates included?  no yes no 
Heating bills included? no no yes 
Recorded rent 115 120 125 
But in this example, it is possible to allocate standardised numerical values to each of the 
bills: it is assumed that refuse collection typically costs 10 coins, water rates 20 coins, and 
heating bills 30 coins. Rents can then be converted to a common basis. That basis could be 
an all-inclusive rent, in which case the typical cost of the non-included bills would be added 
to the face-value rent. Or it could be a pure rent excluding all bills, in which case the cost of 
the included bills would be subtracted from the face-value rent. The result is the same in 
both cases: The order of the price ranking reverses.   
Table 9.4: Standardised rent price quotes 
 Flat 1 Flat 2 Flat 3 
Recorded rent 115 120 125 
Standardised rent; base: all-inclusive 165 160 155 
Standardised rent; base: nothing included 105 100 95 
 
The CBS would then not contain the rent that a tenant actually pays, but an ‘as-if rent’; the 
rent that they would pay if a number of pre-specified bills were included/excluded. This as-
if rent would not be an indicator of value for money. There may be good reasons why one 
flat is more expensive than another (it may be aesthetically more attractive, closer to a park 
etc.), but these reasons would be optional features that tenants could do without. Ancillary 
rental costs, in contrast, are not optional. If they are not counted as part of the rent itself, 
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they have to be included elsewhere in the CBS, via a separate allowance. The as-if rent 
would therefore allow the identification of genuine low-cost rents, as opposed to rents that 
merely leave most bills to the tenant.  
This would require a separate price collection process, or at least a significant change in the 
way in which rental rates are currently recorded. The purpose of the current datasets is to 
derive aggregate rent indices. If this is the purpose, it is not a problem if the individual 
quotes are not always comparable to one another: they are all aggregated anyway, and if 
enough quotes are recorded, those that include more than most and those that include less 
than most will cancel each other out. For the purposes of the CBS, though, it does matter 
whether the price quotes are comparable, because if they are not, no meaningful rent 
distribution can be established.   
Evaluating the CBS basket through a follow-up survey 
The above proposals could significantly improve the CBS prototype developed in this thesis. 
This ‘first-best CBS’ would start with a survey that, unlike the PSE, would be explicitly 
designed to produce a consumption basket, rather than a list of necessities. It would 
therefore ask more detailed questions than the PSE, or rather, it would introduce a second 
layer of more detailed questions. The first-best CBS would also consist of price data that are 
specifically selected to match its purposes, which are very different from the purposes of an 
aggregate price index.  
Even so, it would still be useful to devise additional quality checks. Once the CBS basket has 
been completed, the most important question would probably be whether it really 
represents the kind of consumption standard that the original survey participants, who 
established the consensually defined necessities in the first place, had in mind. The most 
straightforward way to achieve this is to ask them. There could be a short follow-up survey 
to the original CBS survey. Survey participants would be shown the full basket, and asked to 
validate it. To simplify, the relationship between the CBS survey participants and the 
researchers compiling the CBS would be akin to the relationship between a wine consumer 
and a sommelier. The wine consumer describes, in layman’s terms, what qualities in a wine 
they are looking for. On the basis of this description, the sommelier then tries to select the 
specific product which best matches it. But the sommelier cannot be completely sure 
whether they succeeded until the consumer has actually sampled the wine, and approved. 
This would be the role of the follow-up survey. It could consist of a question like: 
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“A few weeks ago, we presented you with a list of goods and services, and asked you 
to identify which of these you considered necessary to enable full social participation 
in modern Britain. On the basis of the responses collected, we have now compiled a 
consumption basket. You can see the full basket on the following pages. Please take 
your time to go through this basket, and let us know whether it describes the kind of 
living standard you had in mind when you were completing the original survey.  
This feedback mechanism could allow further improvements in the CBS. 
Testing the public’s understanding of the CBS survey 
One of the arguments made repeatedly in this thesis is that current poverty measures are 
not well understood, and create widespread misunderstandings. It has been argued that 
the CBS would avoid these problems by virtue of its tangibility. The precise theory of 
poverty underpinning it may not be easy to communicate, and neither are the technical 
details of its construction, but the CBS basket itself should be intuitively accessible. A 
newspaper article on CBS poverty could, for example, summarise the contents of the basket 
with a small information graphic, thus clarifying what kind of living standard the CBS 
poverty line corresponds to.  
However, while there are good reasons to expect CBS poverty to be widely understandable, 
there is no proof that it really will be. This could be the final litmus test once the CBS has 
been in use for a while. It could be tested in, for example, a study where survey 
respondents are presented with a short news article on CBS poverty, and then asked to 
summarise it in their own words, and/or asked to answer specific questions about it. In 
particular, such a study would have to test whether people understand what kind of 
poverty CBS poverty is. Ideally, the answers to the following five questions would be ‘yes’: 
1. Do people understand that CBS poverty is different from destitution/ subsistence 
poverty? 
2. Do they understand that it is not a measure of inequality?  
3. Do they understand that the composition of the CBS basket can change over time?  
4. Do they understand that the CBS poverty rate responds to price changes as well as 
changes in expenditure? 
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5. Do they understand that the basket is selected by consensus, not researchers’ 
judgement?  
If most people understand most of those issues, the CBS would have fulfilled its purpose. 
 
9.3 Suggestions for future research: How to use the CBS 
 
The CBS should replace measures of relative poverty and absolute poverty, both for 
research and policy purposes. This would require the CBS to be published on an annual 
basis. This could not be done immediately, because it is, admittedly, a much more 
demanding measure to compile than relative and absolute measures. But the highest 
hurdle is the initial launch. Once it has been established, keeping it up to date is much less 
of a challenge.  
CBS poverty figures could then published annually in the ‘Households Below Average 
Income’ (HBAI) series compiled by the DWP and the ONS, in the same format in which 
relative and absolute figures are currently published. The HBAI would then contain CBS 
poverty rates for the population as a whole, as well as differentiated by household type, 
occupational status, region, ethnicity, age of the household reference person etc. In the 
medium term, it could also be supplemented by a measure of persistent CBS poverty. Like 
with persistent relative poverty, this would require tracking households’ poverty status for 
a number of years, and studying the movements into and out of poverty. Relevant research 
questions would be: What is the average duration of CBS poverty? What share of the CBS 
poverty population is poor for longer than a year? In what respect do households which 
move out of CBS poverty after a year or less differ from those whose CBS poverty status is 
more protracted? Among those who move out of CBS poverty, how many fall back into CBS 
poverty again, and in what respect do they differ from households which move out of CBS 
poverty for good? 
The current government, as well as the last, is aiming to meet target levels of relative and 
absolute child poverty by 2020. Such targets could also be specified for CBS poverty, for 
children or any other population subgroup, depending on political priorities.  
Research on the impact of government policy decisions on relative and absolute poverty is 
currently conducted by institutions like the Institute for Fiscal Studies. Most of their 
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poverty-related studies are simulations of the impact of changes in the tax and benefit 
system on poverty rates. These can be changes that are really being considered by the 
government, or hypothetical changes. Through such simulations, the impacts of changes 
which work in opposite directions can be separated. For example, one of the institute’s 
major poverty forecasts has shown that the introduction of the new Universal Credit will, 
on its own, decrease child poverty rates. However, changes elsewhere in the tax and 
benefit system, and especially a slower uprating of benefit payments, will increase them. 
The latter effect is forecast to more than outweigh the former (Brewer et al, 2011).  
For poverty studies of this type, a replacement of relative and absolute measures with a 
CBS would not cause any disruptions. These studies could continue undisturbedly, because 
they are just as applicable to CBS poverty rates as they are to relative or absolute rates. The 
only major change would be that these studies would have to cope with one additional 
unknown: The impact of a change in tax/benefit rates on income can be estimated very 
precisely (in a static perspective), but the impact on consumption is a more roundabout 
one. For example, an increase in a benefit payment might not fully translate into an 
increase in consumption, because a share of it might be saved rather than spent. Models of 
this kind would therefore have to incorporate a group-specific consumption function. But 
this can be achieved, and in fact, there are IFS studies which have already done this, albeit 
in a different context (see Brewer et al, 2006).  
Taken together, up until here, this means that even if the CBS fully replaced relative and 
absolute measures, there would still be a considerable degree of continuity in poverty 
research. A lot of the current research could continue with only minor alterations.  
But the CBS would add an entirely new pillar to this. Research on the determinants of 
product market prices in different sectors of the economy would now have to be added to 
poverty research. As has been repeatedly critiqued throughout this thesis, these 
determinants are not currently part of poverty research at all. If the CBS was adopted, the 
focus on what has driven recent changes in house prices, energy prices etc. could become 
just as important for poverty research as the focus on changes in benefit levels – and it 
could conceivably become more important.  
The relative importance of changes in expenditure and changes in the prices of the goods in 
the CBS basket would itself become one of the most important questions in poverty 
research. A major change in the poverty rate would inevitably raise the question of whether 
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it has been caused by a change in the poverty line, by a change in expenditure levels, or by 
a combination of both.  
In this respect, the adoption of the CBS would fundamentally alter the character of poverty 
research, not least in comparison to the studies reviewed in subchapters 4.1 and 4.2. These 
studies concentrate on ‘the big picture’, that is, they concentrate on those aspects of social 
and economic policy which determine the character of a social and economic model as a 
whole. Especially studies on relative poverty often use a broad-brush terminology, grouping 
countries into distinct models such as ‘Anglo-Saxon Capitalism’, ‘Nordic Social Democracy’, 
‘Continental European Christian Democracy’ etc. CBS poverty research, in contrast, would 
raise questions of a much more practical, ‘hands-on’ type. Big-picture questions like 
whether a country should adopt ‘Anglo-Saxon Capitalism’ or ‘Nordic Social Democracy’ 
would be relatively unimportant. ‘Bread-and-butter’ questions like what has led to the 
increase in rent levels and energy bills in the UK would come to the fore instead.  
The reason for this change in focus is that a CBS poverty agenda, which concentrates on the 
determinants of basic living costs, could be quite easily compatible with a range of 
economic and social models. Even if e.g. the British land use planning system was radically 
reformed, it would not turn the UK into a fundamentally different economic model.  
Another salient feature of the research discussed in Chapter 4 is that it is chiefly concerned 
with universal drivers of poverty. The policy recommendations that follow do not differ 
from country to country, or over time. In this respect, too, a CBS poverty agenda would be 
radically different. It would be a highly country-specific and time-specific agenda, with little 
relevance even for neighbour countries or prior decades. As mentioned, a British CBS 
agenda would have to focus heavily on housing costs, as this is the cost item which has 
shown the strongest increases. In contrast, if there was e.g. a Swiss CBS or a German CBS, 
the agendas built upon them would presumably pay little attention to housing costs, 
because these are simply not a large issue in these countries (The Economist house price 
indicators, 2012). In the UK, meanwhile, the systematic increase in house prices only began 
in the 1980s. If a CBS agenda had been devised before then, it would presumably have paid 
much less attention to housing costs than a CBS agenda devised today would have to. So 
even relatively similar countries could develop very different CBS agendas, and the same 
country could develop different CBS agendas at different points in time.  
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In short, a CBS poverty research agenda would in large parts focus on small-scale, practical 
issues that are country-specific and time-specific. In this respect, it would differ markedly 
from studies on the determinants of relative and absolute poverty, which focus on the 
universal big-picture-questions which define an economic and social model as a whole.  
IFS-style simulations, which estimate the impact of hypothetical tax and welfare reforms on 
the poverty rate, could be continued without discernible changes. But they would have to 
be complimented with simulations of hypothetical reforms that would affect the level of 
the CBS poverty line. It would no longer be enough to show how poverty rates respond to 
e.g. changes in the uprating formula of the Child Tax Credit, or to changes in the eligibility 
criteria of Working Tax Credit. Poverty simulations would now also have to show how the 
poverty rate would respond to e.g. a relaxation of land-use planning restrictions, a phasing 
out of renewable energy obligations, a withdrawal from the Common Agricultural Policy 
etc.  
Once such simulations were available for a large enough number of feasible policies, it 
would become possible to establish a cost-effectiveness ranking of anti-poverty policies, 
both for the population as a whole and for selected subgroups. A highly cost-effective anti-
poverty agenda could then be derived, which would start with policies at the top of the 
ranking list, and steadily work its way down, subject to competing policy priorities. The 
ranking would change regularly, because most anti-poverty tools will be characterised by 
declining ‘marginal benefits’ and/or rising ‘marginal costs’. If a policy tool is already being 
deployed extensively, then presumably, making even greater use of it will no longer have 
the same effect as previous increases. Policy tools that are so far underused, however, 
could still deliver large benefits at a low cost.  
This thesis does not claim that an anti-poverty agenda which focusses on cutting basic living 
costs is per se superior to an anti-poverty agenda based on the use of traditional social 
policy instruments. But it does claim that in the UK, the latter are already being deployed 
extensively, while the issue of living costs has long been neglected. Under those 
circumstances, there is potential for devising a much more cost-effective anti-poverty 
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A1: Weekly poverty line for a household of two adults and two children, 1996-2009, in £, 
nominal terms 
 
   ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
London lower 332 360 414 433 414 465 475 487 486 499 528 589 650 638 
middle 346 372 427 442 430 475 482 499 507 512 538 608 667 658 
upper 358 381 436 454 437 486 497 526 525 525 560 630 693 673 
South East lower 336 365 387 406 415 446 469 487 481 488 477 482 522 541 
middle 343 376 396 413 422 457 474 495 491 494 491 492 530 557 
upper 356 383 409 427 435 468 484 506 511 510 504 508 548 578 
South West lower 320 329 335 341 337 363 373 397 458 430 420 426 441 469 
middle 326 334 342 348 348 368 384 413 465 438 432 434 451 479 
upper 338 345 355 358 360 379 397 421 476 453 445 450 464 504 
East  lower 280 294 309 329 343 386 393 418 439 460 440 436 465 472 
middle 292 306 320 342 361 398 403 427 450 465 449 444 478 485 
upper 299 313 328 350 370 409 412 441 463 477 458 460 495 497 
East Midlands lower 284 296 299 311 319 332 350 369 381 390 367 367 382 419 
middle 291 302 304 320 326 344 358 377 390 393 378 375 398 432 
upper 303 310 314 328 335 352 367 385 415 403 391 390 422 449 
West 
Midlands 
lower 308 312 323 338 339 376 400 394 394 396 392 399 424 434 
middle 319 324 333 350 351 387 404 400 405 402 400 408 437 446 
upper 330 338 346 360 364 402 420 416 417 411 413 420 458 460 
Yorksh. & 
Humber 
lower 294 305 313 321 313 329 332 358 359 390 385 396 427 438 
middle 299 311 320 326 329 335 338 366 371 396 391 404 439 446 
upper 308 321 330 332 336 343 352 384 384 404 407 422 453 464 
North West lower 281 302 324 327 334 348 332 351 350 375 389 395 416 426 
middle 289 308 328 336 339 358 340 361 363 380 395 402 425 439 
upper 305 318 339 346 353 371 350 373 375 390 404 416 443 456 
North East lower 296 282 293 309 324 344 337 351 361 394 394 403 420 417 
middle 303 287 298 318 328 354 343 357 366 398 399 409 426 426 
upper 312 295 307 324 336 362 354 365 385 409 410 420 436 440 
Wales lower 308 310 334 364 376 389 384 396 399 402 397 409 432 454 
middle 314 315 340 369 381 395 395 409 404 408 404 413 445 462 
upper 319 324 363 377 391 401 406 424 417 429 414 427 455 478 
Scotland lower 337 354 369 380 385 407 416 437 421 445 434 424 445 482 
middle 346 361 379 391 396 416 422 445 438 451 442 434 456 492 
upper 364 371 393 402 404 426 437 460 456 463 446 447 467 511 
Northern 
Ireland 
lower 264 277 279 278 283 320 307 312 315 330 323 334 363 374 
middle 269 283 285 284 288 326 318 318 321 337 332 350 373 381 








A2: Weekly poverty line for a household of two adults and one child, 1996-2009, in £, 
nominal terms 
 
  ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
London lower 257 278 321 335 316 357 364 373 372 379 411 459 508 498 
middle 267 287 330 342 326 364 370 382 387 390 419 471 520 511 
upper 275 294 337 351 331 373 381 401 400 400 435 488 539 524 
South 
East 
lower 258 281 298 312 315 342 356 371 365 370 368 371 403 419 
middle 264 288 305 318 319 349 361 377 374 375 379 378 410 431 
upper 273 294 313 327 328 358 369 386 387 386 389 390 424 446 
South 
West 
lower 254 261 266 269 263 286 295 311 361 336 334 337 351 375 
middle 258 265 271 275 270 290 302 322 366 341 343 344 359 383 
upper 268 274 280 283 279 299 312 329 375 353 353 356 370 402 
East 
Anglia 
lower 217 227 237 254 261 293 299 321 336 352 342 336 362 367 
middle 226 236 245 264 274 303 307 327 344 356 349 343 372 377 
upper 232 242 252 270 280 311 314 337 354 366 357 354 385 386 
East 
Midlands 
lower 225 235 235 244 247 260 275 289 298 303 292 290 304 331 
middle 230 239 240 251 251 268 281 296 305 306 300 296 316 341 
upper 238 245 247 257 258 275 288 303 323 314 311 307 333 355 
West 
Midlands 
lower 257 261 272 286 282 316 335 328 327 327 328 333 355 360 
middle 265 269 279 295 291 324 339 333 335 332 335 339 365 369 
upper 274 279 289 302 300 335 350 344 345 339 345 349 380 381 
Yorksh. & 
Humber 
lower 234 245 249 255 246 259 263 284 283 307 311 318 344 353 
middle 238 249 255 259 255 264 267 289 291 312 316 324 354 360 
upper 245 256 262 264 260 271 277 303 302 319 328 337 364 374 
North 
West 
lower 227 243 263 267 267 281 264 280 278 297 316 321 340 349 
middle 233 247 266 273 271 288 271 289 287 301 321 326 348 358 
upper 244 255 274 281 281 298 279 298 296 308 329 336 361 371 
North 
East 
lower 234 224 231 242 248 269 263 272 280 303 311 318 333 331 
middle 239 227 235 248 251 275 267 277 284 307 316 322 338 338 
upper 246 233 241 253 257 282 276 283 296 315 324 330 346 350 
Wales lower 242 244 268 289 293 307 303 311 312 312 313 319 340 358 
middle 247 248 273 293 296 311 311 320 315 317 318 322 350 364 
upper 251 254 287 299 304 317 319 330 325 330 326 333 357 377 
Scotland lower 261 272 284 291 291 310 318 335 322 337 335 326 344 372 
middle 267 278 292 299 299 318 323 341 333 342 342 333 352 380 
upper 280 285 301 307 304 325 335 352 346 351 345 344 360 395 
Northern 
Ireland 
lower 211 221 223 219 218 258 246 247 251 261 261 269 294 304 
middle 215 226 227 224 222 262 254 252 256 267 267 281 302 310 









A3: Weekly poverty line for a household of two adults without children, 1996-2009, in £, 
nominal terms 
 
  ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
London lower 179 193 226 236 226 247 253 259 258 258 292 328 363 355 
middle 186 200 232 241 232 252 258 264 267 266 298 336 371 361 
upper 191 206 237 247 236 259 265 275 274 274 308 346 382 371 
South East lower 184 200 214 223 970 243 250 260 256 257 265 265 289 302 
middle 187 204 218 227 985 247 254 265 263 261 271 271 295 309 
upper 193 208 222 233 243 252 260 271 270 268 278 279 305 319 
South 
West 
lower 191 197 200 202 203 213 221 229 269 246 253 255 265 285 
middle 194 200 204 206 206 216 224 235 273 249 258 259 271 291 
upper 200 206 210 212 212 223 232 241 279 257 266 269 280 304 
East Anglia lower 151 157 162 177 185 198 202 221 230 241 240 234 254 256 
middle 157 163 168 182 192 204 207 224 234 244 245 239 260 263 
upper 161 167 172 186 197 211 213 231 242 251 252 246 268 270 
East 
Midlands 
lower 161 169 168 174 178 185 196 206 210 211 210 208 219 236 
middle 164 172 171 177 181 189 200 211 215 213 217 213 226 243 
upper 168 177 177 182 187 194 205 216 226 219 225 221 237 253 
West 
Midlands 
lower 190 193 202 214 215 233 246 239 238 235 241 244 260 262 
middle 194 197 206 219 220 238 249 243 242 239 246 249 267 268 
upper 200 204 213 224 226 245 255 250 250 244 254 257 276 277 
Yorksh. & 
Humber 
lower 166 177 178 181 180 182 185 200 198 214 225 231 249 254 
middle 170 180 181 184 184 186 189 204 203 218 229 235 254 259 
upper 174 184 186 188 188 191 194 213 210 224 237 243 262 270 
North 
West 
lower 165 175 192 197 199 204 188 200 196 208 231 236 250 257 
middle 168 178 194 200 202 207 193 206 201 211 235 238 255 262 
upper 175 183 200 205 209 214 199 213 207 217 241 245 264 271 
North East lower 176 168 171 179 185 200 194 198 206 220 235 240 251 249 
middle 180 170 174 182 187 202 197 202 209 222 238 243 255 254 
upper 183 174 177 186 192 207 203 207 213 228 245 249 261 263 
Wales lower 170 173 196 207 212 218 215 220 217 215 220 223 239 252 
middle 173 175 199 210 214 222 220 225 220 219 224 226 244 257 
upper 177 179 205 214 220 226 225 230 226 225 231 233 250 265 
Scotland lower 185 191 201 203 207 216 223 236 226 232 238 229 243 261 
middle 190 195 206 208 213 222 227 240 231 235 243 235 247 267 
upper 196 200 211 214 217 227 235 246 238 242 246 243 253 278 
Northern 
Ireland 
lower 155 162 163 157 160 192 182 179 182 189 194 200 219 228 
middle 158 166 166 161 163 195 187 182 187 193 199 209 224 233 









A4: Weekly poverty line for a single parent household with one child, 1996-2009, in £, 
nominal terms 
 
  ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
London lower 208 227 268 281 267 301 309 315 315 321 352 398 442 428 
middle 216 234 275 286 276 306 313 321 326 328 357 407 451 439 
upper 222 239 280 292 279 312 321 336 335 336 369 419 465 447 
South 
East 
lower 221 241 258 271 278 299 314 326 320 324 322 323 352 365 
middle 225 246 263 275 282 305 317 330 326 327 330 329 357 374 
upper 232 250 270 282 289 311 322 336 336 336 337 337 366 385 
South 
West 
lower 212 217 221 224 222 240 248 263 311 285 280 283 292 313 
middle 215 220 225 228 228 243 254 271 314 289 287 287 298 319 
upper 221 226 231 233 235 249 261 276 320 296 294 295 305 332 
East 
Anglia 
lower 181 190 200 216 228 255 259 278 292 307 296 290 312 315 
middle 188 196 205 223 238 262 264 283 298 310 301 295 319 322 
upper 192 200 210 227 243 267 269 290 305 317 307 303 328 329 
East 
Midlands 
lower 186 195 195 203 210 218 232 244 252 257 245 243 253 277 
middle 190 198 198 208 213 225 237 248 257 259 251 247 262 284 
upper 195 202 203 213 218 229 242 253 270 265 258 255 274 293 
West 
Midlands 
lower 215 218 228 241 242 270 288 279 278 279 278 281 298 299 
middle 222 224 233 247 249 275 291 282 284 282 282 285 305 305 
upper 227 231 240 253 256 283 299 291 291 287 289 292 316 313 
Yorksh. & 
Humber 
lower 188 197 200 204 201 208 213 232 232 252 254 260 281 287 
middle 191 200 204 207 209 211 215 236 238 256 258 264 288 291 
upper 195 205 209 210 213 216 223 245 245 261 266 273 295 301 
North 
West 
lower 187 201 220 223 228 236 220 233 232 249 264 269 285 291 
middle 191 204 222 228 230 241 224 239 238 252 268 272 290 298 
upper 200 209 228 233 238 248 230 245 245 257 273 279 299 306 
North 
East 
lower 192 179 186 196 206 222 220 227 236 259 262 266 276 271 
middle 195 182 189 201 208 227 223 231 238 261 265 269 279 276 
upper 200 186 193 204 212 231 228 235 249 267 270 274 285 284 
Wales lower 206 205 229 248 257 266 261 268 269 269 267 271 288 303 
middle 209 208 232 251 260 268 267 274 271 272 271 273 295 307 
upper 212 213 244 255 265 272 273 282 278 283 276 280 300 315 
Scotland lower 215 224 236 241 246 260 267 283 272 283 279 269 283 309 
middle 220 228 242 247 252 265 271 287 280 286 284 274 289 314 
upper 229 233 249 253 256 270 279 295 289 293 286 282 295 324 
Northern 
Ireland 
lower 169 178 178 174 178 211 200 198 205 214 213 221 240 249 
middle 172 181 180 177 181 214 206 201 208 217 218 230 246 253 










A5: Weekly poverty line for a single adult household, 1996-2009, in £, nominal terms 
 
    ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
London lower 133 143 175 183 173 191 199 201 203 201 234 268 297 284 
middle 137 148 178 186 176 194 202 204 208 205 237 272 302 288 
upper 139 151 181 189 179 198 206 210 211 209 243 278 308 294 
South 
East 
lower 147 159 173 181 186 199 208 213 211 209 216 215 235 245 
middle 149 161 175 183 188 201 210 216 215 211 220 219 238 249 
upper 152 163 177 186 190 204 213 220 219 216 224 224 244 255 
South 
West 
lower 147 149 152 153 154 163 173 177 217 190 194 195 201 218 
middle 149 151 155 155 156 165 175 181 219 193 197 198 205 222 
upper 152 155 158 159 159 169 179 184 222 197 202 203 210 229 
East 
Anglia 
lower 117 120 125 139 148 160 164 178 188 196 194 187 203 204 
middle 121 124 128 142 152 164 167 180 191 199 197 190 207 208 
upper 123 126 131 144 155 167 170 184 195 203 201 194 212 212 
East 
Midlands 
lower 124 129 128 133 137 143 155 160 167 165 164 161 168 181 
middle 126 131 130 135 139 146 158 163 169 167 168 164 172 185 
upper 128 134 133 138 142 148 161 166 175 170 172 168 178 191 
West 
Midlands 
lower 149 150 158 169 170 187 201 191 191 187 190 192 204 201 
middle 152 153 161 172 173 190 203 193 194 189 193 195 208 204 




lower 123 129 129 131 131 131 137 148 147 160 168 172 185 188 
middle 124 131 131 133 133 133 139 151 150 162 171 175 188 191 
upper 127 133 134 135 135 137 142 156 154 165 175 178 193 197 
North 
West 
lower 127 134 149 153 156 159 146 153 150 160 179 184 194 198 
middle 129 135 151 155 157 161 149 157 153 162 182 184 197 201 
upper 133 138 154 158 161 165 152 160 156 165 186 188 202 206 
North 
East 
lower 135 123 126 132 138 152 152 154 161 175 185 188 194 189 
middle 137 125 128 134 140 154 154 156 163 176 187 190 196 192 
upper 139 127 130 136 143 157 158 159 165 180 191 193 199 197 
Wales lower 136 134 157 166 172 177 177 177 175 172 175 175 186 197 
middle 137 136 159 168 174 179 179 180 176 174 177 176 189 199 
upper 139 138 162 170 177 181 183 183 180 178 180 180 193 204 
Scotland lower 141 144 153 154 158 166 174 184 175 178 182 173 181 198 
middle 144 147 156 157 162 169 176 187 178 180 185 176 184 201 
upper 148 149 160 160 164 172 181 190 182 184 187 181 188 207 
Northern 
Ireland 
lower 115 119 118 113 115 145 139 130 137 142 147 153 165 173 
middle 117 121 120 114 117 147 141 132 139 144 150 158 168 176 









A6: Weekly poverty line for a household of two adults and two children excluding housing 
costs, 1996-2009, in £, nominal terms 
 
  ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
London 191 198 204 209 203 222 222 235 240 241 235 247 266 281 
South East 159 169 168 172 168 184 189 200 203 205 205 207 222 235 
South West 168 173 176 179 173 184 188 204 210 213 218 218 235 245 
East Anglia 153 161 164 167 162 178 184 189 197 198 199 202 219 227 
East Midlands 158 162 163 168 164 177 179 190 195 195 196 196 215 232 
West Midlands 166 169 170 175 168 186 188 195 200 197 203 207 228 242 
Yorks. & Humber 177 181 188 192 186 198 196 205 209 219 219 226 248 256 
North West 159 167 168 172 166 182 183 194 195 200 206 209 223 233 
North East 164 166 170 178 174 185 175 183 184 192 199 205 223 232 
Wales 156 160 157 169 164 175 179 189 186 191 196 203 224 232 
Scotland 179 186 189 197 191 203 203 209 210 221 222 223 241 253 
Northern Ireland 162 167 172 175 170 181 181 190 183 191 192 198 215 217 
 
A7: Weekly poverty line for a household of two adults and one child excluding housing 
costs, 1996-2009, in £, nominal terms 
  ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
London 191 198 204 209 203 222 222 235 240 241 235 247 266 281 
South East 159 169 168 172 168 184 189 200 203 205 205 207 222 235 
South West 168 173 176 179 173 184 188 204 210 213 218 218 235 245 
East Anglia 153 161 164 167 162 178 184 189 197 198 199 202 219 227 
East Midlands 158 162 163 168 164 177 179 190 195 195 196 196 215 232 
West Midlands 166 169 170 175 168 186 188 195 200 197 203 207 228 242 
Yorks. & Humber 177 181 188 192 186 198 196 205 209 219 219 226 248 256 
North West 159 167 168 172 166 182 183 194 195 200 206 209 223 233 
North East 164 166 170 178 174 185 175 183 184 192 199 205 223 232 
Wales 156 160 157 169 164 175 179 189 186 191 196 203 224 232 
Scotland 179 186 189 197 191 203 203 209 210 221 222 223 241 253 














A8: Weekly poverty line for a household of two adults without children excluding housing 
costs, 1996-2009, in £, nominal terms 
 
  ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
London 128 132 136 140 138 145 145 152 155 153 158 165 178 186 
South East 107 113 113 116 870 121 122 130 132 131 138 140 151 159 
South West 119 123 125 126 125 128 130 137 142 143 154 155 168 176 
East Anglia 101 105 106 108 106 108 113 118 122 122 130 131 142 148 
East Midlands 105 108 107 109 108 113 115 123 123 121 130 130 142 152 
West Midlands 113 115 117 120 119 125 125 130 132 129 138 141 155 164 
Yorks. & Humber 119 123 125 128 126 131 129 133 134 141 148 154 166 173 
North West 107 112 113 115 115 119 120 128 125 127 139 141 151 158 
North East 113 115 116 120 119 121 116 119 119 120 135 139 152 159 
Wales 101 105 107 111 109 113 114 120 116 118 126 130 144 150 
Scotland 120 123 125 128 128 131 132 137 134 140 149 149 159 167 
Northern Ireland 110 113 116 117 115 122 121 127 122 125 130 134 146 149 
 
A9: Weekly poverty line for a single parent household with one child excluding housing 
costs, 1996-2009, in £, nominal terms 
 
  ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
London 140 144 150 153 153 164 164 174 178 180 173 183 198 209 
South East 120 127 127 130 131 140 145 153 155 158 156 157 168 178 
South West 125 127 130 132 131 136 141 153 158 161 161 162 174 181 
East Anglia 115 120 124 126 126 137 141 144 151 152 151 154 166 172 
East Midlands 118 120 121 126 126 133 135 143 147 148 147 147 161 174 
West Midlands 122 124 123 127 126 137 140 144 149 147 150 153 168 178 
Yorks. & Humber 130 132 137 140 140 145 144 151 156 163 161 166 182 187 
North West 118 124 124 127 126 135 136 145 147 151 153 155 165 173 
North East 120 120 124 131 131 136 131 137 138 146 149 152 164 170 
Wales 118 120 117 127 127 133 135 143 142 146 149 153 170 174 
Scotland 131 137 139 146 144 150 150 155 158 166 164 165 178 187 










A10: Weekly poverty line for a single adult household excluding housing costs, 1996-2009, 
in £, nominal terms 
  ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
London 79 79 82 84 83 87 89 92 95 92 97 101 109 113 
South East 69 70 71 72 72 75 78 81 84 82 87 88 94 99 
South West 74 74 75 76 75 76 80 82 88 86 93 94 101 107 
East Anglia 65 66 66 67 66 68 72 73 78 77 82 82 89 93 
East Midlands 66 67 66 67 66 69 73 75 78 75 81 80 88 94 
West Midlands 71 70 71 73 73 77 80 80 83 79 85 87 95 101 
Yorks. & 
Humber 
74 74 75 77 75 78 79 80 81 85 90 93 100 104 
North West 67 68 69 71 70 73 75 78 77 78 86 87 93 97 
North East 70 70 70 72 72 73 72 72 73 74 84 86 94 97 
Wales 65 66 67 69 68 70 74 74 72 73 79 81 89 93 
Scotland 74 75 76 77 77 79 82 83 81 85 91 90 96 101 
Northern 
Ireland 



















A11: The Food Basket: Canadian MBM and CBS 
MBM quantity CBS 
2% Milk 10.45l Shop milk, semi-skimmed, per 2 pints/1.136 
litres 
Yoghurt, fruit. 2% BF 230g Yoghurt/fromage frais (small individual) 
Cheddar cheese, medium 245g Cheese Cheddar, Home produced, per kg                                                                 
Processed cheese slices 275g 
Mozzarella cheese, 16.5% BF 365g 
Vanilla ice cream, 10% BF 930ml Ice cream specify flavour  
Grade A large 12 Large, free range,  
Round steak 500g Home killed beef, Stewing Steak, per kg 
Boneless stewing beef 210g 
Ground beef, medium 655g Home killed beef, best mince, per kg 
Pork chops, loin 400g Home killed Pork, loin chops, with bone, per 
kg 
Chicken legs, no back 1.34kg Fresh boneless chicken breast per kg 
Wieners, beef and pork 165g Cooked ham, loose, spec type (per 100g) 
Sliced ham, 11% fat 335g 
Frozen fish fillets 200g Frozen Fish Fingers                                                                         
Pink salmon, canned 115g  Frozen Prawns 
Tuna, canned, in water 65g Canned Fish, Tuna, specify oil/brine/water 
(180-200g) 
Baked beans, tomato sauce, canned 330ml Baked Beans (415-420g tin) 
White beans, dry 80g 
Bread, enriched, white 1.4kg Large loaf, white, unsliced, 800g                                                
Bread, whole wheat 1.4kg Large wholemeal, sliced loaf 
Hot dog/hamburger rolls 18 6 Bread Rolls White/Brown 
Flour, all purpose 655g Flour, self-raising 1.5kg 
Flour, whole wheat 165g 
Rice, long-grained, white, parboiled 550g Basmati rice 500g 
Spaghetti/macaroni, enriched 755g Dry spaghetti or pasta 500g 
Macaroni/cheese dinner, dry 155g 
Oatmeal, regular/quick-cooking 55g 
Corn flakes 345g Breakfast Cereal 1 unsweetened                                                        
Shreddies 345g Breakfast Cereal 1 sweetened/chocolate 
coated 
Soda crackers 205g Cream Crackers, packed 200g 







A11: The Food Basket: Canadian MBM and CBS (continued) 
MBM quantity CBS 
Oranges 710g Oranges, class 1, each 
Apple juice, canned, vitamin C added 1l Apple Juice, 1 litre carton 
Orange juice, frozen concentrate 330ml Concentrated fruit drink e.g. orange (1 
litre) Tomato juice 165ml 
Tomatoes 560g Fresh-veg, Tomatoes, per kg 
Whole tomatoes, canned 240ml Canned Tomatoes,  approx 390-400g 
Apples 1.8kg Apples, dessert (per kg)   
Bananas 2.3kg Bananas, (per kg) 
Grapes 480g Grapes, (per kg) 
Pears 755g Pears, dessert (per kg) 
Raisins, seedless 100g Canned Fruit, 400-450g. (Specify type) 
Fruit cocktail, canned in juice 335ml 
Potatoes, fresh 5.5kg Potatoes - new - loose per kg 
French-fried potatoes, frozen 615g Frozen Chips (908g approx) 
Broccoli 585g Fresh Veg - Broccoli (per kg) 
Cabbage 255g Fresh Veg - Cabbage-whole-per kg 
Carrots, fresh 885g Fresh Veg - Carrots-per kg 
Celery 345g 
Cucumber 455g Fresh Veg - Cucumber (whole) 
Lettuce, iceberg 450g Fresh Veg - Lettuce - Iceberg 
Lettuce, romaine 595g 
Onions 740g Fresh Veg - Onions - per kg 
Green peppers 305g Fresh Veg - Peppers - state loose or per kg 
Kernel, corn, canned 565ml Canned Sweetcorn (198-340g) 
Green peas, canned 215ml Frozen Garden Peas (900g-910g) 
Margarine, tub, non-hydrogenated 365g Margarine/low-fat spread, 500g 
Butter 190g Butter, Home produced, 250g     
Canola oil 230ml Olive Oil - 500ml - 1 litre 
Salad dressing (mayo type <35% oil) 195ml Mayonnaise (400g-500g) 
Sugar, white 845g Sugar - Granulated, white, per kg 
Strawberry jam 155ml Jar of jam, 340-454g, specify flavour 
 
 
